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A

COURSE

OF Sam'l. Miller.

LECTURES

ON THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS IN

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS,

AND

DIVINITY:

WITH

REFERENCES TO THE MOST CONSIDERABLE AUTHORS ON EACH SUBJECT.

BY THE LATE

REV. PHILIP DODDRIDGE, D.D.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

A GREAT NUMBER OF REFERENCES,

AND MANY NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE VARIOUS WRITERS, ON THE SAME TOPICS, WHO HAVE APPEARED SINCE THE DOCTOR'S DECEASE.

BY ANDREW KIPPIS, D.D. F.R.S. AND S.A.

VOLUME I.

LONDON:

Printed for G. G. and J. ROBINSON; R. BALDWIN; C. DILLY; W. J. and J. RICHARDSON; F. and C. RIVINGTON; J. MATHEWS; S. HAYES; W. OTRIDGE and SON; J. SCATCHERD; DARTON and HARVEY; C. LAW; T. N. LONGMAN and O. REES; VERNOR and HOOD; D. OGILVY and SON; J. CUTHELL; LACKINGTON and Co. and J. WALLIS.

1799.

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BY THE FORMER EDITOR.

THIS work was originally drawn up for the uſe of the ſtudents under the Author's care; but it appears by a clauſe in his will, that it was his intention it ſhould be publiſhed after his deceaſe. And though it would, no doubt, have appeared to much greater advantage, if the Author had prepared it himſelf for the preſs; yet it is hoped that it will not be thought, even in its preſent form, unworthy of the public view.

The tranſcript from which it was printed, I have carefully compared with the original ſhort-hand copy; and the public may be aſſured, that the Author's ſentiments have been every where ſcrupulouſly preſerved; no other alterations having been made, than ſuch as are neceſſary in all poſthumous works, that have not had the Author's laſt hand. A few references have been added, particularly to ſome books publiſhed ſince the Author's death, and others omitted, that ſeemed leſs important.

If the reader ſhould think the references under the ſame head are ſometimes too much alike; he will pleaſe to conſider, that though the ſentiments in each may be nearly the ſame, yet the different manner of expreſſion will often ſerve more fully to explain and illuſtrate the ſubject: beſides, that one Author may be at hand, when the other is not.

In order to aſſiſt the reader in conſulting particular paſſages referred to, the reference is always made to the chapter *and* ſection, *where that could be done: and as in many caſes it could only be made to the* page, *an account is added at the end, of*

the Editions, *to which ſuch references are made, (where the books could be procured) with the* number of pages *in the volume, which, by the rule of proportion, may be ſome direction to find the paſſage in any other edition.*

As to the work itſelf, it may be proper to acquaint the public, that the mathematical form, into which it is thrown, was taken from a work of the ſame kind, in manuſcript, drawn up in Latin, *by the Author's Tutor, the Reverend Mr.* John Jennings *of* Hinckley, *from whom he has borrowed ſome of the propoſitions and demonſtrations, eſpecially in the former part. But he has ſo much enlarged and improved upon the original plan, that the whole may properly be conſidered as a new work.*

As my regard to the Author's memory, and my apprehenſion of the uſefulneſs of the work itſelf, led me to comply with the requeſt of the Author's widow, to inſpect the publication of theſe Lectures, I thought it neceſſary to give this general account of what has been done in relation to them, for the ſatisfaction of the public; and heartily wiſh they may ſubſerve the cauſe of learning, religion, and moderation.

Birmingham,
Jan. 31, 1763.

S. CLARK.

PRE-

PREFACE,

TO THE

THIRD EDITION.

IN the life of Dr. DODDRIDGE, prefixed to the ſeventh edition of his Family Expoſitor, it is obſerved, that in a future impreſſion of the author's "Courſe of Lectures," it would be extremely uſeful to enlarge the liſt of references, by introducing the names and productions of thoſe writers who have treated upon the ſeveral matters in queſtion ſince the Doctor's deceaſe. It is added, that to a perſon converſant in the hiſtory of controverſies, this would be no very difficult taſk; and that it might, in particular, eaſily be executed by any gentleman who, as a tutor, has made uſe of the Lectures as a Text Book, and who conſequently has been in the habit of referring to ſucceeding authors.

Though I do not compleatly anſwer to the whole of this deſcription, (having only been occaſionally a reader on a few detached parts of Dr. Doddridge's Lectures), I was, nevertheleſs, readily induced to undertake the buſineſs ſuggeſted, from a conſciouſneſs of the utility of the deſign, and from the hope that I had ſo far attended to the progreſs of literature as to be in ſome degree qualified for the employment. At

the ſame time, I entertained no doubt of my being able to obtain aſſiſtance from the manuſcript references of ſuch tutors as had regularly gone through the Doctor's Courſe. In this reſpect I have happily ſucceeded. The Reverend Benjamin Edwards of Northampton, has favoured me with the uſe of his copy of Dr. Savage's notes, whence I have been ſupplied with a conſiderable number of references, ſeveral of which might have eſcaped my own recollection. It is ſtill a ſuperior aid which I have derived from the communication of the references of my late excellent friend, the Reverend Samuel Merivale, for ſome time Theological Tutor in a Proteſtant Diſſenting Academy at Exeter. For this communication I am indebted to the Reverend James Manning of the ſame city, Mr. Merivale's relation. Mr. Manning, with that zeal for promoting every valuable undertaking which marks his character, and with that friendſhip which I have experienced in many pleaſing inſtances, voluntarily undertook to tranſcribe the references in queſtion, together with ſome other papers that might be conducive to my purpoſe. By ſuch aſſiſtance, united with a due meaſure of diligence on my own part, the Lectures, in point of references, will be found to be very greatly augmented. This will be particularly apparent to any one who ſhall take the trouble of comparing the catalogue of authors inſerted at the end of the preſent work, with that which is given in the former editions.

Beſides

Beſides the new references which pervade the whole body of the text, I have added, at the bottom of the page, many notes of reference, the intention of which is not only to aſſiſt theological and other pupils during their academical courſe, but to point out ſuch ſources of information as may be ſerviceable to them in their future enquiries. It is not to be expected that in their ſtate of pupilage they ſhould be able to pay a due attention to one half of the books here ſpecified: while, at the ſame time, it may be of great importance to know where hereafter to apply for freſh ſtores of knowledge and improvement.

There is one thing which I wiſh particularly to be remembered, and that is, that it is no part of my deſign to give general illuſtrations of the ſubjects treated upon, or either to confirm or to gainſay the opinions of Dr. Doddridge. This would have been the creation of a new work. It is the buſineſs of individual tutors to enlarge upon the Lectures in that way which accords with their own ſentiments. My ſole aim is to mention, with freedom and impartiality, the writers on all ſides of the different queſtions which are the objects of diſcuſſion, that hereby the mind of the ſtudent may be duly enlarged, and that he may be able, with the greater advantage, to proſecute his ſearches after truth.

It is neceſſary to mention, that not having received Mr. Merivale's references till the work had been printed ſo far as to the ſixty-ſeventh

propoſition, I have inſerted in an Appendix thoſe which preceded that propoſition. A ſecond Appendix contains a liſt of ſome productions which either did not occur to my remembrance at the proper time, or have been publiſhed ſince the Lectures were committed to the preſs.

I muſt acknowledge a great error into which I have fallen in the note ſubjoined to the 334th page of the firſt volume. In that note I have aſcribed to Dr. Wm. Wagſtaffe a Treatiſe on the future Exiſtence and Immortality of the animal Creation. The book in queſtion was written by a Dr. Hildrop. The reader will forgive the temporary failure of recollection with regard to a performance which was peruſed between forty and fifty years ago, and has not ſince been ſeen. Dr. Hildrop's work was, I believe, entitled, "Free Thoughts on the Brute Creation."

Weſtminſter,
Aug. 5, 1794.

AND. KIPPIS.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION*.

IT may be not improper, in the entrance of this work, to give ſome general account of the plan of it, and ſome directions for ſtudying it in the moſt uſeful manner.

The work itſelf, contains an abſtract of the moſt important and uſeful thoughts I have any where met with, on the chief ſubjects which can be ſuppoſed to come under conſideration, in the review of *Pneumatology*, *Ethics*, and *Divinity*. And as theſe ſciences do inſenſibly run into each other, I judged it not proper to treat of each *ſeparately*, and ſo to divide the whole into three diſtinct parts, the firſt Pneumatological, the ſecond Ethical, and the third Theological; but have choſen to conſider them in ſuch a *connected* view, as might convey to the mind, with the greateſt eaſe and advantage, the principal truths relating to each. The whole work is divided therefore into ten parts, and contains in all 230 Lectures. The *firſt* part, (Lect. 1—22.) conſiders the powers and faculties of the human mind.—The *ſecond*, (Lect. 23—51.) the being of a GOD, and his natural perfec-

* This Introduction is to be conſidered as the Author's addreſs to his own pupils, when they entered upon this courſe of Lectures, which will ſhew the propriety of ſome of the directions, which might otherwiſe appear too particular and minute.

tions.

tions.—The *third*, (Lect. 52—90.) treats of the nature of moral virtue in general, and of the moral attributes of the Deity: of the ſeveral branches of virtue, and the nature of civil government.—The *fourth*, (Lect. 91—100.) of the immortality and immateriality of the human Soul, with its original; as alſo our general obligation to virtue, and the ſtate of it in the world.—The *fifth*, (Lect. 101—110.) conſiders the reaſon to deſire and expect a revelation, and the external and internal evidence with which we may ſuppoſe it ſhould be attended.—The *ſixth*, (Lect. 111—153.) aſſerts and vindicates the genuineneſs, credibility, and inſpiration of the Old and New Teſtament.—The *ſeventh*, (Lect. 154—163.) contains an account of the ſcripture doctrine, relating to the exiſtence and nature of GOD, and the Divinity of the SON and SPIRIT.—The *eighth*, (Lect. 164—187.) treats of the fall of human nature, and our recovery by the mediatorial undertaking of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, with the nature of faith in him, and of the covenant of grace eſtabliſhed through him. So that the doctrine of Chriſt's atonement, and the Spirit's influences, are alſo comprehended in this part.—The *ninth*, (Lect. 188—209.) is a ſurvey of the chief duties which the goſpel requires; and more particularly of the poſitive inſtitutions; in which the doctrine of the chriſtian ſabbath, the ſacraments, and the conſtitution of the church are conſidered.—The *tenth* and laſt part, (Lect. 210—230.) contains the Scripture Doctrine of angels, and of the future ſtate, includ-

including the reſurrection, and the moſt remarkable events to precede or attend it.

Theſe are the great ſubjects of the work, and I believe the very mention of them is ſufficient to ſhew, how important a part of an academical courſe it muſt make, and how much it muſt be the concern of every prudent and judicious ſtudent to give it a large ſhare of his application.

For the more profitable ſtudying this courſe of lectures, it will be adviſeable, that, as ſoon as poſſible after the lecture has been given, it be carefully reviewed, and the chief *references* read and contracted. But in contracting them, it will be unneceſſary to tranſcribe thoſe paſſages, the ſubſtance of which is already inſerted in the lecture: it will be ſufficient to take ſome general hints of their contents; and to tranſcribe only thoſe parts, which are very peculiar and obſervable. And here ſome diſtinction is to be made, between thoſe books, which may very probably be always at hand in reviewing the lectures, and thoſe which may not ſo probably be within your reach.

A diligent attendance on the courſe will, I hope, be both a pleaſure and improvement: yet I would adviſe every pupil, (if he can) to go over it *twice*; for though the ſubjects themſelves, at the ſecond review, will want the advantage of novelty, yet more thoughts will often ariſe in lecturing, and the whole will be made more familiar to the mind: beſides, that the ſtudent will by this means have an opportunity of reading and ſtudying ſome things,

things, which accidental cauſes might have obliged him before to paſs over without due attention.—And for this purpoſe, it may be very convenient to keep a catalogue of thoſe lectures, which by abſence, illneſs, or any other accidental circumſtance, were not ſtudied ſo carefully as might be wiſhed; as likewiſe of thoſe things, which did not, in the courſe of lecturing, appear ſolved and explained in a ſatisfactory manner. And if any difficulties ariſe, which ſeem peculiar, let them be drawn out in writing, to be lodged in the tutor's hands, or made the ſubject of a theſis, to be canvaſſed at large. In the mean time, full liberty will be given to make any objection or inquiry, from time to time, which will be examined in the hours of lecture, ſo far as the limits of time and other employments will allow.

Yet let it be remembered, that the ſtudent is ſuppoſed to be already acquainted with many things here brought into queſtion. It would be a moſt fatal miſtake, to act as if nothing were known of God and Chriſt, till the chief doctrines relating to both come to be examined in this courſe. Many ſmall treatiſes, which may be read in a few hours, contain evidence enough, both of the being of a God, and the truth of the chriſtian religion, to ſatisfy an upright mind: though it may be convenient, that thoſe who are to be the teachers and guardians of theſe truths, or thoſe who may be expoſed to peculiar temptations to doubt or diſbelieve them, ſhould be acquainted with their evidence in a larger extent.

extent. Let the great vital truths of chriſtianity taught in ſcripture be conſtantly regarded. As to matters of *controverſy*, let them be referred to their proper place, without any eagerneſs to anticipate them; which often produces great bigotry and error, as well as a neglect of what is propoſed to immediate inquiry. And may it never be forgotten, that matters of abſtruſe ſpeculation and laborious inquiry, are not, even to *Theological* ſtudents, the *one thing needful*, though they may be important in ſubordination to it.

I would remind you, dear Sir, (whoever you are that are going over theſe lectures) that you may enter into eternity, long before you can have attended, or even tranſcribed them: and therefore, I would beſeech and charge you, by all your hopes and proſpects there, that it be your daily and governing care, after having ſolemnly devoted your ſoul to God through Chriſt in the bonds of the chriſtian covenant, to live like his ſervant, to keep yourſelf in the love of God, and to endeavour in all things to adorn his goſpel. So will you be moſt likely to ſucceed in your inquiries, through the communication of light from the great Father of lights: and ſo will you be prepared for the infinitely nobler diſcoveries, enjoyments, and ſervices of the future ſtate; even though you ſhould be deprived of the reſidue of your days here, and cut ſhort, (as many of your brethren have been) in the intended ſtudies and labours of this courſe.

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LECTURES

ON

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS, AND DIVINITY.

PART I.

Of the Powers and Faculties of the HUMAN MIND.

AXIOM I.

EXISTENCE is a ſimple idea, which we get both by conſcioufneſs and obſervation. *Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* vii. § 7. *l.* iv. *c.* ix. § 3.—*Burnet at Boyle's Lect. vol.* i. *p.* 2, 3.—*Grove's Poſt. Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 3, 4. LECT. I.

DEFINITION I.

Whatever our thoughts are immediately employed about, whether as ſimply perceiving it, or as aſſerting or denying any thing concerning it, is called an IDEA.

SCHOLIUM.

The definition more frequently given is, that an *Idea* is the repreſentation of a thing in the mind, which the mind immediately perceives; and the thing itſelf ſuppoſed to exiſt without our thoughts is called the *Archetype* of the idea.

But we do not yet chuſe to aſſert or deny any thing concerning the external exiſtence of ſuch ſuppoſed archetypes, and for this reaſon have not thought it ſo proper to uſe this definition.

DEFINITION II.

Whatever exiſts is called a BEING.

SCHOLIUM.

We do not here enter largely into the diſtinction which the metaphyſicians make between *Ens reale*, which exiſts without any dependence upon our thoughts, and *Ens rationis*, which owes its exiſtence to its being the object of them; nor into the queſtion between the *Realiſts* and *Nominaliſts*; but by *Being* in the proceſs of this diſcourſe we mean *Ens reale* *.

Watts's Ontology, c. xvi.—*Watts's Logic, p.* 27, 28.

DEFINITION III.

Whatever is contained in the adequate idea of any being, is called its PROPERTIES.

COROLLARY I.

A being is the ſame with all its properties taken together. And therefore

COROLLARY II.

We can have no conception of any ſubſtance diſtinct from all the properties of the being in which they inhere; for this would imply that the being itſelf inheres, and ſo on to infinity.

Jennings's Log. Def. 15.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* i. *c.* iv. § 18. *ib. l.* ii. *c.* xiii. § 19, 20. *ib. c.* xxiii. § 2, 3, 6.—*Watts's Philoſ. Eſſ.* ii. § 1.

* The knowledge of theſe diſtinctions, and of the diſputes carried on concerning them, by the ſchoolmen, may hereafter be ſought for in Enfield's Hiſtory of Philoſophy, and in other works. Much information of this kind occurs in ſeveral articles of Bayle's Dictionary.

DEFI-

DEFINITION IV.

BODY is an extended ſolid being.

Graveſend's Phyſ. l. c. ii, iii. § 9, 12, 18.—*Le Clerc's Phyſ. l.* v. *c.* iii. § 1—3.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* iv.

AXIOM II.

THOUGHT is a ſimple idea which we get by reflecting on what paſſes in our own minds.

Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p. 277, 278.—*Crouzaz's Log. vol.* i. *p.* 10.

DEFINITION V.

SPIRIT is a thinking being, or a being which has the power of thought.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxxiii. § 18.

COROLLARY I.

We have as clear an idea of ſpirit as we have of body; the eſſential properties of each being equally known, and the inward conſtitution equally unknown.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxiii. § 15.—*Procced. of Underſtand. p.* 74—78.

COROLLARY 2.

We are at leaſt as certain of the exiſtence of ſpirit as of body: the former we know by conſciouſneſs, which is always infallible; the other by the ſenſes, which may be miſtaken.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 7 & 11.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxiii. § 31.

SCHOLIUM I.

The *Carteſians* thought that thoſe primary and eſſential properties of body and ſpirit, mentioned *Def.* 4 & 5, were the reſpective ſubſtances whence all their other properties flow: and Dr. *Watts* maintains the ſame opinion; urging that they agree with the received definition of

ſubſtance, as they ſupport the accidents of figure, ſize, colour, *&c.* in bodies, and doubting, fearing, willing, *&c.* in ſpirit; and both ſubſiſt independently on human power. He farther pleads, that we have no idea of the ſupport of theſe properties, and that if theſe be deſtroyed, nothing will remain.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 53.—*Watts's Eſſ.* ii. *præſert.* § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

A power of communicating motion by impulſe is improperly mentioned by Mr. *Locke* among the eſſential properties of body, and that of moving body by volition among thoſe of ſpirit.

DEFINITION VI.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY is that branch of learning which relates to *body*, giving an account of its various phænomena, and the principles on which the ſolution of them depends.

DEFINITION VII.

PNEUMATOLOGY is the doctrine of *ſpirits*, or that branch of ſcience which relates to them.

DEFINITION VIII.

ETHICS is that branch of learning by which our faculties are directed to that manner of acting, by which we may obtain the higheſt happineſs, *i. e.* the ſupreme enjoyment of which our natures are capable.

DEFINITION IX.

LECT. II.

The HUMAN MIND is that in or of a man which thinks.

Watts's Eſſ. ii. *p.* 59.

COROLLARY.

The human mind is a ſpirit. *Comp. Def.* 5.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

Des-Cartes in his definition calls it "a thinking, incorporeal, inextended ſubſtance, which "ſhall ſurvive the body to which it is united, "and with which it was immediately created by "God, in order to form a perfect man." It is evident that on this definition it will be matter of much controverſy whether man has a mind or not. Yet he defines it ſomething otherwiſe in his *Principles*.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 8.

AXIOM III.

It is evident that men have not one COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS.

COROLLARY.

Every one has a mind peculiar to himſelf.

More's Immort. of the Soul, l. iii. *c.* xvi. *p.* 212—216.—*Ditton on the Reſurrect. p.* 467—471.

AXIOM IV.

VOLITION is a ſimple idea which we get by reflection.

DEFINITION X.

ACTION ſignifies volition with the effect which we will.

COROLLARY 1.

Nothing can act but ſpontaneouſly.

COROLLARY 2.

Nothing but a thinking being can act; for ſpontaneity implies an idea of the action to be performed.

SCHOLIUM.

Action is commonly, though in a leſs proper ſenſe, applied to irrational, and even inanimate

beings, when the body immediately employed in producing a new effect, is said to act upon that in which it is produced, as the sun-beams upon the earth, the fire upon fewel.

Watts's Ontology, p. 342.

DEFINITION XI.

As that being which acts is called the AGENT, so that which is acted upon is called the PATIENT, whether sensible or insensible, or whether the action produced be a pleasing or displeasing effect.

DEFINITION XII.

Pleasure and *Pain* are simple *Ideas:* that which tends to produce the former is called NATURAL GOOD, and that which tends to produce the latter NATURAL EVIL.

COROLLARY.

The loss of good is evil, and the removal of evil is good.

SCHOLIUM.

See an unnecessary description of *Pain* in *Collier's Ess. part* iii. *p.* 1*.

AXIOM V.

POWER, whether ACTIVE or PASSIVE, is a sensible idea, which we get by observing the changes produced in the beings about us by agents and patients.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 1, 2.

DEFINITION XIII.

Those properties or powers of any spirit, whereby it is rendered capable of action, enjoyment, or suffering, are called FACULTIES.

* The design of this scholium, which has been severely censured, was only to convince the student, by a remarkable instance of the absurdity of attempting to describe simple ideas.

PROPO-

PROPOSITION I.

To take a ſurvey of the principal faculties of the human mind.

SOLUTION.

1. We find within ourſelves a power of perceiving, abſtracting, compounding, comparing, diſcerning, judging, reaſoning, which all lead us on in the purſuit of truth, *i. e.* in the right apprehenſion of the nature of things, and are called by the common name of *Underſtanding.*

Duncan's Logic, ap. Precept. vol. ii. *l.* i. *c.* i. § 4. *ib. l.* ii. *c.* i. § 1. *ib. l.* iii. *c.* i. § 1, 2.

2. The power of retaining and recollecting our ideas in the abſence of their archetypes is what we call *Memory.* But when ideas or trains of ideas, occur, or are called up by Memory in a lively manner, and without regard to the order of former actual impreſſions and perceptions, it is ſaid to be done by the power of the *Imagination* or *Fancy.*

Hartley on Man, vol. i. *Introd. p.* 3.—*Balguy's* VI. *Serm. p.* 44—46.—*Balguy's Sermons, vol.* i. *p.* 357—359.

3. We perceive on many occaſions various commotions in our minds; (which alſo produce changes and impreſſions not only on the nerves of the brain, but in the exterior parts of the body) which commotions we call *Paſſions.* Pleaſure and pain are the great hinges on which they turn, and the more particular modifications of them will be conſidered *Prop.* 13.

Dr. *Watts* deſcribes them thus: "They are "ſenſible commotions of our whole nature, "both ſoul and body, which are occaſioned "by the perception of an object according to "ſome ſpecial property that belongs to it."

(*Watts on the Paſſions, p.* 5.) To excite them it muſt appear rare and uncommon, good, *i. e.* agreeable, or evil, *i. e.* diſagreeable *.

4. A power of forming *volitions*; which *Locke* defines to be the act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itſelf to have over any part of the man, by employing it in or with-holding it from any particular action: but what that *exerting its dominion* is, can only be known by conſciouſneſs. *Ax.* 4.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 15.

5. A power of moving ſome parts of the body. Others it has no immediate power over, the motion of ſome being always involuntary, as that of the heart. In other parts it is ſometimes voluntary and ſometimes otherwiſe, as in the lungs and inteſtines.

Des-Cartes de Paſſ. l. i. § 13, 16.

DEMONSTRATION.

We find by experience that theſe faculties are in our own minds, and we perceive by their effects they are in the minds of others.

COROLLARY 1.

Man is a being of great abilities and excellencies; ſo that if it ſhall hereafter appear that he was produced by any other intelligent being, it may reaſonably be concluded, that he was deſigned for great and important purpoſes.

COROLLARY 2.

While theſe faculties continue in a degree of vigour, he muſt be capable of great and noble improvements; ſo that much of the difference between perſons in other reſpects equal,

* With Dr. Watts's Doctrine of the Paſſions compare a Short Theory of the Paſſions, by Dr. Thomas Balguy, in the Appendix to his "Divine Benevolence aſſerted," an octavo pamphlet, publiſhed in 1781.

will

will depend upon the degree in which this natural furniture is cultivated or neglected.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It is not proper to ſpeak of the underſtanding and other faculties of the ſoul as if they were diſtinct principles of action: the underſtanding is the *ſoul* underſtanding, the will is the *ſoul* willing: and to repreſent them as diſtinct agents produces confuſion in our ideas.

Witſii Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. *c.* vii. § 4, 5.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxi. § 17—20.—*Crouzaz's Logic, vol.* i. *part* i. *c.* viii. § 6. *p.* 144.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The power which the mind evidently has of moving the various parts of the body by nerves inſerted in the muſcles is truly wonderful, ſeeing the mind neither knows the muſcles to be moved, nor the machinery, by which the motion in it is to be produced: ſo that it is as if a muſician ſhould always ſtrike the right note on a very complex inſtrument, which he had never ſeen before. That no laws of mechaniſm can produce this, is proved by its being voluntary, as well as by other conſiderations.

Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 12. *p.* 29—35.—*Matho, vol.* i. *p.* 359, *&c.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is queſtioned whether there be any motion in the human body which depends upon the mind, and yet is involuntary.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Berkley entirely denies the power of *abſtraction*, as an evident abſurdity and inconſiſtency, and ſays we have only a power of making one particular idea a repreſentation of all the reſt. But this is all grounded upon an unwary expreſſion

preſſion of Mr. *Locke*. The truth is, that we do not poſitively exclude, but only overlook a part of the idea from which we abſtract: *v. g.* when I conceive of a line by abſtraction, I do not deny that it is either ſtraight or crooked, but only think of the flowing of a point without determining its direction *.

Locke ib. l. ii. *c.* ix. § 9.—*Berkley's Princ. Introd.* § 6—20. — *Proced. of Underſt.* *p.* 186—188.

PROPOSITION II.

LECT. III. To ſurvey thoſe phænomena obſervable in BRUTE ANIMALS, which ſeem to bear ſome reſemblance to the faculties of the human mind.

SOLUTION.

They ſeem to have a power of *perception*; *v. g.* to ſee, to hear, to ſmell, to taſte, and to feel; and it ſeems that it is by this power, that thoſe bodies, which we call animal, are diſtinguiſhed from thoſe that are inanimate.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* ix. § 11.

2. They ſeem alſo to have *memory*; which appears by the marks of their recollecting a train of ideas, when one that has a relation to the reſt is by ſenſation preſented anew; and eſpecially by birds perfecting themſelves by practice in tunes they have imperfectly learnt.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* x. § 10.—*Proced. of the Under. p.* 158—162.

3. They appear capable of exerting *volitions*, and of putting them into execution by correſpondent motions of their bodies.

4. They appear to be impreſſed with *paſſions*, as joy, ſorrow, fear, hope, deſire, gratitude, an-

* For a farther elucidation of this ſubject, recourſe may be had to Reid's "Intellectual Powers of Man;" and Mr. Dugald Stewart's "Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind."

ger,

ger, *&c.* and ſometimes in a very violent degree.

5. They appear not to have a power of *abſtraction*, becauſe they do not uſe articulate ſounds as the ſigns of their ideas, though the organs of ſome are capable of pronouncing them.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xi. § 10, 11.—*Proced. of Underſt. p.* 188, 189.

Gr. 5.|6. They are incapable of any high degree of *reaſoning*, ſince that evidently depends upon abſtract ideas.—*Object.* Many of their actions ſeem rational. *Anſ.* They are, and in ſo high a degree, that if they were governed by any reaſon of their own, they would exceed the ſagacity of the generality of men: yet in other inſtances they appear mere idiots; and in the actions of the ſame ſpecies there is ſo little variety, that we cannot imagine this to be the caſe. This muſt therefore be granted to be a very ſtrange phænomenon.

Spectat. N°. 120. *vol.* ii. *p.* 139.—*Spect. de la Nat. vol.* i. *part* ii. *p.* 70, 71.—*Collib. Inq. into the Exiſt. p.* 86, 87. *Ed.* 1. *p.* 100, 101. *Ed.* 3.—*Beattie's Diſſertations, p.* 60—71.—*Reimarus's Diſſertations, p.* 216—218.

COROLLARY I.

The *Carteſian* hypotheſis, that Brutes are mere machines, is very incredible, ſince theſe phænomena can by no means be accounted for on any mechanical laws, nor upon any principles, which will not prove it poſſible, that thoſe which appear to us human creatures may be mere machines, and not only irrational but inſenſible too*.

* This hypotheſis was adopted for a time by ſome of the followers of Carteſius, and was embraced by Dr. Watts. It is now univerſally exploded, and was never worthy of any ſerious conſideration.

Des-Cartes de Method. § 5. *p.* 34—36. —*Le Clerc's Phyſ. l.* iv. *c.* xii. § 9—13.—*Ray's Wiſdom of God, p.* 54—57. —*Proced. of Underſtand. p.* 170—174. —*Eſſ. upon Hunting, p.* 52—92.—*Reg. Philoſ. Conv. vol.* iii. *p.* 83—85.—*Ditton on the Reſurrection, p.* 392—400.—*Watts's Ruin and Recovery. Appendix. Eſſay* 1*ſt.*

COROLLARY 2.

It is evident that man is a creature ſuperior to the brutes, though ſome authors have endeavoured to ſink him to a level with them. *Vid. Prop.* 1.

Blount's Anima Mundi, p. 40—46.—*Orig. adv. Celſum, l.* iv. *p.* 217—222.—*Gelli's Circe by Layng, paſſ.*—*Ditton on the Reſurrection, p.* 395.

SCHOLIUM.

That *Plants* are a ſpecies of animals, and have ſome ſort of ſenſation, is ſtrongly maintained, though with no appearance of reaſon, by

Redi de Generat. Inſect. p. 245—249, 257—260.—*Edwards's Exercit.* N°. viii. *ad finem* *.

DEFINITION XIV.

LECT. IV.

That may be called a man's own BODY, which is the animal ſyſtem over which his will exerciſes an immediate power, and by the organs of which ideas are tranſmitted to his mind; and that is to be accounted a VITAL part of it which partakes of its vegetation.

* This idea has lately been revived, and ſeems to be rather growing into faſhion. See an ingenious Eſſay on the ſubject, by Dr. Percival, in the Mancheſter Philoſophical Tranſactions.

PROPO-

PROPOSITION III.

To enumerate the principal phænomena of the dependance of the human mind on the body.

SOLUTION.

1. When the nerves of the body are moved, ideas are preſented to our minds whether we will or no, according to the different ſenſes to which thoſe nerves ſerve which are put into agitation; that is, certain ideas in the mind ſucceed to certain motions in the brain.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* i. § 25.—*Cheyne's Princip. c.* iii. § 39. *p.* 228, 229.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 34.—*Des-Cartes Prin. part* iv. § 197. *p.* 216.

2. Paſſions are often excited by bodily motions; and on the other hand, when raiſed, produce changes in the body, ſometimes even contrary to our volitions; *v. g.* in anger and bluſhing.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xx. § 17.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 97—106, 113—135.

3. When the body is indiſpoſed, the mind is often diſabled from uſing its faculties; *v. g.* the underſtanding is diſabled by drunkenneſs and ſleep, motion by the palſy, memory by diſeaſes, *&c.*

4. When the ſenſes are gently and naturally ſhut up, and the command over the body intermitted, as in ſleep, if we think at all we are ſaid to dream; and generally wander through airy tracks of thought, which have no agreement with each other, nor are at all corrected by the judgment. Ideas fetched out of the memory, ſeem to us to be produced anew; and out of mere ſimple ideas laid up in the memory, new imaginary ideas of ſubſtances are formed,

and

and ſeem to be produced by external objects. When the ſenſes are obſtructed in a violent and unnatural manner, as in a ſwoon, if we think at all we may obſerve the ſame phænomena, but in a ſtill more languid degree.

Lime-ſtreet Lect. vol. ii. *p.* 442, 443.—*Des-Cartes Dioptics, c.* vi. § 17.—*Rohault's Phyſ. l.* iv. *c.* xix.—*Lucret. l.* iv. *ver.* 905—1024—*Herv. Med. vol.* ii. *p.* 43. *note.*

5. In a frenzy, though the ſenſes be not ſhut up, nor the command of the mind over the body ſuſpended, yet the ſame phænomena are found as in ſleep, only in a more vivid and pathetic degree.

Aretæus de Morb. Acut. l. ii. *c.* iv, v. *p.* 17. *Boer. Ed.* Vid. *Boer. Not. in loc.*

6. Sometimes by very intenſe thinking, we do not attend to impreſſions made on the organs of ſenſation, nor receive ideas from them. This in a very high degree may be called a trance or extaſy.

Plutarch's Lives, vol. ii. *p.* 435, 436.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* ix. § 3, 4. *Ib. c.* ii. § 19. *p.* 1—3.—*Flavel's Pneumat. ap. Opera, p.* 276, 277. *Edin. Ed. Vol.* i. *p.* 475, 476. *Lond. Ed.*—*Guelperius in Acts* x. 10.—*Col. Gardiner's Memoirs,* § 30—32.

COROLLARY.

Man is a very feeble creature, and we have little reaſon to boaſt of thoſe intellectual powers, the exerciſe of which, by the very conſtitution of our nature, does not only depend upon an animal ſyſtem, but is neceſſarily ſubject to frequent long interruptions, as in the ſtate of ſleep.

Burnet's

Burnet's Theory, vol. ii. *p.* 164.—*Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p.* 176, 177.—*Herv. Contempl. vol.* ii. *p.* 39, 40, 48—50 *.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is queried to what we are to aſcribe the difference to be found in the intellectual capacities of men. LECT. V.

ANSW. The principles of phyſiognomy, the decay of the faculties in old age, the deſtruction or reſtoration of them by corporeal accidents, and many of the phænomena mentioned in the propoſition, may convince us, that the temperature and conſtitution of the body, has a great influence on the mind. It muſt alſo be allowed, that the circumſtances of education and converſation, may make a conſiderable difference beween perſons in other reſpects equal. Yet if we attend to the variety there is in all the works of nature, we may be inclined to think there is a like variety in the internal conſtitution of human ſouls: which conjecture is confirmed by obſerving, that no viſible difference has yet been diſcovered between the brain of the weakeſt and the moſt ſagacious of mankind; as well as that perſons in the ſame circumſtances, and with the ſame opportunities, often make very different improvements †.

Des-Cartes de Method. ſub. init. p. 1.—*Watts's Death and Heaven, p.* 97—102.

* From all theſe circumſtances recent philoſophers have deduced arguments to prove that the ſoul is not diſtinct from the body. On this ſide of the queſtion, the ſubject has been copiouſly diſcuſſed by Dr Prieſtley, in his Diſquiſitions concerning Matter and Spirit; and by Mr. Cooper, in his Philoſophical Eſſays. On the other ſide, ſee Berington's "Letters on Materialiſm;" his "Immaterialiſm delineated;" Gifford's "Outlines of an Anſwer to Dr. Prieſtley's Diſquiſitions;" and Belſham's "Eſſays," vol. ii. p. 1—30.

† Theſe objects of ſpeculation, being more curious than immediately uſeful, may well be referred by young ſtudents to future conſideration.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have diſtinguiſhed between the *rational* and the *animal* ſoul, as if they were two diſtinct Beings, calling the former the *Spirit*, the latter the *Soul*. They ſuppoſe the intellect and will are ſeated in the former, the paſſions and appetites in the latter; and that the *Soul* is a principle common to brutes, which therefore they ſometimes call by very contemptible names, as the *horſe*, the *brute*, &c. whereas they think the *Spirit* is peculiar to man. *Vid. Prop.* 1. *Sch.* 1. *Proced. of the Underſt. l.* ii. *c.* x. *p.* 367, 370—377.—*Marc. Anton. l.* ii. § 2. *l.* iii. § 16. *l.* xii. § 3. *with Dac. Notes.*—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ. part* i. § 47.—*Pope's Iliad, l.* xxiii. *ver.* 122. *vol.* vi. *p.* 61, 62.—*Maſon on Self Knowledge, l.* i. *c.* ii. *p.* 14.—*Vitring. Obſ. l.* iii. *c.* iv. *præf.* § 2—8.

DEFINITION XV.

The SOUL is ſaid to be SEATED in that part of the body, where ſenſation terminates, and voluntary motion begins.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Soul is ſeated in the *Brain*.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The nerves on which ſenſation and motion evidently depend, terminate in the brain, or in the *medulla ſpinalis*, which is derived from thence, and whoſe fibres are probably all continued to it.

2. If a ſtrait ligature be made on any nerve, or it be cut aſunder, ſenſation continues in that part neareſt the brain, and ceaſes in that which is more remote.

3. In men, and in moſt other animals, death immediately enſues, if the head be cut off, or the

the brains taken out, or the cerebellum wounded.

4. All known diſtempers that immediately take away ſenſation, are ſeated in the head.

Grad. 1—4. *Def.* 14.|5. The ſoul is ſeated in the brain. *Q. E. D.*

Keil's Anat. c. viii. § 1.—*More's Immort. of the Soul, l.* ii. *c.* vii. § 10.—*Watts's Eſſ.* iii. *p.* 78—80.

COROLLARY.

The ancients were miſtaken in placing it in the *heart*; and *Van Helmont* in the *mouth of the ſtomach*. It may be obſerved by the way, that *Philo*, who with many ancients ſuppoſed the ſenſitive ſoul to be ſubdivided into the iraſcible and concupiſcible, placed the former in the heart, the latter in the belly, while he thought the rational was ſeated in the head.

Vitringa ubi ſupra, § 4. *ſub fin.*—*More, ibid. l.* ii. *c.* vii. § 5.—10.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 38.

SCHOLIUM I.

It muſt ſtill be matter of controverſy, in what part of the brain the ſoul is ſeated. There is no reaſon to think, as ſome have imagined, that it is in the *meninges*; but whether it be in the *pineal gland*, as *Des-Cartes* ſuppoſes; or as Dr. *More* thinks, among the animal ſpirits in the *fourth ventricle*, or in the *corpora ſtriata*, as has been lately maintained in *France*, or in ſome part different from any of theſe, we cannot certainly ſay *.

Des-Cartes de Paſſ. § 32.—*More, ibid. l.* ii. *c.* vii. § 12—18. *c.* viii. *per tot.*

* The queſtion concerning the ſeat of the ſoul, for a long time excited the attention of philoſophers, and has been the ſubject of various diſcuſſion. At preſent, we believe that it is deemed of little importance.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The conſtitution of ſome animals may perhaps be different from that of men in this reſpect. It is certain the phænomena mentioned *gr.* 3. are not always to be found in them; for waſps will live a long time after their heads are cut off; eels are ſooneſt killed by ſtriking them on the tail; and vipers will live ſome hours after their heads are cut off, and their bowels taken out.

More, ibid. l. iii. *c.* xv. § 1, 2.—*Bacon's Nat. Hiſt. Cent.* 4. *N°* 400.

DEFINITION XVI.

LECT. VI. Any idea or propoſition is ſaid to be INNATE, when it is not acquired by the uſe of the faculties, but ſo implanted in the mind from its original, as to be common to the whole ſpecies, independently upon any circumſtances in which individuals may be placed.

PROPOSITION V.

There are no innate ideas in the human mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can no *ſimple* idea be aſſigned, but may be traced up to *ſenſation* or *reflection*, or *both*: *v. g.* to *one ſenſe* alone; as ſeeing green, hearing the ſound of an organ, ſmelling a roſe, taſting a peach, feeling ſolidity, *&c.* or *more*; as extenſion, motion, reſt: to *reflection* only, as perception, volition, duration: or *ſenſation* and *reflection* both, as exiſtence and various kinds of pleaſure and pain. *Ax.* 1.

Locke, l. ii. *c.* iii. v—vii. *Ibid. c.* i. § 2, 7—9.

2. We ſee that ſimple ideas are acquired gradually, and the furniture of various perſons differs according to their various circumſtances in life. *Locke, l.* ii. *c.* i. § 2, 5, 7, 20—23.

3. When

3. When the organs of ſenſation are deſtroyed, ſimple ideas proper to them are no more acquired; and thoſe who from their birth want proper organs, want correſpondent ideas, even though they be ever ſo important to the comfort and uſefulneſs of life.

Locke, l. i. *c.* iv. § 20. *Ibid. l.* ii. *c.* iii. § 1.

Grad. 1—3.|4. It is needleſs and unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that any *ſimple* ideas are innate.

5. *Compound* ideas are made up of ſimple ones, nor can we by any operation of the mind produce any idea how chimerical ſoever, the materials of which we are not already poſſeſſed of.

Locke, l. ii. *c.* ii. § 2. *Ibid. c.* xii. § 8.

Grad. 4, 5.|6. It is needleſs and unreaſonable to ſuppoſe any of our ideas innate. *Q. E. D.*

Proced. of Underſt. p. 382-384.—*More's Philoſ. Works, l.* i. *c.* 5, 6.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Dr. *Watts* ſuppoſes there are three ſources of our ideas, viz. *Senſation*, *Reflection*, and *Abſtraction*; but ſince he grants that the materials of the laſt are derived from the two former, this cannot be reckoned a third primary ſource any more than *compounding*.

Watts's Phil. Eſſ. iii. § 16. *p.* 93-97.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Brown, in his *Procedure of the Underſtanding*, maintains that we have all our ideas originally from *Senſation*: but his proof depends entirely upon his definition of the word *Idea*, which he takes for a picture or repreſentation of ſome *ſenſible* object laid up in the imagination; which is different from our definition of it. *Vid. Def.* 1.

Proced. of Underſt. p. 55, 63—66.—*Dr. Price's Review of the Morals, c.* i. § 2.—*Lord Monboddo on the Origin and Progreſs of Language, v.* i. *p.* 1—184.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Moſt of thoſe ideas which ariſe from reflection, come into the mind later than thoſe which ariſe from ſenſation.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* i. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Many errors in our ideas of ſenſation are rectified by reflection.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* ix. § 8, 9.—*Smith's Optics, vol.* ii. *Append. p.* 27, 28.—*Locke's Fam. Lett. p.* 134—138.—*Watts's Logic, part* ii. *c.* iii. § 3. *p.* 200.

PROPOSITION VI.

LECT. VII. There are no innate propoſitions in the human mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. All propoſitions conſiſt of ideas: therefore innate propoſitions would imply innate ideas, contrary to Prop. 5.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iv. § 19.

2. If any propoſitions could be ſuppoſed innate, it muſt be thoſe that are intuitively diſcerned: but theſe, though aſſented to as ſoon as propoſed, are not known before ſuch propoſal, even by thoſe whoſe minds are leaſt corrupted by education and cuſtom: which ſhews (by the way) that they cannot be the principles of all our knowledge, not being themſelves firſt known.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* ii. § 4, 16, 21—27.

3. All propoſitions relating to *identity* and *diverſity* of ideas may be intuitively diſcerned, and conſequently muſt be innate, if intuitive diſcerning were the mark of an innate propoſition. But this would imply, that all our ideas were innate, which is evidently abſurd.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iv. § 4, 5. *Ibid. l.* 4. *c.* vii. § 4.

4. Propo-

4. Propoſitions ſuppoſed innate cannot be diſtinguiſhed from others, ſo that a complete catalogue of them ſhould be made: yet this might reaſonably be expected if any were ſo, and would be neceſſary to render them uſeful.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iii. § 14. *Ibid. c.* iv. § 21.

5. Several of thoſe propoſitions which are of greateſt importance in morality, and ſeem moſt evident, and are therefore moſt likely to be innate, are unknown to ſome, and expreſsly contradicted by others, and all need proof.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iv. § 4—13.—*Sale's Pref. to the Koran, p.* 131, 132.—*Watts's Eſſ.* iv. § 1.—*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 381.

Gr. 1—5.|6. *Valet propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM I.

It may be granted, that there are certain circumſtances, in which it is impoſſible for the mind to avoid receiving certain ideas, and aſſenting to certain propoſitions, and even taking them for granted in all its reaſonings: and this is the neceſſary conſequence of its conſtitution. It may alſo be granted, that there is ſomething in natural temper diſpoſing to gratitude, compaſſion, &c. as effectually as if propoſitions recommending them were inſcribed upon the ſoul. But this is by no means inconſiſtent with what has been ſaid above: and in this ſenſe Mr. *Locke* owns innate practical principles, as the *deſire of happineſs.*

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iii. § 2.—*Watts's Eſſ.* iv. § 2—4. *p.* 100—102, 104—107.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The dream of innate ideas, ſeems to have ariſen on the one hand, from the deſire of teachers to impoſe their own ſentiments upon their

diſciples, as ſacred truths ſtampt on their minds by the Author of nature; and on the other, from the eaſe with which ſuch principles have been early received, and the aſſurance with which they have been aſſented to, ſo that people cannot remember that they have ever doubted of them *.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iii. § 21—26. *Ibid. c.* iv. § 24.—*Enquiry concerning Political Juſtice, vol.* i. *p.* 12—18.

PROPOSITION VII.

LECT. VIII.

The ſame external qualities in objects, may excite different ideas in different perſons.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If the organs of ſenſation be at all different, the ideas of the ſame object muſt be proportionably ſo, while the ſame laws of nature prevail.

2. It is probable, there may be ſome degree of difference in the organs of different perſons; *v. g.* in the diſtance of the *retina* and *chryſtalline* humour of the eye; in the degree of extenſion in the *tympanum* of the ear, in the acrimony of the *ſaliva*, &c. And the variety which is obſervable in the faces, the voices, and the bones of men, and almoſt through the whole face of nature, would lead us to ſuſpect that the ſame variety might take place here.

* The doctrine of innate ideas, and innate propoſitions, was long maintained; and Mr. Locke was obliged to take much pains upon the ſubject. Though the ſyſtem is now generally exploded, there has appeared in a few late writers a tendency to revive ſomething like innate propoſitions, under the terms of the "Principles of Common Senſe." Dr. Reid is guarded upon the ſubject; but his followers have not been equally prudent. See Beattie's "Immutability of Truth," and more eſpecially Dr. Oſwald's "Appeal to Common Senſe in Behalf of Religion." Sentiments very ſimilar to thoſe maintained by theſe gentlemen had long before been advanced by Pere Buffier, in his "Firſt Truths, and the Origin of our Opinions explained," a tranſlation of which work, from the French, was publiſhed in 1780.

3. Thoſe

3. Thoſe things which are very pleaſing to one, are extremely diſagreeable to another.

4. Thoſe things which are at one time very agreeable, are at another very diſagreeable to the ſame perſon, when the organs of his body are indiſpoſed, or when other diſagreeable ideas are aſſociated with thoſe that had once been grateful.

Gr. 1, 2, and 4|5. *Valet propoſitio.*

Locke's Eſſay, b. ii. *c.* xxxii. § 15.—*Ars Cogitandi, p.* i. *c.* i.—*Le Clerc's Logic, p.* i. *c.* i. § 15.

SCHOLIUM.

Though the cauſes mentioned above may probably produce ideas which differ in *degree* in the minds of different perſons, there is no apparent reaſon to ſuppoſe they differ in their *kind*; *v. g.* that what appears green to one, ſhould conſtantly appear red to another, and *vice verſa.*

Malebranche's Reſearch, l. i. *c.* xiii. § 5, 6.—*Rohault's Phyſ. part* i. *c.* xxvii. § 6. *vol.* i. *p.* 197.—*Philoſophical Tranſactions, vol.* lxviii. *part* ii. *For* 1778.

PROPOSITION VIII.

To ſurvey the phænomena of the human memory with the ſolutions that have been given of ſome of them. See *Prop.* 1. *gr.* 2.

SOLUTION.

1. A vaſt ſtock of ideas are treaſured up in the memory, which it eaſily produces on various occaſions.

The *Carteſians* ſay, that objects coming in by ſenſation and ideas got by reflection, make traces in the brain.—But how exquiſitely fine muſt theſe be, when in ſo ſmall a compaſs the names and images of ſo many objects, as well as ſo many propoſitions and arguments are inſcribed. Who can ſufficiently admire it, not only in ſuch extra-

ordinary caſes as are mentioned by *Derham*, &c. but in thoſe caſes which are moſt common?

Derham's Phyſ. Theol. l. v. *c.* i. *p.* 262.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 42.—*Cicero's Tuſc. Diſp. l.* i. § 24, 25.—*Watts's Eſſ.* iii. § 13, 14.—*Rollin Maniere, &c. vol.* i. *p.* 275—277.—*Auguſt. Confeſ. l.* x. *c.* 7. *Senec. Controv. l.* i. *ſub init.*

2. We can diſtinguiſh ideas brought out of the memory from thoſe that come in by ſenſation or reflection; perhaps by the livelineſs of the impreſſion, or by the train of relations.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* 10. *c.* vi. § 5, 6.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 26.

3. Ideas of which we have but a general and imperfect remembrance may often be recovered by recollection.

Watts's Eſſ. iii. § 15.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* x. § 7.

4. Memory in a great meaſure depends upon the body, and is often much injured by a diſeaſe, and afterwards recovered with recovering ſtrength, which on the *Carteſian* hypotheſis is accounted for, by ſuppoſing that thoſe parts of the brain, on which theſe characters are written, are by ſuch diſorders relaxed, in the ſame manner as the nerves in the other parts of the body are liable to be weakened or diſabled.

5. The memory differs at different ages. Children ſoon forget, as they ſoon learn: old people learn with difficulty, and remember beſt what they learnt when young. That is, ſay the *Carteſians*, becauſe the brain growing by degrees more dry retains old characters, but does not eaſily admit new.

6. Dreams generally make little impreſſion on the memory: becauſe, ſay ſome, the animal ſpirits are then but gently moved.

Watts's Eſſ. N°. v. § 2.

7. An

7. An idea attended with great pleaſure or pain makes a deep impreſſion on the memory, *i. e.* a deep trace on the brain, the ſpirits being then violently impelled.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* x. § 3.

8. The power of recollecting differs extremely at different times: and it is generally ſtrongeſt, when we are moſt briſk and lively.

9. We remember that beſt in the morning, which we learnt juſt before we went to ſleep: becauſe, ſay the *Carteſians*, the traces made then are not apt to be effaced by the motions of the ſpirits, as they would, if new objects of ſenſation had preſented themſelves; and during this interval, they have (as it were) time to ſtiffen.

10. Senſible ideas gradually decay in the memory if they be not refreſhed by new ſenſations; the traces perhaps wearing out: yet they may laſt many years.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* x. § 4, 5.

11. When a train of ideas is very familiar to the mind, they often follow one another in the memory without any laborious recollection, and ſo as to ariſe almoſt inſtantaneouſly and mechanically; as in writing, ſinging, *&c.* the traces between them being worn like beaten roads.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxxiii. § 6.

12. The memory is a faculty which is almoſt inceſſantly exerciſed while thought continues; (though the inſtances of laborious recollection are comparatively few:) nor do we ever find the human mind entirely ſtript of it, though it be often impaired.

DEMONSTRATION.

LECT. IX.

The probability of the *Carteſian* hypotheſis will appear from conſidering,

1. How well it agrees with the various phænomena mentioned above.

2. The

2. The analogy upon this hypotheſis between ſenſation and memory, the one ariſing from impreſſions made on the brain, the other depending on traces continued there.

3. The inſtances in which memory has been almoſt wholly loſt at once by a ſudden violent blow upon the head; inſomuch that a great ſcholar has entirely loſt the knowledge of letters by it, and has been forced with infinite labour to begin again from the elements of them: and in other inſtances the recollection has been gradual, and the events of childhood and youth have been recovered firſt.

COROLLARY.

The memory is a uſeful faculty, which deſerves to be carefully cultivated by attention and exerciſe, frequent reviews and converſation.

Free-Thinker, N°. 72.—*Rollin's Man. &c. vol.* i. *p.* 277—279.—*Watts's Improv. of the Mind, part* i. *c.* xvii.

SCHOLIUM I.

The artificial methods which ſome have propoſed muſt be allowed to be very ingenious; but perhaps are rather calculated to improve a memory already good, than to help a bad one.

Rollin's Maniere, &c. vol. i. *p.* 279, 280. —*Grey's Memoria Technica.—Bruen's Life, p.* 56—58.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The excellency of the memory conſiſts partly in its ſtrength of retention, and partly in its quickneſs of recollection.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* x. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If the *Carteſian* hypotheſis ſhould be admitted, memory will ſtill continue a great myſtery: for it muſt be acknowledged impoſſible thoroughly to

to explain how either that or ſenſation ſhould be affected by any impreſſion on the brain, or what connection there can be between ſuch impreſſions and thought in any of its modes.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Locke* accounts for the aſſociation of ideas, which is the cauſe of antipathies and many errors, with other ſtrange phænomena, by memory; ſuppoſing ſuch traces are worn on the brain as unite ideas, ſo that when the mind turns to one it ſhould almoſt neceſſarily fall on the other too. See *Solution, gr.* II.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxxiii. § 7—18.—*Hartley on Man, Prop.* X, XI. *vol.* i. *p.* 65—72.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If the *Carteſian* hypotheſis be admitted, it muſt be owned that nothing gives a greater idea of the minuteneſs of the parts into which matter may actually be divided, than the ſmallneſs of thoſe traces, by which ſo many dictionaries, hiſtories, poems, *&c.* are tranſcribed, and ſo many pictures exactly drawn in miniature *.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is probable the weakneſs of memory in infants may be one chief cauſe of their being ſo long before they come to the uſe of ſpeech, as well as the want of dexterity in uſing the organs of it.

AXIOM VI.

LECT. X.

We get our ideas of SUCCESSION, by obſerving the train of ideas paſſing through our minds one after another. *Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xiv. § 4.

* That memory is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which we can give no account, but that we are ſo made, is maintained by Dr. Reid, in his "Eſſays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," p. 303—310. For an account of the different theories concerning Memory, ſee the ſame author, p. 338—356.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IX.

The ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs of the ſucceſſion of ideas in the human mind have certain limits.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Some motions are ſo ſwift, and others ſo ſlow, that they cannot be ſeen.

2. Motion is always ſucceſſive.

3. Could our ideas ſucceed each other as faſt as the bodies move in one caſe, and as ſlow as they move in the other, the motion would become viſible.

1, 3.|4. The ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs of ideas coming in by ſight have their limits.

5. There is equal reaſon to believe it with regard to other ideas: as ſome of the like phænomena may be obſerved concerning ſome ideas that come in by hearing.

6. We are not able to retain one idea long in the mind without any variation; nor can we call up any given number of ideas, in any given time; *v. g.* we cannot think over ten verſes between one vibration of the pendulum, and another.

Gr. 4 and 5, and 6.|7. *Valet propoſitio.*

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xiv. § 6—14.

SCHOLIUM.

It is evident that there are various degrees of velocity in the ideas of different perſons, and of the ſame perſon at different times; partly according to the temper in which he is, and partly according to the degree in which he exerciſes his volitions: and where the velocity is the ſame, it will ſeem greater in proportion as the kinds of ideas are more various. *Watts's Eſſ. N°.* xii. § 2.

AXIOM VII.

The idea of DURATION is a ſimple idea, which we get by reflecting on the ſucceſſion of our ideas. *Locke's Eſſ. ib.* § 1—3.

COR-

COROLLARY.

When we are inſenſible of the ſucceſſion of our ideas we are alſo inſenſible of duration.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 4, 5.

DEFINITION XVII.

TIME is a part of duration meaſured by ſome ſuppoſed equal ſucceſſion, a certain number of which makes a *period* or *epocha.*

Locke ib. § 17.—*Auguſt. Confeſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xiv. *apud Jackſon's Works, vol.* i. p. 883.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The revolutions of the heavenly bodies ſerve for a convenient meaſure of time, ſeeing they are long, various, publicly viſible, and nearly equable. Yet any phænomena returning periodically and regularly, (*v. g.* the freezing of water, the blowing of flowers, a fit of the ague, *&c.*) might with regard to any particular perſon anſwer the ſame end. *Locke ib.* § 19, 20.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheleſs, in the abſence of ſuch aſſiſtance, the train of ideas paſſing through a man's mind may be to himſelf the meaſure of time: though neither this nor any other meaſure can be demonſtrated entirely equable.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 21.

SCHOLIUM 3.

When the duration of any being is ſaid to be either long or ſhort, it is only as compared with that of other beings.

Free-Thinker, vol. iii. *N°.* 114.—*Le Clerc's Logic, part* i. *c.* iv. § 6.

COROLLARY 1.

The ſame part of duration may appear of different lengths to different perſons, and to the ſame

same persons at different times. See *Prop.* 7. *Schol.* *Spectator, vol.* ii. *N°.* 94.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may learn the reason why years (*cæteris paribus*) appear longer to us while very young, than as we grow up to riper age; because the objects being newer, strike the mind more forcibly, and so the succession is more observed than when they grow more familiar to the mind. The like may be observed of the day we spend in a strange place, or a road we are not used to travel. Yet if by frequent repetition a thing is grown tedious to us, it appears of a longer duration; because we mingle many other ideas with it, and therefore on the whole there is a greater succession.

COROLLARY 3.

If an almighty power be supposed, it may make that part of duration, which appears but a moment to one, appear a thousand years to another, or a much greater period, and *vice versa*; which is indeed an amazing thought.

COROLLARY 4.

Time is not (as it has often been said to be) the measure of motion, but motion is one, though not the only measure of time: for if there were no material world, and so no motion, there might still be time, if there were any intellectual being whose ideas succeed each other. See *Schol.* 1.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 22, 23.—*Jackson's Works, vol.* i. *l.* v. *c.* xiii. § 2. *p.* 881, 882.—*Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, p.* 310—314. 322—331.

DEFINITION XVIII.

LECT. XI.

Those PROPERTIES or QUALITIES of bodies, are called PRIMARY, which are in them, whether we

we perceive them or not: (*v. g.* bulk, number, figure, ſituation of their ſolid parts, motion, reſt, *&c.*) But thoſe ideas, which by means of theſe primary qualities are excited in our minds, as colours, ſounds, ſmells, taſtes, *&c.* being vulgarly but falſely ſuppoſed to be in bodies, are called SECONDARY QUALITIES.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* viii. § 8—22.—
Watts's Eſſ. N°. iii. *p.* 81—85.

SCHOLIUM.

Mr. *Locke* farther divides ſecondary qualities into thoſe that are *immediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the ideas which the bodies themſelves produce in us; and thoſe that are *mediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the changes which we ſee them produce in other bodies.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 23—26 *.

PROPOSITION X.

To enumerate ſeveral inſtances and cauſes of the imperfection of human knowledge.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are ignorant of many things for want of ideas; perhaps wanting proper organs for ſuch kind of ideas, and certainly wanting ſuch an intenſeneſs of thoſe organs which we have, as would be neceſſary to diſcover many things which are now concealed from us by their diſtance or minuteneſs. This occaſions great imperfections in our knowledge both of body and ſpirit.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* iii. § 23—27.

2. We are not able to diſcern the connection between many of thoſe ideas which we have, particularly that between the primary and ſecondary

* See this whole matter amply diſcuſſed by Dr. Reid, in his "Intellectual Powers of Man," p. 75—302.

qualities of bodies, which is a great impediment to phyſical enquiries.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* iii. § 9—17. *ib. c.* vi. § 11—15.—*Watts's Eſſ. N°.* iii. § 9.

3. Few important propoſitions are intuitively known; and all demonſtrative knowledge depends upon the memory, which being fallible brings ſome degree of uncertainty on what we learn by it.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* ii. § 4—7. *ib. c.* iii. § iii. *c.* xi. § 9—11.

4. We are often obliged to judge by analogy, the particulars of which are generally very imperfect, and come vaſtly ſhort of a compleat induction.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* xii. § 9. *c.* xvi. § 12.

5. The various avocations of life, an indolent temper, and wrong methods of purſuing knowledge, hinder our attaining what might otherwiſe come within our reach.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* iii. § 30.

COROLLARY.

Since our knowledge is ſo limited, it muſt be of great uſe and importance to know the limits of it.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* i. § 4—6.—*Maſon on Self Knowledge, p.* 62.—*Butler's Serm. N°.* xv.

SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheleſs, we are not deſtitute of capacities and opportunities for coming to the knowledge of thoſe things on which our happineſs moſt evidently depends.

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* i. § 5. *ib. l.* iv. *c.* xi. § 8.—*Jonval's Lett. in Nat. Diſplayed, vol.* i. *p.* 277—290.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

The queſtion, whether there be any material world or not, will come in with greater advantage hereafter: yet were the negative to be granted, (which Biſhop *Berkley* maintains,) the ſame difficulties with thoſe above-mentioned would occur, with a little alteration of phraſe.

PROPOSITION XI.

To enquire wherein PERSONAL IDENTITY conſiſts. SECT. XII.

SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes it conſiſts in a *continued conſciouſneſs of the ſame actions*; and thence infers, that, if the conſciouſneſs of one ſpirit were to be transferred to another, they would both make but one perſon; and that, if any ſpirit ſhould loſe all conſciouſneſs of its former actions, it would from that time become a different perſon. To confirm this, he pleads that, when it is evidently apparent that conſciouſneſs is loſt, *i. e.* in caſe of phrenſy, when a man is beſides himſelf, the ſober man is not puniſhed for the actions of the mad-man, nor the mad-man for the actions of the ſober man. But I think this may be accounted for another way, without ſuppoſing that the law looks upon them as different perſons.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxvii. § 9—27.

2. To this Dr. *Watts* very juſtly objects, that fancied memory might make two men born in the moſt diſtant places and times the ſame perſon, or real forgetfulneſs might make the ſame man different perſons; *v. g. Lee* the tragedian, when diſtracted, might be ſucceſſively *Alexander*, *Socrates*, *Tully*, *Virgil*, *Luther*, queen *Elizabeth*; and therefore *Lee*, when diſtracted, might juſtly

be rewarded or puniſhed for all the different actions which he aſcribes to himſelf: and finally, ſeveral men might become the ſame perſons. This he thinks is contrary to the common forms of ſpeech and to true philoſophy.

Watts's Eſſ. N°. xii. § 7. *p.* 294—308.

3. He therefore concludes, that *the ſame perſon*, in an incompleat ſenſe, *is the ſame intelligent ſubſtance or conſcious mind*, but in a more compleat ſenſe, is *the ſame ſoul united to the ſame body*; or in other words, that, while a ſpirit is united to a body, the ſame continued animal life, in union with the ſame ſpirit, generally attended with the ſame conſciouſneſs, goes to conſtitute the ſame perſon. If the queſtion be ſtarted relating to a ſuppoſed reſurrection, it is anſwered that if the reſurrection precedes the diſſolution of the body, it does not alter the common forms of ſpeaking; but if the body be diſſolved, we may refer it to an after enquiry how far and in what caſes it may be ſaid to be the ſame. Mr. *Locke* alſo acknowledges this to be moſt probable: ſo that the chief queſtion between them is only about the application of the word *perſon* in a caſe that is never likely to happen, *i. e.* of transferred conſciouſneſs. Yet for this very reaſon I think Dr. *Watts's* notion is to be preferred. And to conclude, if God ſhould utterly deſtroy the ſoul and body of any man whom we know, and afterwards create a new ſpirit, united to a new body and in form reſembling the other, and give to it the exact conſciouſneſs of the man whoſe body and ſoul was deſtroyed, and ſhould reveal to us what he had done, we could not converſe with this new produced man as the ſame man we formerly knew, or approve that as an equitable conduct, by which he ſhould be rewarded or puniſhed for the actions of the annihilated man. This abundantly ſhews the impropriety of Mr. *Locke's*

Locke's manner of ſtating the queſtion, and how much Dr. *Watts's* is to be preferred to it.

Watts's Eſſ. ib. p. 301—306, 308—313. —*Locke's Eſſ. ib.* § 25.—*Le Clerc's Ontology, c.* ii. § 7.—*Butler's Analogy, Diſſ.* i. *p.* 439—450. *Oct. ed. p.* 305 —309. *Quarto ed. of* 1736.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Mr. *Locke* ſeems to have been led into this miſtake, by conſidering what we commonly call *ourſelves*, rather than what we call *the ſame perſon* when ſpeaking of *another*. (*Vide Locke ubi ſupra*, § 16.) Yet it is plain we do not make conſciouſneſs the *only* rule even here, ſince no one is conſcious of his having been born, nor of many other events and actions of his life, which nevertheleſs upon the evidence of reaſon and teſtimony, without conſciouſneſs, he would not at all ſcruple to apply to himſelf.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have two ideas of *body* in all reſpects the ſame, for inſtance, of a book, or watch, we judge that they have the ſame archetype, if each of the ideas have the ſame relation to certain times and places; for we know that two bodies cannot be at the ſame time in the ſame place. As for the queſtion, whether two *ſpirits* may or not, it depends upon the doctrine of the immateriality; and it is proper to defer the examination of it, till we have proved that there is ſome immaterial ſpirit.

Eſſay on Perſonal Identity, publiſhed for Robſon, 1769.—*Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Perſonal Identity, printed at Cambridge, and ſold by Johnſon*, 1769.—*Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, p.* 315—321. *p.* 332—337.

PROPOSITION XII.

LECT. XIII. To enquire whether men think always without intermiſſion.

COMPARISON of ARGUMENTS.

SECT. I. For the AFFIRMATIVE.

If there be a time when the ſoul does not think, the exiſtence of it as a ſpirit is deſtroyed: and we can imagine nothing to remain, unleſs it be ſomething merely material. Now there is no apparent reaſon to think the ſoul thus exiſts by intervals; and therefore we muſt conclude it always thinks.

To this it is replied, that ſuch a definition of the ſoul, as implies continual actual thought, is begging the queſtion in diſpute. When *actual thought* is ſuſpended, there may remain ſome ſecret *power of thinking* reſulting from the conſtitution of the ſoul, which will exert itſelf when the obſtruction is removed. As a bow when bent has a diſpoſition to ſtraiten itſelf again, or a clock to ſtrike, though the hammer be held back.

To this it is anſwered, we can have no idea of this power. If the power of thinking be not the very ſubſtance of the ſoul, there muſt be ſome unknown ſubſtance in which the power inheres: nor can we imagine how it awakes itſelf again to actual thought.

It is farther objected, that the various degrees of intenſeneſs of thought, which we all perceive, ſeem to prove that thought is not the eſſence of the ſoul; for then it muſt be uniform and conſtant. (*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xix.)

But it may be replied, that the leaſt degree of thought is thought, as the fineſt particle of matter is matter. On the whole it muſt be granted, that, if it be hereafter proved without this propoſition, that the human ſoul is immaterial, there will

will be some considerable weight in the argument; if the contrary be proved, there will be very little.

Watts's Eff. N°. v. § i. *p.* 116—118.—*Locke's Eff. l.* ii. *c.* i. § 10—19.—*Enquiry concerning Political Justice, p.* 335—340.

SECT. II. For the NEGATIVE.

Arg. 1. If we think in our sleep, we think in vain; and it is not to be thought we are so constituted as that this should be necessary.

Answer. If all our forgotten thoughts are in vain, many of our waking thoughts are so; for how few can we perfectly recollect? We may as well argue against our existing at all without thought, as a useless thing. Besides, there is perhaps in sleep some continued sense of pleasure, which the wise Author of nature might connect with so necessary a support of life as sleep is. To which we may farther add, that the uninterrupted thought of every rational spirit, whether remembred or forgotten, may make a part of a scheme, in the general right and useful, though the advantage of it in some particular instances may not appear. As we may suppose with respect to those minerals or metals in the bowels of the earth, which are never in fact discovered.

Locke, ib. § 15—*Watts's Eff. ib.* § 3. *p.* 127, 128.

Arg. 2. Infants, who have but few ideas, sleep much; probably before, and to be sure after their birth: but is it to be imagined they are all that while necessarily employed in thinking?

Anf. It is allowed they have few, or no ideas by *reflection:* (for the thought of a learned *Scotch* Anatomist, who pretends they are then forming the heart and lungs for their respective offices, seems too extravagant to be particularly exa-

mined). But ideas of *ſenſation* they have early; perhaps ſome ſtrong ſenſations of the mother communicated to them before the birth: but when the ſoul is firſt united we know not.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 17, 21, 22.—*Watts's Eſſ. ib. p.* 129—131.

Arg. 3. As we fall aſleep we ſeem gradually to approach to a ſtate of inſenſibility; it is therefore probable that at length we arrive at it.

Anſ. If by inſenſibility be meant incogitation, the phænomenon is denied: the ſame kind of argument may prove, that matter might be annihilated by continual diviſion.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xix. § 3, 4.

Arg. 4. We do not remember that we think in many of our ſleeping hours, therefore how can we know that we do?

Anſ. Dreams may be entirely, or but imperfectly, or not at all remembered, according to the various degrees in which the nerves are impreſſed by the motion given to the animal ſpirits in ſleep. Beſides, daily experience ſhews us, that occurrences of the day bring to mind dreams, which in the morning we had forgotten; and we have often a general remembrance that we have dreamed, though we know not of what: to which it may be added, that people ſometimes in their ſleep diſcover marks of great emotion, when, if aſked in the morning what it was that diſquieted them, they do not perhaps know; ſo that though it would be very ridiculous to argue from univerſal experience that we always think in our ſleeping hours, this will not be an unanſwerable objection againſt any other argument; nor can it poſſibly prove that we ever ceaſe from thinking, any more than breathing, which we alſo forget; or than forgetting the circumſtances of our birth will prove we were never born.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* i. § 13, 14, 18.—*Watts's Eſſ. ib.* § 2. *p.* 120—25.

Arg.

Arg. 5. It might be expected that thoſe operations of the ſoul ſhould be moſt rational, in which it is moſt abſtracted from the body; whereas, by what we remember of our dreams, we perceive the contrary.

Anſ. It may be a law of the creation, that, during our union with the body, a certain diſpoſition of the nerves, generally wanting in ſleep, ſhould be neceſſary to rational and connected thought; and that ſuch a wild play of the animal ſpirits as ariſes from the obſtruction of the nerves ſhould cauſe roving imaginations, which therefore by the way it is no diſhonour or detriment to forget.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 16.—*Watts's Eſſ. ib.* § 3. *p.* 126, 127.

Arg. 6. If a man thinks without knowing it, the ſleeping and waking man are two different perſons.

Anſ. If by *knowing* it, be meant *remembering* it, (which it muſt mean if it be at all to the purpoſe) they cannot be different perſons, according to Mr. *Locke*'s principles of identity, unleſs every inſtance of forgetfulneſs makes a man a new and different perſon: and then how many thouſands and millions is every man! This objection would ſuppoſe two diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſſes acting in the ſame body by intervals, as in ſleeping and waking; which none ever maintained.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 12. *c.* xxvii. § 23.—*Watts's Eſſ. ib. p.* 125, 126.

Arg. 7. If the ſoul always thinks, there muſt be ſome innate ideas, contrary to *Prop.* 5.

Anſ. There muſt be ſome one idea at leaſt or perception; but that it is this rather than that, does not ariſe from the original conſtitution of the ſoul, but from the circumſtances in which the body to which it is united is placed: (thus it

might have been the idea of *colour* as well as *heat*). So that ſuppoſing the ſoul at the firſt moment of its union with the body to have the idea of *heat*, this would not prove heat to be an innate idea. *Def.* 16.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 17, 20, 21.—See on this ſubject, *Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 330—346. and *note* (*a*) Oct. Ed.

SCHOLIUM.

It may not be amiſs here to mention the argument which Mr. *Baxter* has drawn from the phænomena of dreams, to prove the exiſtence of ſome immaterial ſpirits by which they are ſuggeſted; though the particular manner, in which that ſtrange and ſeemingly inconcluſive argument is managed, cannot here be largely repreſented, and need not be particularly confuted.

Baxter on the Soul, c. x. *paſſim.* Oct. Ed. *vol.* ii. § 1.

PROPOSITION XIII.

LECT. XIV. To take a more particular ſurvey of the PASSIONS of the human mind, according to Dr. *Watts*'s diſtribution of them. See *Prop.* 1. *Sol. gr.* 3.

SOLUTION.

An object may be conſidered as *rare* and uncommon, as *good* or *evil* in the *general*, or with reſpect to the various *kinds* of good or evil, and the particular *circumſtances* that attend it.

1. If an object be in the general conſidered as *rare*, it excites *Admiration:* ſudden wonder is *Surpriſe*, great wonder is *Aſtoniſhment*. This paſſion has no oppoſite. If an Object appear *good* in the general, it excites *Love*; if *evil*, *Hatred*.

N. B. Theſe are primary paſſions, and thoſe under the next head are derived from the two laſt of theſe.

2. As

2. As to the various *kinds* of good and evil; conſidering an object merely and abſolutely as valuable, it excites *Eſteem*, which in a very high degree is *Veneration*, and in a ſupreme degree is *Adoration*. If it be conſidered as worthleſs, it excites *Contempt*, eſpecially if it be propoſed as excellent. If it be conſidered as fit to receive good from us, it is the object of *Benevolence* or Good-will; if fit to receive evil, *of Malevolence* or Ill-will. But it is to be obſerved that this paſſion centers only on ſenſible objects, *i. e.* on objects capable of perception. If the object be conſidered as fit to do me good, or afford me any preſent pleaſure, it produces *Complacency*, if the contrary *Diſplicency*. Complacency in any very high degree towards an inferior, or on conſiderations not adequate to that degree of regard, is *Fondneſs*; the oppoſite to which is *Diſguſt* or Loathing.

N. B. There may be benevolence where there is no complacency, but a high degree of complacency without benevolence is hardly conceivable.

3. As to the various *circumſtances* in which the good or evil object is conſidered, it may be either *preſent* or *abſent*.

(1.) Future good conſidered as poſſible excites *Deſire*, which is the great ſpring of action: if evil be conſidered as poſſible, it excites *Averſion*.

(2.) If there be a probable proſpect of obtaining abſent good, it excites *Hope*; if evil be likely to come upon us, it produces *Fear*. The higheſt degree of hope is *Confidence* or Security; when little remains, there is *Deſpondency*; and when hope is entirely baniſhed, *Deſpair* ſucceeds. Fear joined with foreſight, is *Anxiety*; with careful contrivance to avoid it, is *Solicitude*; mingled with ſurpriſe and riſing to a violent degree on a ſudden, is *Terror*; and a high degree of

of averſion attending the idea of any object we apprehend or reflect on, is *Horror*.

(3.) Good obtained awakens *Joy:* evil actually endured brings *Sorrow*. Moderate joy is *Gladneſs:* ſudden and high joy is *Exultation:* habitual joy is *Cheerfulneſs*. Moderate ſorrow is *Trouble:* great ſorrow is *Diſtreſs* and Anguiſh: habitual ſorrow is *Melancholy*. *Congratulation* is the ſentiment and expreſſion of joy ariſing from the happineſs of another. *Pity* and Compaſſion is ſorrow ariſing from the diſtreſs of another. *Sympathy* comprehends both: *Envy* is the contrary of both. *Jealouſy* is a ſpecies of envy, ariſing from an apprehenſion of preference given to another perſon in the affections of one for whom we have a peculiar regard. *Shame* may be reckoned as a ſpecies of ſorrow, attended frequently with bluſhing, ariſing from a conſciouſneſs, imputation, or apprehenſion of any thing that appears to be matter of diſgrace, in ourſelves, or others we are concerned for, *i. e.* when likely to expoſe us or them to the contempt of others.

(4.) When any intelligent being deſignedly brings good upon us, it excites *Gratitude*; when evil, *Anger*. With reſpect to our fellow-creatures, gratitude is a mixture of complacency and benevolence; anger is diſplicency with ſome degree of malevolence. When anger riſes to an exceſſive degree, it is *Rage* and Fury; when it is deeply rooted, it is *Rancour* and Spite; when ariſing on trifling occaſions, and expreſſed in little tokens of reſentment, it is *Peeviſhneſs*.

When an affront is apprehended, beneath us or any other perſon to whom it is offered, it excites *Indignation*; and when anger is attended with a deſire of hurting another it is called *Malice*; and when this is in conſequence of an apprehended injury, *Revenge*.

Watts on the Paſſions, § 2. *p.* 4—9. *Ed.* 2. —*Fordyce's Mor. Philoſ. b.* i. § 2—4.— *Pope's Ethic Epiſt.* ii. *ver.* 93—204.— *Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xx.—*Hutcheſon's Treatiſe on the Paſſions.*—*Le Brun* "*Of the Characters of the Paſſions.*"

SCHOLIUM 1.

Des-Cartes divides the primary paſſions into ſix, *viz.* Admiration, Love, Hatred, Deſire, Joy and Sorrow: and though this is by no means an accurate diſtribution, yet his deſcription of the paſſions contains many excellent paſſages.

Des-Cartes de Paſſ. part ii. § 69. *p.* 81.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As pain is uſeful for preſerving the animal body from thoſe injuries which might prove fatal to it, ſo many of the paſſions, which are diſagreeable in their preſent operations, are uſeful and even neceſſary, both to individuals and ſocieties.

Watts on the Paſſ. p. 85—88.— *Butler's Serm. N°.* viii. *p.* 150—154.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* vii. § 4.—*Foſter's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 122—125, *and* 128.

PROPOSITION XIV.

To enquire into the Original of our paſſions. LECT. XV.

SOLUTION.

1. They may either ariſe from the motion of the body, impreſſions on the ſenſes, or operations of the mind by which ideas are produced: as the ſight of beauty, hearing of muſick, or underſtanding a propoſition.

2. From ideas recollected by the memory, which may be accompanied with ſome degree of pleaſure or pain, which they at firſt gave. (*Prop.* 8. *gr.* 7.)

3. From

3. From the exerciſe of reaſon, which apprehends a probability of approaching good or evil.

Des-Cartes de Paſſ. part ii. § 51.—*Watts on the Paſſ.* § 3. *p.* 10—17.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The ſecond and third ſource ariſe from the firſt; ſince there could have been no memory nor reaſoning, without ideas preſented to the mind as the ground-work of its operations.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some think the paſſions may be raiſed by means of the body, when no particular idea is preſented to any one of the ſenſes; that is, only from the temperature of the body: *v. g.* when we find ourſelves chearful or ſad, and cannot aſſign any reaſon for it: which if it be admitted, may in the judgment of ſome make it dubious, whether the firſt idea in the human mind be (as Mr. *Locke* maintains) an idea of ſenſation. But it may perhaps be anſwered, we have a ſenſe of the temperature of the body; and that we are ſeldom in our waking hours deſtitute of ſome ſenſible impreſſions, which are at different times painful or pleaſant, in different degrees, according as our organs are diſpoſed.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* i. § 23, 24.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The paſſions cannot be immediately excited or ſuppreſſed by our volitions, but conſequentially they may; eſpecially thoſe ariſing from the third ſpring, by which ſome ariſing from the two former may be balanced.

Des-Cartes de Paſſ. § 45—47.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is queried why objects are often found to affect the paſſions leſs when they are grown familiar, than they did before.—To this it may be anſwered,

anſwered, that admiration in a great meaſure proceeds from the novelty of objects. Perhaps in other inſtances it may be owing to ſome unknown connection between making the *firſt* impreſſion on the brain and the excitation of the paſſions. Yet it is obſervable, that the degree in which we are impreſſed, is by no means proportionable to the novelty of objects alone; it depends much more upon the temperature of the body, and a variety of other particulars.

AXIOM VIII.

We find by experience that our minds are ſo conſtituted, that ſome degree of paſſion or deſire is neceſſary to action; ſo that an entire ſuſpenſion of them would be attended with a ſtagnation of all our faculties.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* vii. § 3.—*Des-Cartes de Paſſ.* § 40.—*Spectator, vol.* iv. *N°.* 255.

COROLLARY.

It muſt be of the greateſt importance, in order to influence men to a due courſe of action, to know how to awaken or moderate their paſſions by proper application to them; and thoſe who act as if they deſired entirely to eradicate the paſſions, are ignorant of the conſtitution of human nature, and can expect but little ſucceſs in their attempts to work upon the mind.

Doddridge's Dedication of x *Serm. p.* 10.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. *Locke* maintains that *deſire* is always a ſtate of uneaſineſs: but it is certain, that in many caſes the uneaſineſs is abundantly overbalanced by a probable proſpect of the immediate enjoyment of good: and if ſome degree of uneaſineſs be univerſally neceſſary to action, it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to conceive how any active being can be perfectly happy.

Locke's

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 32—34.—*Watts on Liberty, p.* 23—25. — *Grove's Poſthumous Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 136, 137. — *Watts's Eſſay on the Freedom of Will in God and his Creatures. Octavo. Or his Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 382, 383.

SCHOLIUM 2.

We cannot miſtake in judging of preſent pleaſure or pain, as the incentives of deſire or averſion; but in judging of future we often do.

Locke's Eſſ. ib. § 61—65.

DEFINITION XIX.

LECT. XVI.

When a being is determined to the performance of any action, not by a view of the beneficial conſequences that may attend it, but merely from a ſtrong impulſe leading to the action itſelf, that being is ſaid to act by INSTINCT.

COROLLARY 1.

There are many remarkable inſtincts in mankind, which greatly tend both to the good of individuals and the ſpecies. Thoſe which are called natural appetites plainly come under this claſs; to which may be added parental affection, and ſome workings of compaſſion and gratitude: though it muſt be granted the force of all theſe is very different in different perſons.

Baxter's Practical Works, vol. i. *p.* 379. *col.* 2.—*Andry apud Mem. of Literat. vol.* i. *p.* 15.—*Hutcheſon's Enq. p.* 143—147, 195—199.

COROLLARY 2.

Brutes are governed by inſtinct in many of their actions, as was obſerved above, *Prop.* 2. *gr.* 6. The reaſon upon which many of their actions depend, could not be diſcovered without a penetration far beyond what is to be found in the

the generality of men. See particular inſtances of this in the Bee (*a*), in the Ant (*b*), in the Waſp (*c*), in the Raven (*d*), in the Formica Leo (*e*), in the Galli Sylveſtres (*f*), in the Bohaques (*g*), in the Fox (*h*), in the Beaver (*i*), in the Turkey Hen (*k*), in the Common Hen (*l*), beſides many others (*m*).

(*a*) *Ray's Wiſdom of God, p.* 132, 133. 2 *Ed. p.* 122—124.—*Nat. Diſp. vol.* i. *p.* 168—178, 182—184, 194—202.——(*b*) *Guardian, vol.* ii. *N°.* 156, 157.—*Plin. Nat. Hiſt.* xi. 30.——(*c*) *Nat. Diſpl. part* i. *p.* 126—148.——(*d*) *Albert. Magnus, apud Crad. Harm. part* ii. *p.* 67. *note in the margin.*——(*e*) *Nat. Diſp. part* i. *p.* 234—240.——(*f*) *Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p.* 229.——(*g*) *Derham, Ib. p.* 212.——(*h*) *Derham, Ib. p.* 204.——(*i*) *Nat. Diſpl. part* ii. *p.* 106—114.——(*k*) *Nat. Diſpl. Ib. p.* 23, 24.——(*l*) *Spect. vol.* ii. *N°.* 120.——(*m*) *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l.* ii. § 48—50.—*Cambray ſur l'Exiſt.* § 23. *p.* 46, 47.—*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 211—220.—*Eſſay on Hunting, p.* 53, 54,—*Pope's Ethic Epiſt.* iii. *ver.* 172—198 *.

SCHOLIUM I.

That inſtinct is not mere imitation, ſee proved by a remarkable ſtory in

Galen, apud Ray's Wiſd. of God, p. 349—353. 2 *Ed. p.* 133—135.

* Great light has been thrown upon the properties and inſtincts of animals by many recent authors. See particularly Buffon's Natural Hiſtory, Pennant's Arctic Zoology, and George Edwards's Works; to which ſeveral other productions might be added. Many of the Voyages and Travels that have lately been publiſhed are worthy of being particularly ſtudied in this view. The information given by Captain Cook, and the other circumnavigators of the globe, muſt not be forgotten.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is probable, that in moſt inſtances if not in all, the actions to which any being is determined by inſtinct, are accompanied with immediate pleaſure.

DEFINITION XX.

LECT. XVII.

A MENTAL HABIT is a facility of thinking or willing any action acquired by frequent acts.

PROPOSITION XV.

Mental habits do very much depend upon the memory.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Memory, furniſhing us with ideas and relations, makes it eaſy for us to think upon any ſubject.

2. Furniſhing us with motives, it makes it eaſy to will it.

3. When memory ceaſes, we ſee that mental habits are deſtroyed.

1 and 2, and 3. 4. *Valet propoſitio.* (*Def.* 20.) *Clerici Pneum. Sect.* i. *c.* iv. § 18—22.

COROLLARY 1.

Mental Habits muſt very much depend on the body, ſince memory plainly does ſo. *Prop.* 8. *Sol. gr.* 4.

COROLLARY 2.

The facility with which the body obeys the command of the mind, is a thing different from mental habit: yet it may have ſome affinity to it, as bodily motion depends upon volition.

COROLLARY 3.

No habits can in ſtrict propriety of ſpeech be ſaid to be *infuſed*; ſince it is impoſſible the firſt act of any kind ſhould be the effect of habit, according to the definition. Yet a diſpoſition may

may be given to perform acts at first with as much readiness, as if they had been learnt by long practice. Neither can any habit be properly said to be *hereditary:* yet there may be, and it is plain in fact that there are certain hereditary dispositions towards contracting habits of one kind rather than another.

SCHOLIUM 1.

On these principles some account for the phænomenon which has frequently been observed, that a great degree of wit and judgment seldom meet in the same person; because wit is an habit of finding out the resemblance of ideas, and making an agreeable assemblage of them; whereas judgment is the habit of distinguishing accurately between those that have some resemblance, though they really differ. It is not to be wondered at, if two such different habits do not ordinarily occur in the same mind. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged highly probable, that habit is not the only thing that makes the difference between various persons in this respect, though it may serve very much to increase it*. See *Prop.* 3. *Schol.* 1.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. *c.* xi. § 2.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Idiots reason very little, and make few propositions; whereas the mad-man reasons very much, and often justly, but upon very precarious and false principles.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. *c.* xi. § 12, 13.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The force of habit, both mental and corporeal, is so great, that it is an evident part of wisdom

* For the different accounts which have been given of Wit, recourse may be had to the Spectator, vol. 1. N° 58—63; to Mr. David Fordyce's Dialogues on Education; and to Lord Kaims's Elements of Criticism, vol. ii. chap. xiii. p. 60—84.

to take care how habits are formed; and it is worth our while to use great labour to turn and fix them on the right side.

Tillotson's Serm. vol. i. *N°.* 29. *p.* 301—304.—*Dodsl. Præcept. vol.* ii. *p.* 519—530.

DEFINITION XXI.

Those properties of any being are called PERFECTIONS, which directly tend to promote its happiness.

COROLLARY.

Only spirits are capable of perfection, since a capacity for happiness implies perfection, *i. e.* thought.

SCHOLIUM.

Nevertheless, in an inferior sense, or by analogy, insensible beings may be called perfect, *i. e.* as they are fitted to answer the purposes intended by them.

Watts's Ontol. c. viii. *p.* 353—355.

DEFINITION XXII.

LECT. XVIII. That mind is said to be possessed of NATURAL LIBERTY, or liberty of choice, which is so constituted, as that its volitions shall not be invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it, but by its own sovereign pleasure.

COROLLARY I.

If any instance occurs, in which the mind can chuse no otherwise than it does, it is not in that instance naturally free; though it chuses with the greatest delight, and executes its volitions without any restraint.

Watts on Liberty, p. 8, 9.—*Collins on Liberty, part* ii. *Ed.* 2.—*Limborch's Theology, l.* ii. *c.* xxiii. § 20.

COR-

COROLLARY 2.

Natural liberty as before defined, includes what ſome have called *a liberty of contrariety*, as well as of *contradiction*; *i. e.* ſuppoſes the mind able to chuſe the contrary, as well as to defer its choice: if indeed theſe two expreſſions do not ſignify in fact the ſame thing, which in ſome connections at leaſt they may.

Hutcheſon's Metaph. p. 22.

DEFINITION XXIII.

EXTERNAL LIBERTY, or liberty of action, is oppoſed to a conſtraint laid on the executive powers; and conſiſts in a power of rendering our volitions effectual.

COROLLARY.

There may be external where there is not natural liberty, and *vice verſa*.

Watts on Lib. p. 4, 5.

SCHOLIUM.

The liberty of which Mr. *Locke* generally treats, is a liberty of action not of choice, and that *Collins* expreſsly allows.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 7—13, 21—30, 71.—*Collins on Lib. p.* 115—118.

DEFINITION XXIV.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY conſiſts in a prevailing diſpoſition to act according to the dictates of reaſon; *i. e.* in ſuch a manner as ſhall, all things conſidered, moſt effectually promote our happineſs. A diſpoſition to act contrary to this is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally diſpoſed to follow reaſon, or act contrary to it, it is then ſaid to be in a ſtate of INDIFFERENCE.

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. ii. *p.* 617, 618.—*Perf. Sat.* v. *ver.* 124—191.—*Clarke's Serm. vol.* iii. *N°.* 1. *p.* 5—13. *Ed.* 12*mo.*

COROLLARY.

Philoſophical liberty is a perfection of the mind; (*See Def.* 21.) ſince much of our happineſs depends on our conduct, and by acting according to reaſon, much good may be obtained, and much evil avoided.

DEFINITION XXV.

A man is ſaid to be MORALLY FREE, when there is no interpoſition of the will of a ſuperior being, to prohibit or determine his actions in any particular under conſideration.

Watts on Liberty, p. 4.

COROLLARY.

As the ſame man may be ſubject to the controul of various ſuperiors, one of which may allow what another prohibits, he may as to the ſame action be ſaid to be or not to be morally free, according to the perſons whoſe will is in queſtion. Nevertheleſs, where there is one who has a much greater power and authority over him than any of the reſt, it is proper to judge of his moral freedom by conſidering the will of ſuch a ſuperior perſon.

DEFINITION XXVI.

Compleat liberty conſiſts in the union of natural, external, moral, and philoſophical liberty, without any ſtruggle or difficulty.

Watts on Lib. p. 9—12.—*Colliber's Enq. p.* 47—59. *Ed.* 3.

COROLLARY 1.

Compleat liberty on the whole is a perfection. (*See Def.* 24. *Cor.*

COROLLARY 2.

Compleat liberty ſeems to conſiſt in a certain ſymmetry or ſubordination of the faculties; and, when

when applied to ſuch beings as ourſelves, ſuppoſes a ſerene underſtanding, moderate paſſions riſing in proportion to the nature of objects, the will chuſing to follow ſuch regular impreſſions, and the executive powers readily and vigorouſly performing its dictates.

COROLLARY 3.

When we ſpeak of compleat liberty, it is not ſo proper to enquire whether the *will* be free, but rather whether the *man* be ſo. (*See Prop.* 1. *Schol.* 1.) Yet natural liberty evidently belongs to the *will.*

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 14—19.—*Watts's Eſſ. N°.* xii. § 5.

SCHOLIUM.

What ſome call a *liberty of ſpontaneity,* conſiſts merely in *chuſing* to perform any particular action: nor does it at all enter into the queſtion, whether we can chuſe or perform the contrary. But ſince this is nothing more than *willing,* it does not deſerve the name of liberty.

For the *Carteſian* notion of it, ſee

Des-Cartes Princ. i. § 37—39.—*Watts on Lib. p.* 6.

PROPOSITION XVI.

LECT. XIX.

The mind of man is poſſeſſed of natural liberty, *i. e.* liberty of choice.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are conſcious to ourſelves, that we have a power of chuſing otherwiſe than we do in a multitude of inſtances.

2. We univerſally agree that ſome actions deſerve praiſe and others blame; and we ſometimes condemn ourſelves as conſcious of the latter: for which there could be no foundation at all, if we were invincibly determined in every volition,

and had it to say, we had done the best we possibly could.

3. The laws of all nations agree to punish some actions in a man who is master of his reason, for which they would not punish one whom they knew to be distracted.

4. When equal objects are proposed to our choice, we sometimes determine to chuse one of them rather than another, without being able to assign any reason for such a preference.

1, 2, 3, 4|5. *Valet propositio.*

Grove of Hum. Lib. § 13—16.—*Watts on Liberty*, § 3, *p.* 28—39.—*Religion of Nature*, *p.* 63, 64. *Ed.* 4*to.*—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 85—89.

COROLLARY.

The will is not determined (as some have asserted) by the last dictate, or rather assent of the understanding, nor the greatest apparent good, nor a prevailing uneasiness, which last seems to coincide with the former.

Watts on Lib. p. 17—23, 25—27.—*Locke's Eff. l.* ii. *c.* xxi. § 35, 36.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 97—100.—*Clarke and Leibnitz*, *p.* 403—415.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that we are formed with a necessary desire of happiness, and consequently cannot chuse any thing but what in present circumstances appears most conducive to it: and experience is appealed to as confirming the assertion, since we are always in fact most inclined to what we chuse.

Answer. This must be acknowledged a considerable difficulty.

It is granted that what we chuse must have some appearance of good; but the mind appears in fact, as well as from the reasoning in the proposition,

poſition, to have a power of preferring a ſmaller preſent to a greater abſent and future good, though at the ſame time it condemns itſelf of folly in ſuch a choice; which it could never do, if what it choſe always appeared to be the greateſt good; ſince then in every choice it would act according to the neceſſary impulſe and conſtitution of its nature. And though we allow that there is always a greater inclination to what we chuſe than what we refuſe, yet till this inclination be proved invincible, the propoſition may hold good.

Turretine, vol. i. *Loc.* x. *Qu.* ii. § 7, 15, 16.—*Coll. on Lib. p.* 40—44.—*Burn. on the Art. p.* 117, 118.—*Watts on Lib. p.* 70—74.—*Grove on Lib.* § 18, 19.—*Grove's Mor. Philoſ. vol.* i. *p.* 205—214.—*Maclaurin's Newtonian Philoſ. p.* 81—84.—*Clarke and Leibnitz, Append. N°.* 3.—*Cato's Letters, vol.* iv. *N°.* 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the argument from ſelf-accuſation *Collins* replies, that it is only the ſenſe of having acted againſt ſome rules, which on reflection we apprehend it would have been better for us to have followed, though it did not appear ſo when we did the action.—But how then could conſcience condemn us, not only in our after reflections, but in the act itſelf? or how could we condemn ourſelves for having done fooliſhly in chuſing what did appear to us the greateſt good, and could not but ſo appear?

Collins ib. p. 105, 106.—*Grove's Poſth. Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 93—148. *præf.* § 3—7, *and* § 21.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is objected to the argument, *gr.* 3. that puniſhments are often inflicted where it is granted

there is no liberty at all, as on lunatics, drunkards, and brutes.

Anſ. It may be debated how far it is proper to call the ſeverities uſed with them in ſome caſes puniſhments, or how far they may be deſtitute of all natural liberty. But as for *Collins's* argument, that were man a free creature rewards and puniſhments would ſignify nothing, becauſe it would lie in his own breaſt to ſlight them; it is moſt evidently weak: for nevertheleſs they would be a probable means of anſwering their end, and that they are not always effectual is evident in fact. *Collins ib. p.* 86—88, 91—98.

SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT. XX. To the fourth argument (which is generally called *choice* ἐν ἀδιαφορίᾳ) it is anſwered by the oppoſers of natural liberty, that no ſuch caſe can occur that two objects ſhould appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impoſſible; for that would imply an effect without a cauſe, or a balance turning when the weights are equal.—But this is evidently taking the queſtion for granted: for it will not be allowed that *willing* is a neceſſary effect, which muſt imply a compelling efficient cauſe; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights. And as to the fact in queſtion, a cauſe which we *cannot aſſign* is to us *no* cauſe: and yet in many ſuch caſes we determine.

Collins ib. p. 44—52, 57—59.—*Watts on Lib. p.* 68—70.—*Clarke and Leibnitz, p.* 38. § 1. *p.* 93—95, 121—123, 169, 173—177, 291. *Append. N°.* iv. ix. *p.* 165. § 14, 15, *p.* 281—287.—*Cicero de Fato,* § 24, 25.—*Jackſon on Liberty, p.* 193—196.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther pleaded, that ſuch a liberty would be an imperfection to the human ſoul; becauſe it

it would ſuppoſe it in ſome inſtances to act without reaſon.

Anſ. Our ſcheme of liberty ſuppoſes a power of chuſing rationally in all inſtances; of ſeeing and preferring a greater good; and chuſing of two objects equally good, one, where there is reaſon for taking *one*, though not for taking *this* rather than *that:* whereas to deny this is plainly to limit the mind in its power of choice and capacity for happineſs in ſome inſtances. Yet I think (though we allow that ſome particular pleaſure may ariſe from the conſciouſneſs of having uſed this natural liberty aright, when it might have been abuſed) it muſt be granted, that a power of chuſing worſe rather than better is not neceſſary to the happineſs of any being. But is mankind in ſuch a perfect ſtate, that we are under a neceſſity of maintaining that it could not have been greater or happier than it is?

Collins ib. p. 62—83.—*Watts ib. p.* 70—74.—*Colliber's Enquiry, p.* 50, 51.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxi. § 48—52.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 119—121.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The ſentiments of many conſiderable moderns may be ſeen in *Collins on Lib. p.* 14—31. and thoſe of ſeveral antients in

Collins ib. p. 59—62.—*Jackſon on Lib. p.* 82—91, 98—113.—*Lucas's Enquiry, vol.* i. *p.* 163—185, 130—135.—*Hutch. Metaph. Syn. c.* iv. *p.* 22, 23, *compared with p.* 57.

SCHOLIUM 7.

What Mr. *Locke*'s notion of liberty on the whole was, is much debated. The truth of the matter ſeems to be, that he changes his idea of it; ſometimes meaning external liberty, of which he generally ſpeaks, (ſee *Def.* 23. *Schol.*) ſometimes

times philoſophical, (as in the place quoted above, *l.* ii. *c.* xxi. § 49.) and ſometimes he ſeems to recur to the notion of natural liberty again, eſpecially when he ſays in ſo many words, that freedom conſiſts in not being under a neceſſary determination of our will in any particular action, (§ 51.) and in a power of ſuſpenſion: (§ 52.) by which laſt manner of ſtating it, he ſeems not to throw any light upon the queſtion; ſince all the difficulty attending a poſſibility of determining to act one way or another, will attend a poſſibility of determining to act or not to act.

Locke's Fam. Epiſt. p. 474, *&c. præfert. p.* 480.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Thoſe who believe the being and perfections of God, and a ſtate of retribution, in which he will reward and puniſh mankind according to the diverſity of their actions, will find it difficult to reconcile the juſtice of puniſhment with the neceſſity of crimes puniſhed. And they that believe all that the ſcripture ſays on the one hand of the eternity of future puniſhments, and on the other of God's compaſſion to ſinners, and his ſolemn aſſurance that he deſires not their death, will find the difficulty greatly increaſed. But as many of the words here uſed are not yet ſtrictly defined, nor the evidence of the propoſitions ſtated, it may ſuffice briefly to have ſuggeſted the thought.

Cato's Letters, vol. iv. *N°.* 110.—*Jackſon's Reply, paſſim.—Hartley on Man, vol.* i. *p.* 500—511 *.

PRO-

* Since the preceding Lectures were written, the queſtion concerning Liberty and Neceſſity has again received a moſt copious and acute diſcuſſion. See Jonathan Edwards's Enquiry into the Freedom of Will;—The Doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſſity illuſtrated, by Dr. Prieſtley;—A free Diſcuſſion of the Doctrines

PROPOSITION XVII.

The philoſophical liberty of the mind is much impaired, and we are obnoxious to a lamentable degree of ſervitude. (*Def.* 24.) LECT. XXI.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The underſtanding is often ſo far influenced by the paſſions, as to be unwilling to enter on reaſonings, which may ſeem to lead to a concluſion contrary to our intereſt.

2. The paſſions and prejudices of our minds inſenſibly mingle themſelves with the whole proceſs of reaſoning when it is undertaken, leading into many embarraſſments and inconſiſtencies, obſcuring truth and gilding error; ſo that frequently the judgment is formed upon a very unfair hearing, agreeably to the bias the mind is under, and contrary to the evidence that might have been obtained.

3. We often find it difficult to excite our paſſions at the command of reaſon, and to fix them on objects which appear to our underſtanding moſt worthy of regard: on the contrary, they are often excited by ſuch objects, as the under-

Doctrines of Materialiſm and Philoſophical Neceſſity, in a Correſpondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Prieſtley;—Obſervations in Defence of the Liberty of Man, as a moral Agent, by the Rev. John Palmer;—Dr. Prieſtley's Letter to Mr. Palmer, in Defence of his Illuſtrations;—Mr. Palmer's Appendix to his Obſervations:—Dr. Prieſtley's ſecond Letter to Mr. Palmer;—Mr. Jacob Bryant's Addreſs to Dr. Prieſtley, upon his Doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſſity illuſtrated;—Dr. Prieſtley's Letter to Mr. Bryant;—Dawes's Free Enquiry into the Merits of a Controverſy between Dr. Price and Dr. Prieſtley;—The Doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſſity briefly invalidated;—Reid's Eſſay on the Active Powers of Man, p. 267—368;—The notes to the new edition of Hartley on Man;—Belſham's Eſſays, Philoſophical, Hiſtorical, and Literary, vol. i. p. 1—15;—Eſſays, Philoſophical and Literary, by Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh;—and Enquiry concerning Political Juſtice, vol. i. p. 283—317.

ſtanding

ſtanding has been by irreſiſtible evidence compelled to diſapprove, and thereby we are led to commit actions, which, while we do them, we condemn ourſelves for.

4. Bodily conſtitution and appetite have ſometimes almoſt a conſtraining power to hinder the execution of the wiſeſt volitions. Yet it muſt be acknowledged, this impulſe is not invincible: we may ſtop ourſelves in the career; and enter upon a contrary courſe: ſo that upon the whole, the way to happineſs is rather difficult than impoſſible. See *Prop.* 15. *Schol.* 3. and *Prop.* 16. *Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxi. § 47, 56—59.

COROLLARY.

It is plain from theſe phænomena, of which experience may convince us too ſurely, that the ſymmetry of the ſoul and ſubordination of its faculties, mentioned *Def.* 26. *Cor.* 2. in which compleat liberty conſiſts, is in a great meaſure violated in the human ſoul. But whether it were originally in the ſame ſtate, cannot be determined till we have examined other previous propoſitions.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xxi. § 53—55.—*Seed's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 339—344.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is greatly debated, how far the will has in our preſent ſtate any influence on the judgment, in aſſenting to any propoſition in queſtion. Some maintain that it cannot have any influence at all; but I think experience proves the contrary: and though there muſt be ſome ſhow of argument to determine the judgment, yet it ſeems to be the conſequence of that natural liberty aſſerted *Prop.* 16. that the mind can divert itſelf from examining proofs which are likely to eſtabliſh a diſagreeable propoſition; and by labouring to confirm and embelliſh arguments on the favou-

rite

rite side of the question, can bring itself to assent to what it wishes to find true, though vastly superior evidence on the contrary side were fairly within its reach. Yet it must be acknowledged, that this remark only takes place in propositions which have some certain limited degree of evidence, since there are some cases in which the truth will invincibly force itself upon the understanding, and no artifice can be sufficient to evade it.

Collins on Lib. p. 33—36.—*Clerici Pneumat. l.* i. *c.* iii. § 14.—*Watts on Lib. p.* 13—16.—*Locke's Eff. l.* iv. *c.* xx. § 6, 12—16.—*Clarke and Leibn. p.* 403—415.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many actions of brutes seem to discover some degree of liberty; but how far they are possessed of it seems impossible for us to determine, since all the principal proofs of the natural liberty of the human mind arise from what passes within ourselves, and what we learn by discoursing with other men; and not merely from what we observe in their most rational or capricious actions.

Reynault's Philos. Converf. vol. iii. *p.* 82—87.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

There are many particulars in which the knowledge we have of our own minds is very imperfect, and we are as it were a mystery to ourselves. LECT. XXII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We know not what our soul is, otherwise than by its operations; but are not able to determine what that constitution is, whence those operations proceed, or what particular and distinct idea is to be affixed to the word *principle*;

it

if we call it, as many do, an intelligent or conſcious principle. See *Def.* 3. *Cor.* 2. *Def.* 5. *Schol.* 1. *Def.* 9.

2. We know not how the ſoul is united to the body, or what connection there is between impreſſions made upon the organs of ſenſation and the ideas ariſing in our minds, or between the volitions of our minds and the conſequent motions of our bodies. *Prop.* 1. *Schol.* 2.

3. We know not certainly how ideas are laid up in the memory: it is not demonſtrably evident that there are traces in the brain correſpondent to thoſe ideas: (*Prop.* 8.) but if it were, how recollection is performed, and in many caſes why one idea is recollected rather than another, is not poſſible for us to ſay. *Prop.* 8. *Schol.* 3.

4. It ſtill remains in ſome degree an uncertain queſtion, whether we think always or only by intervals. *Prop.* 12. *Dem.*

5. It is extremely difficult to remove all the objections againſt liberty of choice, eſpecially againſt that which is ſtated *Prop.* 16. *Schol.* 1.

6. The queſtion wherein perſonal identity conſiſts, how plain ſoever it may have appeared to ſome, has been differently determined by different perſons of great learning and abilities; and is after all attended with ſome perplexities, perhaps chiefly ariſing from what is mentioned above *gr.* 1. (*Vid. Prop.* 11.)

7. The phænomenon of dreams does alſo contain ſome very unaccountable things. How ideas are then ſuggeſted to the mind, in the reception of which we are entirely paſſive: how dialogues are formed; and how the moral principles of action ſeem to be ſuſpended, even while we continue to reaſon, (though often after a wild and inconcluſive manner,) upon circumſtances and events in which we imagine ourſelves to be engaged. (*Vid. Prop.* 3. *gr.* 5.)

* *Baxter on the Soul, vol.* ii. § 1. 8*vo Ed.*

8. The

8. The phænomenon of phrenſy is likewiſe very unaccountable, and how the ſtate of the nerves and juices of the body at that time ſhould ſo ſtrangely affect our rational powers, and make us creatures ſo very different from ourſelves. *Prop.* 3. *gr.* 6.

1—8.|9. *Valet Propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

The like may in ſome degree be ſaid of the imperfection of the knowledge we have concerning our own bodies: in which, though great improvements and diſcoveries have been made, ſome very important queſtions ſtill remain undecided, *v. g.* By what mechaniſm animal ſecretion, reſpiration, and muſcular motion are performed: whence the ſyſtole and diaſtole of the heart ariſes: what is the uſe of the ſpleen and the cœcum: not to mention the rationale of many diſtempers, about which many celebrated phyſicians are much divided: and almoſt the whole doctrine of the nerves.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The phænomena mentioned in the propoſition and the preceding ſcholium ſerve to illuſtrate *Prop.* 10, and add a very important article to it.

COROLLARY 1.

It becomes us to maintain a deep and conſtant ſenſe of the ignorance and weakneſs of our own minds, when we always carry about, in the very conſtitution of them and our bodies, ſuch affecting demonſtrations of it.

COROLLARY 2.

Since ſuch a modeſt ſenſe of our weakneſs and ignorance will have a great tendency to promote the honour and happineſs of our lives, by teaching us to avoid many inſtances of arrogance and ſelf-conceit, which expoſe men both to enmity

and contempt; therefore Pneumatology, which leads us into this humbling view, is a noble and useful study. (Compare *Prop.* 3. *Cor. Prop.* 10, and 17.)*

COROLLARY 3.

If we should hereafter prove the existence of any being vastly superior to us, and especially of a being possessed of infinite perfections, it must be expected that there will be many things relating to him, which it is not possible for us fully to explain or comprehend; and our enquiries concerning such a being ought to be pursued with great modesty and humility.

Butler's Serm. p. 303—305.—*Spectator, vol.* viii. *N°.* 590.—*Jonval's Letter, apud Nat. Disp. vol.* i. *part* 2. *p.* 293, *&c.*

* Though it is the only design of the editor to point out new references and authors, he cannot forbear recommending the sentiments of these two corollaries to the attention of academical pupils. When it is considered how extremely difficult many questions in themselves are, and what different conclusions have been drawn concerning them, by men of the profoundest knowledge and the deepest reflection, there is a modest scepticism which it will become young students to preserve, till time shall have given them the opportunity of wider enquiry and larger observation. This remark would not have been made, if instances had not occurred of youth who have eagerly, and even arrogantly, adopted hypothesis, on one side or the other, without sufficiently exercising that patience of thinking, and that slow progress of examination, which are likely to be the most favourable to the acquisition of truth.

The END *of the* FIRST PART.

PART

PART II.

Of the BEING *of a* GOD *and his* NATURAL PERFECTIONS.

AXIOM IX.

IT is impoſſible that any thing ſhould of itſelf ariſe into being; or that it ſhould be produced without ſome producing cauſe, exiſting in order of time, as well as of nature, prior to the thing ſo produced; or in other words, which muſt not only be *conſidered* before the effect, in order to underſtand it thoroughly, but muſt alſo be ſuppoſed to have *exiſted* before it.

LECT. XXIII.

DEFINITION XXVII.

That is ſaid to be a SELF-EXISTENT, or NECESSARILY EXISTENT BEING, which does not owe its exiſtence to any other being whatſoever, either as its cauſe or its ſupport, but would exiſt, or be what it is, were there no other being in the whole compaſs of nature but itſelf.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 17, 18.—*Burnet, ib. vol.* i. *p.* 7, 8.

SCHOLIUM.

It ſeems ſafer, in this momentous argument on which we are now entering, to acquieſce in this general and ſimple idea of ſelf-exiſtence, gradually deducing from thence other ideas connected with it, than to ſtate it, as Dr. *Clarke* has done, "That which cannot ſo much as be "imagined not to exiſt, or that which has ne"ceſſity for the cauſe of its exiſtence;" ſince if there be any ſelf-exiſtent being at all, it ſeems

not proper to ascribe its existence to any cause whatsoever.

Law's Enquiry, p. 147—150.—*Abernethy's Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 191—193. *Dubl. Ed. p.* 203—205. *Lond.*

COROLLARY 1.

If any self-existent being does now exist, it has existed from all eternity: for if it ever began to exist, it must (by the 9th *Axiom*) have owed its existence to some prior being as its cause, which is plainly contradictory to the notion of self-existence stated above.

COROLLARY 2.

If there be or ever has been any self-existent being, it is also *everlasting, i. e.* it will never cease to be. For dissolution must arise from something external or internal: but nothing external can dissolve that which depends upon no other being for it's support: and no imaginable reason can be assigned, why there should be any internal cause of dissolution in that being which has (by *Cor.* 1.) existed from eternity, or which was indeed in any single past moment self-existent and independent: which is so plain, that, whoever may have denied the existence of a self-existent being, none have ever asserted, that there was such a being, and that his existence is now extinguished and lost; or that there is some self-existent being, which, though now subsisting, will at length be destroyed or dissolved of itself. Yet it must be owned that a late writer, who seems determined to carry scepticism to the greatest excess, has presumed to call this matter into question. *Hume's Philos. Essays, p.* 253.

COROLLARY 3.

If there be any self-existent being, it is also *immutable*. For since a being is the same with all

all its properties taken together, (*Def.* 3. *Cor.* 1.) if any property were taken away from it, a part of the being would perish, which is inconsistent with its being necessary; (*Cor.* 2.) or if any properties were added, the being itself would not be eternal, and therefore not necessarily existent. (*Cor.* 1.)

Crouz. Log. vol. i. *p.* 426.—*Abern. vol.* i. *p.* 196—200. *Dubl. Ed. p.* 209—213. *Dublin.*

COROLLARY 4.

There is no medium between a self-existent and derived being: or in other words, whatever exists at all is either self-existent or derived.

COROLLARY 5.

The existence of every derived being may at length be traced up either mediately or immediately to what is self-existent, which in order to its producing it must according to the *Axiom* have existed before it. (*Cor.* 4. *Axiom* 9.)

COROLLARY 6.

From the Corollary above it will follow, that whatever is eternal is self-existent.

COROLLARY 7.

To maintain a *series* or succession of derived beings from eternity, is most absurd: for every series supposes some first, and to suppose that first to be derived is self-contradictory, (as above, *Cor.* 5.) with this farther absurdity, that the greater the series, the greater support it will need, as a chain consisting of many links will need a greater support than one consisting but of a few such links: and should a *circle* of causes be supposed, instead of solving it will if possible increase the absurdity; since this would suppose

every cauſe in the circle to have produced itſelf, and all the other cauſes too.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 11—14.—*Woolaſt. Rel. of Nat. p.* 65—68.

DEFINITION XXVIII.

That is ſaid to be *ſimply infinite* in its kind, which has no bounds; or than which nothing in its kind can be conceived greater: but if it be conceived as bounded in ſome reſpects and unbounded in others, then it is ſaid to be only infinite *ſecundum quid*, as a line infinitely produced one way from a given point: but this is a very improper ſenſe of the word.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xvii. § 1—3.—*Watts's Ontology, c.* xvii.

COROLLARY.

Whatever is ſelf-exiſtent, has all its properties infinite. (See *Def.* 27.) For if it be neceſſary in any time or place, (if it be its nature to exiſt in time and place) it muſt be neceſſary at all times and in all places; and ſince, whatever its other properties are, to ſet bounds to them, is to aſſert its non-exiſtence beyond thoſe bounds, whether of power, wiſdom, *&c.* it ſeems extremely probable, not to ſay certain, that what hinders its exiſtence beyond thoſe bounds might hinder its exiſtence entirely. But it could not be a ſelf-exiſtent being, if its exiſtence might have been hindered, or could be deſtroyed.

Clarke ib. p. 458, 459, 462, 463, 465, 466, 469—476.

SCHOLIUM I.

On much the ſame principles, Mr. *Grove* directly infers, that a being neceſſarily exiſtent muſt be infinitely perfect. Some perfections it muſt have, or it could not be any thing at all; and

and for the ſame reaſon that it has any one perfection, and in any one degree, it muſt be poſſeſſed of all poſſible perfections, and in all poſſible degrees. But this is a point of ſo great importance, that we chuſe rather to infer it from other mediums of argument, than to reſt the whole ſtreſs of it upon ſuch a deduction: eſpecially as upon the principles of *Def.* 21. *Cor.* this argument can have no place, till it be proved that whatever is ſelf-exiſtent is percipient, or endued with thought.

Grove's Poſth. Works, vol. iv. *p.* 7.—*Howe's Living Temple, part* i. *c.* iv. § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is diſputed, whether our idea of infinite be a *negative* or *poſitive* idea. Some have pleaded, that *bounds* imply a negation of continued exiſtence beyond them, and conſequently by removing this negation we form a poſitive idea.

Cambray ſur l'Exiſt. p. 379—383.—*Boyſe's Tranſlation, p.* 145—151.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xvii. § 13, 16—19.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It may alſo be queried, whether our idea of infinite be a *ſimple* or *compound* idea: yet I think it may more properly be ſaid to be a ſimple idea, as no addition of finites can make up an infinite. It will be difficult to find out any idea more ſimple.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Something has exiſted from eternity.

DEMONSTRATION.

Ax. 1.|1. It is evident that ſomething does actually exiſt: *v. g.* we know that we ourſelves do.

2. If ſomething has not exiſted from eternity, the things which now are muſt have ariſen abſo-

lutely from nothing, and without any producing cauſe, contrary to *Ax.* 9.

1, 2.|3. We are certain ſomething has exiſted from eternity.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 8, 9.—*Abern. Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 184—187. *Dub. Ed. p.* 195—198. *Lond.*

SCHOLIUM.

It muſt be acknowledged extremely difficult to conceive of any thing having exiſted from eternity; yet ſince there are ſuch evident proofs of it, we learn that a thing may be true, the manner of which is entirely inconceivable to our limited minds, or againſt which ſome objections may lie which to us are unanſwerable.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 9—11.

PROPOSITION XX.

There has from eternity exiſted ſome ſelf-exiſtent or neceſſary Being.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 19.|1. There has from eternity exiſted ſomething, either ſelf-exiſtent or derived. See *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 4.

Def. 27.|2. If there were not ſo evident an abſurdity as there ſeems to be, in ſuppoſing a derived being eternal, yet its exiſtence, (even granting its eternity, and much more evidently ſuppoſing it not to be ſo,) may be traced up to a ſelf-exiſtent being, which as ſelf-exiſtent is eternal.

1, 2.|3. *Valet propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM.

The propoſition follows directly from *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 6. but we chuſe to keep it in its preſent form; that if any ſhould think there may be an eternal neceſſary emanation from a ſelf-exiſtent principle,

ciple, as many have maintained, the foregoing propoſition might reſt on a foundation not to be affected by ſuch an apprehenſion.

Introduction to the Ancient Univerſal Hiſtory, p. 5. Octavo Edition.

PROPOSITION XXI.

The ſyſtem of things which we call the material world, did not exiſt from eternity in its preſent form, but had a beginning. LECT. XXIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

Arg. 1. We may not only conceive of many poſſible alterations which might be made in the form of it, but we ſee it inceſſantly changing; whereas an eternal being, for as much as it is ſelf-exiſtent, is always the ſame. *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 8. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 22, 23.

Arg. 2. We have no credible hiſtory of tranſactions more remote than ſix thouſand years from the preſent time; for as to the pretence that ſome nations have made to hiſtories of greater antiquity, as the *Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, Chineſe, &c.* they are evidently convicted of falſhood at large in

Stillingfleet's Orig. Sacr. p. 15—106.—*Millar's Propag. of Chriſt. vol.* i. *p.* 100—112.—*Pearſon on the Creed, p.* 58—60.—*Jenkins of Chriſtianity, vol.* ii. *pref. p.* 4—11.—*Alix's Reflections, vol.* i. *p.* 95—120.—*Winder's Hiſt. of Knowledge, vol.* ii. *paſſim.*—*Lucretius, l.* v. *ver.* 325—330*.

* The Hindoos make great pretenſions to a very high antiquity, and credit has been given to their aſſertions. But the extravagancy of their Chronology has been ſhewn by the beſt of all judges, Sir William Jones, as may be ſeen in his Diſſertation on the ſubject, publiſhed in the ſecond volume of the Aſiatic Reſearches.

Arg. 3. We can trace the invention of the moſt uſeful arts and ſciences; which had probably been carried farther, and invented ſooner, had the world been eternal.

Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. vii, viii.—*Lucret. l.* v. *ver.* 331—339.—*Nichol's Conf. vol.* i. *p.* 76—87. 12*mo. p.* 45—51. *Oct.*—*Cheyne's Princip. c.* ii. § 24. *p.* 63—68.—*Burnet's Theory, vol.* i. *p.* 54—59.

Arg. 4. The origin of the moſt conſiderable nations of the earth may be traced; *i. e.* the time when they firſt inhabited the countries where they now dwell: and it appears that moſt of the weſtern nations came from the eaſt.

Newton's Chronology, paſſim.—*Patrick on Geneſis, c.* x.—*Wells's Geog. of the Old Teſt. vol.* i. *c.* iii.—*Pearſon on the Creed, p.* 60, 61.—*Perezon. Cumberland, de orig. Gent. & Bochart's Phaleg. paſſim.*—*Bryant's Mythology, paſſim.*—*Michaelis's Spicilegium Geographiæ Hebræorum, paſſim.*

SCHOLIUM.

If it be ſaid that deluges, peſtilences, conflagrations, *&c.* deſtroy men with their inventions, it may be anſwered, (1). If the world were eternal, there muſt have been an immenſe number of theſe devaſtations, and it is amazing (if there be, as this hypotheſis ſuppoſes, no ſuperior being that preſides over them,) that they ſhould not have deſtroyed the whole human race. (2). If any had ſurvived, the moſt uſeful arts would have been preſerved.

Lucret. l. v. *ver.* 339—352.—*Pearſon on the Creed, p.* 61. *margin.*—*Religion of Nat. p.* 91, 92.

LECT. XXV. *Arg.* 5. The projectile force of the planets is continually diminiſhing, by the reſiſtance of the fluid through which they paſs, *i. e.* the rays of light;

light; which are every where diffuſed through all parts of their orbits in ſo vaſt a quantity, that multitudes of them fall on bodies too ſmall to be diſcerned by the naked eye, as appears by microſcopical obſervation. Now if we allow this diminution in the projectile force in one year or age to be ever ſo ſmall, there muſt be a finite time in which it will be utterly deſtroyed; and conſequently had the preſent ſyſtem of things been eternal, (ſince on this ſuppoſition the ſame laws of nature muſt have prevailed) the planets would long ago have fallen into the ſun.

Watts's Eſſ. N°. x. § 1. p. 242—245.—
Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 20. p. 53—56.

Arg. 6. The ſun is continually loſing ſome of its light, and conſequently muſt long ere this time have been reduced to utter darkneſs, if the world had been eternal. If it be ſaid, that every ray of light after a certain elongation falls back into the ſun; we anſwer, ſome of them muſt in their return ſtrike on the planets, falling on their dark hemiſphere, by which means they would be abſorbed, and the decay would be real though more gradual, according to the reaſoning above. If it be anſwered, that there may be ſome kind of fewel provided, as ſuppoſe comets, by which the ſun is fed; we reply, that fewel is or is not exactly adjuſted to the expence of his flame; if it is not exactly adjuſted, if too little, the conſequence urged above will at length though ſtill more ſlowly follow; if too much, the ſun growing continually hotter, the earth and other planets muſt have been burnt up, and ſo an argument againſt its eternity will ariſe in another form, from the ever-growing heat of the ſun: but if the adjuſtment be exact, it will be ſuch a proof of deſign and government in the works of nature as would be ſo greatly ſerviceable in another view, that any friend of religion might willingly

lingly ſpare this argument againſt the world's eternity, when there are ſo many others unanſwerably ſtrong. And it may be obſerved, that a ſimilar train of reaſoning may take place as to ſome following particulars.

Cheyne's Princ. c. i. § 42. *p.* 95—98. *c.* ii. § 19. *p.* 51, 52.

Arg. 7. Since it is probable that the fixed ſtars and the ſun attract each other, had they been eternal, they muſt long ere this have met in the centre of gravity common to the whole univerſe. And nearly akin to this, is the argument which may be drawn from the effect of the neareſt acceſs of the earth to *Mars*, or any other ſuperior planet; in conſequence of which it might be ſuppoſed to be drawn by ſuch attraction a little from its orbit; the eccentricity of which would by this means be continually increaſed, till the earth were utterly deſtroyed. The like argument may be applied to the other planets, and eſpecially to *Saturn:* but the thought is in general ſo much the ſame, that it has not been judged neceſſary to inſiſt upon it.

Cheyne's Princ. c. i, § 22. *p.* 58—60.

Arg. 8. Sir *William Petty* has attempted to prove that the number of mankind doubles in 360 years: but though the exactneſs of his computation ſhould be doubted, if there be any periodical and conſtant increaſe at all, it will prove the world not to be eternal; as from a limited diſtance of time it muſt ere now have been overrun with human inhabitants. Some have indeed maintained a decreaſe ſince the *Auguſtan* age: but if it could be proved that mankind do actually decreaſe periodically, or that the increaſe is exactly balanced, this argument will ſtand on the ſame footing with *Arg.* 6. As for plagues, by which ſome ſuppoſe the balance to be made, if we may judge by what we know of their hiſtory,

the diminution of mankind by them bears but a very ſmall proportion to its increaſe, as computed by *Petty**.

Nich. Conf. vol. i. *p.* 62—76. *Oct. Ed. p.* 36—44.—*Cheyne's Princ. c.* ii. § 25. *p.* 68—72.—*Perſ. Lett. vol.* ii. *p.* 148—158.—*Refl. on Polyg. Diff.* vii.

Arg. 9. Many ſubſtances are continually petrifying and oſſifying; ſo that, had the world been eternal, the whole earth would have been but one ſtone, or the petrifaction muſt have ceaſed of itſelf. But if it be ſaid that theſe ſtones diſſolve, and ſo there may be a kind of circulation; it is anſwered, that ſtones grow in one year which do not diſſolve in many centuries.

The argument from the waſte of fluids by the growth of animal and vegetable bodies is much the ſame as this, ſo far as there is any ſolidity in it: but it may be queried, whether the diſſolution of thoſe bodies, and ſeparation of their conſiſtent fluids in a ſeries of years, may not anſwer this.

Nich. Conf. vol. i. *p.* 51—55. *Oct. p.* 30—32.—*Clare on Fluids, p.* 271, 272.

Arg. 10. Hills are continually ſubſiding, which will in ſome finite time reduce the world to a level. If it be objected, that this is balanced by earthquakes, *&c.* which raiſe mountains; it is anſwered, the number of theſe ſo raiſed is comparatively ſmall, and they being hollow would ſoon be waſhed away.

Nich. Conf. vol. i. *p.* 55—62. *Oct. p.* 32—36.—*Ray's* 3 *Diſc. N°.* iii. *p.* 344—364.—*Montfauc. Trav. p.* 377, 378.—*Burn. Theory, vol.* i. *p.* 51—53.

* As to the queſtion concerning the Decreaſe of Mankind ſince the Auguſtan age, ſee the ſubject ingeniouſly diſcuſſed in Hume's Eſſay on the Populouſneſs of Ancient Nations, and Wallace's Diſſertation on the Numbers of Mankind.

Arg.

Arg. 11. According to the beſt calculations which have been made, comets appear on an average at leaſt in 30 years; but whether this account be exact or not, if their return be periodical, there would within an imaginable time have been more than a thouſand millions cutting the earth's orbit in various directions; in conſequence of which the earth muſt have been expoſed to ſuch danger, either of being drawn into the ſun or ſeparated from it, that, without a particular providence, which this hypotheſis oppoſes, its deſtruction muſt have happened long ſince.

Arg. 12. If the world be eternal, it is hard to account for the tradition of its beginning, which has almoſt every where prevailed, though under different forms, among both polite and barbarous nations.

Hale's Orig. of Man, § 2. *c.* xii. § 3. *c.* i. —*Grot. de Ver. l.* i. § 16. *p.* 26—40. —*Burnet's Arch. l.* ii. *c.* i. *p.* 273—285.

COROLLARY 1.

SECT. XXVI. There muſt have been ſome great and excellent being, ſuperior to this whole material ſyſtem, by which it was reduced into that beautiful order, in which it now appears.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may infer the vanity and falſehood of *Spinoza*'s doctrine, who aſſerts, that the whole and every part of the material world is a ſelf-exiſtent being: for he expreſsly ſays, that one being or ſubſtance could not be produced by another, and that all things could be in no other order and manner than they are, *i. e.* that all things in their preſent form are neceſſary, and therefore eternal. *Def.* 27. and *Cor.* 1, 3.

Clarke

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 26—29.—*Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p.* 202—207. *part* ii. *c.* 2. —*Toland's Pantheiſticon, p.* 5—8, 54, 55. *apud*—*Sykes's Connect. c.* iv. *p.* 64—83.—*Orph. Carm. ap. Apul. Op.* (*de Mundo,*) *p.* 190.—*Ramſay's App. to Phil. Princ. vol.* i. *p.* 497, *&c.*—— *Campbell's Neceſſity of Rev. p.* 368.

SCHOLIUM I.

Thoſe arguments which *Redi*, *Malphigius*, and ſeveral modern philoſophers have advanced againſt the doctrine of equivocal generation either of animals or plants, have often been urged as concluſive againſt the eternity of the world: and if they will prove that every animal or plant of the preſent generation was not only contained in its immediate parent, but together with that parent in the remoter generation, and ſo on perpetually, it might indeed prove, that, how ſmall ſoever the bodies now grown up might be at any given time, there is a certain diſtance of generation, at which the organized body containing them and all intermediate generations, each bigger than the embryo in queſtion was at that time, muſt have been bigger than even the whole maſs of the earth. But it may be anſwered, that allowing no animal or plant to riſe into viſible form but from pre-exiſting parents of the ſame kind, it may nevertheleſs in its firſt ſtamina be formed anew, from ſome fluid before making an unorganized part of the adult parent; and in that caſe there will be no peculiar force in this argument, as lying againſt the eternity of the world; for that which ariſes from the exquiſite workmanſhip of an animal body, and the abſurdity of ſuppoſing it produced from any fluid or ſolid merely by mechanical laws, properly belongs to another queſtion.

Redi

Redi de Gen. Inſect. paſſ.—*Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol.* i. *c.* xvi. § 9.—*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* iv. *p.* 127, *ad fine.*—*Cheyne's Princ. c.* ii. § 23. *p.* 60—63.—*Ray's Wiſd. of God, p.* 298—326.—*Varen Geog. vol.* i. *p.* 226. *Eng.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Neither do we argue from the probability that the Torrid Zone would have taken fire; which is examined in

Ray's 3 *Diſc. p.* 381—388.

SCHOLIUM 3.

We likewiſe wave thoſe arguments which are taken from the ſuppoſed abſurdity and impoſſibility of the world's having been actually eternal, or having exiſted through an infinite ſucceſſion; becauſe the ſame objection ſeems to lie againſt every thing which is ſaid to be eternal, and the argument turns on the ſuppoſition, that an infinite is made up of a number of finites.

Burnet on the Art. p. 19, 20.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 35—37.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Some of the *Ancients*, who ſpeak of the eternity of the world, do not ſeem to intend it in the ſenſe in which *Spinoza* aſſerts it. The arguments are deſigned to prove either that ſomething muſt be eternal, which is all that thoſe of *Ocellus Lucanus* amount to, or that the world is a neceſſary eternal effect flowing from the energy of the divine nature, which *Ariſtotle* ſeems to have thought; or that it was an eternal voluntary emanation from a ſupreme and infinitely perfect cauſe, which was the opinion of *Plato*'s followers. Nevertheleſs there is reaſon to believe, that ſome of them were properly *Pantheiſts*, in the ſame ſenſe in which

which the term may be applied to the present followers of *Spinoza*. *Compare Cor.* 2.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 29—35.—*Nichols's Conf. vol.* i. *p.* 22—36.—*Ott. vol.* i. *p.* 12—20.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

If any objection should be brought against the seventh argument, from the supposed infinite number of celestial bodies, which would occasion an equal attraction every way; we must defer the examination of that till we have proved that matter is not infinite, to which we shall quickly proceed.

DEFINITION XXIX.

That is said to be an ESSENTIAL QUALITY, which cannot cease, unless the being itself should be supposed to be destroyed. LECT. XXVII.

Watts's Log. p. 17, 18.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Motion is not essential to matter.

DEMONSTRATION 1.

1. It is evident that when we have abstracted the idea of motion from any particle of matter, there will still remain the idea of extended solid substance, *i. e.* it will still be matter. See *Def.* 4, and 29.

2. If motion be essential to matter, then motion must either be an equal tendency every way, or a prevailing tendency one way.

3. An equal tendency every way would certainly produce rest.

4. A prevailing tendency one way rather than another must arise from some external cause;

* A concise and elegant view of the different opinions of the ancient philosophers on this subject, may be read in Dr. Enfield's History of Philosophy.

and

and if these motions were various, from causes that act in various manners, and not from the necessary nature of body or matter itself.

1 and 2, 3, 4.|5. Motion is not essential to matter. *Q. E. D.*

Toland's Lett. to Seren. N°. 5. p. 186—202.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 24, 25.

DEMONSTRATION II.

Another proof may be drawn from the *vis inertiæ*, which *Baxter* has proved to be essential to matter, and which is directly contrary to necessary motion. This argument is stated at large in *Baxter on the Soul*, and as it cannot conveniently be contracted here, we chuse to refer to the author himself.

Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. *p.* 1—78.

COROLLARY.

Since it appears that matter does move, (still supposing the reality of the material world) it is evident there must be some first mover, *i. e.* some superior immaterial being, from whom its motion is derived.

SCHOLIUM.

The argument which *Toland* brings, in the passage cited above, to prove motion essential to matter, amounts to little more than the universal gravitation observed to prevail in it; but this may be sufficiently accounted for, by supposing it always impressed upon it by the Creator, and that it might at his pleasure be suspended, though no single particle of the whole material world should be now exempted from the influence.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

Matter is not self-existent or necessary.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 4.|1. Tangibility, solidity, or resistance, is essential to matter.

1.|2. If all space were full of matter, how fine soever the particles were, there must be on every side an invincible resistance to the motion of any one of those particles.

3. But we plainly see that there is motion in the corporeal world.

2, 3.|4. There is therefore a vacuum; as will be farther illustrated in the scholium.

Def. 28. *Cor.*|5. But if matter were self-existent or necessary, there must be an universal plenum.

6. Matter is liable to continual changes in its place, contexture, situation, *&c.* which is inconsistent with its being self-existent. *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 3.

4, 5 and 6.|7. Matter is not self-existent. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 503, 504, 25, 26. —*Colliber's Enq. p.* 258—261. *Edit.* 3. —*Bent. at Boyle's Lect.* § 6. *p.* 211—213.—*Howe's Living Temple, part* ii. *c.* 2. § 5.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* ii. § 3. *præf. p.* 345—351, 356—359, 373—383.

COROLLARY.

There must be some immaterial self-existent being, by whom matter was at first created, supposing it now really to exist. See *Prop.* 22. *Cor. Def.* 27. *Cor.* 5.

SCHOLIUM.

A vacuum may farther be proved from the different specific gravity of bodies, compared with the vibrations of pendulums of unequal bulk and equal length in equal times: *v. g.* one of ten pound, vibrates just as fast as another of one

pound whoſe rod is of the ſame length; it has therefore juſt ten times the momentum or force of motion, *i. e.* ten times the gravity; for here it is gravity that gives it the force; or in other words, the gravity is as the quantity of matter: when therefore the gravity under the ſame bulk is unequal, it proves there is more matter in one maſs than in the other, and conſequently pores (at leaſt) in the lighter, though the heavier were to be ſuppoſed entirely ſolid: and the experiment of the feather and guinea deſcending together in the exhauſted receiver eſtabliſhes the argument on the ſame principles.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 503, 504.

AXIOM X.

LECT. XXVIII. If any being be the producing cauſe of another being, not merely occaſionally, but by its own power, it is very reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that it was more excellent or perfect than its production, or at leaſt equally ſo.

COROLLARY.

Seeing a thinking ſubſtance as ſuch is more excellent than a ſubſtance deſtitute of thought, it is not to be imagined that ſpirit ſhould be produced by a being which is not poſſeſſed of thought.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

It is in the nature of things utterly inconceivable and incredible that thought ſhould neceſſarily ariſe from matter.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If thought could proceed from matter, it muſt either ariſe from the general nature of it, or muſt be peculiar to matter in ſome certain configuration and agitation.

2. Thought cannot arise from the nature of matter in general; for then every particle of matter would have thought, which is evidently false and ridiculous to affirm.

3. Any supposed alteration in the figure of the particles of matter, *v. g.* from squares to cubes, or cones, *&c.* has no apparent influence on the production of thought.

4. Motion in general added to matter cannot produce thought; for then almost all matter known to us, being actually though not necessarily in motion, and some of it in a wonderful swift agitation, must be cogitative, contrary to fact.

5. The change of its motion, *v. g.* from a strait line to any kind of curve, or *vice versa*, or its collision against other particles of matter, seems to have no tendency to produce thought.

1—5.|6. *Valet propositio.*

Abern. Serm. vol. i. *p.* 107—117.—*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* 2. *p.* 15—26. *Oct. Ed. p.* 52—68.—*Clarke ib. p.* 52. —57.—*Locke's Eff. l.* iv. *c.* x. § 10.

COROLLARY.

Since we are sure there is such a thing as thought, (*Ax.* 2.) this is another argument independent on *Prop.* 23. *Cor.* to prove that there is some immaterial being. See *Ax.* 9.

Bentley ib. p. 29—36. *Oct. p.* 68—74.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is to no purpose to object, that there may be some unknown connection between certain modifications of matter and thought, from which thought may necessarily result, or that it may be produced from some unknown properties of matter, though not from those which are known; seeing many things are utterly incre-

dible, which cannot be proved to be abſolutely impoſſible.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be farther objected, that it is as inconceivable that matter ſhould ariſe from thought, as thought from matter; it may be anſwered, that we are ſure in fact, that if there be any material world, matter is moved by thought, though we know not how it is done, and that it was actually produced by ſome immaterial being; (*Prop.* 23. *Cor.*) but it cannot be proved in fact that thought is neceſſarily produced by matter, or that any thinking being has been mechanically produced from matter itſelf; though we allow that according to the conſtitution of ſome ſuperior being thought is occaſioned by it, *i. e.* that there is a certain wonderful harmony between impreſſions made on the material parts of our frame and thought; and that thinking beings are produced by a ſuperior cauſe on certain concurrences in the material world *.

Shaftſb. Char. vol. ii. *p.* 296.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* ii. *p.* 350. *note.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

It may not be improper here to collect the proof we have had of the exiſtence of an immaterial being, which ariſes partly from the motion of matter, *Prop.* 22. *Cor.* and its exiſtence, *Prop.* 23. *Cor.* and alſo from the exiſtence of thought, which mere matter could not produce, *Prop.* 24. *Cor.* compared with *Ax.* 10. *Cor.*

* It is ſcarcely neceſſary to ſay, how much the doctrine of this twenty-fourth Propoſition is denied by ſeveral recent philoſophers, of great eminence and ingenuity. See particularly Prieſtley's Diſquiſitions on Matter and Spirit, and T. Cooper's Eſſays. On the other ſide of the queſtion, is Mr. W. Belſham, in the ſecond volume of his Eſſays, p. 1—30.

PROPOSITION XXV.

We are not ourselves necessary or self-existent beings.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is evident we are lately born into this world, and there is no proof of our existence before.

2. We evidently appear to be dependent on every thing about us.

3. The capacity and sentiments of our minds, as well as the powers of our bodies and our external circumstances, are almost continually changing.

Def. 27. *Cor.* 1, 3.|4. But every self-existent being is eternal, independent and immutable.

1, 2, 3, 4.|5. We are not self-existent. *Q. E. D.*

Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 185—188.

COROLLARY 1.

There is some self-existent being, from whom we mediately or immediately derive our existence, and to whom ultimately we owe all the faculties of our nature and all the enjoyments of our lives. *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 5.

COROLLARY 2.

There is great reason to believe that this being is naturally much more excellent than we.

COROLLARY 3.

It is evident that as we are already under great obligations to this being, so we have a constant dependence upon him for every future period and circumstance of our existence.

COROLLARY 4.

It must be of the greatest importance for us most attentively to enquire after him, and to

ſtudy his nature and properties, that we may if poſſible ſecure an intereſt in his favour.

Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p. 188, 189.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

That ſelf-exiſtent being, from whom our exiſtence was ultimately derived, (*Prop.* 25. *Cor.* 1.) is a ſpirit.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Originally and primarily to produce a being is an action.

Grad. 1. *Def.* 10. *Cor.* 2.|2. That muſt be a ſpirit, whereby any being whatſoever is originally and primarily produced.

Prop. 25. *Cor.* 1.|3. Our ſpirits were produced by ſome ſelf-exiſtent being.

Ax. 10. *Cor.*|4. To ſuppoſe a thinking being produced by an unthinking cauſe, would be more evidently abſurd than to ſuppoſe an unthinking being ſo produced.

2, 3, 4.|5. That ſelf-exiſtent being, from whom our exiſtence was ultimately derived, is a ſpirit. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 49—52.—*Abernethy, vol.* i. *Serm.* iv.

SCHOLIUM.

Though it ſeems more proper to ſtate the evidence of this important propoſition thus largely, it is in effect contained in *Prop.* 25. *Cor.* 2. ſince nothing that is not a ſpirit can be more excellent than our minds.

DEFINITION XXX.

LECT. XXIX.

That ſelf-exiſtent ſpiritual being, by whom we and the material world about us were originally formed, we call GOD.

Vanini Amphitheatrum Providentiæ, p. 8—10. *apud*—*Collib. Inq. p.* 243, 244.—*Shaft. Char. vol.* ii. *p.* 10, 11.

COR-

COROLLARY.

It appears from this definition that our idea of God is very complex, and is made up of many ideas arising both from sensation and reflection.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. *c.* xxiii. § 33—36.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

There is a God.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 23. *Cor.*|1. The matter, of which this world or system consists, was originally created by a self-existent immaterial being.

Prop. 22. *Cor.*|2. This matter was first put into motion by some superior, *i. e.* self-existent being. See *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 5.

Prop. 21. *Cor.* 1.|3. This material world was reduced into the beautiful form wherein it now appears by some being superior to it.

4. There is no reason to assert, nor has it ever that we know of been maintained by any, that the being, by whom the matter of our world was at first produced, was a different being from that by which it was first moved and brought into the order in which it now appears *.

Prop. 25. *Cor.* 1 and 2.|5. Our spirits were also derived from some self-existent spirit of superior excellence and perfection.

6. There is no apparent reason to believe that the spirit, by whom our spirits were originally produced, is a being different from that, by which this material world about us was created and formed.

* It may be observed here, that the Gnostics maintained the *Demiourgos* or Maker of this World to be different from the supreme Being; but then they held matter itself to be eternal, and evil *per se*. See Mosheim's Commentarii de Rebus Christianorum in Seculo primo, § 64. and his Institutiones Majores Seculi primi, Pars secunda, § 5. 6. S.

1—6.|7. There is ſome ſelf-exiſtent ſpiritual being, by whom we and this material world were formed; *i. e.* there is a God. *Def.* 30. *Q. E. D.*

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* x. § 1—6 *.

COROLLARY 1.

God is a being more excellent than the material world, or than we, or than any other ſpirit, which may hereafter appear to be derived from him. See *Ax.* 10.

COROLLARY 2.

There is ſomething ſo great and excellent in ſelf-exiſtence, joined with a degree of other perfections ſuperior to thoſe which we can diſcover in any derived being whatſoever, that it ſeems moſt ſafe and reaſonable, in all our farther inquiries into the nature of God, to aſcribe to him what appears to us moſt noble and excellent, and to ſeparate from our ideas of him whatever is defective or contemptible; *i. e.* in other words, to conceive of him as a being of infinite perfections: but of this more fully hereafter. See *Def.* 28. *Cor. & Schol.* 1.

Howe's Liv. Temp. p. i. *c.* iv.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

The being of a God proved from univerſal conſent.

1. Almoſt all men of every place and age have acknowledged a God, learned or unlearned, polite or barbarous, pious or wicked, fearful or courageous; and nations that have differed moſt in their genius and cuſtoms have generally agreed in this important point.

* For other proofs of the being of a God, recourſe may be had to Squire's "Irreligion Indefenſible;" Prieſtley's "Inſtitutes;" his "Letters to Philoſophical Unbelievers," part the firſt; and Bryant's "Treatiſe on the Authenticity of the Scriptures," part the firſt.

2. This

2. This opinion muſt ariſe from prejudice or from right reaſon.

1.|3. It is exceedingly difficult, or rather impoſſible, to find any prejudice common to all who have embraced this opinion. Fear could not affect the courageous, nor the invention of politic princes, princes themſelves, or barbarous nations; blind credulity would not affect the moſt philoſophic inquirers, nor religious hopes men of impious characters; and as for the authority of one perſon affirming it, how could the notion have been ſo univerſally propagated, or merely on this authority ſo univerſally believed? If education infuſed it through ſucceeding generations, why has it been ſo much more uniform than any thing elſe which is ſuppoſed to be ſo tranſmitted?

4. It does not appear that particular prejudices can be aſſigned to ſuit the caſe of all particular perſons.

3, 4.|5. This opinion does not appear to ariſe from prejudice.

2, 5.|6. It ſeems founded on right reaſon: *i. e.* there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

Wilk. of Nat. Rel. p. 41—49. *p.* 52—61. —*Tillotſ. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 14—17.—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* i. *c.* iv. § 8, 9.—*Loubiere's Siam, part* 3. *c.* xxii, xxiii. *p.* 130—132.—*Burn. on the Art. p.* 17, 18.—*Gaſtrel of Nat. Relig. p.* 26—38. *Ridgley's Divin. vol.* i. *p.* 12—14.—*Millar's Prop. of Chriſt, vol.* ii. *p.* 161. *

SCHOLIUM.

The different notions that men have maintained of the deity, and the opinion of many

* How far the univerſal conſent of the Being of God is a fact, may now particularly be traced from the number of late Voyages and Travels to all parts of the world, and to men in all the forms of ſociety.

concerning

concerning a plurality of gods, is urged as an objection againſt the argument ſtated above: but it may be anſwered, that their difference in other things makes their agreement in this great principle ſo much the more remarkable; and it is certain there is not ſuch an agreement in any falſe notion of the deity, or plurality of gods, as there is in his exiſtence in general: to which we may add, that the wrong notions particular perſons have entertained concerning him may often be accounted for by the variety of their genius, condition, education, *&c.*

Wilkins on Nat. Rel. p. 43—45.—*Burn. on the Art. p.* 18, 19.—*Tillotſ. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 15, 16.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

LECT. XXX. In which the being of a God is proved from a brief ſurvey of the works of nature.

LEMMA.

This ſyſtem of things, which we call the viſible world, is full of beauty, harmony and order.

DEMONSTRATION of the LEMMA.

1. This appears by a ſurvey of the heavenly bodies: in which we may diſtinctly conſider their magnitude, number, due ſituation, that they may not interfere with one another, and may lay a foundation for certain aſtronomical diſcoveries, which would otherwiſe have been impoſſible, had there been a perfect ſimilarity in ſituation and ſize. Eſpecially in our ſyſtem we may remark the ſun, that glorious fountain of light and vital influence, by which moſt of the other beauties of the creation around us are diſcovered; and the various planets with which he is ſurrounded; in which we may more particularly obſerve the correſpondence between their diſtance from the central body about which they revolve,

revolve, and the times in which their revolutions are performed, *i. e.* that the ſquares of their periodical times are as the cubes of their diſtances; the ſupply of moons to moſt of the diſtant planets, with the addition of a ring to *Saturn*; the agreement both of primary and ſecondary planets in a ſpherical figure; as well as the agreeable variety that is obſervable in their ſize, and other phænomena relating to them.

Derham's Aſtr. Theology, paſſ.—Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. iii.—*Ray of Creat. p.* 72—78.—*Nat. Diſp. vol.* iv.—*Baxt. Matho.—Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* i.

2. The propoſition appears from a view of the globe of the earth: in which, not to urge the gravitation of bodies on or near its ſurface towards its centre, which is common to our whole ſyſtem at leaſt, if not to the whole material world, and is the great cement of it, we may more diſtinctly conſider its diurnal and annual motion; the atmoſphere with which it is ſurrounded; its conſtituent parts, as it is a terraqueous globe, and compoſed of bodies of very different kinds, lodged upon or beneath its ſurface.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. p. 310—314.—*Nieuw. Rel. Phil. vol.* ii. *Cont.* 17. *p.* 367—413.—*Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p.* 4—18.—*Keil's Aſtron. Lect.* xxi. *ſub init.* 298, 299.

3. The vegetable productions, with which the earth is furniſhed, ſo various, beautiful and uſeful.

Nat. Diſp. vol. i. *Dial.* 14, 15. *part* 2. *p.* 158—248.—*Ray's Wiſd. of God, p.* 116—132.—*Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p.* 404—424.—*Denne's Serm. on Veget.*

4. The animal inhabitants of it: in which we can never ſufficiently admire the organs of ſenſation,

ſation, eſpecially the eye and ear, the organs of reſpiration, of motion, thoſe for receiving and digeſting the aliment, and thoſe intended for generation and the nouriſhment of the fœtus. In the inferior animals, it is wonderful to obſerve, how their different organs are fitted for thoſe different circumſtances in life for which they are intended, and eſpecially to the elements in which they are chiefly to live. To this head may be referred what was before ſaid of their various inſtincts, *Def.* 18. *Cor.* 2. to which we may farther add the limitation of their inſtincts, as well as animal ſenſations, within ſuch degrees, as the convenience of the animal requires. (*Vid. Eſſ. on Man, part* 1.) But above all, in human creatures we may juſtly admire the faculties of the mind, as well as the ſtructure of the body, both which have been largely conſidered elſewhere.

Monro's Compar. Anat. paſſ.—*Derham's Phyſ. Theol. paſſ.*

5. On the whole it may be obſerved, that the more philoſophy is improved and enquiries purſued, the more is the harmony and regularity of the works of nature illuſtrated, and the more evidently does it appear, that objections formerly made againſt them were owing to the ignorance of thoſe that advanced them.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 55, 58, 103—106.—*Nat. Diſp. vol.* i. *p.* 13—15.

6. As theſe things are wonderful when conſidered apart, ſo when the whole is conſidered as a ſyſtem, and in reference to man, for whoſe uſe this earth and what it contains ſeems principally to have been deſigned, many comparative beauties ariſe, which in a ſeparate view could not have been diſcovered.

Shaft. Char. vol. ii. *p.* 285—290.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 1.

These arguments are set in so strong and beautiful a light in the works of *Ray*, *Derham*, *Nieuwentyt*, *Bonet*, *Baxter* in his *Matho*, and in *De la Pluche's Nature Displayed*, especially in the first and fourth volumes, that they deserve a most attentive perusal at leisure *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As to those objections, which are brought from the noxious qualities of some vegetables, animals, or exhalations, from the limitation of our senses, from the helpless circumstances in which human infants are born; as well as from our being subject to diseases and death; besides those arising from the asperities of the surface of our globe, and the inclination of the axis of the earth to the plane of the ecliptic; they are most of them so evidently weak, and capable of being retorted as beauties rather than defects; and they are all so well considered and confuted in the following references, that we shall not more distinctly examine them here.

Lucret. l. v. *ver.* 196—235.——*Blackm. on the Creat. p.* 78—92.——*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* iii. *p.* 10—17. *Oct. Ed.* 5. *p.* 94—104.—*Ibid. Serm.* viii. *p.* 22—40. *Oct. Ed. p.* 83—90.——*Shaft. Char. vol.* ii. *p.* 298—309.——*Ray on the Creat. p.* 249—255.—*Keil's Exam. of Burn. Theory, pass.*—*Pope's Ess. on Man, Epist.* i. *ver.* 165—198.—*Wilkins's World in the Moon.*—*Collib. Enq. p.* 92—94.—*Polign. Anti-Lucret. pass.*——*Clarke on the Origin of Evil, p.* 160. *ad fin. præf. p.* 160—202, 233—264.—*Reimarus on Nat. Relig. pass.*

* The many curious volumes which have recently been published in the different parts of Natural History may be read in this view, though they are not, in general, applied by the authors of them to the purposes of religion.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

The noble powers and properties of the human mind are well worthy of being mentioned here, as a production incomparably more glorious than any thing in the vegetable or brutal creation. It may ſomething aſſiſt our thoughts here, to conſider how the face of nature is embelliſhed and improved by the arts which mankind have introduced into life, and how much entertainment is given mankind by producing them as the effect of their own art and labour, beyond what they could find in them merely as the product of nature.

Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p. 226 *&* 61—65. *—Locke on Government.—Abernethy's Sermons on the Being and Attributes of God.*

PROPOSITION 27. DEMONSTRATION 3.

LECT. XXXI. Proof of the being of a God from the Works of Nature.

Prop. 21.|1. Seeing the world was made, it is univerſally allowed that it muſt have been produced by chance or deſign.

2. Chance is entirely an unmeaning expreſſion, unleſs we aſcribe that to it which is produced by mechanical laws, without the contrivance and purpoſe of the thinking being, whoſe agency may be the means of producing it.

Watts's Ontol. p. 332.—*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* v. *p.* 9—12. *Oct. Ed. p.* 147—153. *5th Ed. p.* 170—174.

2.|3. It may generally be expected, that whatever is thus produced ſhould be very confuſed and imperfect, eſpecially when the effect is very complex.

Lem.|4. This world, though a very complex ſyſtem, is full of beauty, harmony and order, incom-

incomparably ſuperior to any work which we ſee produced by the deſign of the moſt curious artiſt.

3, 4.|5. It is moſt incredible that it ſhould be produced by chance.

1, 5.|6. It was produced by the deſign or counſel of ſome intelligent agent.

Prop. 20. *Cor.*|7. If any derived being were ſuppoſed the immediate former of the world, he muſt ultimately owe his wiſdom and power to ſome original and ſelf-exiſtent being.

6, 7.|8. The frame of the world proves that there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

Lucret. l. v. *ver.* 417—449.—*Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p.* 4—6. § 5—8.——*Bent. ib. Serm.* v. *p.* 12. *and fine. Oct. Ed. p.* 153—177.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 29—34.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 74—84.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 79—85. *Oct. Ed. vol.* i. *p.* 72—92.

DEMONSTRATION 4.

A deity proved from the marks of divine interpoſition which appear in the ſupport and government of the world.

LEMMA.

The author of *Matho* has illuſtrated this topic of demonſtration with incomparable ſtrength and beauty: but ſome of his arguments are of ſuch a nature as to be more properly mentioned in another place.

1. This appears in the continuance of the centripetal and projectile force of the planets, as a mutual balance to each other; neither of which appears neceſſary in itſelf, though a failure of either would be attended with a general ruin: and this thought appears with a force greatly increaſed, when we conſider the various compoſition of that four-fold motion, by which a ſecondary

ſecondary planet revolves about its primary, while both revolve about the ſun.

Baxt. Matho, vol. ii. *Conf.* vii. *p.* 4—18. —*Coll. Inq. p.* 119, 120. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 143, 144.——*Baxt. on the Soul,* § 2. *N°.* 6. *p.* 46, 47. 4*to. vol.* i. *Oct. Ed. p.* 101—106.

2. In preventing the alteration of the obliquity of the earth's axis, or its receiving any other detriment from the approach of comets or any other cauſe; and likewiſe in preventing the inclination of the moon's orbit from becoming greater, or the moon itſelf from being brought nearer to or carried farther from the earth; any of which alterations would be attended with fatal conſequences, eſpecially the two laſt of them, which might be moſt eaſily affected by a comet's approach.

Matho, vol. ii. § 118, 119. *p.* 143, *&c.* § 110. *p.* 91, *&c.*—*Collib. Ib. p.* 144.

3. In regulating the winds, ſo as may be for the preſervation and benefit of the earth; though we are not able to aſſign any certain laws by which it is effected.

Clarke's Rohault, part 1. *c.* xii. § 41. *Note.*—*Collib. Inq. p.* 144.

4. In the due proportion which is obſerved between males and females in the ſeveral ſpecies of animals, and eſpecially in mankind.

Nieuwent. ib. vol. i. *p.* 351—363.—— *Derh. Phyſ. Theol. p.* 175, 176. *Note.*

5. In preſerving the balance of the ſeveral ſpecies of animals, ſo that none ſhould over-run the earth and none be loſt.

Collib. ib. p. 123. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 147—*Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p.* 168—179.—*Nat. Diſp. vol.* i. *part* i. *p.* 44—46.

6. In keeping the ſpecies of animals and vegetables the ſame through ſucceeding ages, and preventing

preventing their being corrupted by undue mixtures.

Collib. ib. p. 122, 123. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 148, 149.

7. In keeping the faces, voices, and handwriting ſo wonderfully diſtinct as they appear to be.

Weems's Works, vol. iv. *part* 2. *p.* 12, 13. *Derh. ib. p.* 308—310.—*Ray's Wiſd. p.* 283—286.

8. The regularity and ſteadineſs with which the world is governed by the ſame laws in the moſt diſtant ages, is a farther noble argument of the divine interpoſition; and is perhaps in nothing more conſpicuous than in this, that the inſtincts of animals are ſtill the ſame.

Shaft. vol. ii. *p.* 337.

9. If in any inſtance theſe laws have been interrupted, and effects have been produced beyond the common courſe of nature; as theſe inſtances do not appear to have been ſo frequent as to overthrow the argument *gr.* 8. ſo they afford a farther argument of a being ſuperior to this ſyſtem of things, and prove that he attends to the affairs of his creatures.

Limb. Theol. l. i. *c.* ii. § 17, 19, 25.—*Crellius de Deo, p.* 23. *in his Works, vol.* iv.

1—9.|10. It appears that the world is under the government of ſome being of great power and exquiſite contrivance, art and conduct; who is himſelf either neceſſarily exiſtent, or derived from ſome other who is ſo.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

To give a view of thoſe other arguments in proof of a deity, which ſeem not of equal force with the former, and yet are urged by perſons of conſiderable note. LECT. XXXII.

SOLUTION.

1. *Carteſius* argues that there muſt be a God, becauſe neceſſary exiſtence is contained in the idea of a God, as three angles are in the idea of a triangle; ſo that though eſſence and exiſtence are in other things diſtinct, yet when conſidered with regard to the deity they are the ſame.

To this it is anſwered, that there is a difference between the notional truth of propoſitions and the real truth of ideas. In plainer terms, the fallacy lies in the ambiguity of thoſe words, *God is a neceſſary exiſtent being:* If the meaning of them be, *q. d.* "By the word GOD, "I underſtand a being that is ſuppoſed to be "ſelf-exiſtent," they will be allowed; but then they prove not his real exiſtence: but if they ſignify, "It is moſt certain there is ſuch a being," the ſenſe is changed, and the propoſition may ſtill be diſputed.

Carteſ. Princ. l. i. § 14—16.—*Camb. Exiſt. p.* 197—199.—*Voyage to the World of Cart. p.* 159—164.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 130—132. *Ed.* 2. *p.* 156—159.

2. *Carteſius* farther argues, "The greater the "objective perfection of any idea is, the more "perfect muſt its cauſe be: but we have the "idea of a being infinitely perfect, therefore "there muſt be ſome infinitely perfect being to "cauſe and produce it."

But this ſeems ſtill to take for granted the thing to be proved, *i. e.* the objective reality of the idea, or the reality of the object ſuppoſed to be repreſented by it. And it may be pleaded, that, without any ſuch archetype at all, an idea of an infinitely perfect being, might be produced by the operation of our minds upon ideas ariſing from inferior objects, ſeeing we do not comprehend infinity, but only deny the bounds of an object which we ſuppoſe infinite.

Carteſ.

Carteſ. ib. § 17, 18, 22.—*Camb. ib. p.* 189—191.—*Voyage to the World of Cart. p.* 166—169.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 132, 133. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 159, 160.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 20—22. *p.* 19—21. *6th Edit.*—*Locke's Eſſ. l.* iv. *c.* x. § 7.

3. *Epicurus*, and many others, particularly Lord *Shafteſbury*, have argued, that the idea of God is univerſal as being innate, and therefore that his exiſtence is certain. *Epicurus* therefore ſuppoſes it natural to admit it; and thoſe who believe man to be God's work, argue from his having ſtampt this character of himſelf upon all his human creatures. But the foundation of this argument has been removed in *Prop.* 8, 6. *gr.* 5. and the references.

Coll. Inq. p. 128—130. *Ed.* 3. 154—156. —*Shafteſb. Lett. to a Clerg.*

4. *Tillotſon* argues to this effect: "The idea "of a God is poſſible, ſeeing it involves no con- "tradiction to ſuppoſe a being of all poſſible "perfections, therefore it is neceſſary: for if "there be no God now, there never can be a "God, ſeeing eternity is a part of our idea of "him; ſo that on this ſuppoſition the exiſtence "of a God is impoſſible, contrary to the hypo- "theſis." But this argument, which ſeems nearly equal to the firſt in a plainer dreſs, may be ſufficiently anſwered by the known diſtinction between an *hypothetical* and an *actual* poſſibility: *v. g.* It may be ſaid to be *hypothetically* poſſible, that the firſt man ſhould have been created with wings, but ſince he was in fact created without wings, it is not *actually* poſſible; and this ſeems to be an inſtance parallel to the other.

Tillotſ. Works, vol. i. *p.* 19.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 133, 134. *Ed.* 3. 161, 162.

DEFINITION XXXI.

Thoſe arguments which are brought from the exiſtence of ſome of the attributes of God to prove the exiſtence of a God, are called proofs A PRIORI: thoſe taken from the phænomena obſervable in the works of nature, are called proofs A POSTERIORI.

SCHOLIUM I.

The queſtion, whether there be any proof of the being of a God *a priori*, depends upon the reality of ſpace and duration, and their being the properties of ſome ſubſtance which will be examined hereafter.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The proof of the *attributes* of a God *a priori*, is the arguing them from ſelf-exiſtence, ſhewing them to have a neceſſary connection with it: and in this ſenſe ſome have denied there can be any proof *a priori*; becauſe nothing can be prior to a ſelf-exiſtent being, and becauſe all our proofs of the attributes of ſuch a being are ultimately drawn from the conſideration of ſome being derived from him. But this objection is evidently founded on a miſtake of the ſenſe in which theſe words are uſed by the moſt accurate writers.

SCHOLIUM 3.

On the whole, it may be proper to diſtinguiſh the various ways of proving the being and attributes of God thus,

1. *Both* are proved *a priori*, when from the real exiſtence of ſpace and duration we infer the exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent being whoſe properties they are, and from neceſſity of exiſtence prove his wiſdom, power, goodneſs, &c *.

2. *Both*

* Amidſt the various attempts to prove the being of a God *a priori*, one of the moſt curious, and which ſeems to approach the

2. *Both* are proved *a posteriori*, when we argue from a survey of the system of nature, that there must be a wise, powerful and benevolent author.

3. The proof is *mixed*, when from the observed existence of any one derived being, whether material or immaterial, more or less perfect, we argue the existence of a self-existent being, and thus infer his attributes from a necessary connection with self-existence, as in the first case.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 494—498. *and p.* 501, 502.—*Waterland's Diss. on the Arg. a priori, apud Law's Enq. ad Fin. præf.* 51—54, 56—60.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

To take a survey of the chief sects of ATHEISTS amongst the ancient *Grecian* philosophers. LECT. XXXIII.

SOLUTION.

SECT. 1. They all agreed in asserting, that there was nothing but *matter* in the universe: but differ as to the question, whether it was animate or inanimate.

SECT. 2. Those who held matter to be *animated*, were in general called ὑλοζοικοι; who, (as they darkly expressed it) maintained that matter had some natural perception, but no animal sensation, or reflection in itself considered; but that this imperfect life occasioned that organization,

the nearest to a demonstration, is a short tract, written by the Rev. Moses Lowman of Clapham. The piece is now become very scarce, and indeed is almost forgotten. We mention it, that, in case it should be met with in any catalogue or sale of books, its value may be known. A Mr. Knight, a Dissenting Minister at Chertsey in Surrey, wrote a book on the same subject, a little more than forty years ago. See also the second edition of Dr. Price's Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals.

from whence sensation and reflection afterwards arose.

SECT. 3. Of these, some held only *one life*, which they called a *plastic nature*; and these were called the *Stoical* atheists, because the *Stoics* held such a nature, though they supposed it the instrument of the deity: others thought that every particle of matter was endued with life, and these were called the *Stratonici*, from *Strato Lampsacenus:* and *Hobbes* seems to have been of this opinion.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 57. *marg.*

SECT. 4. Those atheists who held matter to be *inanimate* were called ἀλομικοι. Of these, some attempted to solve the phænomena of nature, by having recourse to the unmeaning language of *qualities* and *forms*, as the *Anaximandrians*, who thought they were produced by infinite active force, upon immense matter, acting without design: others by the figure and motion which they suppose to be essential to those atoms: these were the *Democritici*; whose philosophy differed but very little from the *Epicureans*, who evidently borrowed many of their notions from *Democritus*.

SECT. 5. *Diagoras* and *Theodorus* among the ancients, as *Vanini* among the moderns, are reckoned martyrs for atheism.

Collier or Bayle in Nom.—Buddæi Hist. Phil. c. iv. § 43—46, & 48.——*Cudworth's System, l.* i. *c.* iii. *præf.* § 34—36, 105, 134—136.—*Cyrus's Trav. vol.* ii. *p.* 27, 28, 31, 32.—*Fenel. Phil. Lives, p.* 110, & 253, 254.—*Hale's Orig. of Man,* § 4. *c.* iv. *p.* 340—342.—*Univ. Hist. vol.* i. *p.* 17—25. *fol.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 1.

Sir *William Temple* is ſaid to have been an atheiſt of a kind different from any of theſe, and to have thought the preſent ſyſtem of things neceſſary and eternal; conſequently his notion has been confuted, by all the arguments brought to prove the world in its preſent form not to have been eternal, and that matter is not ſelf-exiſtent, nor motion eſſential to it, or thought producible from it alone.

Burnet's Hiſt. of his own Times, vol. ii. *p.* 670. *Oct.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

The *Chineſe* have been repreſented by ſome as a nation of atheiſts; and *Burnet* declares that *Confucius* and his followers, of whom Sir *William Temple* was a great admirer, are to be reckoned amongſt thoſe who were atheiſts themſelves and left religion to the people. But *Couplet* (in his *Declaratio Proemialis, p.* 38.) has largely endeavoured to prove, that though their modern writers, *i. e.* thoſe from about the tenth century of chriſtianity, have entertained and propagated atheiſtical notions among the philoſophers of that nation, *Confucius* and their earlier teachers were notwithſtanding votaries to pure religion. But it is very obſervable, that *Confucius* (if the writings, which *Couplet* and his brethren, the Jeſuit miſſionaries, have publiſhed as his, do really contain a juſt repreſentation of what he taught,) ſays little of thoſe branches of duty which immediately relate to God; which leaves too much room for ſuſpicion: though he does indeed ſpeak of ſpirits ſurrounding men when they ſacrifice, in ſuch a manner, as to agree very well with the heathen notion of good dæmons, which perhaps differs not much from the chriſtian doctrine of angels. (*Conf. Morals, l.* ii. *p.* 50—52.)

—52.) Yet I have not been able to find any part of his work in which he ſpeaks expreſsly of God: for that very remarkable paſſage, (*l.* ii. *p.* 88—90.) in which he ſays ſo many ſublime things of *him who is ſupremely holy*, muſt (when the whole of it is taken together) be underſtood of his *wiſe man*, and in that view is ſo impious and prophane, as to leave a great deal of room to imagine, that *Burnet* was not miſtaken in the judgment he formed concerning him; nor will what he ſays of *the great ſpirit of heaven and earth* be ſufficient wholly to remove the ſuſpicion; as it is moſt probable, that it coincides with the notion of a plaſtic power, which ſome of the *Grecian* atheiſts held.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Beſides the objections againſt deſign in the univerſe, (*Prop.* 27. *Lem.* to *Dem.* 3. *Schol.* 2.) other objections againſt a deity have been urged; the chief of which amount to this, that there is ſomething in his nature, operations and conduct which we cannot fully comprehend: but if this argument be allowed as concluſive, we might be brought even to doubt of our own exiſtence. See *Prop.* 18. *Cor.* 3.

Many other arguments or excuſes brought for atheiſm do not deſerve a particular place here, as will appear by conſulting the paſſages here referred to.

Cudworth's Syſt. Book 1. *c.* ii. § 5—22.—*Gaſtrel of Nat. Rel. p.* 187—212.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It ſeems reaſonable to conclude, that the fear of puniſhment from a divine being, and a deſire of ſeeming wiſer than others, have been the chief cauſes of atheiſm; and perhaps the abſurd notions which ſome have entertained of the deity, and the unworthy manner in which thoſe who profeſs

profeſs to believe in him have acted, may be reckoned among the moſt fatal occaſions of it.

Gaſtr. ib. p. 230—248.—*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 84, 85. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 221, 222.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It may not be improper here to hint at the ſtrange conduct of *Tully* in his celebrated book *De Natura Deorum*, who only ſlightly touches on the opinion of *Anaxagoras*, that all things were produced by one infinite mind, and gives no patron to that opinion, nor ſo much as ſpends one page or ſection in diſcuſſing it; though he aſſigns proper advocates to defend at large the *Stoical* and *Epicurean* principles, as well as the *Academical*; and after all, leaves his reader under the impreſſion of the *Epicurean* objections againſt providence; only coldly telling us, that they were not on the whole in his opinion ſo probable as the contrary doctrine. It is obſervable that the moſt religious paſſage in all *Tully*'s works is only a fragment preſerved by *Lactantius*.

Middleton's Life of Cic. vol. iii. *Oct. p.* 350, 351.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Having thus eſtabliſhed the proof of the exiſtence of God, we now proceed in the following propoſitions to conſider the chief of his perfections.

PROPOSITION XXX.

God is eternal, *i.e.* he has exiſted, and will ever exiſt. LECT. XXXIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 27. *Cor.* 1.|1. Whatever is ſelf-exiſtent is eternal.

Def. 30.|2. God is ſelf-exiſtent.

1, 2. 3. God is eternal. *Q. E. D.*
Wilkins Nat. Rel. p. 120—123.—*Abern. vol.* i. *p.* 182—191.

COROLLARY.

God is immutable. Vid. *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 3.
Wilkins ib. p. 115—117.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 56, 57. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 66, 67.—*Abern. p.* 198—200.

SCHOLIUM.

It muſt be acknowledged there is ſomething to us incomprehenſible in the divine eternity, in whatever view we attempt to conceive of it. A *ſucceſſive* eternity is what the mind can form no conſiſtent idea of: for it ſeems, that, if there have been a fifth, a tenth, or hundredth, there muſt have been ſome firſt; and there can be nothing abſolutely infinite, to which a continual addition is making. On the other hand, it is impoſſible for us to conceive of an eternity ſo *inſtantaneous*, as to exclude all paſt and future, and to be but one point of duration: this would make that ſpace of time, to which millions of years are as nothing, but a ſmall part of an hour or a minute, and is in effect declaring that God is now creating the world, and alſo now deſtroying it, ſuppoſing it ever to be deſtroyed. Indeed if all that were meant by an inſtantaneous eternity when applied to God were this, that all things whether paſt or future are as open to his view, as thoſe things which exiſt in the preſent moment, this would be intelligible, but would not remove the difficulty of a ſucceſſive eternity: and to reply (as ſome have done) that this eternity is not to be conſidered as duration at all, but as neceſſary exiſtence, to which neither ſucceſſion nor inſtantaneouſneſs have any relation at all, more than colour to ſound, leaves the queſtion I think under the ſame darkneſs as before.

Never-

Nevertheleſs it is to be remembered, that this difficulty does not ariſe from the doctrine of the deity alone, but is common to every ſcheme that ſuppoſes any thing eterna', as ſomething muſt certainly be; (*Prop.* 19.) and it would follow from ſuppoſing one atom to be ſo, beſides all the other abſurdities ariſing from the denial of an intelligent ſelf-exiſtent cauſe.

Clarke's Serm. vol. i. *p.* 81, 82, *Oct.*—*Collib. Inq. p.* 204—211. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 245—253.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 69, 70.—*Watts's Hymns, l.* ii. *N°.* 17 & 67. *See alſo his Ontology, c.* iv. *p.* 12—17. —*Abern. vol.* i. *p.* 201—207.—*Soame Jenyns's Diſquiſitions, N°.* 4.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

God is omnipotent; *i. e.* no effect can be aſſigned ſo great, but he is able to produce it.

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 30.|1. The very act of creating any being out of nothing, implies a power ſo great, that we can imagine nothing impoſſible to a being who can perform it by his own power.

Prop. 27. *Dem.* 3.|2. The amazing greatneſs and variety of the works of nature ſerve ſtill more ſenſibly to illuſtrate the power of the creator.

3. We ſee nothing which betrays any marks of impotency or weakneſs in the deity.

1, 2, 3.|4. We have no reaſon to believe that any *internal* defect limits the divine power.

5. If there were any other being capable of controuling him, in the execution of his volitions, this being muſt be ſuperior to him, and might (for any thing that appears) have prevented or deſtroyed his being as well as his operations, which would be inconſiſtent with the idea of God (*Def.* 30.) as a ſelf-exiſtent being.

5.|6. There

5.|6. There is no *external* power to limit the operations of the divine being.

4, 6.|7. His power is unlimited, and conſequently can produce any effect be it ever ſo great. *Q. E. D.*

Wilkins of Nat. Rel. p. 145, 146. *p.* 127—129. *Oct. Ed.*—*Clarke's Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 119, 120, 206—216.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 106, 107, 67—69.—*Living Temple, vol* i. *Oct. Ed. p.* 207—215.—*Abern. vol.* i. *N°.* 8.

COROLLARY.

If God be omnipotent, then nothing can be neceſſary to the production of any being in any ſuppoſed circumſtance of time or place, but that God ſhould will its exiſtence in this circumſtance.

Jen. Pneum. Prop. 30.—*Ralphſon de Spatio reali, p.* 67.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 23. *Note.*—*Living Temple, p.* 50, 51.

SCHOLIUM 1.

LECT. XXXV. Another argument to prove that God is infinite in power is drawn from *Def.* 28. *Cor.* for it is certain he has ſome degree of power. A third from *Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 1. *Cor.* 2. ſince it is evident that to conceive of God as omnipotent, is much more honourable than to conceive of him as a being of limited power.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be objected to the fifth ſtep of the preceding demonſtration, that a power merely equal to that of God's might be ſufficient to controul him in the execution of his volitions, and that we have not yet proved there is no being equal to him; it may be replied, that in ſome caſes to controul the acts of another muſt argue ſome ſuperiority; *v. g.* if A will that a creature ſhould exiſt, and B that it ſhould not exiſt, if it does not

not exiſt, then B in that inſtance triumphs over A, and appears ſuperior to him. But if this anſwer ſhould not be judged ſatisfactory, then it muſt be remembered, that we have ſhown that God's power is not limited by any internal defect, and that no external limiting power has yet been proved; and if it ſhould hereafter be proved, by any argument not depending upon his omnipotence, that there is but one ſuch ſelf-exiſtent being as we call God, then this propoſition will be demonſtrated in all its extent.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It muſt be owned that we have no conceptions of a creating power otherwiſe than by its effects: nevertheleſs that will not prove that there is no ſuch thing: a blind man might as well argue againſt the exiſtence of light.

Collib. Inq. p. 60—64. *Ed.* 3. 70—75.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is no limitation of the divine power, to aſſert that God is not able to do what implies a contradiction, for that is in effect to do nothing at all, and conſequently, a pretended power of doing it, is no power at all.

Coll. Inq. p. 180, 181. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 217, 218. ——*Crouz. Log. vol.* i. *p.* 403, 404.—— *Clarke's Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 216—219. ——*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 104.—— *Living Temple, Oct. Ed. vol.* i. *p.* 339 —343.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

LECT. XXXVI.

All the creatures of God, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, ſenſible or ſpiritual, owe their efficacy for producing any effect to the agency of a divine power in and upon them, at the very time when ſuch effect is produced.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Def. 27. 1. Whatever is derived from another does not neceſſarily exiſt in the firſt moment of its being.

2. Whatever

2. Whatever does not neceſſarily exiſt in the firſt moment of its exiſtence, cannot neceſſarily exiſt in the ſecond, or in any following moment; but muſt owe its continued exiſtence to the will of the being by whom it was at firſt produced: for by ſuppoſing its exiſtence to continue when that will ceaſed, we ſhould ſuppoſe it to be without the cauſe of its being. *Q. E. A.*

1, 2.|3. All the creatures of God do every moment depend upon God for the continuance of their exiſtence.

Collib. Inq. p. 64, 65. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 75, 76.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 65.—*Burnet on Art. p.* 30.—*Watts's Eſſ. l.* ix. § 2. *p.* 201—208, 213.—*Ib. N°.* xi. *p.* 267, 268.—*Cheyne's Princ. part* i. § 9.—*Baxt. on the Soul. vol.* i. *p.* 225—227.—*Sherlock on Providence, 9th Edit. p.* 19, 20.

4. The power of action implies ſomething more than continued exiſtence.

3, 4.|5. Whatever is created by God depends continually upon him for the continuance of its active powers.

6. If from any conſtitution of nature whatſoever, there could neceſſarily ariſe any act of power independent on the concurrent volition of God, it is difficult to ſay where that independent power would ſtop; and for ought appears that being might be omnipotent.

7. The wiſeſt and greateſt philoſophers have not been able to trace any connection between ſolidity and gravitation, or motion and thought: therefore a perpetual omnipotent agency ſeems to be the moſt probable way of accounting for thoſe otherwiſe unaccountable phænomena.

Baxter's Matho, vol. i. *Conf.* iv. § 44—49.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. § ii. *præf. p.* 94—101. *& note, p.* 101—108, 128—139.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 300.

5, 6 and

5, 6 and 7.|8. *Valet propoſitio.*

Virg. Æn. vi. *ver.* 724, *&c.*—*Owen on Sp.* *p.* 138—140. *p.* 77. *p.* 465, 466.——*Camb. Exiſt. p.* 111.——*Clarke's* xvii. *Serm. N°.* 7. *p.* 171.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 15. *B. p.* 27, *A. p.* 183. *A. p.* 100. *B.*—*South's Serm. vol.* iii. *p.* 461. —*Reynolds's Works, p.* 7.—*Jenk. Reaſon. of Chriſtianity, vol.* ii. *p.* 484.——*Marc. Anton. l.* v. *c.* 40.—*Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* vii. *p.* 240—244. *Lond. Ed. p.* 225 —229.—*Price's Four Diſſertations, N°.* 1.——*Dr. Stebbing's Diſcourſe on Providence.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

To thoſe who allow the univerſality of divine providence on principles independent on this propoſition, which many do, another argument has been propoſed; which will ſtand thus.

1. God muſt will that any creature ſhould, or ſhould not exiſt, with any given power, in any given moment; for not to will that it ſhould ſo exiſt, would on the preſent ſuppoſition be in effect willing that it ſhould not.

2. If he will that it ſhould not ſo exiſt, it will not: otherwiſe God would not be omnipotent, contrary to *Prop.* 31.

1, 2, 3.|4. Therefore its exiſtence in ſuch circumſtances, *i. e.* its efficacy for producing any effect in queſtion, is owing to the divine volition, *i. e.* to the agency of God in and upon it *. *Q. E. D.*

COR-

* *N. B.* I lay but little ſtreſs upon this *ſecond* demonſtration, though it once appeared plauſible: for perhaps the univerſality of divine providence cannot be demonſtrated on principles independent of this propoſition; ſo that at beſt it is but *argumentum ad hominem:* and the force of this reaſoning may be ſo probably retorted with reſpect to the irrational volitions of free creatures,

COROLLARY I.

LECT. XXXVII. What we generally call *ſecond cauſes*, are not cauſes in the ſtrict propriety of ſpeech; and what we call the *laws of nature*, are only certain rules and methods, by which God generally proceeds, in thoſe of his actions which fall under our cognizance. Nevertheleſs, creatures may in an inferior ſenſe be called cauſes, as certain events commonly follow certain changes in their condition and will.

Boyle's Inq. into Nat. apud—Ray's Wiſd. of God, p. 53, 54.—*Seed's Serm. N°.* 5. *vol.* ii. *p.* 127, *&c.*——*Cheyne's Princ. part* i. § 4. *p.* 4—6.—*Nat. Diſp. vol.* iv. *p.* 50—52.——*Ramſay's Princ. vol.* i. *p.* 251—255.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 179—181.—*Watts's Ontology, p.* 329 *and* 365.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lectures, part* ii. *p.* 222. *6th Ed.*

COROLLARY 2.

It evidently appears that the providence, *i. e.* the notice and care of God extends itſelf to all events, even the ſmalleſt as well as the greateſt. *Vid. Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 4.

Rel. of Nat. p. 95—98.—*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 162—166.—*Baxt. on the Soul, p.* 182, 183.

COROLLARY 3.

We hence learn, into what we are to reſolve the power which our minds have of moving our bodies, *viz.* into a divine volition in ſuch and ſuch inſtances to produce motions in our bodies, correſpondent to the volitions of our minds.

creatures, that it ſeems on the whole beſt to wave it, and to allow, that even while providence is attentive to an event, there may be a medium between abſolutely willing either that it ſhould, or ſhould not exiſt, which is inconſiſtent with the firſt ſtep. D.

To

To this agree the eaſe and ſwiftneſs with which thoſe motions are performed on the act of our will, and the conſtancy of other involuntary, but always needful motions, which cannot be ſolved by any mechanical laws. *Prop.* 1. *Sch.* 2.

Clarke and Leibnitz, N°. v. *App.*—*Clerici Pneum.* § 1. *c.* vi. § 12—16.——*Camb. Exiſt.* § 46, 47.—*Matho, vol.* i. *Conf.* 6. § 79.—*Seed's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 150.

COROLLARY 4.

The wonderful inſtances of inſtinct in brutes may moſt probably be accounted for this way: God, by ſome unknown impreſſion upon them, moving them to and aſſiſting them in ſuch actions, as on the whole are moſt convenient; though the rationale depends on principles, which they cannot know. *Def.* 19. *Cor.* 2.

Spect. vol. ii. *N°.* 120. *ſub fin. N°.* 121. *ſub init.*—*Camb. Exiſt.* § 23. *p.* 46—48. —*Nat. Diſp. vol.* i. *p.* 285, 286. *Ed.* 2. *p.* 197, 198.—*Matho, vol.* i. *Conf.* vi. § 82, 83.—*Origen adv. Celſ. l.* iv. *p.* 217. *Seed's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 148, *&c.*

COROLLARY 5.

Hence we infer the abſurdity of the doctrine of a *Plaſtic nature*, which ſome have thus deſcribed. "It is an incorporeal created ſubſtance, "endued with a vegetative life, but not with "ſenſation or thought; penetrating the whole "created univerſe, being coextended with it; "and under God moving matter, ſo as to pro- "duce the phænomena, which cannot be ſolved "by mechanical laws: active for ends unknown "to itſelf, not being expreſsly conſcious of its "actions, and yet having an obſcure idea of the "action to be entered upon."

As the idea itſelf is moſt obſcure, and indeed inconſiſtent, ſo the foundation of it is evidently

weak. It is intended by this, to avoid the inconveniency of ſubjecting God to the trouble of ſome changes in the created world, and the meanneſs of others: but it appears from this propoſition, that even upon this hypotheſis he would ſtill be the author of them; beſides that to omnipotence nothing is troubleſome, nor thoſe things mean, when conſidered as a part of a ſyſtem, which *alone* might appear to be ſo.

Cudw. Int. Syſt. book i. *c.* i. *p.* 149—172. *præf.* 178—181.—*More's Imm. of the Soul, l.* iii. *c.* 12——*His Philoſophical Works, p.* 212—215.—*Ray's Wiſd. of God, p.* 51, 52.—*Cheyne's Princ. part* i. *c.* i. § 3. *p.* 3, 4.

SCHOLIUM I.

SECT. XXXVIII. It is objected, that if God be thus the author of all our ideas and of all our motions, then alſo of all our volitions, which would be inconſiſtent with that liberty of choice aſſerted, *Prop.* 16.

Anſ. On the principles laid down above, the will is not properly an effect of any neceſſary efficient cauſe; but rather a tendency towards the production of an effect, ſo far as we apprehend it to be in our power; (*Prop.* 1. *gr.* 4.) and for any thing which appears in the objection, or is aſſerted in the propoſition, when all the requiſites to volition are ſuppoſed, it lies in our own breaſts to determine one way or another; and though God, upon ſuch a determination of ours, adds efficacy to the volition, even when it is moſt fooliſh and pernicious, that does not properly make him the author of the action. (*Vid. Def.* 10.) And they who ſuppoſe a ſtock of power lodged in the hand of the creature by virtue of its original conſtitution, (God at the ſame time knowing in every particular how it will be uſed,) will labour under the ſame difficulty in this reſpect with us; nay, their hypotheſis at laſt will be found

found equivalent to our's: and if we allow that univerſal preſence and inſpection of God, which all who are not atheiſts admit, it will be nearly as difficult to account for his not interpoſing to prevent ſuch actions, as for his adding efficacy to them in a natural way.

Camb. Exiſt. § 67.—*Howe on Preſcience*, § 6, 7. *Op. vol.* ii. *p.* 500—503.——*Watts's Diſſ. on Trin. N°.* 5. *p.* 142, 143.—*His Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 604, 605.—*Mandeville's Free Thoughts, p.* 108, 109.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 205—210.——*Collib. Enq. p.* 195—198. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 235—238.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that if God produces all our ideas by his own impreſſion on the mind, then a material world was not neceſſary, and conſequently it would be unbecoming the nature and character of God to produce it. *Vid. Prop.* 31. *Cor.*

Anſ. 1. The denial of any material world at all, according to *Berkley*'s and *Collier*'s ſcheme, would remove the foundation of this objection: nevertheleſs, for reaſons which will afterwards be mentioned, we do not chuſe to have recourſe to that ſolution; but add,

2. Allowing the creation of a material world to be to us utterly unaccountable on this ſuppoſition, we cannot therefore certainly ſay that it was in vain: and as for its not being abſolutely neceſſary, it will not eaſily be granted, that any thing that God does, is ſo.

3. If we grant that God has a power of producing any idea in our minds without an external archetype, (of which dreams ſeem to be an evident proof, and which is ſo certainly included in omnipotence that few deny it,) then it will be as hard to account for the creation of the ma-

terial world, as if we admit the propoſition to be true.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that it is a diſhonour to the divine being, to ſuppoſe him immediately concerned in the moſt mean and trifling events; and that it would be exceedingly ridiculous, were our diſcourſe commonly to be formed upon the principles of this propoſition.

Anſ. We before (*Cor.* 5.) obſerved the uſefulneſs and beauty of many things *on the whole*, which, when conſidered *in themſelves*, may appear mean and vile (of which the diſcharge of the fæces from animal bodies is a remarkable inſtance:) and we may farther add, that there is no occaſion at all for introducing a change in our common forms of ſpeech, ſeeing there is a ſenſe, in which thoſe things may be ſaid to be the actions of the creatures, which are done by the intermediation of their volition, though not by an active force of their own, at that time independent on the concurrent volition of God (*Cor.* 1.): ſo that upon the whole, they may be ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from thoſe, which are, with full propriety and in the higheſt ſenſe, called the actions of God.

Crouz. Log. vol. i. *p.* 436—440, 442.—*Watts's Eſſ. N°.* 3. *c.* iii. § 10—15. *p.* 87—90.

SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT. XXXIX. It is farther objected, that it would be a diſhonour to the divine being, that, whereas a common workman can make a machine, which ſhall go on for ſome time without his interpoſition, God ſhould not be able to produce what can operate without his perpetual agency.

To this it is anſwered, 1, All human arts are but the means of altering ſome circumſtances in

the form and disposition of matter, which before existed under certain laws, entirely independent on the will of the artist: but it is the peculiar glory of God, to have a whole world of creatures in a perpetual dependance on himself.

2. That when we assert a perpetual divine agency, we readily acknowledge that matters are so contrived, as not to need a divine interposition in a different manner from that in which it had been constantly exerted. And it is most evident, that an unremitting energy, displayed in such circumstances, greatly exalts our idea of God, instead of depressing it; and therefore by the way is so much the more likely to be true. *Vid. Prop* 27. *Cor.* 2.

3. We may add, that this argument tends to prove, contrary to the opinion of most that have advanced it, that God might make a creature, which should subsist without his supporting presence and agency.

Burn. on Art. p. 33. *Watts's Ess. N°.* ix. § 2. *p.* 201—208.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 195—198. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 235—238.—*Clarke and Leibnitz, p.* 3—7. § 4. *p.* 13—17. § 4. *p.* 27—31. § 6—9. *p.* 43—47. § 6—9. *p.* 363—365.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

God is a being of perfect KNOWLEDGE: *i. e.* he knows in the most certain and perfect manner whatever can be the object of knowledge, *i. e.* whatever does not imply a contradiction.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Def. 30. *Prop.* 27|1. God is a spirit, *i. e.* a thinking being.

1.|2. God must have some degree of knowledge.

2. *Def.* 28. *Cor.*|3. There is no reaſon for ſetting bounds to his knowledge, *i. e.* he knows all things in the moſt perfect manner. *Q. E. D.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

Def. 30. *Prop.* 27. *Prop.* 32.|1. God has made all the creatures, and continually actuates and ſupports them.

1.|2. He muſt know all that relates to them.

3. He muſt by conſciouſneſs know himſelf.

2, 3.|4. He muſt know all things. *Q. E. D.*

SCHOLIUM.

To this it may be objected, that there may be ſome other ſelf-exiſtent creator, and that this being with his creatures may be unknown to God: and it is allowed, that the argument of this ſecond demonſtration cannot appear in its full evidence, till we have proved the unity of the Godhead: nevertheleſs the ſecond ſtep alone would be ſufficient to prove, that he knew all things that belong to us; which is that in which we are chiefly concerned.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

1. Knowledge is an attribute of ſo great importance, that without it, whatever conceptions we could form of the deity, would be very low and imperfect.

Prop. 27. *Cor.* 2.|2. It is reaſonable to conceive of God in the moſt honourable manner.

1, 2.|3. It is reaſonable to conceive of God as a being of great knowledge; and to remove from our idea of him, as much as poſſible, all degrees of error, ignorance and uncertainty.

4. There is no apparent reaſon for limiting his knowledge, ſo as to exclude from it any thing which can be the object of intelligence, to us or any other being.

3, 4.|5. It

3, 4.|5. It is reasonable to conclude that he is a being of perfect knowledge. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. *p.* 248—252. *N°.* 11.—*Wilk. Nat. Rel. p.* 124—128. —*Tillotf. vol.* ii. *p.* 599, 600, 602, 603, 609—611.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 102, 103.——*Abernethy, vol.* i. *N°.* 9. *p.* 290—306.

SCHOLIUM.

That God is a being of boundless knowledge as well as power, was the opinion of the wisest heathens; as appears from the custom of swearing, as well as from many passages quoted from their writers in the references above.

COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears that God knows all the secrets of the heart, and therefore is most able to judge of the real characters of men.

COROLLARY 2.

It appears that any hypocrisy, when we are dealing with him, or addressing to him, is very great folly, though it may be most artfully disguised.

DEFINITION XXXII.

A SPIRIT is said to be PRESENT IN ANY PLACE, when it is capable of perceiving and immediately operating upon the body which fills that place, or on spirits united to such bodies, *i. e.* spirits perceiving and acting by them. LECT. XL.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

God is OMNIPRESENT, *i. e.* present in every place.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 33.|1. God perceives the changes of bodies in whatever place they are, and of all spirits united to them.

Prop. 31.|2. He is capable of operating upon them.

3. It is much more honourable to God, to conceive of him as present in all places, than as excluded from any.

1, 2, 3. *Def.* 32. and 28. *Cor.* 2.|4. God is omnipresent. *Q. E. D.*

Howe, ib. vol. i. *p.* 100—110.—*Tillotf. vol.* ii. *p.* 756, 757.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 71, 72. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 84, 85.——*Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* vii.——*Spect. vol.* viii. *N°.* 565, 571.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The first of these arguments only proves that God is where any of his creatures are; and it is only on supposition that there is *but one* God, that it will follow from hence, that he is every where. But it is to be remembered, that the argument, *Def.* 28. *Cor.* if allowed, will prove, that what can by a necessity of its own nature act upon a body in *any* place, may by a necessity of its nature act upon bodies in *every* place; which will be so far a proof of God's omnipresence, independent on his unity: and if it be his property to fill space, he must for the same reason fill all space.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is a great question, whether God be so present as to fill space. This depends upon another question, whether it be the property of an immaterial spirit to fill space: with reference to which I must confess, that when I conceive of spirit as diffused through any part of space, I immediately conceive of it as something *corporeal*; and consequently cannot conceive how it can be asserted of the Divine Being, by those who grant his immateriality, as most of the patrons of this doctrine

doctrine do. But this will be more largely considered below.

Newt. Princip. p. 483.—*Saur. Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 60—64.——*Watts's Eff. N°.* vi. § 5. *p.* 165—169.—*Ramf. Phil. Princ. Prop.* viii. *vol.* i. *p.* 57—72.

DEFINITION XXXIII.

An event not come to pass is said to be CONTINGENT, which either may, or may not be. What is already done, is said to *have been contingent*, if it might or might not have been.

COROLLARY 1.

Contingency is opposed to *necessity* not to *certainty:* for that is said to be certain, which will be, without considering whether it be necessary or not.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 100. *p.* 95. *Edit. 6th.*

COROLLARY 2.

There are in fact various things, which are in their nature contingent; for such are all the actions of free creatures, considered as free. *Vid. Def.* 22. and *Prop.* 16.

Watts's Ont. c. iii. *p.* 331—333.—*Hutcheson's Metaph. part* i. *c.* 4. § 2. *p.* 23—25.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Future contingencies are known to God.

N. B. Though this be comprehended in *Prop.* 33. yet we shall here give a distinct demonstration of it, because it has been so much controverted, and so much of what follows depends upon it.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. So much depends upon future contingencies, that if they be unknown to God, almost every

every thing relating to thoſe of his creatures which are free agents muſt be unknown to him too; ſo that our ideas of the divine knowledge and perfection will by this means be very much diminiſhed.

2. Wiſe and ſagacious men are capable of making very probable conjectures of future events; and therefore it ſeems diſhonourable to deny that God has a power of forming an unerring judgment concerning them.

3. If God does not foreknow future contingencies, he is daily growing more and more knowing, in a prodigious and incomparable degree beyond any of his creatures; which would be inconſiſtent with his immutability, and therefore contrary to *Prop.* 3. *Cor.*

1, and 2, and 3.|4. *Valet propoſitio.*

Howe's Works, vol. i. *p.* 103—104.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 99—102.—*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 605, 606.—*Clarke's Poſt. Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* 11. *p.* 258—268.—*Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* ix. *p.* 313—323.

COROLLARY.

God always wills the ſame thing; for whatever appears to him eligible in any circumſtances which actually are, muſt always have appeared eligible on the foreſight of thoſe circumſtances, *i. e.* he muſt always have willed it; ſuppoſing, what we ſhall hereafter endeavour to prove, that his will is always agreeable to reaſon, and never changed without it.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. XLI.

If it ſhould hereafter be proved on the one hand, that God has foretold the evil actions of his creatures, and on the other, that he could not have made them neceſſary; then it will appear that this propoſition is true in fact, whatever plauſible objections may be raiſed againſt it.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

The principal objection to the propoſition is, that certainly to foreknow contingencies is a contradiction; ſince nothing can be the object of knowledge, but what exiſts in itſelf or in its neceſſary cauſe: and conſequently to deny their being known to God is no more limiting his knowledge, than it limits his power to own he is not able to do what is ſelf-contradictory.

To this we anſwer, that the *certainty* of an event does not imply *neceſſity* (*Def.* 33. *Cor.* 1.); and conſequently, that there may be a foundation for certain foreſight, where the event itſelf is contingent; or in other words, the thing will not be becauſe God foreſees it, but God foreſees it becauſe it will certainly be. It may be added, that not to be able to do a contradiction, is in effect no limitation of the power of God, becauſe a power to effect a contradiction is indeed no power at all. (*Prop.* 31. *Schol.*) But not to know what the will of a free creature will determine, is indeed a limitation of knowledge, or in other words, a difficulty, with which the divine underſtanding (if the propoſition be denied) is puzzled and confounded.

It muſt be acknowledged, that the method, by which God foreſees theſe contingencies, is unknown; for I think it not ſafe to ſay, as ſome do, that the mind is ſo conſtituted, that it does always in fact, though not neceſſarily, determine itſelf according to the preponderancy of the motive offered to it; which, if it were granted, would not be a certain foundation of preſcience; ſince if this ſcheme could be reconciled with the doctrine of liberty as ſtated *Prop.* 16. yet it would ſubject the divine being to a poſſibility of error in every particular, and in all the ſchemes depending upon each. We are ſure by *Prop.* 33. that God knows all things that actually are, whereas

whereas our own knowledge is limited to a very narrow ſphere; and therefore, ſince we are ſure the divine underſtanding does in that inſtance entirely exceed our comprehenſion, why may we not as well allow that it may exceed it in the manner of foreknowing future contingencies; or where is it we may more reaſonably ſuppoſe the human mind to be puzzled, than when it would attempt to explain the method of divine knowledge?

Crellius de Deo, p. 67, 68. *ap. Op. vol.* iv. ——*Collib. Inq. p.* 91. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 106—109—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 100—104.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 102, 103.—*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 606—608.——*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 104—106. *vol.* ii. *p.* 503, 504.——*More's Enchir. l.* iii. *c.* ii. § 2.—*Lettres Perſ. vol.* i. *N°.* 56. ——*Jackſon on human Liberty, p.* 50—76.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the ſecond ſtep it is anſwered, God may indeed form very probable conjectures, vaſtly beyond the reach of any human ſagacity, though he cannot certainly foreknow the event.

To this the principal reply is, that to ſuppoſe God always in doubt, and ever liable to be miſtaken, ſeems inconſiſtent with the perfections of his nature, and is a leſs honourable way of conceiving of him; eſpecially if we conſider, that as an event lies more and more diſtant, the poſſibility of an error in each intermediate circumſtance will ſo much affect the reſt, that in a little time there may be upon complicated ſchemes almoſt a total darkneſs. But ſhould it ever appear that he has actually and poſitively without any heſitation foretold future contingent events, and that he has even put the evidence of his true divinity upon ſuch predictions, that would abundantly confirm the ſecond argument: nor would the

the hypothesis of a constant though not necessary determination of the will according to motives, (*Schol.* 1.) be sufficient to vindicate such a conduct; since still there was in every instance at least a possibility of mistake.

SCHOLIUM 4.

To step the third it is objected, that such a change as is there supposed is not inconsistent with the immutability of the divine being; seeing his nature and attributes are still the same, though his ideas are supposed to be different at different times. But it is answered, this is only a partial immutability: whereas the arguments that prove the immutability of God in general will not admit of such a change in the divine views and purposes, as must be involved in the ignorance of future contingent events.

Collib. Inq. p. 56, 57. *Ed.* 3. 66, 67.—*Ridgley's Div. vol.* i. *p.* 62 *.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems strange, that many who grant the universal foreknowledge of what *will actually be*, should deny what they call *scientia media*, or hypothetical prescience, *i. e.* the knowledge of what would follow upon some certain suppositions, which are not fact; *v. g.* how king *George* would have acted, if he had been emperor of *Germany*, or the emperor, if he had been king of *Great Britain*; or how any child who died in infancy would have behaved, if he had grown up to manhood. To object, that this would suppose the divine mind filled with a variety of vain speculations, is very inconclusive; for it is

* The question, whether future contingencies are known to God, unavoidably enters into the grand controversy concerning the Liberty or Necessity of the human Will. Accordingly, it will be found to have been more or less discussed in the authors to whom we have referred under the sixteenth proposition.

difficult

difficult to say, how God could in any instance select any scheme as best, if he had not a view of others with which he might be compared.

Le Blanc's Thes. p. 454—458.—*Juvenal's Sat.* x. *ver.* 350—354.

DEFINITION XXXIV.

LECT. XLII. That being is said to be SPECULATIVELY WISE, who is able rightly to determine and judge of the relation of means to their respective ends, and the value and importance of those ends with respect to the person by whom they are pursued; and that being is said to be PRACTICALLY WISE, who determines his own choice in a manner agreeable to such right views, so as that his own greatest happiness may be most effectually promoted, if it be not yet perfect, and maintained, if it be.

COROLLARY I.

A being of great sagacity, who in some instances chuses excellent ends and right means, yet neglects the greatest of all, may be said to have a partial practical, as well as speculative wisdom, yet must on the whole be accounted foolish.

COROLLARY 2.

Speculative wisdom is a part of knowledge.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

God is possessed of the highest degree both of speculative and practical wisdom.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 27. *Lem.* to *Dem.* 3. and *Dem.* 4.|1. We can conceive no more exquisite degrees of wisdom, than are displayed in the formation and preservation of the world, where we evidently see a most astonishing subordination of means to ends, rising through numberless degrees, in

which the moſt penetrating human underſtanding is ſoon ſwallowed up.

2. We ſee nothing upon which we can with certainty pronounce that it is on the whole fooliſh, becauſe we know not what its connection may be, and what end it may ſubſerve.

Pope's Eſſay on Man.

1, 2.|3. So far as we can judge from fact, God is ſpeculatively wiſe.

Def. 34. *Cor.* 2. *Prop.* 33.|4. Speculative wiſdom being included in knowledge, which was before proved to belong to God, another argument ariſes independent on the former.

3 and 4.|5. God is poſſeſſed of the higheſt degree of ſpeculative wiſdom.

6. To chuſe and act, with an utter diſregard to his own felicity, when known, (as by the preceding ſtep he muſt know the moſt certain methods of maintaining it,) would be a character in a rational agent ſo unaccountable, and in ſo peculiar a manner unworthy of deity, that nothing could be more diſhonourable than to aſcribe it to him.

5—6.|7. *Valet propoſitio.*

Wilk. Nat. Rel. p. 128, 129.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 106, 107.——*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 617, 618.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 65, 66. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 77, 78.—*Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* x.

COROLLARY.

Philoſophical liberty belongs to God in the moſt perfect degree; for that is indeed no other than the practical wiſdom here defined: *Vid. Def.* 24. and that liberty of action belongs to him, appears from comparing *Def.* 23. with *Prop.* 31.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

It may be objected, that it is diſhonourable to the divine being, to ſuppoſe that one thing can be more congruous to his happineſs than another. To this we reply, that we moſt readily acknowledge, that it would be very abſurd (for reaſons afterwards to be mentioned) to ſuppoſe, that the divine felicity depended on the exiſtence of his creatures, or on any action of theirs. Nevertheleſs it is reaſonable to believe, that the divine nature is ſuch, that unſpeakable delight muſt ariſe to himſelf from ſome methods of acting, which ſo perfect an underſtanding cannot but approve; and that on the other hand, different methods of acting muſt appear to him the objects of averſion, as being in themſelves abſurd, contemptible and mean; *v. g.* for him to do homage to any of his creatures, as more excellent than himſelf; or to make a creature merely to torment it. It is ſo far from being diſhonourable to God, to ſuppoſe his happineſs inſeparably connected with certain methods of acting rather than others, that we could think of nothing more reproachful, than to repreſent him as ſo arbitrary a being, that of all poſſible methods of acting which might be propoſed to him, it would be as congruous to his nature and happineſs to chuſe one as the other.

Foſt. Serm. vol. i. *N°.* 5.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

LECT. XLIII. To enquire how far natural liberty belongs to God. *Vid. Def.* 21.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Whenever any thing is more congruous to the divine felicity than another, God certainly chuſes it, nor can we ſuppoſe him to do otherwiſe; for that were inconſiſtent with his wiſdom, and therefore contrary to *Prop.* 36.

2. Never-

2. Nevertheleſs, when of many things which might be propoſed any one is equally congruous to his felicity with the reſt, in this he has a natural freedom of choice; and it ſeems that many things are indeed of ſuch a nature. Now that this liberty is to be aſcribed to him, appears from its being found in the human mind, and its being a perfection in its degree. *Prop.* 16. *Schol.* 5.

Watts on Lib. § 4. *Prop.* 11, 12. 14, 15.—*Tracts, vol.* iv. *p.* 41, 42. 44—48.—*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 389—391.—*Grove on Wiſd. p.* 24—26, 30—37.

SCHOLIUM.

It is objected, that it is a reflection upon infinite wiſdom, to ſuppoſe that God does not always chuſe that one ſcheme which is of all others the beſt, *i. e.* the moſt congruous to his felicity.

It is replied, the objection goes upon the ſuppoſition that there is one fitter than the reſt, which is begging the queſtion. If it be enquired, whether God could not contrive ſuch a ſcheme; it is anſwered, that we moſt readily allow, that he might form a ſcheme, fitter than the beſt which any created underſtanding could contrive; but to ſay, he could not form another equal to that, is ſpeaking without proof: nor does it appear, that it would be any honour to divine wiſdom to maintain it, more than to ſay, that having made one human face exceeding beautiful, it ſhould be impoſſible for him to make another, whoſe beauty ſhould on the whole be equal to it, even though ſome of the features were different: and when God chuſes one of thoſe many things than which nothing could be fitter and nothing better, he may agreeably to the common forms of ſpeech be ſaid to chuſe the fitteſt and the beſt. Nevertheleſs we muſt acknowledge, that when

we weak creatures ſpeak of the divine wiſdom, we ſpeak of what is to us an unſearchable thing*.

Price's Four Diſſertations, Edit. 1. *p.* 121. *Note.*

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

God is infinitely happy.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 36.|1. His wiſdom always enables him to know, and engages him to chuſe what is moſt conducive to his happineſs.

Prop. 31.|2. Being omnipotent, he is always able to do whatever he chuſes, and above the poſſibility of being diſturbed or hurt by any being whatſoever.

To ſuppoſe the divine happineſs dependent on any creature, would be moſt abſurd; for then before that creature was produced, he muſt have been unhappy: and as he had eternally exiſted before the production of that creature, he muſt have been eternally unhappy, *i. e.* of all other beings the moſt unhappy, which it would be moſt diſhonourable and groundleſs to imagine.

1, 2 and 3.|4. God is infinitely happy. *Q. E. D.*

Tillotſ. vol. ii. *p.* 586—588.—*Serm.* 78. *p.* 516, 517. *Edit.* 4.——*Collib. Inq. p.* 57—59. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 67—69.

SCHOLIUM.

It may be aſked, why does God act at all, if he be, as the propoſition ſuppoſes, perfectly happy previouſly to action.

To this we may anſwer, that the divine being may find ſome unknown delight in thoſe voli-

* A doctrine very oppoſite to that of the text is maintained by Mr. Cooper in his Philoſophical Eſſays.

tions, by which he communicates being and happineſs to his creatures; nor does this ſuppoſe any change in him, ſince it is reaſonable to believe he always wills the ſame thing; (*Prop.* 35. *Cor.*) *viz.* that at ſuch times and in ſuch circumſtances beings ſhould exiſt; and being ſecure of the execution of his volitions, (*Prop.* 31. *Cor.*) whatever delight he can be ſuppoſed to have in the actual production and happineſs of thoſe beings, he muſt have had in the purpoſe of producing them: ſo that in this reſpect, things that are not, are to him as if they were. And if it be ſaid, that there is a change in him, when in conſequence of his volition thoſe creatures are produced, he being now their creator, ſupporter, benefactor, *&c.* which he was not before, it is anſwered, this is no change in *him*; a change of relations neceſſarily ariſing from the very idea of a creator, and being perfectly conſiſtent with the higheſt conceivable immutability; elſe God is changing in numberleſs inſtances every moment, as the relations of his creatures change.

And if it were to be allowed, that we find ſome degree of *uneaſineſs* attending the deſire neceſſary to produce action in *us*, which however ſeems not to be wholly the caſe, yet we could not thence argue, that it muſt be ſo with regard to *all* created beings; much leſs can we aſſert it of God, in whoſe volitions and motives of action, we muſt after all acknowledge there is ſomething which we cannot fully explain.

Howe's Works, vol. i. *p.* 505.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

There is no ſelf-exiſtent being beſides that, whoſe exiſtence and attributes we have demonſtrated above. LECT. XLIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If there were any other self-existent being, besides that whose existence we have demonstrated, he must in all respects be equal to him; for otherwise it would be natural to suppose some derivation or dependency, inconsistent with self-existence, and consequently with the hypothesis.

2. To suppose such another being, is to limit the omnipotence of God; for (not to plead God's supposed incapacity to annihilate or change him; because it may be said, that admitting him to be self-existent, this would be a contradiction, and therefore an incapacity of effecting it no limitation of power; nor to insist upon his inability to controul him on account of the supposed omnipotence of this other being, to which the same thought may be applied,) it seems he would be unable to act without his consent, at least tacitly implied. And if their volitions should in any respect contradict each other, which in things indifferent they might at least very possibly do, the one would be a restraint upon the other, and so neither would be omnipotent.

1.|3. It would be impossible for God to conceal any of his counsels or purposes from the knowledge of such a being, which would in some degree derogate from his majesty: or if it were allowed, that he might conceal any thing from that other being, that other being might by a parity of reason conceal some things from him, and consequently he would not be omniscient; nay, supposing this being to be infinite, the number and variety of things so concealed might surpass any expression or imagination of ours.

4. It is a much greater glory to be the highest of all beings, than to be only one of a number of equals; now this supremacy of God would be destroyed

deſtroyed by the ſuppoſition of an equal, eſpecially when it is conſidered, that no one can ſay how many they might be, for we might allow two millions as well as two.

2, 3, 4.|5. It would be much leſs honourable to God, to ſuppoſe any ſuch other being as himſelf, than to ſuppoſe the contrary.

6. The unity of deſign, which ſeems to prevail in the works of nature, makes it reaſonable to believe it had but one author, and that he operated in an uncontrouled manner *.

7. There is no reaſon from the light of nature to conclude, that there are any more deities than one, or indeed to *imagine* there are any more; ſince one almighty and all-wiſe being can do as much as a thouſand ſuch beings can do; and if any revelation of it be pretended, it will be examined in its proper place.

Gr. 5. *Prop.* 27. *Cor.* 2. *gr.* 6 and 7.|8. It is reaſonable to believe, there is no ſelf-exiſtent being, beſides that one, whoſe exiſtence and attributes we have already demonſtrated. *Q. E. D.*

Wilkin Nat. Rel. p. 113, 114.—*Burn. on Art. p.* 23, 24.—*Clerici Pneum. Sect.* iii. *c.* x. § 2—4.——*Locke's Fam. Lett. p.* 412—415.——*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 72, 73.—*Living Temple,* 8*vo. vol.* i. *p.* 226—228.—*Grot. de Verit. l.* i. *c.* iii. —*Lactant. Inſtit. l.* i. *c.* ii.——*Abern. vol.* i. *Serm.* v. *præf. p.* 164—177.—*Prieſtley's Inſtitutes, vol.* i.—*Letters to philoſophical Unbelievers, part* i.

* Though Abernethy's Sermons are referred to, it may not be amiſs to remark, that he has ſtated the proof of the Unity of God, ariſing from the Unity of Deſign in the Works of Nature, with more force and advantage than has been done by almoſt any other writer. Mr. Lowman, in the tract formerly mentioned, has endeavoured to produce a ſtrict demonſtration of the Unity, as well as the Being of a God, from the argument a priori.

SCHOLIUM 1.

LECT. XLV. It is readily acknowledged, that theſe arguments, as well as many by which the foregoing propoſition has been proved, do not ariſe to full demonſtration: yet they carry a very ſtrong degree of probability, in which the mind muſt acquieſce till farther proof can be offered from other principles.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Limborch objects, that this proof is built on the ſuppoſition, that God is a being of all poſſible perfections: we reply, it goes on the ſuppoſition, that we are to conceive of him in the moſt honourable manner that we can; and it ſeems enough, if we can prove that it is diſhonourable to the deity to ſuppoſe a plurality.

Locke's Lett. p. 424—428.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the argument *gr.* 6. it is objected,

1. That we cannot ſee how far the unity of deſign is preſerved, unleſs we knew the whole ſyſtem.

2. That ſo far as we can judge by the ſpecimen we have, it ſeems that unity of deſign is not preſerved, ſince there is a mixture of good and evil; which makes it probable that there muſt be at leaſt two ſelf exiſtent beings, the one evil, and the other good.

To the firſt of theſe we anſwer, that we muſt judge by analogy in this reſpect as in many others; and particularly, that the unity of the divine being ſtands thus far on the ſame footing with his wiſdom, which can only be proved from a comprehenſive view of the whole ſcheme, and muſt be left an uncertain thing, by all created underſtandings, if the reaſoning in the objection be admitted. As to the ſecond, it will be more fully anſwered below: for the preſent it may be ſufficient

ſufficient to obſerve, that the quantity of good, being ſo much greater than of evil, there is no reaſon to believe two equal beings, one entirely benevolent, the other entirely malevolent; which yet muſt be the hypotheſis, if the phænomena referred to could grow into an objection againſt the propoſition.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Grove* argues the truth of the propoſition, from our having no revelation of more deities than one; whereas if there were more, every one of them would be the reaſonable object of veneration from all other beings, even though no benefits were conferred; and conſequently any one wiſe ſelf-exiſtent being would reveal to all his creatures the general knowledge of his aſſociates, that they might pay them all due veneration. But we do not chuſe to inſiſt upon this, becauſe it depends upon thoſe moral perfections of the deity, which we have not yet demonſtrated; and might be liable to ſome objection, even if thoſe moral perfections were granted.

Grove's Poſt. Works, vol. iv. *p.* 27—29.
See alſo p. 85.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It ſeems not improper here to mention ſome other arguments, which have been urged by writers of conſiderable note, which yet appear not to carry along with them equal conviction with the former.

Arg. 1. *Clarke* and *Colliber* argue from the nature of *ſelf-exiſtence*, which is *ſimple*, *uniform*, and *univerſal*; whereas all *variety* muſt ariſe from ſome external cauſe, be dependent on it, and proportionable to the efficacy of it. But to this it is objected, that if it were allowed that extenſion and duration were not, (as Dr. *Clarke* ſuppoſes,) properties of God, (which if they are,

they are undoubtedly *diſtinct* properties,) yet *intelligence* and *volition*, which all allow in the deity, may be conſidered as various things: how then ſhall we account for this variety in him? or if we ſay he is, what the ſchoolmen called, *purus putus Actus*, what idea ſhall we fix to thoſe hard words?

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 46.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 26, 27. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 30—32.

Arg. 2. *Tillotſon* and *Clarke* both argue, that if there were another ſelf-exiſtent being, then the exiſtence of God would not be neceſſary, nay, that this would introduce atheiſm; for no one of the ſuppoſed number would be neceſſary, *i. e.* there would be no God: for you might ſuppoſe any one of them not to exiſt, if the other would ſuffice to account for all the phænomena of nature. But I confeſs this argument ſeems to me to ariſe from the ambiguity of the word *neceſſary:* in one place, it ſignifies what is *hypothetically* neceſſary, *i. e.* neceſſary in order to ſolve ſome apparent phænomena; in the other, it ſignifies *underived.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 46, 47, 459—461, 463, 464, 466, 467, 470.—*Tillotſ. vol.* i. *p.* 491, 492.

Arg. 3. *Wollaſton* argues, (as Mr. *Locke* has done in the preceding references) that if two or more ſuch beings as we have deſcribed be ſuppoſed, their natures muſt be ſuppoſed either the ſame or different; if different, they muſt be contrary, or various; if contrary, each muſt deſtroy the operations of the other; if various, one muſt have what the other wants; both therefore cannot be perfect: but if their nature be perfectly the ſame, then they would coincide, and indeed be but one, though called two. But this latter branch of the argument ſeems not to be ſelf-evident: for ought appears, they might be

be *ſpecifically*, though not *identically* the ſame: and if it be ſelf-evident, it ſuperſedes all the former part of the argumentation, amounting indeed to nothing leſs than an aſſertion, that the exiſtence of two all-perfect beings is a contradiction in terms.

Rel. of Nat. p. 70, 71.

All theſe arguments, with thoſe mentioned in the propoſition, are ſtated and urged in

Camb. of Exiſt. p. 236—246. § 61, 62.

SCHOLIUM 6.

If upon the whole that God, whoſe exiſtence and attributes have been the ſubject of our former enquiries, were only a co-ordinate deity, and the God of our own ſyſtem, he would nevertheleſs be the ſupreme object of our reverence, gratitude and obedience.

Howe's Works, vol. i. *p.* 100, 101.—*Living Temple, part* i. *c.* vi. § 6. *vol.* i. *p.* 326—329.

SCHOLIUM 7.

That ſeveral of the wiſer heathens, notwithſtanding the tales of their prieſts and their poets, believed the exiſtence of one ſupreme deity, appears from many paſſages in their writings: and if the word *God*, wherever we find it uſed, were always to be conſidered, as ſignifying a being of all poſſible perfections, it would be difficult to prove, that there ever was ſuch a thing as polytheiſm in the heathen world. It is the opinion of the learned and ingenious Dr. *Warburton*, that the myſteries of the *greater initiation*, among the heathens, was the diſcovery of the doctrine of the divine unity to the wiſer part of the people: agreeably to which he ſuppoſes, that the ſong aſcribed to *Orpheus*, preſerved by *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Euſebius*, was the very hymn uſed upon that occaſion. That of *Cleanthes* (ſee *Cudworth's*

worth's Int. Syſt. p. 432, 433, and *Weſt's Pindar*) muſt be allowed in the ſtrongeſt ſenſe to ſpeak this language; and is perhaps the fineſt piece of pure and unadulterated natural religion, to be found in the whole heathen world *.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *l.* ii. § 4. *p.* 131—160. *Ed.* 1.——*Tillard's Reply to Warb. c.* iv. *p.* 248—272.—*Ab. Taylor of Faith, Not. p.* 12—17.——*Sykes's Connect. c.* xiv. *p.* 364—383. *præf.* 364, 365.—*Cud. Int. Syſt. c.* iv. § 10—31. *præf.* § 19—28. *p.* 184—186.—*Lact. Inſt. l.* i. § 5.

AXIOM XI.

LECT. XLVI. Our idea of SPACE is a ſimple idea, which we get by obſerving the diſtance of one body from another.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 2—4.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 213. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 256, 257.

DEFINITION XXXV.

The PLACE of a body, is its ſituation with reſpect to ſome other body, with which it is compared.

Watts's Ontology, p. 380. *Edit.* 3.

COROLLARY I.

According to the different ſurrounding bodies brought into compariſon, any body under conſideration may be ſaid to continue in the ſame place, or be removed from it.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 7—9.

* Dr. Warburton's opinion is diſputed by Dr. John Leland, in his great work on the Chriſtian Revelation, vol. i. chap. 8, 9. —For the ſentiments of the ſeveral ſects of the ancient philoſophers concerning the Deity, recourſe may be had to Brucker and Enfield. An account of different Treatiſes of Meiners relative to the ſame ſubject, may be ſeen in the Monthly Review, vol. liii. p. 176. vol. liv. p. 485. vol. lv. p. 469; and in Maty's Review, vol. vi. p. 378—390. 428—437.

COR-

COROLLARY 2.

The univerſe has no place.

Locke ib. § 10.

PROPOSITION XL.

Space is a mere abſtract idea; and does not ſignify any thing which has a real and poſitive exiſtence without us.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Space is either ſomething real and exiſting without us, or a mere abſtract idea.

2. If ſpace be ſomething really exiſting without us, it is either a mode or a ſubſtance.

3. If ſpace be a mode, it muſt be a mode of ſome ſubſtance, and this ſubſtance muſt be co-extended with ſpace; and the great queſtion will be, how ſpace differs from the ſubſtance whoſe mode it is ſaid to be, or how that can be ſaid to be a mode which, if it exiſts at all, exiſts neceſſarily, and is ſo far from depending upon any ſupport, that it is itſelf the ſupport of accidents, ſuch as length, breadth, capacity, *&c.*

3.|4. Space is not a mode.

5. If ſpace be a ſubſtance, it muſt be God: for thoſe who aſſert its reality maintain, (as they needs muſt do) that it is ſelf-exiſtent, infinite, and immutable; and we have already proved (*Prop.* 39.) God to be the only ſelf-exiſtent, infinite and immutable being.

6. Space cannot be God; ſince mere ſpace has neither wiſdom nor power, and we have already proved God to be both omniſcient and omnipotent. *Prop.* 31, 33.

5, 6.|7. Space is not a ſubſtance.

1, 2, 4, 7.|8. Space is a mere abſtract idea, and does not ſignify any thing real and poſitive exiſting without us. *Q. E. D.*

Locke's

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 17, 18.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 218. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 261—263.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 39, 40.—*Watts's Eſſ. N°.* i. § 2—5. *p.* 3—18. § 7. *p.* 23—25.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 74, 75.

SCHOLIUM I.

By what operation of the mind, Dr. *Waterland* apprehends the idea of ſpace to be formed; and what he thinks the foundation of our miſtaking it for ſomething real, ſee in

Waterland ap. Law's Inq. p. 14—16.—*Jackſ. Exiſt. p.* 75, 76.—*Law ib. p.* 26, 27, 30—33.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the propoſition it is objected, that ſpace is a ſimple idea, and therefore muſt have an *objective* reality.

To this ſome have anſwered, by denying that the idea of ſpace is ſimple; ſince we neceſſarily conceive of it, as having *partes extra partes:* but it is more juſtly replied, that bare *privation* is ſufficient to ſuggeſt poſitive ideas, as darkneſs and ſilence, though they have nothing of an objective reality.

Jackſ. on Exiſt. and Unity, p. 63—69.—*Law's Inq. p.* 33, 34.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is ſaid, that ſpace forces its actual exiſtence upon us.

Anſ. If its idea forces itſelf upon us, it is only as mere emptineſs: nor can we certainly argue the real exiſtence of a thing, merely from our not being able to avoid the idea of it, or to ſuppoſe it not to be.

Jackſon ib. p. 69—73.—*Law ib. p.* 44—46. *& p.* 8—12.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is farther objected, that *nothing* has no properties; whereas we talk of the properties of ſpace, and ſettle its dimenſions as well as thoſe of body.

We reply, (as above, *Schol.* 2.) that we ſometimes talk of mere abſtract ideas, as if they were real beings; and though a ſhadow be only a privation of light, yet we often ſpeak of it as a poſitive thing.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 16, 17.—*Watts's Eſſ. l.* i. § 8. *p.* 25—28. *and* § 10. *p.* 31—39.—*Jackſ. ib. p.* 77—81.—*Law's Inq. p.* 48—50.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther argued, that ſpace is neceſſarily infinite, and therefore real.

Anſ. This takes the queſtion for granted: for this infinity ſuppoſes its reality; elſe, wherever body is, ſpace is excluded: nor do we allow that our idea of ſpace is *infinite*, though it may be *ever growing:* the ſame argument would prove number to be infinite, which ſeems a great abſurdity at firſt view.

Jackſ. ib. p. 81—88.—*Law's Inq. p.* 54—65.

SCHOLIUM 6.

If ſpace were not real, it is ſaid there could be no *motion*, becauſe no ſpace to move in.

Anſ. A body might move on to infinity; for there would be nothing to ſtop it; and ſince motion is only a change of place, *i. e.* in the ſituation of bodies with reſpect to each other, (*Def.* 35.) there needs no ſuch medium through which the change ſhould be made.

Jackſ. ib. p. 88—92.—*Law ib. p.* 65—88.

To this Mr. *Jackſon* anſwers, that according to this account of motion, God could not move the whole material creation in a ſtrait line. To which Mr. *Law* replies, with *Leibnitz*, that this would not be real motion, ſince it is neither going to nor from any thing, but is ſtill in the centre of infinite ſpace. If it be ſaid, it relates to the various parts of real ſpace, the body going from one point of it to another; it is anſwered, that this is evidently taking the whole queſtion for granted; and that a motion in a mere void is as conceivable, as a motion in a void ſpace ſuppoſed ever ſo real. After all, the whole ſeems to amount to little more than a controverſy about the definition of *motion*.

Jackſon ib. p. 93—95.—*Law ib. p.* 68—70.—*Clarke and Leibnitz, p.* 57. § 5. *p.* 79. § 4. *p.* 99. § 13. *p.* 133. § 13. *p.* 307. § 52, 53.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is farther objected, that ſuppoſing two bodies a yard aſunder, and all intervening bodies annihilated, if ſpace be nothing, they would be contiguous, ſince in that caſe there would be nothing between them.

Anſ. To be *contiguous*, and to have *nothing between them*, are not ſynonymous terms. To be *contiguous*, ſignifies to *touch* one another; which is not a neceſſary conſequence of their having nothing between them.

Watts's Eſſ. N°. 1. § 11. *p.* 39—43.—*Jackſ. ib. p.* 92.—*Law ib. p.* 50—53.

COROLLARY.

It is matter of humiliation, to think that there ſhould be ſuch weakneſs and darkneſs in the mind of man, that ſome of the greateſt geniuſes ſhould

ſhould diſpute whether ſpace be *God*, or whether it be *nothing*.

Watts ib. N°. 1. § 6. *p.* 20—23.—*Ramſ. Phil. Princ. Prop.* 24. *Schol.* 2.

SCHOLIUM 8.

It ſeems that *time* is an abſtract idea, as well as ſpace: having gotten the idea of it from ſome things in a conſtant ſucceſſion, we conceive it to flow uniformly on, and to take in all exiſtences; thus it becomes a kind of common receptacle, as well as ſpace. But many of the ſame arguments brought for and againſt the reality of ſpace, may alſo be applied to that of time. Vid. *Ax.* 6, 7. *Def.* 17.

Law's Inq. p. 79, 80.—*Jackſ. ib. p.* 76. —*Watts's Ontology, ch.* xii. *on Time, and ch.* iv. *on Duration.*——*Soame Jenyns's Diſquiſitions, Diſſertation the* 4*th.*

AXIOM XII.

It is impoſſible for two bodies to be in the ſame place at the ſame time. Vid. *Def.* 3. LECT. XLVII.

PROPOSITION XLI.

God is incorporeal or immaterial.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 23.|1. Materiality has already been proved incompatible with ſelf-exiſtence, therefore God being ſelf-exiſtent muſt be incorporeal.

Prop. 32. *Ax.* 12.|2. If God were corporeal, he could not be preſent in any part of the world, where body is: yet we have proved his preſence to be continually neceſſary for the ſupport and motion of body.

1, 2.|3. God is incorporeal. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke's Serm. vol. i. *p.* 98. *Oct.*—*Taylor of Deiſm, p.* 259, 260.

COR-

COROLLARY.

God is inviſible.

Abern. Serm. vol. i. *N°.* iv.

SCHOLIUM I.

The chief objection which has been urged againſt the propoſition is, that unleſs God were corporeal, we could not imagine that he ſhould produce body, ſince nothing can give what it has not. It is anſwered, that we grant nothing can produce an effect more excellent than itſelf; (*Ax.* 10.) but to be corporeal is not a greater excellency and perfection than to be incorporeal, but rather the contrary: nor would our conceptions of God's producing matter be at all helped by conceiving of him as material; unleſs that production were only making ſome alteration in the form and ſituation of ſome parts of himſelf, which is far from being the idea of creation: and indeed on the whole, creation is a thing of which we can form no diſtinct idea, whether we ſuppoſe the creator on the one hand, or the creature on the other, corporeal, or incorporeal.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some who allow the immateriality of the divine being contend, that though it is impoſſible one body ſhould penetrate another, yet it is not impoſſible that an immaterial being ſhould penetrate body, for their natures will ſtill be diſtinct; and the preeminence of the divine nature above all corporeal or derived natures is ſuch, that there is not an equal reality in both, as there is in two particles of matter, which hinder them from coming into the ſame place.

Anſ. Though we eaſily perceive what it is for a ſubtil fluid to penetrate a body rarer than itſelf, *v. g.* for water to fill the pores of a ſponge, yet this does not help our ideas, when we apply penetration

penetration to an incorporeal ſubſtance; and it ſeems altogether as reaſonable to ſuppoſe that an immaterial being moves bodies by contact, as that it does in a proper ſenſe penetrate them. If that penetration mean no more, than that God can act in and upon every particle of matter where or however ſituated, this will be readily granted; but this ſeems not to be what is contended for by Mr. *Colliber*. On the whole, conſidering the immateriality of God, if any thing be aſſerted concerning his omnipreſence, beyond what is expreſſed, *Def.* 32, it is to us myſterious and incomprehenſible.

Collib. Inq. p. 218—221. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 263—265.—*Watts's Ont. c.* xii. *p.* 377—379.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Notwithſtanding what has been aſſerted in the former corollary, it may be allowed poſſible for God to manifeſt himſelf to his creatures, by preſenting ſome material phænomenon to their ſenſes, and thereby communicating ideas to them: yet in this caſe, it is only in a ſecondary and leſs proper ſenſe, that we may be ſaid to ſee God, or hear his voice.

Burnet on Art. p. 25.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Some who have maintained that God is ſo preſent as actually to fill ſpace, have differed in explaining the extent of that preſence. Sir *Iſaac Newton* and Dr. *Clarke* argue, that infinite ſpace is poſſeſſed by him; but *Colliber* denies it: and though he maintains that the divine being penetrates all ſpace, yet, as he denies the infinity of real ſpace, he alſo denies the infinite extenſion of the divine being, and by a parity of reaſon, the infinity of the other properties of his nature: and as many of his thoughts are uncommon, it

will not be amiss to subjoin some account of the arguments on both sides *.

Newton's Princ. p. 483.——*Collib. Inq. p.* 141, 142. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 170, 171.—*Mrs. Cockburne's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 400—402.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It appears, by the forementioned references to *Colliber*, that he denies God to be *infinite*, in our sense of infinity; for to have no bounds, is to be in its own nature incapable of end, which is the explication he gives of *positive* and *absolute infinity*. (Vid. *Def.* 28.) How far he is consistent with himself, in denying this, while he grants what he calls a *negative infinity*, may be afterwards considered. It is however apparent, that if he keeps to his own idea, in denying the infinity of God, he in effect asserts, that there are certain bounds, beyond which the extension, power, knowledge, *&c.* of the divine being do not exist: and indeed in his late treatise, which he calls, *The Knowledge of God*, he very evidently avows it, when he confesses that the deity must have some figure, and intimates it may probably be spherical.

Collib. Knowledge of God, p. 22—24.

* "Colliber," says Dr. Savage, in a note, "in his Denial "of God's Immensity, is not new. It was denied by Socinus "and his followers, (see Socini Opera, tom. i. p. 685.) and "by Vaortus, though not a Socinian. Compare Turretini "Institutiones, locus iii. quest. 8, 9, vol. i. p. 213, 221. Ge- "neva edition. Colliber seems to want clear notions of his "subject, and was by no means a close judicious writer, nor "deserving of so much attention as our author has paid him." The fact is, that when Dr. Doddridge drew up his Lectures, Colliber's Inquiry had excited considerable notice, as is apparent from its passing through three editions. The book is now nearly sunk into oblivion. It was formerly read by the present editor, who, in his opinion concerning it, entirely agrees with Dr. Savage.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XLII.

To propoſe and examine ſome of the moſt conſiderable arguments, brought to prove the abſolute infinity of the divine being. LECT. XLVIII.

Watts's Ontology, chap. xvii.

LEMMA.

The ſolution will conſiſt of two parts: in the firſt, we ſhall produce the arguments brought to prove that *ſomething* is actually infinite: and in the ſecond, ſhall conſider the arguments to prove that infinity belongs to the *divine being.*

SOLUTION. PART I.

Arguments to prove that *ſomething* is actually infinite.

Arg. 1. Some have argued from the nature of ſpace, which (ſuppoſing it to be, as Mr. *Colliber* does, a real thing) is certainly infinite, and cannot be bounded ſo much as in thought. *Colliber* grants we can have no idea of the end of it; yet maintains there may be an end of univerſal ſpace, as we know there is of particular: and if it be aſked, what bounds it? he anſwers, *nothing*; but will not allow that it is therefore infinite. But it is plain he conceives of ſpace only as the interſtice betwixt bodies; and how this is more real than the void which lies on the other ſide the remoteſt body, I cannot imagine. But if *Prop.* 40. be true, this can be no ſolid argument: for nothing would be more abſurd, than to aſcribe infinity to *nothing*, or to a mere abſtract idea.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xvii. § 4, 21.——*Collib. Inq. p.* 150—153. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 185—193.

Arg. 2. It is pleaded that the divine being is allowed to be eternal; now eternity, *i. e.* infi-

nite duration, is as incomprehenſible as any other kind of infinity.

Colliber anſwers, eternity is not and cannot be an infinite duration, being limited on the one ſide by the preſent moment; and he adds, that *duration* does not belong to God. Yet ſtill, if we conſider him as a being without a beginning, (which ſurely we muſt confeſs him, or ſomething to be) I ſee not how it is poſſible to ſeparate duration from our idea of him: and if we cannot, ſurely here is an infinite in one reſpect, indeed in that reſpect in which it is moſt difficult to conceive of it.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xvii. § 5, 20.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 149, 150, 153, 154. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 180—185.

Arg. 3. Another argument is taken from the infinite diviſibility of matter, ſince it is certain diviſion can never annihilate.

This Mr. *Colliber* is obliged to omit. But he pleads, that this infinite diviſibility does not imply an infinite number of parts in every particle of matter, but rather the contrary; for elſe the ſubject muſt be of an infinite bulk. Some have replied, theſe parts may be infinitely ſmall; but he denies that any thing can be ſo; and if they were, matter could not be infinitely diviſible. If it be ſaid, that this infinite diviſibility proves that there is an infinite diſtance between the ſmalleſt beings and nothing, he ſays, that creation proves the contrary. Nevertheleſs it may be anſwered, that we maintain the creator to be omnipotent, and that an almighty power may overcome that infinite diſtance; or rather, that when we talk of an infinite diſtance in this ſenſe, we only mean a very great diſtance; ſo that nothing certain can be concluded from this argument.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* xvii. § 12.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 161—165. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 194—200.

Arg. 4.

Arg. 4. Others have pleaded that no limits can be ſet by our thoughts to the number and extent of *poſſibilities*, but more may be conceived to be produced, and ſtill more without bounds; there muſt therefore be an actual infinity, in proportion to this poſſible one.

Colliber anſwers, this only proves that our imaginations may be perpetually going on in their operations; but that there is no reaſoning from imagination to fact, without confounding poſſibilities and realities: and indeed it muſt be confeſſed, that all the utmoſt efforts of imagination will always be finite, though they be ever growing.

Howe's Works, vol. i. *p.* 63, 64, 67.—*Living Temple, part* i. *c.* iv. § 4.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 176—179. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 213—216.

SOLUTION. PART 2.

LECT. XLIX.

Arguments to prove the infinity of *the divine being.*

Arg. 1. Some have argued, that if God be limited, it muſt either be by himſelf, or by another; but no wiſe being would abridge himſelf, and there could be no other being to limit God.

Colliber anſwers, that no cauſe can beſtow abſolute infinity upon its effect; and therefore there needs no cauſe of the finiteneſs of any created, why then of an uncreated being? And farther, the argument ſuppoſes it to be matter of choice with God, whether he would be finite or infinite, which it is unreaſonable to ſuppoſe; and would indeed imply (what *Plato* and *Carteſius* are ſaid to have maintained) that the deity produced himſelf by a proper cauſality; whereas not to abridge itſelf, can never make any being infinite. Thus it may be ſaid, that as God did not make himſelf wiſe, nor did another being make him wiſe, yet he is wiſe; ſo he may not limit himſelf, nor be limited by another, and

yet he may be limited. If in anſwer to this it be urged, that as he is wiſe, ſo is he alſo unlimited by the neceſſity of his nature, which is all that can be replied, this argument thus founded will coincide with the next.

Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol. ii. *p.* 193, 194. *Or, apud Opera, vol.* i. *p.* 263.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 145—147. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 175—178.

Arg. 2. Others plead that infinity follows from ſelf-exiſtence; for a neceſſity that is not univerſal, muſt depend on ſome external cauſe, (Vid. *Def.* 28. *Cor.*) which a ſelf-exiſtent being does not.—To this Mr. *Colliber* replies,

1. That though neceſſary exiſtence has no relation either to place or limit, any more than to variety, yet as there is ſome ſort of variety in God, (*Prop.* 39. *Schol.* 2.) ſo there may be limits.

2. That to be finite is not properly the effect of any cauſe, and therefore may conſiſt with neceſſary exiſtence.

3. That finiteneſs is in itſelf neceſſary; becauſe every being has a compleat and poſitive nature, whereas our idea of infinite is negative.

4. That how abſolute ſoever the neceſſity of a ſuppoſed infinite being can be, that of a finite may be equally ſo. He adds, we muſt not argue too much from abſtract ideas to things: that may be neceſſary in its own nature, which we may conceive as not exiſting, *v. g.* perfect wiſdom; and that may not be neceſſary in its own nature, which we may not be able to conceive not to exiſt, *v. g.* ſpace.

It ſeems that the third of theſe anſwers is inconſiſtent with the firſt: that any being ſhould be the leſs compleat, and the leſs poſitive, becauſe it is infinite, I own I cannot conceive; though our idea of infinite ſhould be allowed to be a negative idea.

Clarke

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 43.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 168—174. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 203—211.—*Berry-Street Sermons, vol.* i. *p.* 107. *Second Edition.*——*Locke's Eff. l.* ii. *c.* xvii. § 12—14.

Arg. 3. It is urged that creation is so great an act of power, that we can imagine nothing impossible to that being who has performed it, but must therefore ascribe to him infinite power.

Colliber answers, the distance between being and not being may be said to be finite, because it has been passed over; and is indeed no other than between thinking and not thinking, moving and not moving; though they are irreconcileable with each other, there may be a possibility of passing from one to the other, without an infinite degree of power. Yet he adds, nothing on this side a contraction can be imagined less possible than a production from nothing, and therefore allows a proper omnipotence in God, which he takes to be infinite power: so that this argument seems to be given up. *Prop.* 31. *Schol.* 4.

Collib. Inq. p. 147—149. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 178—180.

Arg. 4. It is more honourable to the divine being to conceive of him as infinite than finite.

To this *Colliber* answers, by endeavouring to prove, that to conceive of him as infinite leads us into many absurd and dishonourable notions of him, which will be surveyed in the next proposition: yet he is forced after all to acknowledge a negative infinity, *i. e.* that there is nothing too great for the power of God, that nothing which can be the object of knowledge is unknown to him, and that no being can bound God, or even human imagination itself. Vid. *Prop.* 41. *Schol.* 5.

Collib. Inq. p. 180—183. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 217—221.

SCHOLIUM I.

I have not here mentioned the argument taken from the ſuppoſed innate idea of infinity, nor from the immenſity of matter; both which appear to me ſo evidently inconcluſive, as not to deſerve ſo large a ſurvey as the former.

Collib. ib. p. 144, 145, 154—161. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 174, 175, 200—203.——*Camb. ſur l'Exiſt. p.* 191—197. § 50, 51.—— *Boyce's Tranſlation, p.* 135—137.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument from the fulneſs of being ſuppoſed in God, if it imports any thing at all, muſt coincide with ſome of the former arguments, eſpecially the fourth.

Collib. ib. p. 175, 176, *Ed.* 3. *p.* 212, 213. —*Howe's Living Temple, part* i. *c.* iv. § 2.—*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 344, 345.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 320.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

LECT. L.

To review and conſider the arguments which Mr. *Colliber* has urged againſt the divine infinity, and by which he has endeavoured to prove it a pernicious doctrine.

SOLUTION.

He aſſerts it to be attended with pernicious conſequences, whether we conſider the deity *in himſelf*, or *with reſpect to us*.

PART I.

With reſpect to the *deity itſelf*, he maintains that it leads us into the following abſurdities.

1. To aſſert his inextenſion; for all extenſion naturally implies bounds, therefore the *Platoniſts*, aſſerting the infinity of God, ſaid he was *a mathematical point*, thereby making him infinitely

leſs than the leaſt grain of ſand; yet at the ſame time they aſſerted him to be *all in all*, and *all in every part*; than which nothing can be more abſurd.

To this it is anſwered, 1.|That many maintain extenſion does not imply limits.

2.|That a mathematical point being only an abſtract idea, God cannot properly be repreſented by it.

3.|That when it is ſaid he is *all in all*, and *all in every part*, nothing more may be meant than this, that his almighty power can operate in every place, and is the ſupport of all other beings; which *Colliber* himſelf allows.

But he replies, if we do not allow this way of ſpeaking, we muſt go into the ſcheme of the *Nullibiſts*, and affirm that God is no where.—And what if it ſhould be aſſerted, that it is not his property to be preſent in any place, by a diffuſive preſence?—It will be ſaid that therefore he is not at all.—But this pretended axiom will require proof. *Prop.* 41. *Schol.* 2.

Collib. Inq. p. 184—187. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 222—229.

2. From the doctrine of God's infinity ariſes that of *abſolute ſimplicity*; elſe each attribute would be infinite, whereas it is ſaid there can be but one infinite.

Anſ. This objection ariſes from an abſurd confounding the idea of attribute with that of being. *Def.* 12. *Cor.* 1.

Collib. ib. p. 190, 191. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 229—231.

3. From infinity is inferred abſolute omnipotence, which includes a power of working contradictions.—But it is ſufficient to anſwer that this is not properly a power, as has been obſerved above. *Prop.* 31. *Schol.* 4.

Collib. ib. p. 192. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 231, 232.

4. From

4. From infinity follows abſolute omniſcience, which would eſtabliſh the doctrine of decrees, inconſiſtent with liberty and therefore with virtue.

Anſ. We have endeavoured to ſhew that the foreknowledge of God is not inconſiſtent with liberty. *Prop.* 35. *Schol.* 2.

Collib. ib. p. 193, 194. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 232—235.

5. Hence ſome have inferred, that God not only *does*, but *is* all things. This is *Spinoza's* ſcheme; who argues that an infinite being muſt comprehend all particular finite beings.—But it may be replied, that this argument ariſes from miſtaking the word *infinite*, which implies, that the being to whom it is aſcribed, has no bounds; now God is not at all bounded by the exiſtence of creatures, whoſe natures are entirely different from his own. And how, on *Colliber's* own ſcheme, can God be where the creatures are, without a confuſion of his being with theirs, if the foundation of *Spinoza's* argument, even on his own principles, be juſt.

Collib. ib. p. 198—200. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 238—241.—*Howe's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 69—72.—*Living Temple, part* i. *c.* iv. § 9. *vol.* i. *p.* 216—223.—*Works of the Learned, for* 1738. *Jan. Art.* iv.

SOLUTION. PART 2.

LECT. LI. With reſpect to *ourſelves*, Mr. *Colliber* aſſerts,

1. That the doctrine of the divine infinity diſcourages our enquiries into the nature of God; becauſe we muſt for ever deſpair of attaining to the knowledge of him.

Anſ. On *Colliber's* own principles, we muſt acknowledge it to be impoſſible perfectly to know him; nor is it any wonder that it ſhould be ſo. (Vid. *Prop.* 18. *Cor.*) But ſuppoſing him to

to be infinite, we may know as much of him as if he were finite, though more will continue unknown.

Collib. Inq. p. 200. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 241—243.

2. It is ſaid this doctrine raiſes prejudices againſt his exiſtence, becauſe it makes it impoſſible to conceive clearly of him.—To this we may reply,

1. There can be no ſcheme, on which there will not be ſome difficulties: thoſe of atheiſm will be ſtill greater than would follow from ſuppoſing an infinite deity.

Gurdon at Boyle's Lect. paſſ. præf. p. 79, 80.—*Abadie Verit. de la Rel. part* i. *c.* xvi, xvii. *vol.* i. *p.* 117—132.

2. If *one* finite being could be ſuppoſed neceſſary, why may not *any other? i. e.* Why may not the doctrine of the finiteneſs of God, be a ſhelter for atheiſm in one view, as well as that of his infinity in another?

Collib. Inq. p. 201—203. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 243.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Mr. *Colliber* ſeems chiefly to have oppoſed the doctrine of the infinity of God, in order to eſtabliſh his ſcheme of denying the divine decrees and foreknowledge, which muſt indeed ſuppoſe him a limited being.

SCHOLIUM 2.

On the moſt accurate ſurvey and examination of theſe two laſt propoſitions, we may perhaps ſee reaſon to remark,

1. That many arguments which have been brought to prove the infinity of God are inconcluſive.

2. That to ſuppoſe him finite, would not free the mind from all difficulties in conceiving of him, eſpecially thoſe which are the conſequences of

of his eternity; but would plunge us into ſome new difficulties.

3. That though it be moſt honourable to the divine being, to ſuppoſe him infinite, yet if we conceive of him only as ſuperior to all other beings, and poſſeſſed of perfections beyond the inveſtigation of our minds, there will be a foundation laid for religion and virtue, in the ſeveral branches in which we ſhall afterwards endeavour to open it.

The END *of the* SECOND PART.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

Concerning Dr. BERKLEY'*s Scheme, That there is no material World.*

IN conſidering this ſcheme, we ſhall
I. Propoſe the ſcheme itſelf, and the arguments by which it is ſupported.
II. Examine the objections brought againſt it.
III. Conſider how far our enquiries into natural philoſophy are affected by it.

SECT. I. The ſcheme itſelf is not, that ſenſible objects have *no real exiſtence*; or that all is but a waking dream: he diſclaims both theſe: his principle is, that no ſenſible object exiſts *unperceived*; or more plainly, that *there is no material world*, and that *primary*, as well as ſecondary qualities, do only exiſt in the mind perceiving them; ſo that if all minds were annihilated, all bodies would be annihilated too; and the difference between dreaming and perceiving, is only that the latter is more active, regular and vivid than the former.

The arguments by which the Doctor ſupports this ſyſtem are theſe:

1. The exiſtence of a material world cannot be demonſtrated; becauſe an almighty power can always produce ſuch ſenſations without any archetype, and it is plain in dreams he does ſo.

Anſ. This will not prove that he *has* done it. We aſſert not that matter is a neceſſary being; but its actual exiſtence may nevertheleſs be proved, as well as that of a created mind.

2. It is an uſeleſs incumbrance; becauſe a divine influence is neceſſary to produce ideas from material archetypes.

Anſ.

Anſ. The divine power may be illuſtrated in ſuch a harmony; and the actual ſupport of bodies ſeem an act of great power, as well as the union of the ſoul and body, of great wiſdom.

3. The ſuppoſition of it is very inconvenient, as it introduces diſputes about the production and ſubſiſtence of bodies, the infinite diviſibility of matter, the union of body and mind, *&c.*— But it may be replied, that if giving occaſion to diſputes could diſprove the thing diſputed about, we muſt alſo give up the exiſtence of ſpiritual and immaterial beings.

4. It implies a contradiction. Senſible objects are the things we perceive by our ſenſes; but we can perceive only our own ideas and ſenſations: now it is plainly repugnant, that any of our own ſenſations ſhould exiſt unperceived, and therefore that ſenſible objects ſhould ſo exiſt.

Anſ. This is plainly taking the queſtion for granted; yet he triumphs greatly in this argument, and ſays, the bare poſſibility of the exiſtence of any extended moveable ſubſtance, or in general any idea, or any thing like an idea, but in a thinking mind, is abſurd. But this triumph is extremely ill grounded; becauſe if it were granted him, that ſenſible objects are in fact only the things which our ſenſes immediately perceive, *i. e.* that they are our own ideas, (which is, as we obſerved above, begging the queſtion) it will not follow from thence, that it is impoſſible there ſhould be, or ſhould have been, any external archetypes of them.

Berkley's Princ. § 22.

5. The various appearances of the ſame object to different perſons at the ſame time, prove that it exiſts only in a perceiving mind; elſe the ſame thing muſt have different magnitudes, colours, *&c.*

Anſ.

Anſ. The various circumſtances in which it is, ſeems to account for its different appearance; and if the object were material, it muſt be ſo.

6. The beſt philoſophers have granted it as to *ſecondary* qualities, but the caſe is the ſame as to *primary*.—This is denied.

SECT. II. The objections againſt it are theſe.

1. To deny the poſſibility of matter, is plainly limiting the power of God.

2. This hypotheſis, which ſuppoſes us under a continual deception, reflects upon the divine veracity.—He anſwers, the ſame objection will lie againſt ſuppoſing the earth to move about the ſun.

3. The ſenſes give us ſuch an evidence, that if it is poſſible they may be true notices of what paſſes without us, we muſt certainly believe they are ſo.

4. Our ideas can have no parts; but the objects of them have parts: therefore the objects are ſomething different from the ideas themſelves.

5. Every thing real is baniſhed out of the world.—This *Berkley* expreſsly denies.

6. Things on this ſuppoſition are continually annihilated and created anew.—He anſwers, the ſchool-men allow a continual creation. But that is a weak reply. If *Adam* and *Eve* both ſlept, the ſun for that time was annihilated: if it be ſaid, it exiſted in the divine mind; it may be anſwered, ſo it did from all eternity, and at that rate all creatures muſt be eternal.

7. It makes all the apparatus of nature in the organization of plants and animals vain.

Anſ. Not vainer than upon the ſuppoſition of a continued divine concurrence, aſſerted *Prop.* 32. they are rules which God has laid down, according to which he directs his own operations.

8. This doctrine deſtroys all the evidence of the exiſtence of other created ſpirits; ſome alſo add,

add, of the divine exiſtence; but I think not: yet it certainly weakens ſome proofs of it, eſpecially that taken from the *vis inertiæ* of matter.

SECT. III. How far our inquiries into natural philoſophy are affected by it.

1. It cuts off a great part of our preſent inquiries.

2. In a ſtrict ſenſe, it would change a great part of our language.

3. Nevertheleſs, it leaves room for the obſervation of the phænomena of nature, and the connection between cauſes and effects, in many inſtances. On the whole, it is a ſcheme deſtitute of proof. The moſt we can aſſert is, that it is *poſſible*; and we are led every moment, whether we will or no, into an apprehenſion of the contrary. If we believe it to be true, we ought to act in every inſtance, and on every occaſion, juſt as if it were falſe.—We conclude with obſerving, that as ſome have denied all *material*, and others all *immaterial* ſubſtances, each aſſerting one or the other *only* to be real, we may reaſonably believe them *both* to be ſo.

Berkley's Princ. & Dial. paſſ.—Collier's Immat. World.——Baxter on the Soul, vol. ii. § 2. *Oct.—Lord Kaims's Eſſ. on the Princ. of Morality and Nat. Rel. part* ii. *Eſſ.* iii. *p.* 237—239 *.

* A controverſy concerning Berkley's hypotheſis was carried on ſome years ſince in the Gentleman's Magazine. The ſubject has likewiſe excited the particular attention and confutation of Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie. See Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind. See alſo his Eſſays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Eſſay ii. ch. 10, 11. p. 156—185; and Beattie on the Immutability of Truth, part ii. ch. ii. § 2. p. 169—191. Quarto edition.

PART

PART III.

Of the Nature of MORAL VIRTUE *in general, and the* MORAL ATTRIBUTES *of* GOD. *Of the ſeveral* BRANCHES *of* VIRTUE, *and the Nature of* CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

AXIOM XIII.

FROM the *eſſences* of things (the ideas of which immutably exiſt in the divine mind) ariſe certain DIFFERENCES, and from the circumſtances in which they are placed, certain RELATIONS, inſeparable from thoſe eſſences or circumſtances. LECT. LII.

AXIOM XIV.

The actions of an intelligent being may *agree* or *diſagree* with the *nature, circumſtances* and *relations* of things; or in other words, they may with reſpect to them be FIT or UNFIT: *v. g.* Evil is as unfit to be returned for good, as a cubical caſe is unfit exactly to contain a globe.

DEFINITION XXXVI.

The *agreement* of the actions of any intelligent being with the nature, circumſtances, and relation of things, is called the MORAL FITNESS, or the VIRTUE of that action; the *diſagreement* is therefore the MORAL UNFITNESS, or VICE.

COROLLARY.

There is really and neceſſarily a moral fitneſs in ſome actions, and a moral unfitneſs in others. Vid. *Ax.* 14.

Wiſhart's Reform. Serm. p. 5, 6.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 174—179, 181.—*Letters to Dr. Clarke, p.* 5—11.—*Chand. Ref.*

Ref. Serm. p. 5—7, 14—19.—*Benſon's Serm. N°.* ii. *p.* 40—45.—*Dr. Adams's Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue, p.* 3—6 *.

SCHOLIUM.

To this ſome have objected the various opinions of learned men, and the difference in the laws of various nations concerning right and wrong.

We anſwer, that it does indeed from hence follow, that all the moral fitneſſes of things are not ſelf-evident; and we readily allow, that in ſome caſes it may be very difficult to pronounce concerning them, and in others the judgments of men may be ſo prejudiced by corrupt affections as to err, though the caſes themſelves are very clear. Nevertheleſs, there are ſome things ſo plain, that they were never denied to be more fit than their oppoſites: nor was it ever commanded or allowed by any known law, that every man might plunder or murther his fellow-citizens as he pleaſed; that no faith ſhould be kept, or compacts performed, *&c.*

Locke's Eſſ. l. i. *c.* iii. § 9—12.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 181—183.—*Paſſeran's Phil. Inq. paſſ* †.

AXIOM XV.

The actions of an intelligent being appear to have a BEAUTY or excellency, when they are morally fit, and a TURPITUDE and deformity, when they are morally unfit.

* For a moſt elaborate and ample vindication of the doctrine of moral Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes, ſee Dr. Price's "Review of the principal Queſtions and Difficulties in Morals."

† This objection is particularly conſidered and anſwered in Dr. Beattie's Eſſay on the Immutability of Truth.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM I.

This anſwers the queſtion, " What are moral fitneſſes fit for?" Their mutual congruity and harmony is as fit to gain the approbation of an intelligent mind, as muſic to pleaſe an ear that is rightly formed.

Grove's Wiſd. of God, p. 29. *Vol.* iv. *of his Works, p.* 44.—*Wiſhart's Ref. Serm. p.* 11—15.—*Chand. Ref. Serm. p.* 27—31. *Benſ. Serm. N°.* ii. *p.* 48—50.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The apprehenſion of that beauty or deformity, which ariſes in the mind by a kind of natural inſtinct, previouſly to any reaſoning upon the remoter conſequences of actions, has been with great propriety called by many elegant writers the *Moral Senſe:* but what is peculiar in ſome of their notions will be afterwards ſtated and examined.

Hutcheſon on the Paſſ. p. 245—253.

DEFINITION XXXVII.

An intelligent agent is ſaid to be OBLIGED IN REASON, to that which appears to him on an impartial enquiry moſt *honourable* and decent; and to be OBLIGED IN INTEREST, to that which on an impartial enquiry ſhall appear moſt conducive to his *happineſs* on the whole.

Balg. Law of Truth, p. 4—12. *In the vol. of his Tracts, p.* 372—380.

SCHOLIUM.

Though an obligation in reaſon and intereſt may ſeem diſtinct, yet they are, at leaſt in a great meaſure, if not entirely, connected: for on the one hand, the obligations of reaſon, honour and decency, cannot be broken through, without ſome *uneaſineſs* to a mind conſcious of the violation of them; and on the other, it is a

reaſonable, decent and honourable thing, to be influenced by a regard to our own happineſs.

DEFINITION XXXVIII.

The MORAL RECTITUDE or VIRTUE of any being conſiſts, in acting knowingly and deſignedly in a manner agreeable to the moral fitneſſes of things; and VICE, in acting contrary to them, when they are or might have been known to him.

Balg. Inq. into the Foundation of Moral Goodneſs, part i. *p.* 30, 31. *Vol. of Tracts, p.* 67.

COROLLARY I.

There is a beauty inſeparable from virtue of character, and a deformity from vice. Compare *Ax.* 15. and *Def.* 36.

Shafteſb. Char. vol. ii. *p.* 28—36.

COROLLARY 2.

Every intelligent being capable of diſcerning this beauty and deformity, is in reaſon obliged to the practice of virtue in every inſtance. Compare *Def.* 37.

Price's Review, c. 6.—*Burlamaguy's Elementa, part* i. *c.* v. vi. *Part* ii. *c.* vii.

COROLLARY 3.

The foundation of virtue and vice cannot depend upon the mere will of any being whatſoever. Vid. *Ax.* 13, 14.

Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 11—15.—*Grove of Wiſd. p.* 23—26. 36—40. *Vol.* iv. *of his Works, c.* i. § 1—2*.—*Mole's Serm. of Moral Virtue, p.* 21—24, 27.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. LIII. Nevertheleſs, as the circumſtances of things vary, the fitneſs of actions will proportionably vary; and therefore the will of a ſuperior may

* The doctrine of the third corollary is ſtrongly aſſerted and maintained in Dr. Price's work, before referred to.

make

make ſome things fit, which otherwiſe would not be ſo; (*v. g.* a general's command to a ſoldier to march any particular way, or a magiſtrate appointing an execution, *&c.*) but while the ſame circumſtances continue, the moral fitneſs of things will always be the ſame.

Mole on Mor. Virtue, p. 27, 28.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To what is ſaid *Cor.* 3. ſome have objected, that this is ſetting up ſomething different from, and independent on the divine being, to be the rule of his actions.—But it is replied, that as nothing can be prior to God, ſo nothing diſtinct from his nature is here aſſerted to be a law or rule of action to him. We cannot ſuppoſe the divine mind ever to have been without ideas; (for then God would have been without knowledge, and without volitions, and conſequently without action; all which are moſt inconſiſtent with what we have before proved concerning him:) now perfectly diſcerning every idea, (*Prop.* 33.) he muſt have perfectly diſcerned all their relations, and therefore among the reſt the moral fitneſs of ſome, and unfitneſs of other actions, in ſuch and ſuch ſuppoſed circumſtances: ſo that on the whole, it is no more injurious to the divine being to aſſert, that he cannot alter his own ſenſe of ſome moral fitneſſes, than that he cannot change his nature, or deſtroy his being.

Limeſtr. Lect. vol. ii. *p.* 579—581.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought themſelves, on the premiſes laid down above, authorized to ſay, that ſuppoſing God to change his mind concerning theſe things, the things themſelves would nevertheleſs continue the ſame.

But it may be obſerved with regard to ſuch a manner of expreſſion, that if we conſider God as

exiſting alone and prior to all creation, and by a change of *mind* mean only a change of *will*; then to ſay, the things themſelves would nevertheleſs continue the ſame, is only ſaying, that God would ſtill continue to diſcern what is right, though his own actions were contrary to his judgment; which is a trifling propoſition, as well as a blaſphemous hypotheſis. But if the ſuppoſition be, that his *ideas* are likewiſe changed, this would ſuppoſe the former ideas totally deſtroyed, ſeeing there would be no other mind in which they could exiſt; and then all the *relations* and *fitneſſes* would be deſtroyed with them. But if we were to conſider other minds as exiſting, and to ſuppoſe God either to change his ideas, or to act contrary to rectitude, while any one of his creatures retained this ſenſe of it; it is granted that virtue would ſtill be the ſame: but if it be hereafter proved, that God is a being of perfect rectitude, (ſince we have already demonſtrated his immutability,) it will follow, that all theſe ſuppoſitions are in effect no other, than that God ſhould ceaſe to be God; and are ſo unreaſonable and indecent, that they ought not to be made.

Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 14, 15*.

SCHOLIUM 4.

If it ſhould be hereafter proved to be the will of God, that all rational creatures ſhould proſecute virtue; and alſo proved, that the will of God lays an obligation on his rational creatures; then from hence it will evidently appear, that no man, capable of knowing God, is obliged to

* At the time when Dr. Clarke's ſcheme of eternal Fitneſſes was in general eſtimation, ſome writers, in the extravagance of their zeal for it, expreſſed themſelves in very ſtrange and unjuſtifiable language, and ſuch as the doctor himſelf could by no means have approved. The tracts to which we refer have juſtly ſunk into oblivion.

any thing by the moral fitneſs of things, to which he is not alſo obliged by the will of God.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If it be farther enquired, whether our obligations ariſing from the fitneſs of things, be *antecedent* to thoſe ariſing from the will of God, we anſwer,

1. If God will the univerſal virtue of all his rational creatures, he muſt will it from the firſt moment of their exiſtence; and taking the matter in a general view, no obligation in order of time can be prior to that ariſing from his will, nor reach farther, ſince univerſal virtue comprehends all moral fitneſſes.

2. It muſt be acknowledged, that our ſenſe of the fitneſs of ſome things may be prior to our diſcovery of the exiſtence and nature of God; and that in proportion to the degree in which that ſenſe is more or leſs ſtrong, there will be a correſpondent degree of obligation: nay it is hard to ſay, how any one could know that he *ought* to do a thing, which he knew to be the will of God, unleſs he had ſome previous ſenſe of obligation in reaſon or intereſt, on which ſuch a conviction ſhould be founded.

3. Nevertheleſs, as children apprehend the ideas of *things*, ſooner than they learn the names of *complex*, *moral modes*, the eaſieſt and beſt way of forming them to a ſenſe of virtue will be, to give them an early ſenſe of the being and perfections of God, according to their feeble capacities of apprehending them; repreſenting it as his command, that they ſhould do every thing they know to be good, and forbear every thing they know to be evil. But

4. As to the order of our conception of things, when we come to examine them in riper years, if the rectitude of God ſhould hereafter be proved to us on the one hand, and our obligation to

obey him on the other; then when we know any thing to be *fit*, we know it to be the will of God; and when we know it to be the will of God, we know it to be fit for us to do in preſent circumſtances: and therefore we need not be very nice in adjuſting, on which of theſe things the greateſt ſtreſs is to be laid; ſince we ſhould then conſider the will of God not merely as an arbitrary thing, but as the will of a wiſe and a righteous being. And it is certain, that whatever might be conceived as fit from other abſtract conſiderations, will appear yet more fit, when conſidered as the will of ſuch a being: ſo that a regard to the divine authority, in doing a thing, can never diminiſh the degree of virtue in an action, but will always increaſe the ſenſe of obligation to it.

Wright againſt Mole, p. 41—43.

SCHOLIUM 6.

On the whole it is proper to obſerve, that great care ſhould be taken, eſpecially in popular diſcourſes, that we do not make any falſe ſuppoſitions of God's being changed from what we know him immutably to be; that we do not repreſent him as under the reſtraint of ſomething ſuperior to himſelf; nor ourſelves as under greater obligations to ſomething elſe than we are under to God. It is much more proper to ſay, (if the rectitude of the divine being be proved) that his unerring judgment is the rule of *his* actions, and his will as directed by it, (however that will may be known,) the rule of *ours*; and the foundation of moral good and evil ſhould be aſſerted, not to be *previous* to, or merely conſequent upon, but inſeparably *connected with* the immutable will of God.

Wright againſt Mole, p. 27—30, 44—51. —*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxviii.—*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *p.* 36—53.——*Bott's Anſwer*

Anſwer to Warb. p. 228, *ad fin. præf. p.* 232—239.

DEFINITION XXXIX.

LECT. LIV.

Moral rectitude is generally called HOLINESS, when applied to God; VIRTUE, when applied to the creature.

Joſ. Mede's Works, p. 8, 9*.

SCHOLIUM.

Virtue is ſometimes taken in a more limited ſenſe, for the duties we owe to *ourſelves* and our *fellow-creatures:* and then *Religion* is put to ſignify the duties we owe more immediately to *God.*

AXIOM XVI.

Where there is any moral turpitude in the actions of a rational being, it is (*cæteris paribus*) proportionable to the degree, in which ſuch a being underſtands the relations of things, and is free from temptation to act contrary to them.

PROPOSITION XLIV.

God is a being of perfect HOLINESS, *i. e.* of the higheſt moral rectitude.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 33.|1. His infinite underſtanding muſt enable him to diſcern all the relations of things as they really are.

Prop. 31.|2. He is almighty, and therefore has nothing to fear.

Prop. 38.|3. He is perfectly happy, and therefore has nothing to hope.

2, 3.|4. He is infinitely removed from all temptation to act contrary to moral rectitude.

* Joſeph Mede, in the paſſage referred to, did not mean philoſophically to define the moral Rectitude of God, but to deſcribe, in general, his ſingular Greatneſs and Holineſs.

1, 4. *Ax.* 16.|5. It would be highly dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose him in any respect to deviate from the exactest rectitude in his actions.

6. Without any temptation or advantage, to deviate from moral rectitude, must fill the mind of the divine being with uneasy reflections upon it. *Def.* 37. *Schol.*

6.|7. It would be inconsistent with the divine felicity.

5, 7.|8. *Valet propositio.*

Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 15—28.—*Scott's Christ. Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 361—364.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 327.—*Tillotf. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 662.

COROLLARY 1.

It is reasonable to believe that it is the will of God, that all created beings, that are capable of virtue, should make it the great object of pursuit.

COROLLARY 2.

Since God is a being of almighty power, and has the final happiness or misery of all creatures in his hands, every creature capable of virtue must be obliged in interest, as well as reason, to cultivate the practice of it: (Vid. *Cor.* 1.) and thus it appears, that virtue and self-love can only be perfectly reconciled by *religion.* See Dr. *Watts*'s pamphlet on the subject; or his Works, vol. iii. p. 715, &c.

COROLLARY 3.

Whatsoever shall hereafter be proved a branch of virtue, and does not imply some degree of weakness and dependence in the being by whom it is to be practised, is undoubtedly to be found in God.

COR-

COROLLARY 4.

If we ſee God in fact doing any thing, we may aſſure ourſelves that it is agreeable to the reaſon of things that it ſhould be done, though we cannot ſhew how it agrees; and though there may be ſome objections to it, which, in conſequence of the imperfection of our views, we are not able to anſwer.

Butl. Anal. part i. *c.* vii.

SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be queried, whether this rectitude of the divine being be *neceſſary*, *i. e.* whether God can do what is morally unfit.

Anſ. God has a natural power to do what is moſt unfit for him to do, if we conſider merely the action itſelf; *v. g.* to put a period to the exiſtence of the moſt excellent creature, *&c.* but conſidering all the circumſtances of an evil action, which cannot but be known to him, he cannot ſo oppoſe and contradict himſelf as to do it: for it is as impoſſible for a free agent, of perfect immutable rectitude, to act contrary to reaſon, *i. e.* to deſtroy its own rectitude, as for neceſſary exiſtence to deſtroy its own being; and if the rectitude of God were not immutable, then he might be changed from a moſt benevolent to a moſt malevolent being, from a moſt faithful to a moſt perfidious being; which ſurely is as inconſiſtent with ſelf-exiſtence, as a change from knowledge to ignorance, or from power to weakneſs. Nevertheleſs God may freely chuſe this or that action, out of many others equally good and fit.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 115—119. *p.* 110—114. *Ed.* 6.——*Grove on Wiſdom, p.* 30—33.—*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 46—49. —*Mole's Found. of Virt. p.* 24.—*Wright againſt Mole, p.* 8, 9, 22—25.

DEFI-

DEFINITION XL.

LECT. LV. That being may be ſaid to be perfectly GOOD or BENEVOLENT, who promotes the happineſs of others ſo far as it is fit to be promoted.

PROPOSITION XLV.

God is perfectly Good.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We ſee a great deal of happineſs in the creation, of which God is the author; and generally ſpeaking, thoſe things which contain diſplays of art and wiſdom, are calculated to promote the happineſs of his creatures: under which head we are to rank the benevolent inſtincts, which he has implanted in the human mind.

2. We ſee no mixture of evil, from whence good may not proceed; and are ſure that in many inſtances good does actually proceed from thoſe things which have the appearance of evil.

3. The greateſt part of thoſe evils which we here obſerve ariſe from the abuſe of human liberty, and therefore are not directly to be charged upon God. *Prop.* 16.

1, 2, 3.|4. If we judge by the phænomena of nature, *i. e.* by the divine works of creation and providence obvious to us, it ſeems that God is a good being.

5. God is ſo great, as to have no need of ſeeking his own happineſs in the cauſeleſs miſery of his creatures; nor is it a conceivable thing how he ſhould take any pleaſure in it, or how he could be happy with a ſuppoſed malignant diſpoſition.

6. Benevolence is the great glory of a rational being, and without it, no other perfection can appear amiable and honourable.

Gr. 4.

Gr. 4 and 5. *Prop.* 38. and *Gr.* 6. *Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 1. *Cor.* 2. 7. We have reaſon to believe that God is perfectly good. *Q. E. D.*

Wilk. Nat. Rel. p. 135—139. *p.* 119—122. *Ed.* 7.——*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 113.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 68—71. *Ed.* 3. *p.* 81—84.—*Clarke's Poſt. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 321—327, 337—341. *Oct.*—*Bays on Div. Benev. p.* 20—29.——*Abern. Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* 2 *.

SCHOLIUM I.

The great objection to this, is the mixture of evil in the world, natural evil, *i. e.* pain, and moral evil, *i. e.* vice: (Vid. *Def.* 38.) and it is queſtioned, how far the exiſtence and prevalence of it in ſo great a degree can be reconcileable with what has been ſaid of the divine goodneſs, ſince God has already been proved an almighty being.

Anſ. 1. We cannot poſſibly judge as to the proportion there is between the quantity of happineſs and miſery in the creation, merely from what we obſerve in this part of it, which is our own abode. There may perhaps be regions incomparably more extenſive and populous, in which neither natural nor moral evil are known, at leaſt by experience.

2. It is poſſible there is no evil of any kind, from which a degree of good may not proceed, more than ſufficient to counterbalance it.

3. When moral evil has been introduced, which (as was obſerved above, *gr.* 3.) might be by the uſe of liberty in free creatures, then penal evil is on the whole good, and well ſuited to a ſtate of diſcipline, which may poſſibly in

* For a curious and valuable tract on this ſubject, ſee Dr. Thomas Balguy's Divine Benevolence aſſerted and vindicated.

thoſe

thoſe circumſtances be intended as a proper introduction to a ſtate of enjoyment.

4. The ſcheme of things which we now ſee may perhaps be continually growing better and better; not to ſay, that for aught certainly appears by the light of nature, the time may come, when all natural and moral evil may ceaſe.

Rel. of Nat. p. 71, 72.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 37—39, 90, 91.——*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 245—249.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 283.—*Balg. on Div. Rect. p.* 31—33, 38—40.—*Tracts, p.* 241—243, 249—251.—*Leibnitz Theod. vol.* i. *p.* 83—85.——*Mandev. Free Thoughts, p.* 99—102.—*Maim. More Nevoch. part* iii. *c.* xii.——*Travels of Cyrus, p.* 248—258. 12*mo.*—*Hallet on Script. vol.* ii. *p.* 310—318.—*Abern. Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* 3.—*S. Clarke on the Orig. of Nat. Evil, præf. p.* 60—77, *& p.* 160, *ad fin.*—*Bonet's Contemplation of Nature.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

LECT. LVI. It will ſtill be demanded, why was moral evil permitted? To this it is generally anſwered, that it was the reſult of natural liberty; and it was fit, that among all the other claſſes and orders of being, ſome ſhould be formed poſſeſſed of this, as it conduces to the harmony of the univerſe, and to the beautiful variety of beings in it.

Yet ſtill it is replied, why did not God prevent this abuſe of liberty? One would not willingly ſay, that he is not able to do it, without violating the nature of his creatures; nor is it poſſible that any ſhould prove this. It is commonly ſaid, that he permitted it, in order to extract from thence greater good. But it may be farther queried, could he not have produced that

that greater good without such a means? Could he not have secured among all his creatures universal good and universal happiness, in full consistency with the liberty he had given them? I acknowledge I see no way of answering this question, but by saying, he had indeed a natural power of doing it, but that he saw it better not to do it, though the reasons upon which it appeared preferable to him are entirely unknown to us.

Pope's Ethic Epist. N°. i. *ver.* 43—60. & 123—172.—*Foster's Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* i. —*Clarke on the Orig. of Mor. Evil, præf. p.* 122—140. & *p.* 182—198 *.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought it more for the honour of the divine being to say, that the nature of things is such, that the happiness of the whole system will be more effectually promoted by the misery of some part of it; and therefore, that perfect benevolence would induce the creator to chuse such a mixed scheme rather than another in which there should have been unmixed virtue and happiness.—But granting that there is no evil, from which an equal or greater degree of good may not proceed, (*Schol.* 1. *gr.* 2.) yet it may justly be asked, what is here meant by *the nature of things*, or how can it possibly be imagined or believed, that a greater sum of happiness should arise from the mixture of evil, than omnipotence could have produced some other

* To the writers here referred to may be added Bonet's "Contemplation of Nature." Among the works which exaggerate the evils of mankind, in order to promote atheistical purposes, may be reckoned the "Systeme de la Nature," ascribed to Mirabeau the father. On the question, Why God did not prevent the abuse of liberty? no one is more sceptically copious than Bayle, in several articles of his Historical Dictionary, and particularly under the heads of Manichæans and Paulicians.

way;

way; or how can the view or experience of misery be neceſſary to give a virtuous being a more exquiſite reliſh of happineſs *?

SCHOLIUM 4.

If we ſtill remain diſſatisfied with the reply given to the objection, *Schol.* 1. it ſeems that the chief reaſon is, that we are apt to go on the miſtaken principle, that God muſt needs raiſe the happineſs of the univerſe to the higheſt poſſible degree. But we are to remember, on the one hand, that God is a being of infinite power, (*Prop.* 31.) and on the other, that to be *created* implies to be *limited* in point of *happineſs*, as well as of *power*; and to be poſſeſſed of ſome limited degree of happineſs, neceſſarily implies a poſſibility of receiving ſome higher degrees of it from an almighty power; ſo that it can never be ſaid, that God has done his utmoſt for the happineſs of any particular creature, or of the univerſe in general: and this is ſo far from being a reflection on him, that it is indeed his glory. Whatever the number of creatures be, it might have been multiplied to and beyond any given degree; there might have been as many beings of the higheſt order of all, as there are of them and all the ſubordinate claſſes; and whatever were ſuppoſed to have been done, there would ſtill have been room for the inquiry, why was not more done: and if the anſwer is not to be reſolved into mere ſovereign pleaſure, as perhaps it may, then it muſt be referred into ſome reaſon unknown to us; for the reaſon cannot be, that the

* For the writers who maintain that both the natural and moral evil exiſting in the world are eſſential parts of the beſt poſſible ſyſtem, recourſe may be had to Hartley, Prieſtley, Cooper, and Godwin. Soame Jenyns may in part be mentioned in this view.

happineſs

happineſs of the whole would have been leſs, which in this caſe it is a contradiction to aſſert.

Boyle on Venerat. p. 88, 89.—*Bayes on Div. Ben. p.* 65—70.—*Fenelon's Phil. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 70—82. *præf.* § 9, 10. *p.* 72—76.—*Leibnitz Theod. vol.* ii. *p.* 251, *&c.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

To this way of ſtating the divine goodneſs, as purſuing the happineſs of the creation ſo far as it is fit to be purſued, it is objected, that nothing can be fit, but what tends to produce happineſs; and that no being can be perfectly good, unleſs he does all the good he can poſſibly do. But this laſt principle cannot, for the reaſon above-mentioned, be allowed, when we ſpeak of an almighty agent.

On the whole, it muſt be owned to be a conſiderable difficulty. Nevertheleſs, we are ſure there is a mixture of evil in the world; and it becomes us ſeriouſly to conſider, whether it be more honourable to God, or decent in us to ſay, that he could have prevented it, though for ſome wiſe but unknown reaſon he did not chuſe to do it; or to ſay, he could not have prevented it, without chuſing a ſcheme, in conſequence of which his creation might have been leſs happy than it now is.

Balg. on Div. Rect. p. 23—30. *Tracts p.* 241—248.—*Bayes on Div. Benev. p.* 29—33.—*Grove on Wiſd. p.* 59—80. *Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 72—100.

SCHOLIUM 6.

LECT. LVII.

It may not be improper here to take ſome notice of the celebrated controverſy, between Mr. *Balguy*, Mr. *Bayes* and Mr. *Grove*, concerning the *Spring of the divine actions*. *Balguy* refers them all to *Rectitude*, *Bayes* to *Benevolence*, and

Grove to *Wiſdom*. There is ſomething which well deſerves an attentive peruſal in their writings on this ſubject, of which we ſhall give a ſhort abſtract in the following ſcholia, ſo far as they relate to the preſent queſtion *.

Balguy maintains, that God always does that which is right and fit, and that all his moral attributes, *viz.* juſtice, truth, faithfulneſs, mercy, patience, *&c.* are but ſo many different modifications of *rectitude*. He thinks it moſt agreeable to the divine ſimplicity, and moſt honourable to God, to conceive of him as always influenced by this uniform principle; and that this manner of conceiving of him would prevent much confuſion in our ideas, which ariſes from conſidering his different attributes as having different intereſts and claims.

Div. Rect. p. 3—8. *Tracts, p.* 212—217.

He grants that the *communication of good* is *one* great and right end of the creator; but maintains that it is not the *only* end: he ultimately aims at *his own glory, i. e.* the complacential approbation of his own actions, ariſing from a conſciouſneſs of having inviolably preſerved a due decorum, order and beauty in his works: and if ever the happineſs of any particular creature, or of the whole ſyſtem interfere with this, (as he thinks it ſometimes may) it muſt ſo far give way to it.

Div. Rect. p. 20—25. *Tracts, p.* 219—222.

* This controverſy, though much celebrated in its time, is now nearly forgotten. There have lately been few or no ſpecific ſpeculations concerning the Spring of Action in the Deity, any farther than as it has generally been referred by recent philoſophers to Benevolence. The tracts, however, of Balguy and Grove, as well as of Mr. Bayes, may ſtill deſerve the attention of a ſtudent, ſince they contain many important ſentiments relative to the divine conduct.

This leads him into ſome reflections on the nature of *beauty* and *order*, in which he maintains that they are real and abſolute in themſelves, and are not merely relative to our faculties; otherwiſe, why this wonderful apparatus, this profuſion of art and ſkill in the univerſe? He contends that Dr. *Hutcheſon* grants this, when he places all beauty in *uniformity amidſt variety*. Now whatever is beautiful in the univerſe, the creator muſt ſee it, and have a perfect view of all that is amiable and delightful in it. He concludes this part of his diſcourſe with obſerving, that to ſuppoſe all the beauty, order and harmony of the univerſe ſubſervient to the happineſs of living creatures, is hardly to be reconciled with the appearance of things: ſo that on the whole, the increaſe of *happineſs*, and love of *order*, being both agreeable to the rectitude and perfection of the divine nature, are joint ends, blended together both in the works of creation and providence.

Div. Rect. p. 16—23. *Tracts, p.* 223—230.

SCHOLIUM 7.

To this Mr. *Bayes* objects, that to conſider God firſt in general as doing all that is right, and then to deduce his particular moral attributes, as branches of this univerſal rectitude of his nature, is going farther about than is neceſſary, and leaves particular attributes entangled in juſt the ſame difficulty as before. But if it were otherwiſe, he ſays, that as nothing can be *fit* but what tends to promote happineſs, the beſt idea we can entertain of the rectitude of God, is a diſpoſition in him to promote the general happineſs of the univerſe; and that we may as well conſider all the other moral attributes as comprehended in this, and different modifications of it, as to conſider them united in *Balguy's* view

of rectitude; but with this advantage, that here we shall have something certain to depend upon; whereas it must throw the mind into perpetual perplexity, if (for ought we know) God may have some ends in his actions and dispensations, entirely different from and perhaps opposite to the happiness of his creatures.

Bayes on Div. Benev. p. 7—19.

As for the ideas of *order* and *beauty*, he seems to query whether those objects which appear beautiful to us may appear so to the divine mind. He thinks that the only glory, which God can propose as the end of his actions, is the approbation of his own benevolent mind, as acting always in such a manner as shall be most for the happiness of the creation. He urges several objections against *Balguy's* notion of beauty, which it is not necessary to contract here, lest we deviate too much from the principal question.

Bayes ib. p. 33—44.—*Relig. of Nat. p.* 116—119.

On the whole, he concludes that the divine benevolence is not to be stated, as "an unbounded inclination to communicate the highest degree of happiness," which is a contradiction, as it would be to suppose the greatest possible triangle actually described; (Compare *Schol.* 4.) but "as a kind affection towards his creatures, inclining him to confer upon that universe which he has made (and which he might have created or not, or have created with inferior or superior capacities for happiness) the greatest happiness of which it is capable." But if it be asked, why it was not made capable of more, he supposes that must be referred into the will and pleasure of God.

Bayes ib. p. 70, 71.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 8.

LECT. LVIII.

Mr. *Grove* refers all into the *wisdom* of God, which he says is "the knowledge that God has "of what is fitting or unfit to be chosen in every "imaginable circumstance;" and taking it for granted that he is under no wrong bias, concludes that he always chuses according to this fitness. He adds, that nothing can be fit to be chosen by any being, but what has some reference to *happiness*, either that of the agent or some other; and that *beauty* and *order* are nothing any farther than as they tend to communicate pleasure to percipient beings: therefore the end of God in the creation must be *happiness*; as to the degree and manner of attaining it, suited to the faculties, dependencies and freedom of his rational creatures. On the whole, he supposes it must be apparently fit, that no reasonable creature should be made miserable, before he deserves it. He farther adds, that he should be made for happiness; but that he should be obliged as reasonable and free to chuse reason as his guide to it: and if he will not be persuaded to take the right way, it is fit he should be left to the ill consequences of his own wrong choice. All this therefore he supposes God must will.

Grove on Wisd. p. 1—7. *Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 7—13.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 116.

As *Bayes* and others have maintained, that benevolence is a *kind inclination* or affection in God, *Grove* endeavours to prove, that properly speaking, there is no inclination in him; and maintains, that to suppose such an inclination as depends not on the previous act of the divine understanding, will be in effect imputing to him a blind and irrational propensity; and that nothing could be more dishonourable to the Divine Being, than universally to assign this reason for his conduct in any instance, "that he was inclined, or

"had a mind to do it." But he farther maintains it, as probable at least, that there are no inclinations in God at all distinct from his actual volitions, but that the actings of the divine will are immediately and inseparably connected with those of his understanding: to suppose the contrary, he thinks would in effect be supposing, that reason would not be sufficient to determine the divine mind. If any determination be said to have proceeded from such inclination, that coincides entirely with the former exploded hypothesis of blind inclination: but if it be said, the action proceeded partly from reason and partly from inclination, he asserts, that it may as well be supposed to proceed entirely from reason.

Grove ib. p. 14—23. *Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 22—31.——*Balg. Div. Rect. p.* 9, 10. *Tracts, p.* 217, 218.

Hence Mr. *Grove* infers in the process of his discourse several things, relating to the divine liberty, the origin of evil, the divine happiness, and the duties of natural religion, which have been or will be referred to, so far as there appears any thing peculiarly remarkable in them.

SCHOLIUM 9.

From the survey we have taken of this controversy, it may be natural to make the following remarks.

1. That each of these ingenious writers discovers a pious temper, a concern for the honour of the Divine Being, and the advancement of virtue in the world.

2. That they all acknowledge that God does always what is right and good: nay, that when one thing is on the whole more fit than another, he invariably chuses it.

3. That both Mr. *Grove* and Mr. *Balguy* acknowledge the *communication of happiness*, to be a noble and

and excellent end, which the deity in ſome meaſure has always in view; and which he proſecutes, ſo far as to bring happineſs at leaſt within the reach of all his rational creatures; never inflicting any evil upon them out of caprice, or without ſome juſt and important reaſon.

4. That there is very little difference between the foundation of *Grove*'s diſcourſe, and that of *Balguy*'s; *wiſdom* in the former being ſo ſtated, that to be always governed by it coincides with the notion of *rectitude*, maintained by the latter.

5. That Mr. *Bayes* himſelf does not aſſert, that it would have been impoſſible for God to have produced a greater ſum of happineſs; and by granting the contrary, ſeems to overturn the foundation of thoſe arguments, by which he attempts to prove, that God has made the creation as happy as its preſent capacity would admit.

6. It ſeems that a virtuous mind may be as eaſy, in conſidering God as a being of univerſal *rectitude*, as if we were to conſider him as a being of unbounded *benevolence:* nay it ſeems, that in ſome reſpects the former will have the advantage; as it is impoſſible for us confidently to ſay, what will be for the greateſt happineſs of the whole; but on the other hand, we may naturally conclude, that rectitude will on the whole incline God to treat the virtuous man in a more favourable manner than the wicked.

7. That the ſcheme of univerſal benevolence in the higheſt ſenſe ſeems evidently to imply *fatality:* for if all the ſin and miſery of the creatures were neceſſary to produce the greateſt poſſible ſum of happineſs, and if the perfection of the divine nature determined him to produce this greateſt ſum, then ſin and miſery would be neceſſary; whereby the doctrine of liberty is deſtroyed, and ſuch a ſeeming reflection thrown on the divine character, as few would be able to digeſt.

8. It ſeems therefore on the whole beſt to keep to that in which we all agree, and freely acknowledge, there are depths in the divine counſels unfathomable to us; ſo that though we may juſtly believe God has his reaſons for ſuffering evil to be produced, we cannot certainly determine what thoſe reaſons are; and when we go about particularly to explain them, we find it difficult, according to the different ſchemes we embrace, on the one hand to vindicate his goodneſs, or on the other his omnipotence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

LECT. LIX.

God is INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. This would follow merely from his being a ſpirit, endued with perfections vaſtly ſuperior to our own. Vid. *Prop.* 27. *Cor.* and *Prop.* 18. *Cor.* 1.

2. There may be (for any thing we certainly know) attributes and perfections in God, of which we have not the leaſt idea.

3. In thoſe perfections of the divine nature, of which we have ſome idea, there are many things to us inexplicable, and with which, the more deeply and attentively we think of them, the more we find our thoughts ſwallowed up; *v. g.* his ſelf-exiſtence, his eternity, his omnipreſence, whether it be conceived of as diffuſive or not diffuſive; his producing effects by mere volition, the creation of matter or even of ſpirit; his omniſcience, where his knowledge of what is paſt from the creation of the world (how long ſoever you ſuppoſe it to have been) bears no given proportion to the knowledge of what is yet to come, if any creature be ſuppoſed immortal; eſpecially his knowledge of future contingencies; how, being perfectly happy, and conſequently having nothing to wiſh or deſire, he was excited to act: how,

how, being perfectly good and omnipotent, he permitted evil to enter into the world; beſides many other particulars touched upon in the preceding lectures.

1, 2, & 3.|4. God is incomprehenſible. *Q. E. D.*

Abern. Serm. vol. ii. *N°.* 6, 7.

COROLLARY I.

We have reaſon to believe, that as the perfections of God are infinite, if there be any orders of intelligent creatures ſuperior to us, theſe perfections muſt alſo be incomprehenſible to them.

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. ii. *p.* 768.——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 93, 94.

COROLLARY 2.

It certainly becomes us to uſe great modeſty and caution, when we are ſpeaking of the divine perfections.

Archbp. King of Predeſt. § 30, 31.

SCHOLIUM.

It ought to be remembered, that the incomprehenſible nature of the Divine Being is no ſufficient reaſon for our allowing ourſelves in ſelf-contradictory language, when we are ſpeaking of him; as ſome of the antients did, when they ſpoke of him as *more than unknown, without exiſtence, without ſubſtance, a ſuper-divine divinity*, and as *terminating infinity* itſelf, ſo that infinite ſpace is but a ſmall corner of his productions, and *beyond perfection*; which, though probably deſigned only as ſtrong hyperboles, tend to expoſe the perſons that uſe them to ridicule, rather than to exalt our ideas of the divine glory.

Divine Analogy, p. 65, 66.—*Fraſer's Life of Nadir Schah, p.* 12—18.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XLVII.

The paſſions and affections of human nature are not in any degree to be aſcribed to God; Compare *Prop.* 1. *Gr.* 3. and *Prop.* 13.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Many of thoſe paſſions are grievous and troubleſome, as anger, envy, fear, ſhame, *&c.* and conſequently there can be no room for them in a being perfectly happy, as God is. *Prop.* 38.

2. Others of them, which afford more pleaſing ſenſations, are founded on ſome degree of weakneſs, and plainly imply a defect of happineſs, as deſire, and hope, *&c.* and conſequently are inconſiſtent with the omnipotence, as well as the felicity of God.

3. The workings of the paſſions in us are always attended with ſome commotions in animal nature, and therefore imply corporeity; but God being incorporeal, ſuch paſſions can have no place in him. *Prop.* 41.

1, 2, & 3|4. God is free from human paſſions. *Q. E. D.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheleſs in a *figurative* ſenſe, love and joy, anger and pity, *&c.* may be aſcribed to God; when we mean no more, than that God does ſuch acts, as in us would be at leaſt probable indications of ſuch paſſions in our mind, *v. g.* ſupplying the neceſſitous, relieving the ſorrowful, puniſhing the vicious, *&c.* Yet ſtrictly ſpeaking, we are to conceive of all theſe, as performed by him with the utmoſt calmneſs and ſerenity; and even that complacency, with which God contemplates his own perfections, and the actions and characters of the beſt of his creatures, is of a nature very different from, and vaſtly ſuperior to, thoſe ſallies of joy, which we perceive

perceive in ourſelves, in the moſt agreeable ſituations of life, and when our enjoyments are moſt refined.

Limb. Theol. l. ii. *c.* x. § 3.——*Burn. on the Art. p.* 24—27.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be proper here to mention the ſcheme, which Mr. *Brown* advances in his *Divine Analogy* as of ſo great importance, and which is built upon a hint in Archbiſhop *King*.

He pretends, that all we know of God is merely by *Analogy*; *i.e.* from what we ſee in ourſelves and obſerve in others, compared with events produced by the divine being, we conclude, that there is ſomething in God, in ſome degree *anſwerable* to thoſe phænomena, though indeed very *different* from them. This analogy, as he maintains, differs much from *metaphor*, which is a mere figure, *v. g.* when we ſpeak of the eye of God, the hand of God, it is a metaphor, God being entirely incorporeal: but when we ſpeak of the knowledge and power of God, it is by analogy.

If he means by this, that the divine manner of knowing and acting is different from ours, or that whatever degree of knowledge and power we poſſeſs, bears no proportion to that of the ſupreme being, it is what every one will very readily allow, and has generally been aſſerted by all who believe the exiſtence and infinite perfections of God: but if he intends any thing elſe, his meaning ſeems either very unintelligible, or very abſurd; ſo that the ſcheme, in either of theſe views, ſeems utterly unworthy of that vaſt parade, with which he introduces it, as if the whole of natural and revealed religion depended upon ſuch an explication of the matter.

Archbiſhop King of Predeſt. § 3—6, 8, 9, 37.—*Grove on Wiſd. p.* 42, 43. *Works, vol.*

vol. iv. *p.* 48, 49.—*Proced. of Underſtanding, p.* 3—6. & 132—143.—*Divine Anal. c.* i.—*Law's Notes on King, on the Orig. of Evil, p.* 67—70. *Quarto Edition, Ed.* 3. *p.* 89—93.

PROPOSITION XLVIII.

LECT. LX. To conſider ſome of the moſt celebrated definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, and to compare them with that given, *Def.* 38.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Dr. *Clarke* and Mr. *Balguy* have the ſame notion with that ſtated above; as evidently appears from the references to them, *Def.* 38. and 36 *Cor.* And thoſe of the *ancients*, who defined virtue, to be *living according to nature*, ſeem to have meant much the ſame.

2. Mr. *Wollaſton* has placed it in a regard to *truth: i. e.* he ſuppoſes that not only our words, but our *actions* have a language; when this language is agreeable to the nature of things, then the action is virtuous, but when it implies a falſe aſſertion, then it is vicious. This account, though it differs in words, ſeems entirely to coincide with the former, or evidently to depend upon it.

Rel. of Nat. p. 8—13. & 20—24.—*Hutcheſ. on the Paſſ. p.* 253—274.—*Grove's Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 50—54.

3. Dr. *Hutcheſon* defines *moral goodneſs*, "to "be a quality apprehended in ſome actions, "which produces approbation and love towards "the actor, from thoſe who receive no benefit "from the action;" and ſuppoſes what he calls a *moral ſenſe*, implanted in our natures, or an inſtinct, like that of ſelf-preſervation, which, independently on any arguments taken from the reaſonableneſs and advantage of any action, leads

us

us to perform it ourselves, or to approve it when performed by others.

Hutches. Inq. Pref. p. 6—8. *&* *p.* 101—106. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 14—16. 111—116.

That there is indeed such a sense, as to some branches of virtue, though in many persons and instances much impaired, is not to be denied, and is well illustrated and proved in

Hutches. Inq. p. 107—124. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 117—135.—*Spect. vol.* viii. *N°.* 588.

Nor does it imply any innate idea, as some have supposed; any more than the intuitive discerning of self-evident propositions, implies the ideas connected with them to have been innate.

Watts's Eff. N°. iv. § 5 *p.* 108—113.

But Dr. *Hutcheson* has made this instinct to be the very *foundation* of virtue; and expressly says, that "every good action is supposed to follow "from affection to some rational agent;" and that "the true spring of virtue is some instinct, "which influences to the love of others, as the "moral sense determines us to approve actions "flowing from this principle."

Hutches. Inq. p. 143, 153. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 155—165.

But Mr. *Balguy* pleads that this makes virtue an *arbitrary* thing, which might have been contrary to what it is, had the instinct been contrary: that it implies that a creature with intelligence, reason and liberty could not have performed one good action, without this affection: that it makes brutes capable of virtue, since they are capable of affections: that it estimates the excellency of characters by the strength of passions, by no means in our own power; and on the whole, gives us a much less honourable idea of virtue, than the method of stating it, which is taken above: to which we may add, that if we do not conceive of God as an *affectionate* being, such an idea

idea of moral goodneſs as this, would be inconſiſtent with that of the divine rectitude.

It may be obſerved by the way, that though Lord *Shafteſbury* uſes many expreſſions, which Dr. *Hutcheſon* has adopted, yet it ſeems that he in the main falls in with the account given above; ſince he conſiders virtue as founded on "the *eternal meaſure* and immutable *relation of* "*things*," or in other words as conſiſting "in a "certain juſt diſpoſition of a rational creature "towards the moral objects of right and wrong."

Shafteſb. Char. vol. ii. *p.* 36, 40.

We conclude this head with obſerving, that Dr. *Hutcheſon*'s definition is liable to ſome exception; as there may be room to queſtion, what he means by the expreſſion, "thoſe who receive "no advantage from the action:" if it be only *the generality of mankind*, it is evidently a vague, uncertain manner of ſpeaking, and for that reaſon to be declined in ſo important a definition; but if he means *all rational beings*, then it will remain to be proved, that all theſe, or even the human ſpecies, do neceſſarily approve and love virtue in all its branches, and all that practiſe it.

Balg. Found. of Goodneſs, part i. *p.* 7—15, 20—22. *Tracts, p.* 46—54. 59—62.

LECT. LXI. 4. Many writers, both ancient and modern, have placed virtue in *the imitation of God:* and it muſt be allowed to be a very noble view of it. Now as it has already been proved, *Prop.* 44. that God is a being of perfect rectitude, it follows, that taking virtue on our definition, it will alſo be an imitation of God.—But on the whole, this definition did not ſeem preferable, for two reaſons, 1. Becauſe it is difficult to prove the moral perfections of the divine being, otherwiſe than by the medium of an immutable difference in actions, the conformity to which ſhall be

be honourable, and the contrary diſhonourable. 2. Becauſe, when virtue is ſaid to be an imitation of God, great allowance muſt be made for the different nature and relations of that bleſſed being and ourſelves: ſince there are ſome things, in which it would be impoſſible or impious for us to attempt to imitate him; and others, in which it is impoſſible that he ſhould be an example to us; *i. e.* in all thoſe branches of duty, which ſuppoſe either dependence, corporeity, or guilt. There is indeed in theſe branches of virtue, a *correſpondence* between the nature of God and our temper and conduct; but that cannot in ſtrict propriety be called a *reſemblance*.

Plato ap. Howe's Bleſſedn. &c. Tit. Page. —*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 581.—*Howe ib. p.* 69—79. *Ap. Op. vol.* i. *p.* 471—475. —*Evans's Chriſtian Temp. vol.* i. *p.* 59 —66.

5. Others, and particularly Dr. *Cumberland*, in his *Law of Nature*, have placed the whole of virtue, as in men, in the *love of God*, and *our fellow-creatures*; or to expreſs it in his own words, "The foundation of all natural law is "this, the greateſt benevolence of every rational "agent towards all, forms the happieſt ſtate of "every and of all the benevolent, ſo far as it is "in their power; and is neceſſarily requiſite to "the happieſt ſtate which they can attain, and "therefore the common good is the ſupreme "law."

This is an amiable view of it, and well expreſſes that principle of gratitude and benevolence, whence all true virtue in us muſt flow: but it nearly coincides with Dr. *Hutcheſon*'s notion *gr.* 3. and in a great meaſure with *gr.* 4. for to love God, is to regard him as the centre of happineſs, whom therefore we muſt in all things ſtudy to reſemble and to pleaſe: and thus it

it is an univerſal principle, of which the love of our neighbour is a very important branch: and when we are required, to do to others as we would have them do to us, the meaning is, that we muſt treat them as we could reaſonably deſire they ſhould treat us, were they in our circumſtances and we in theirs. So that here is a reference to the fitneſs of things according to preſent circumſtances; which plainly ſhews that precept to be founded on the definition of virtue which we have advanced.

Cumberl. Law of Nat. c. i. § 4.—*Hobbe's Leviath. p.* 140, *ſub fin.*——*Evans's Chriſtian Temper, vol.* ii. *p.* 186—194.

6. *Ariſtotle*, and other ancient moraliſts have placed virtue in a *mediocrity*; ſuppoſing vice to conſiſt in extremes. But it is evident, that merely from this definition none could know what virtue is; nor can it be determined what is an extreme, till we know what is agreeable to the nature of things: beſides there are ſome branches of virtue, which cannot be carried to an extreme, *v. g.* reſignation to the will of God, belief of his promiſes, *&c.*

Ariſtot. Ethic. l. ii. *c.* vi.—*Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, Prol.* § 43—45.—*Relig. of Nat. p.* 24, 25.

7. Some have placed all virtue in a *wiſe regard to our own intereſt*; which ſeems to have been the opinion of Dr. *Waterland*, Mr. *Clarke* of *Hull*, and Dr. *Rutherforth*. Concerning which it may be obſerved, that the queſtion is not, whether virtue be always moſt for our intereſt; (Vid. *Prop.* 44. *Cor.* 2.) nor whether there be any ſuch thing in nature as diſintereſted benevolence; (which we ſhall afterwards examine, *Prop.* 50. *Schol.*) or whether, ſuppoſing there is, all virtue conſiſts in it, ſo that our own intereſt ſhould be diſregarded; but whether a wiſe regard

to

to it is the cleareſt, the moſt rational and amiable view of virtue in general; which from what has been ſaid above, evidently appears not to be the caſe.* †

COROLLARY.

From a ſurvey of all theſe it may appear, that the moſt conſiderable writers, whoſe notions we have examined in the five firſt ſteps, have differed from each other, more in expreſſion, than in meaning, in the different views they have given of moral virtue.

PROPOSITION XLIX.

To eſtimate the degree of virtue in any given action. LECT. LXII.

* Dr. John Brown may be added to the number of thoſe who have placed virtue in a wiſe regard to our own intereſt. See the ſecond of his Eſſays on the Characteriſtics of the Earl of Shafteſbury.

† Other definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, have been given ſince the Lecture was written. Mr. Hume includes under his deſcription of virtue whatever is agreeable to ourſelves and others, and whatever is uſeful to ourſelves and others. Dr. Adam Smith refers it to the principle of ſympathy. Mr. Archdeacon Paley defines virtue to be, "the doing good to "mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the ſake "of everlaſting happineſs."

Hume "on the Principles of Morals," as ſeparately printed, paſſim, or in the Collection of his Eſſays.—Adam Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments," vol. i. p. 1—52. Sixth Edition.——Paley's "Principles of moral and political "Philoſophy," vol. i. p. 41—53. Seventh Edition.—— Dr. Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 8—77.

For a view of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue, and of the different ſyſtems which have been formed concerning the principles of Approbation, ſee Dr. Adam Smith ubi ſupra, vol. ii. p. 195—358.

About fifty years ago, Mr. Jameſon, a Scotch clergyman, publiſhed a treatiſe to ſhew, that the obligation of virtue is unitedly founded upon the reaſon and fitneſs of things, the moral ſenſe, and the will of God.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can be no virtue at all in any action, if the agent by whom it is performed has not ſome idea of the moral fitneſs of things. Vid. *Def.* 38.

2. There can be no virtue at all in it, if there be not an ultimate purpoſe of acting agreeably to that fitneſs, or from an end, which it is upon the whole virtuous to propoſe: for if the action be deſigned merely as a means of obtaining an end which it is vicious to deſire and purſue, in that connection it participates of the meanneſs of the end, how excellent ſoever it might otherwiſe have been; and the nobler the motive is, *cæt. par.* the more virtuous is the action.

Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol. i. *c.* iv. *p.* 251—258. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 97—100.—*Spect. vol.* iii. *N°.* 213.

3. The action muſt on the whole be *choſen* by the agent, in order to its being virtue in him; otherwiſe it is not ſo properly his action, as the action of ſome other being, whoſe inſtrument or organ he at that time is. Vid. *Def.* 10.

4. It is much debated, whether it be neceſſary that the being acting ſhould have a *liberty of choice*, (*Def.* 22.) *i. e.* be able to chuſe otherwiſe. It muſt be owned, this does not follow from our definition of virtue: nevertheleſs it may be allowed, that the virtue of a being in a *ſtate of probation* muſt be founded in a liberty of choice.

Balg. Div. Rect. p. 26—28.—*Grove Div. Wiſd. p.* 61—63.

5. It cannot be neceſſary, that there ſhould be in the general ſome degree of *affection* in every agent, to render his actions virtuous; for then the divine being, if he be free from affections and paſſions, would be incapable of virtue, con-

trary to *Prop.* 43. But when paſſions are wrought into the conſtitution of any being, as in us, it is indeed very deſirable that they ſhould concur with the volition; but if they do not, and a fit action is performed, without any paſſionate impreſſions at all, from a rational principle of gratitude to God and regard to the happineſs of man, it is ſtill a virtuous action. Vid. *Prop.* 48. *gr.* 3. *Balg. Inq. part* i. *p.* 57—60. *Tracts, p.* 92—95.

6. Though the degree of virtue in any action is leſſened by the degree in which it proceeds from a regard to any private advantage, diſtinct from virtue itſelf, (Vid. *gr.* 2.) yet if any be excited to virtuous actions, in hopes thereby of attaining to a ſtate of complete virtue, the degree of virtue in ſuch actions is not thereby leſſened; but this is properly loving virtue for virtue's ſake.

Shafteſb. Charl. vol. ii. *p.* 58—66.—*Balg. Lett. to a Deiſt, N°.* i. *p.* 33—36.—*Balg. Moral Goodn. part* ii. *p.* 33—38. *Tracts, p.* 129—132.

7. When the paſſions work in a powerful manner on the ſide of virtue, the force of virtue is in that caſe leſs ſeen, than when they work ſtrongly againſt it, and a regard to the fitneſs of things ſurmounts them. Nevertheleſs, there may be as great virtue in a being, where there is no ſtruggle at all, as where virtue triumphs over the moſt violent oppoſition; otherwiſe the deity would be incapable of virtue: nay there may be virtue, where the paſſions plead ſtrongly on its ſide; otherwiſe a man would daily grow leſs capable of exalted degrees of virtue, as he gained a conqueſt over the irregularities of his paſſions, which is all moſt evidently abſurd.

Shafteſb. Char. vol. ii. *p.* 36—38.—*Balg. of Moral Good. part* ii. *p.* 88, 89.—*Tracts, p.* 192—193.

COROLLARY I.

LECT. LXIII. On nearly the like principles, (*mutat. mutand.*) the degree of *Vice* in any given action may be eſtimated. The matter is largely ſtated on both ſides in

Hutcheſ. Inq. p. 150—168. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 165—183.

COROLLARY 2.

It is impoſſible certainly to pronounce on the degree of moral good in any action, unleſs we exactly knew the heart of the agent, and alſo knew the whole of his circumſtances and relations, ſo as to be able confidently to determine, what he could, and what he could not have known concerning the moral fitneſs, or unfitneſs of the thing in queſtion. Vid. *Def.* 38.

COROLLARY 3.

God alone can certainly and infallibly judge of the degree of virtue or vice in any given action: much more may this be affirmed concerning the whole of any *character*.

SCHOLIUM I.

Dr. *Hutcheſon* has attempted to introduce mathematical calculations into theſe ſubjects of morality; of which it may not be improper to give a little ſpecimen. It is to be obſerved, that he undertakes to ſhew the method of ſtating the importance of a *character*, rather than the degree of virtue in any *particular action*; and his rules are theſe. Let M ſignify the *moment*, or degree of *good* produced by the perſon, whoſe character is under conſideration; B the *benevolence* of his temper, and A his *ability:* then $M=B\times A$, *i. e.* in a compound ratio of his benevolence and ability: when in any two beings their abilities are the ſame, M=B: when their benevolence is equal, M=A. On the other hand, it appears from

from the former view, that $B=\frac{M}{A}$ *i. e. directly* as the moment of good, and *inverſely* as the ability.

When preſent *intereſt* lies *on the ſide* of virtue, if I expreſs it, then $B=\frac{M-I}{A}$; but if it lies *againſt* virtue, then $B=\frac{M+I.}{A}$ He adds, that it is the perfection of goodneſs, when $M=A$, for then the virtue of any two beings compared will be equal, *i. e.* : : 1 : 1 whatever their abilities are. This he ſuppoſes the *Stoics* meant, when they ſaid, the virtue of a wiſe man was equal to that of the gods. Yet here by the way, they took it for granted, that a wiſe man had no regard at all to his own intereſt, otherwiſe the aſſertion on theſe principles would be falſe: and if the reaſoning *Prop.* 45. *Schol.* 4. be allowed, this canon cannot be applied to the divine being; ſince A expreſſes an infinite quantity, and M can only expreſs a finite.

To expreſs the degree of *moral evil* in any character, let μ ſignify the *degree of evil* produced, and H *hatred* or ill-will; and the former canon (*mut. mutand.*) may be applied.

Hutch. ib. p. 168—174, 177, 178. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 182—188. 191, 192.

SCHOLIUM 2.

How right ſoever this may be in the general, yet when particular circumſtances and characters come to be examined by it, it will be found of little uſe; ſince it is hardly poſſible to expreſs by proportional numbers, the degree of benevolence, the degree of ability for virtuous actions, and the degree in which intereſt is apprehended and conſidered for or againſt them; which muſt

all be exactly adjusted before the preceding canons can be applied.

DEFINITION XLI.

LECT. LXIV. Those branches of virtue which more immediately respect God, are called DIVINE, those which respect our fellow-creatures, are called SOCIAL, and those which respect ourselves, HUMAN or PERSONAL VIRTUES.

PROPOSITION L.

To enquire into the principal branches of divine virtue.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is fit we should often contemplate the divine being; since he appears by the foregoing propositions possessed of such illustrious perfections, as well deserve our most attentive thoughts; and since the knowledge of his nature must be of great use to direct us in the methods of pleasing him, and securing our own happiness.

Wright's Great Concern, Edit. iii. *p.* 158—163. *Ed.* i. *p.* 151—157.——*Scott's Christian Life, vol.* i. *p.* 85—90.

2. On account of those perfections, it is fit we should humbly adore him, as infinitely superior to all other beings; and that both our souls and bodies should concur in the expression of such adoration.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 182—185. *Ed.* i. *p.* 174—177.——*Scott ib. p.* 91—96. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 33—36.

3. Forasmuch as God is the most amiable being, it is fit we should love him with all our heart; *i. e.* should think of him with the highest complacency and delight; and as he is our great benefactor, that we should cherish the most lively sentiments of gratitude towards him; and that, seeing he is the source of being and happiness,

we

we ſhould conſider our own happineſs as centred in him.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 200—205. *Ed.* i. *p.* 194—198.——*Scott ib. p.* 96—105. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 38—41.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 11—17.——*Evans's Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* viii. *p.* 167—173.—*Abern. Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* x.

4. Foraſmuch as God is the author and diſpoſer of all events, it is fit we ſhould obſerve, acknowledge, and conſider his providential interpoſition, in all the various occurrences of life.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 163—169. *Ed.* i. *p.* 157—163.

5. In conſequence of this his univerſal providence, in conjunction with his wiſdom and goodneſs, it is fit, we ſhould acquieſce in the determinations of his will, when moſt contrary to our preſent intereſt, or natural inclinations.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 196—199. *Ed.* i. *p.* 189—194.—*Scott ib. p.* 115—126. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 45—49.

6. Conſidering on the one hand his power, and on the other his evident and experienced wiſdom and goodneſs, it is fit we ſhould truſt ourſelves to his providential care, as to what is ſtill before us.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 206—208. *Ed.* i. *p.* 200, 201.——*Scott ib. p.* 126—135. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 49—53.—*Abern. vol.* ii. *N°.* xi.

7. Seeing all our happineſs does entirely depend upon his favour, it is fit we ſhould make it our higheſt care to pleaſe him, by complying with all the intimations of his will, and by imitating the moral perfections of his nature, ſo far as we are capable of ſuch imitation; which, as was before obſerved, implies a regard to all the known branches of virtue (*Prop.* 48. *gr.* 4.):

nevertheleſs, when conſidered in this particular view, it is a branch of that duty which we immediately owe to God, and a regard to it ſhould run through the whole of our lives; that even our minuteſt actions may as far as poſſible be dignified and ſanctified by it.

Wright ib. Edit. iii. *p.* 192—195. *Ed.* i. *p.* 185—189.——*Scott ib. p.* 105—115. *Works, p.* 41—45.

SCHOLIUM 1.

See alſo on this ſubject the following writers,

Amory's Dial. on Devotion.——*Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l.* ii. § 4.—*Grove's Ethics, part* ii. *c.* xix.—*Butler's Serm. N°.* xiii, xiv.—*Xenoph. Mem. l.* i. *c.* 4. *l.* iv. *c.* 3. —*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 78—95.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* ii. *p.* 29—109.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Faith in the divine declarations is alſo a branch of divine virtue; but cannot ſo properly be conſidered here, as we have not yet examined the evidence of the divine veracity: and we may add, that a diligent inquiry into whatever bears any ſtriking and probable marks of a declaration from heaven, will be a natural conſequence of that veneration for God, that love to him, and that care to pleaſe him, which were ſpecified in the 2d, 3d, and 7th ſteps, as branches of divine virtue.

COROLLARY 1.

It is vicious to aſcribe ſupreme divine honour to any other than God alone. Vid. *Prop.* 39.

COROLLARY 2.

It is alſo vicious to worſhip God by images, ſince it tends to ſink our conceptions of him, *g.* 2 *&* 3.

Limb.

Limb. Theol. l. v. *c.* xxxiii.—*Crellii Ethic. l.* iii. *c.* vi. *p.* 329, 330. *Vol.* iv. *among the Fratres Poloni.*

COROLLARY 3.

The desire of foreknowing future contingencies, and all such astrological and magical arts, as some pursue in order to the discovery of them, are to be avoided; as not only tending to vex and disquiet the mind, but also, as in a degree inconsistent with the reverence, submission, and dependence, which we owe to the Divine Being.

Howe's Works, vol. ii. *p.* 137—144.——*Turret. loc.* v. *quæst.* 7. § 18.——*Prid. Connect. vol.* ii. *p.* 329—331.—*More's Theol. Works, p.* 240—255.—*Welwood's Memoirs, p.* 105—107.—*Horace, B.* i. *Ode* xi.—*Jennings's Antiquities, vol.* i. *p.* 381.—*Limb. Theol. B.* v. *c.* xxxv.

COROLLARY 4.

Great care should be taken, that our inquiries into the nature of the blessed God be made with a becoming reverence, and not in as loose and indifferent a manner, as if we were examining the properties of a mathematical figure, or a mechanical engine.

Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. i. *Pref.* § 24.—*Boyle on Venerat. p.* 1, 2.

COROLLARY 5.

To blaspheme the name of God, *i. e.* to speak of him in a manner signifying contempt, or hatred, must be a most horrible degree of wickedness.

Witf. Ægyp. l. i. *c.* v. § 4. *l.* ii. *c.* xvi. § 1.——*Barrow's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 133—135.

COR-

COROLLARY 6.

Foraſmuch as our obligation to theſe branches of *divine virtue* is plainly founded on the nature of things, it is evident they give a very defective account of virtue, who confine it, (as the ancients generally did, and thoſe who reject revelation often do,) to *ſobriety*, and *benevolence:* and there is great reaſon to believe, that God as indiſpenſably requires thoſe regards to *himſelf* before deſcribed, as he does *ſocial* virtue: for though on account of the infinite perfections of his nature he cannot require them for his own ſake, *i. e.* to advance his own happineſs, yet his love to rectitude and order on the one hand, and his regard to the trueſt happineſs of his rational creatures on the other, muſt engage him abſolutely to inſiſt upon them.

Leland againſt Tind. vol. i. *p.* 236—243. *Edit.* ii. *p.* 187, *&c.—Leechm. Serm. on the Duty of a Min. p.* 36—39. *Glaſg. Ed.—Leechman's Sermons, vol.* i.

PROPOSITION LI.

LECT. LXV. To take a general ſurvey of ſocial virtue. *Def.* 41.

SOLUTION.

The univerſal rule here is, that virtue obliges us to avoid whatever would be grievous to any of our fellow-creatures, if it be not neceſſary to procure ſome greater good; and that we labour to promote the happineſs of all about us to the utmoſt of our power.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Our natures are ſo conſtituted, that we cannot but approve of kind and benevolent actions, and abhor thoſe which are malevolent and cruel.

1, 2. Every

1.|2. Every man, by an ill-natured conduct, muſt expoſe himſelf to the hatred and contempt of others.

1.|3. By an ill-natured conduct, a man would be expoſed to the upbraidings of his own mind.

4. Mutual ill-offices naturally circulate; and it is exceedingly probable, that they will at laſt come home to the man who allows himſelf in them.

Lettres Perſannes, vol. i. *N°.* viii—xi.

Prop. 45. and *Prop.* 50. *Gr.* 7.|5. God is good, and therefore a benevolent conduct is an imitation of him, and conſequently a branch of virtue.

Gr. 2, 3, 4 & 5.|6. It is reaſonable therefore, and conſequently virtuous, to avoid doing what is grievous to others, and to do them all the good that we can, *i. e.* to be as benevolent as poſſible. *Q. E. D.*

Hutcheſ. Inq. Eff. ii. § 5. *p.* 195—222.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 128, 129.—*Puffend. de Off. l.* i. *c.* viii. § 1—6.——*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 95—105.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, p.* 231—235. 241—259.

COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears that the rule of loving our neighbour as ourſelves is a ſummary view of ſocial virtue; which, at the ſame time that it gives the *rule*, ſuggeſts the *reaſon*, as it is moſt apparent, that our conduct is to be determined, not by conſidering who the perſon is, with regard to whom we act, but what the circumſtances of his caſe are.

Rel. of Nat. p. 41.——*Evans's Chriſtian Temple, vol.* ii. *p.* 168—176.——*Butl. Serm. N°.* xi. xii.

COR-

COROLLARY 2.

Since life is the foundation of happineſs, virtue requires that we ſhould not only forbear taking away the lives of our fellow-creatures, (unleſs when the good of the whole requires it,) but that we ſhould be ready to preſerve their lives, when we can do it without expoſing our own, and in our own expoſing the whole, to damage at leaſt equal to the advantage that would ariſe from the preſervation of the life or lives ſuppoſed to be ſecured at the expence of ours.

Cic. de Offic. l. iii. *c.* xxiii. *p.* 167. *Tool. Ed.*

COROLLARY 3.

The law of univerſal benevolence extends alſo to *ourſelves*; and conſequently obliges us to take care to ſecure our own lives, and to furniſh ourſelves with the neceſſary ſupports of them, if it lie in our power, that we may not be burthenſome to others. It alſo obliges to act in ſuch a manner, as to preſerve our characters fair and untainted; for if they be damaged, our capacity of being uſeful to others will be proportionably impaired.

COROLLARY 4.

The law of univerſal benevolence extends itſelf even to the *brutes*, ſuppoſing them capable of ſenſation, and conſequently of pleaſure and pain. And though there ſhould be reaſon to ſuſpect, that the arguments *Prop.* 2. are not concluſive, yet ſince it is difficult, if not impoſſible, certainly to prove, that they are mere machines, a virtuous man would be cautious how he abuſes them, (eſpecially ſince they are generally ſuppoſed to have ſenſation,) leſt by any degree of cruelty towards them, an habit of cruelty might be contracted or encouraged: nevertheleſs, as they are capable of but ſmall degrees of happineſs

in

in compariſon with man, it is fit that their intereſts ſhould give way to that of the human ſpecies, whenever in any conſiderable article they come in competition with each other.

Puff. Law of Nat. l. iv. *c.* iii. § 6.—*Hale's Contemp. vol.* i. *p.* 293—295.—*Guard. vol.* i. *N°.* 61.—*Faſt. Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* iii. *.

SCHOLIUM.

As we here diſmiſs the conſideration of benevolence in general, and proceed to particular branches and effects of it; this ſeems to be the proper place to touch upon the celebrated queſtion, whether, and how far benevolence is to be conceived as *diſintereſted.* With reſpect to which, the following remarks ſeem juſt and rational.

1. That every man cannot but deſire his own happineſs, whenever he thinks of it.

2. That this happineſs will be more effectually obtained, by a due regard to the public, than by ſeeking a ſeparate intereſt; as appears by principles laid down above.

3. That when the connection of ſelf-advantage with benevolent actions is thought of, it ſeems impoſſible that it ſhould not alſo be intended and conſidered: (*gr.* 1.) and the principle of univerſal benevolence, inſtead of forbidding, will require that ſome regard ſhould be paid to it, in ſuch a circumſtance.

4. That it would be very mean and ungenerous, if it were poſſible, to ſeek the happineſs of the public, without any affection to it, but merely as an inſtrument of private good.

* The obligation of mercy to Brute Animals has been elaborately conſidered by Dr. Humphrey Primatt, in an expreſs Treatiſe on the ſubject. Mr. Granger publiſhed, alſo, a Sermon on the ſame ſubject, which, both on account of its ſize and price, is better adapted for the inſtruction of the lower orders of mankind.

5. That

5. That when a man feels the higheſt pleaſure in doing good to the public, and even ſacrificing his own ſeparate intereſt to it, he muſt certainly have a real love for it, which may with ſome conſiderable propriety be called diſintereſted, if it be not ſo in the higheſt poſſible ſenſe.

6. That as the happineſs of *one* is of little importance, when compared with the happineſs of *all*, it ſeems reaſonable, that ſo far as it is regarded, it ſhould not be made the chief end of actions profitable to the public, nor conſidered in any other view, than as ſubordinate to the good of the community, of which each is but one.

7. That the benevolent affections may be ſo ſtrong, as to prevent any reflection upon the preſent pleaſure, and much more the future advantage of a benevolent action to ourſelves.

8. That the mind is ſo formed, as to reflect with great pleaſure and delight on characters and actions, the conſideration of which does not immediately affect our own perſonal intereſt; and to ſay, that our complacency in them ariſes from an apprehenſion, that the prevalency of ſuch a temper in us would be advantageous to ourſelves, ſeems aſſerting an evident falſhood.

Hutcheſ. on Paſſ. p. 13—26. *Inq. p.* 160—162 *.

PROPOSITION LII.

LECT. LXVI. It is conſiſtent with benevolence, and therefore with virtue, that brute animals ſhould be ſlain for the food of men.

* That there is no ſuch thing as diſintereſted benevolence, is a favourite principle with many writers.—See, on this ſide of the queſtion, Dr. Brown, in his "Second Eſſay on Shaftesbury's Characteriſtics," and Dr. Rutherforth, in his "Moral Writings."—On the other ſide of the queſtion are Mr. Hume, in his "Principles of Morals;" and very recently, Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning Political Juſtice," Book iv. chap. viii. p. 341—361. See, alſo, Dr. Beattie's "Elements of Moral Science," Vol. i. p. 244—249.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If animal food be uſed with moderation, it ſeems that hereby the happineſs of mankind is promoted: this more generous kind of food may afford briſker ſpirits than a vegetable diet uſed alone: at leaſt, it ſeems that thoſe who have from their infancy been accuſtomed to eat fleſh, would be expoſed to conſiderable trouble and inconvenience, if not to diſtempers, by entirely leaving it off.

2. The happineſs of the brutes is not on the whole diminiſhed but rather promoted by this means: for a violent death does not ſeem to be nearly ſo painful as a natural death, coming upon them by the ſlow advances of a diſeaſe: their life, though it be ſhortened, yet is not embittered with fear and expectation of death, of which they ſeem not capable: to which we may add, that out of regard to our own advantage, we take care to feed and defend them, which renders their lives much happier than they would otherwiſe be; whereas, were they not to be uſed for food, we muſt either deſtroy them without eating their carcaſes, to prevent their multiplying too faſt upon us, or they would deſtroy each other, conſume the vegetable creation, and perhaps grow dangerous to us for want of ſufficient food.

3. It is alſo to be remembered, that where the cuſtom of eating fleſh has long prevailed, it ought not to be laid aſide without great and important reaſons; conſidering what great numbers of mankind are ſubſiſted, by keeping cattle, and trafficking in them alive or dead.

SCHOLIUM I.

Whereas ſome have objected, that it is an invaſion of the rights of God, as the great Lord of life, to make ſuch havock of the lives of brute animals, it may be anſwered,

1. That

1. That by appointing it in the courſe of his providence, that they ſhould multiply ſo faſt, God has made it neceſſary that many of them ſhould be ſlain, from whence we may reaſonably argue, that he allows us to kill them for food.

2. That in the various claſſes of animals, it ſeems that the greater are generally ſupported by eating the leſs: not to ſay, (what yet ſome have urged,) that the teeth and ſtomachs of men are ſo formed, as to intimate that they were intended to feed upon fleſh.

3. The agreeable variety of taſtes, which God has given to the fleſh of many birds, beaſts and fiſhes, is a farther preſumption that he deſigned them for our food, and conſequently meant to give us a liberty of taking away their lives.

4. Moſt vegetables, when they come to be examined by microſcopes, ſwarm with multitudes of ſmall animals, which live in and upon them; ſo that a man, who ſhould ſcruple deſtroying animals, would hardly be able to find a ſubſiſtence, at leaſt not without reſigning ſome of the fineſt vegetables, and ſo fruſtrating the kind purpoſe of providence in creating them.

Reynolds's Lett. to a Deiſt, N°. i. *præf. p.* 24—61.—*Thompſ. Spring, ver.* 336—378. *Autumn, ver.* 1089—1124.—*Ovid's Met. l.* xv. *ver.* 50—152.——*Puff. Law of Nat. l.* iv. *c.* iii. § 4, 5.——*Nat. Diſp. part* i. *p.* 44—49.——*Fitzoſb. Let. N°.* viii.——*Clarke's Orig. of Evil, p.* 266—295 *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheleſs care ſhould be taken, not to add any unneceſſary circumſtances of terror and pain

* Mr. Holwell and Mr. Oſwald, both of whom have reſided in the Eaſt-Indies, have embraced the principles of the Hindoos, and written againſt the uſe of animal food; Mr. Oſwald in a diſtinct Treatiſe, very lately publiſhed.

to

to their death, nor ſhould we accuſtom ourſelves to ſport with their lives.

Dodd. on Educ. p. 22, 23.—*Delany on Rel. Dut. p.* 92——*Thomſon's Autumn, line* 360—482.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have objected, that ſeveral of the arguments uſed in the propoſition extend not to *fiſh*. But it is anſwered, that if a right of killing terreſtrial animals for food be eſtabliſhed, there ſeems little reaſon for ſcrupling to uſe fiſh in the like manner; it ſeems a part of the ſcheme agreeable to the reſt: and the inſtinct, which brings them in ſhoals at certain times to the ſhore, ſeems an intimation that they are intended for human uſe.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It ſeems an inſtance of the goodneſs of the divine being, that he has in the courſe of his providence appointed the greater part of animals to die by ſome ſudden violence, rather than by a lingering decay, in which on the whole they would ſuffer a great deal more, than they can do in the few painful moments which generally attend their death, when ſlain by men, or when devoured by each other, in which perhaps ſurprize and aſtoniſhment take off much of the ſenſe of pain.

PROPOSITION LIII.

To enquire how the parts and fruits of the earth ought to be diſtributed for the uſe of its inhabitants, before any mutual agreement is made between them, *i. e.* conſidering things in a *ſtate of nature*. SECT. LXVII.

SOLUTION.

1. If there be enough of each, every one may take what he firſt lights on.

2. When he has thus taken it, another perſon ought not to ſeize upon it without his leave, but ſhould rather take ſome other part not ſo occupied.

3. Nevertheleſs, if there be not enough for each, he who has poſſeſſed himſelf of more than is neceſſary for his own ſubſiſtence, ought to impart ſome of it to him who is not capable of thus providing for himſelf. Vid. *Prop.* 51.

4. If neceſſary ſupplies be denied to a perſon incapable of providing otherwiſe for himſelf, he may ſeize on the poſſeſſions of another; nevertheleſs with this proviſo, that no one ſhall be deſtroyed by ſuch a ſeizure, whoſe life is of more importance to the whole community than that of the perſon who makes the ſeizure. Vid. *Prop.* 51. *Cor.* 2.

5. Nevertheleſs, it is not requiſite that an equal diſtribution ſhould be made; ſince on the one hand, each has in common caſes a right to the fruits of his own induſtry, on the principles laid down above, *gr.* 1, 2. and on the other, it is for the good of ſociety in general, that ſome ſhould be richer than the reſt, ſeeing there are many civil offices to be performed in life, which might become matter of dangerous debate, if ſome perſons were not by the ſtraitneſs of their circumſtances induced voluntarily to perform them.

DEMONSTRATION.

The demonſtration appears from *Prop.* 51. *Sol.* and *Cor.* 2. for it is evident, that theſe rules will promote the happineſs of mankind in general.

Locke on Gov. l. ii. *c.* v.—*Grot. de Jure Belli & Pac. l.* ii. *c.* ii. § 2.—*More's Utopia, p.* 78—98.

SCHOLIUM I.

It ſeems that *uſury* is not in general to be condemned, provided it be no more than is proportionable

tionable to that gain which the perſon borrowing receives from the loan; eſpecially among men, who ſubſiſt not merely by agriculture and grazing and manual arts, but by trade or merchandize; ſince it is evident that among ſuch, the money might turn to better account to the owners, than in the former caſe; and conſequently the owners would have a juſt claim to ſome equivalent, for the advantage they forego in favour of the borrower. Nevertheleſs, in exacting this, virtue requires a compaſſionate regard to any calamitous circumſtances, which may render the borrower incapable of paying intereſt, or perhaps the principal.

Puff. Law of Nat. l. v. *c.* vii. § 8—12.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* xii. § 21 *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many things continue yet common, and are not become the property of any, there being enough to ſuffice all; ſome of them not being capable of occupation by one perſon alone, and others ſuch that the property of them would not be uſeful to any, *v. g.* wild beaſts and birds, air, inſects, ſea-water. Whether the *ſea* can come into property, has been warmly diſputed: *Grotius* denies it in his *Mare Liberum*, and *Selden* aſſerts it in his *Mare Clauſum:* but it would be tedious and unneceſſary to give a view of their arguments here.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* ii. § 3—5.—*Puff. ib. l.* iv. *c.* v. § 5—10.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Property in any degree ceaſes, when the thing is abandoned by the former poſſeſſor: and the ſecurity of mankind ſeems to require, that when

* Mr. Bentham has lately publiſhed a curious Eſſay on Uſury, in which the Engliſh laws upon this ſubject are examined, and the wiſdom and propriety of them freely diſcuſſed.

any thing has been long in the poſſeſſion of a perſon, family, or nation, it ſhould continue with them, if for a conſiderable time the original poſſeſſor has entered no claim upon it. Perhaps hereby that former poſſeſſor may ſuffer ſome damage; yet there would be ſo much room for fraud and litigation, were antiquated claims often to be revived, that on the whole, they would undoubtedly occaſion greater trouble than advantage to mankind; and it is impoſſible to lay down any general rules, which would not in ſome inſtances bear hard on the innocent and virtuous.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* iv. § 3—9.—*Puff. ib. l.* iv. *c.* xii. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Perhaps upon theſe principles, that kind of theft, which was permitted by the *Spartan* law, might be juſtified; as by making ſuch a law, the proprietors ſeemed voluntarily to have relinquiſhed their property to thoſe who could ſeize it in ſuch circumſtances: but how far it was on the whole prudent to do it, is difficult to determine, without ſtating the matter more largely than would be convenient here.

Rollin Man. vol. iii. *p.* 340—347 *.

DEFINITION XLII.

LECT. LXVIII. That verbal propoſition is ſaid to be ETHICALLY TRUE, in which we join thoſe relations, attributes, or properties, which *ſeem to us* to belong to any idea, and ſeparate thoſe, which *ſeem to us* not to belong to it; but it is then LOGI-

* Some ſingular opinions with regard to property are advanced by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning Political Juſtice," vol. ii. p. 787—895.—The doctrine of property is particularly conſidered by Archdeacon Paley, in his "Moral and Political Philoſophy," Book iii. chap. i. vol. i. p. 105—122. Seventh Edition.

CALLY

CALLY TRUE, when we join thoſe that *do really* agree, and ſeparate thoſe which *do not*.

COROLLARY 1.

A propoſition *logically* true, may be *ethically* falſe, and *vice verſâ*.

COROLLARY 2.

Propoſitions directly contrary to each other, in the mouths of different perſons, may both be ethically, though not logically true.

SCHOLIUM.

Ethical truth is ſometimes divided into *veracity*, *i. e.* a conformity of our words to our thoughts, and *faithfulneſs*, *i. e.* a conformity of our actions to our words: the laſt ſeems to be limitted to words expreſſing a purpoſe of doing *good* to another.

DEFINITION LXIII.

That propoſition, in which we culpably violate ethical truth, is ſaid to be A LIE.

Puff. ib. l. iv. *c.* i. § 8.

PROPOSITION LIV.

Virtue requires that ethical truth ſhould be preſerved among men in their diſcourſes with each other.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Speech may be uſeful in ſpreading the knowledge of thoſe things, which may advance the happineſs of mankind.

2. In order to render it thus uſeful, it is neceſſary that a perſon ſhould be believed.

3. If ethical truth be not regarded, the perſon ſpeaking cannot be believed.

4. The violation of ethical truth has generally been regarded as infamous, and perſons who allow themſelves in it, do thereby neceſſarily ſub-

ject themſelves to great contempt, and ſo greatly impair both their comfort and uſefulneſs.

1, 2, 3 & 4.|5. *Valet propoſitio.*

Puff. ib. § 7, 10.—*Watts's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 168—170. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 226.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* iii. *c.* i. § 11.—*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *part* ii. *c.* xi.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 184—189. *Seventh Ed.*

COROLLARY 1.

It is injurious to virtue, to allow ourſelves to abuſe the ambiguity of words, in ſuch a manner as thereby to lead others into a miſtake, ſince moſt of the ill conſequences which follow from direct lying, do alſo follow from ſuch equivocations and mental reſervations.

Puff. ib. § 13, 14.—*Grot. ib.* § 10.—*Burnet's Eſſ. on Queen Mary, p.* 63, 64.

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue forbids our deceiving others by *actions*, as well as by words; ſince the reaſoning of the propoſition does not depend upon making uſe of articulate ſounds, or written characters, but upon any method taken to communicate our ideas to each other.

Puff. ib. § 2.

SCHOLIUM 1.

To this ſome have added a farther argument, taken from the *nature* of ethical truth, which, ſeparate from all its *effects*, ſeems to imply ſomething in it ſo ſacred, that a violation of it is diſhonourable and contemptible, and therefore vicious, though no damage ſhould ariſe to ourſelves or others from ſuch a violation; eſpecially conſidering, that God is the witneſs of every falſhood, and conſequently it is a kind of indignity offered to him, to utter any thing in his

preſence which he knows to be contrary to our own knowledge. This ſome have expreſſed by ſaying, God has given us *a ſenſe*, by which we unavoidably delight in the truth, nor is it in our own power ſo far to reconcile ourſelves to falſehood, as to approve of a ſcheme, in which any given degree of happineſs ſhould be produced by falſhood, ſo well as one, in which it ſhould be produced by truth.

Balg. Law of Truth, p. 4—12. *Tracts, p.* 373—383.—*Butler's Anal. p.* 316—318. 4*to Ed. Oct. Ed.* iii. *p.* 462—464.

SCHOLIUM 2.

From hence ariſes a queſtion of conſiderable difficulty and importance; whether it may be in any caſe lawful, to ſpeak what is ethically falſe.

Thoſe who maintain the principles of the former ſcholium muſt deny it: but thoſe who place the obligation to ethical truth merely on the principles laid down in the propoſition, affirm, that if in any caſe, the happineſs of mankind may be more effectually promoted by falſhood than truth, in that caſe, falſhood ceaſes to be a vice and becomes a virtue; and they ſuppoſe that many ſuch caſes actually occur: and that on theſe principles, it is lawful to uſe falſhood in our diſcourſes with perſons that are diſtracted, with infants and ſick men, with a melancholy man, and thoſe who enquire after the truth, with a deſign of doing that injury by the knowledge of it, which without it they would not have been able to effect.

This muſt be acknowledged a controverſy of very great difficulty. Perhaps it is not poſſible for any human or finite underſtanding to determine, whether the univerſal obſervation of truth would be more for the advantage of the rational creation, than the violation of it in ſome ima-

ginable particulars: but as it is certain that the generality of mankind are too prone to artifice and deceit, and would be ready to abuſe the doctrine of the innocence of falſhood in any caſe, we ſhould be very cautious of maintaining it; and an honeſt, generous, and religious man, if he errs at all, would rather chuſe to err on the ſide of truth. And perhaps a regard expreſſed to it, even in circumſtances, where it could not be maintained, without great danger and ſeeming ill conſequences to ourſelves, might make ſuch impreſſions on the minds of very bad men, as might prove of ſervice to the cauſe of virtue and the happineſs of mankind; eſpecially conſidering the unlimited power which God has over all the thoughts of mens hearts, and all the circumſtances and occurrences of their lives: and it will be ſeen, when we come to enquire into the evidence of the divine veracity, that this attribute of the deity is incapable of being proved, if the opinion which we are here oppoſing be admitted. To all which we may add, that the ſuppoſed lawfulneſs of ſpeaking falſely in great emergencies for the preſervation of life, might alſo be extremely miſchievous to mankind, by depriving them of all inſtances of martyrdom for religion; and is indeed a maxim ſo dangerous to human ſociety, that it ſeems, that a wiſe and benevolent man, who firmly believes it, would on his own principles teach the contrary. And after all, if the principle itſelf were granted, yet many of the inſtances mentioned above, ſeem of too trivial a nature, to juſtify having recourſe to a falſhood; and in particular, nothing can be more dangerous to children, than to be taught to lie, by the example of their parents and governors.

Puff. ib. § 9, 10, 15, 16, 18.—*Barbeyrac's Notes, ib. l.* iv. *c.* i. § 7.——*Grot. ib. l.* iii. *c.* i. § 12—14.—*Watts's Serm. vol.*

vol. ii. *App. p.* 207—219. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 240—245.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 29, 30. —*Cambr. Telemach. l.* iii. *p.* 57—59.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs, allowance is to be made for the change which cuſtom may have introduced into the ſignification of words, which has brought ſome expreſſions of complaiſance and kindneſs, in moſt civilized nations, to ſo looſe an import, that a man has no room to imagine, they will be interpreted rigorouſly, according to their utmoſt literal extent, and therefore need not be ſcrupulous about the uſe of them; *v. g.* as if he could not ſay, "he was at a friend's ſervice," unleſs he intended thereby to make himſelf *a ſlave.*

Puff. de Jure, l. iv. *c.* i. § 6.—*Spect. vol.* viii. *N°.* 557.—*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 5, 6.

DEFINITION XLIV.

A PROMISE is any ſpeech, or other ſign, by which we ſignify to another perſon a preſent determinate purpoſe, of transferring to him a part of our property or liberty, which nevertheleſs he is not actually to poſſeſs, till after ſome time. LECT. LXIX.

DEFINITION XLV.

A mutual promiſe, or agreement of two or more perſons with each other, may be called A COVENANT, whether the performance of one of the parties be, or be not the condition of obliging the other: but it is in the former caſe, called a *conditional covenant.*

COROLLARY.

There is ſome foundation for diſtinguiſhing between *conditional promiſes,* and *pacts* or *covenants*; not only, as each party in a covenant may be abſolutely bound to the performance of his part, without waiting to ſee whether the other

other will perform his, but also, as there may be a *conditional* promise, which is not *mutual*, whereas every covenant must necessarily be mutual.

Puff. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* viii. § 8.

PROPOSITION LV.

Virtue requires that promises be fulfilled.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 54.|1. Ethical truth, and therefore virtue requires, that when I declare a fixed purpose of giving or doing any thing, I should really intend it.

Gr. 1. *Def.* 44.|2. The promisee, *i. e.* the person to whom the promise is made, acquires a property in virtue of the promise.

3. The uncertainty of property would evidently be attended with great inconvenience.

4. By failing to fulfil my promise, I either shew, that I was not sincere in making it, or that I have little constancy or resolution, and either way injure my character, and consequently my usefulness in life.

1, 3 & 4. *Prop.* 51. *Cor.* 4.|5. Virtue requires that promises should be fulfilled.

Watts's Serm. vol. ii. *p.* 146. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 146.—*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *part* ii. *c.* xii *.

SCHOLIUM I.

A man is not bound by a naked *assertion*, as he is by a promise; nevertheless, when he makes such an assertion, he ought to intend to act according to it, (*Prop.* 54.) and when publicly made he should not lightly change it, lest his

* A directly opposite doctrine to what is here advanced, is maintained by Mr. Godwin. See his "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. i. p. 150—156. This deduction is, that it is a part of our duty to make as few promises or declarations exciting appropriate expectations as possible.

character

character for wiſdom and reſolution ſhould thereby ſuffer.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xi. § 2—4.—*Puff. ib. l.* iii. *c.* v. § 5—7.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheleſs there are ſome excepted caſes, in which virtue does not oblige us to fulfil our promiſes, becauſe the reaſons mentioned in the propoſition do not extend to them, *v. g.*

1. If a promiſe was made by us, before we came to ſuch exerciſe of reaſon, as to be fit to tranſact affairs of moment; or if by any diſtemper, or ſudden ſurprize, we are deprived of the exerciſe of our reaſon, at the time when the promiſe is made.

Puff. ib. l. iii. *c.* vi. § 5.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* xi. § 5—7.

2. If the promiſe made was on a falſe preſumption, in which the promiſer, after the moſt diligent enquiry, was impoſed upon, eſpecially if he were deceived by the fraud of the promiſee.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xi. § 6. *l.* ii. *c.* xiii. § 4.—*Puff. ib. l.* iii. *c.* vi. § 6—8.

3. If the thing itſelf be vicious; for virtue cannot require that vice ſhould be committed.

Puff. ib. l. iii. *c.* vii. § 6, 7.——*Grot. ib. l.* ii. *c.* xi. § 9.

Under this head, we may rank the giving a reward for an evil action.

Grot. ib. l. ii. *c.* xi. § 8.—*Puff. ib. l.* iii. *c.* vii. § 8.

4. If the accompliſhment of the promiſe be ſo hard and intolerable, that there is reaſon to believe, that had it been foreſeen, it would have been an excepted caſe.

Grot. ib. l. ii. *c.* xvi. § 27.——*Cicero de Offic. l.* i. *c.* x.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

If the promiſe be not accepted, or if it depend on conditions not performed, the non-performance of the promiſe is ſo evidently juſtifiable, that it ſeems hardly worth while to inſert this among the catalogue of excepted caſes.

Grot. ib. l. ii. *c.* xi. § 14, 15. *ib. l.* iii. *c.* xix. § 14 *.

DEFINITION XLVI.

LECT. LXX.

AN OATH is a ſolemn appeal to God, as the witneſs of the truth of ſome facts aſſerted, or of our ſincere reſolution to perform ſome promiſe made, renouncing our claim to the divine favour, or imprecating his diſpleaſure upon ourſelves either implicitly or explicitly, in caſe of falſhood.

COROLLARY.

It is vicious to ſwear by any creature, ſince that is in effect aſcribing to ſuch a creature a degree of knowledge and power, which ſeems peculiar to God. Nevertheleſs, if without the expreſs mention of the name of God, there be a ſecret appeal to him, in that caſe we ſwear by him ultimately, and not ſo much by the creature we mention, *v. g.* If I ſwear by my head, or my child, meaning thereby, "may the divine vengeance fall on my head or my child, if I ſwear falſely."

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xiii. § xi.—*Puff. de Offic. Hom. l.* i. *c.* xi. § 3.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* iv. *c.* ii. § 3.—*Paley's moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 190—197.—*Godwin's Enquiry concerning political Juſtice, vol.* ii. *p.* 631—636.

* The whole ſubject of promiſes; from whence the obligation to perform them ariſes; in what ſenſe they are to be interpreted; and in what caſes they are not binding, is conſidered by Mr. Paley.—Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol. i, p. 123—141. Seventh Edition.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

A vow is a promiſe made to God: if any expreſs or implicit imprecation attend it, it is evidently *an oath:* but as vows are made with different degrees of ſolemnity, ſome of them may, and ſome of them may not be oaths. Yet as an addreſs to God is made by them, they neceſſarily approach nearer to an oath than a promiſe made to our fellow-creatures.

Paley's moral and political Philoſophy, vol. i. *p.* 141.

DEFINITION XLVII.

PERJURY is the uſe of an oath in confirmation of an aſſertion, known, apprehended, or ſuſpected to be falſe; or the wilful violation of a promiſe, which by an oath we had bound ourſelves to perform.

COROLLARY.

As when a perſon ſwears that a thing is ſo and ſo, he is in all reaſon to be underſtood to aſſert, that he certainly knows that it is ſo; the guilt of perjury may be contracted, even where a man believes a thing is as he aſſerts, if he has not a competent and determinate knowledge of the thing.

PROPOSITION LVI.

Perjury is a very heinous crime.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is plainly inconſiſtent with the reverence due to the divine being; as it implies, either that we do not believe his omniſcience, or fear his diſpleaſure, either of which is contrary to *Prop.* 51.

2. Mankind have in all ages profeſſed ſome peculiar reverence for an oath, ſo that it has been uſed

uſed to determine controverſies, and ſeal the moſt ſolemn mutual engagements.

2.|3. Faith among men would be ſtill more injured by perjury, than by a falſe aſſertion, or promiſe uttered without an oath; ſince therefore theſe have been ſhewn to be detrimental to mankind, (*Prop.* 54, 55.) this muſt be yet more ſo.

4. Perjury has always been eſteemed a very deteſtable thing, and thoſe who have been proved guilty of it have been looked upon as the peſt of ſociety.

1, 3 & 4.|5. Perjury, being thus diſhonourable to God, injurious to others, and to ourſelves, is a great crime. *Q. E. D.*

Occaſ. Paper, vol. i. *N°.* vii. *p.* 5—12.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* iv. *c.* ii. § 2.—*Barrow's Works, vol.* i. *Serm.* xv.—*Paley's moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 197, 198.

COROLLARY 1.

Care ſhould be taken, that we do not impair the reverence due to an oath, by uſing or impoſing oaths upon trifling occaſions, or adminiſtering them in a careleſs manner.

Occaſ. Paper, ib. p. 22—24.

COROLLARY 2.

The reverence of an oath requires, that we take peculiar care to avoid ambiguous expreſſions in it, and all equivocation and mental reſervation. Vid. *Prop.* 54. *Cor.* 1.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 3.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* iv. *c.* ii. § 12—15.—*Tully de Offic. l.* i. § 13.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Something of this kind may be ſaid of *ſubſcription to articles of religion*, theſe being looked upon as ſolemn actions, and nearly approaching to

to an oath. Great care ought to be taken, that we subscribe nothing that we do not firmly believe. If the signification of the words be dubious, and we believe either sense, and that sense in which we do believe them is as natural as the other, we may consistently with integrity subscribe them: or if the sense in which we believe them be less natural, and we explain that sense, and that explication be admitted by the person requiring the subscription in his own right, there can be no just foundation for a scruple. Some have added, that if we have reason to believe, (though it is not expressly declared,) that he who imposes the subscription, does not intend that we should hereby declare our *assent* to those articles, but only that we should pay a compliment to his authority, and engage ourselves not openly to contradict them, we may in this case subscribe what is most directly contrary to our belief: or that if we declare our belief in any book, as for instance the bible, it is to be supposed that we subscribe other articles, only so far as they are consistent with that; because we cannot imagine, that the law would require us to profess our belief of contrary propositions at the same time. But subscription upon these principles, seems a very dangerous attack upon sincerity and public virtue, especially in those designed for public offices *.

Burn. on the Art. p. 6—9.—*Clarke on the Trinity, Introd. Ed.* 1. *p.* 20—26. *Ed.* 2. *p.* 23—29.——*Conybeare's Serm. on Subscript. p.* 24—31.

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* The question concerning subscription to articles of religion has of late years received the most ample discussion. It would be almost endless to enumerate the various tracts that have appeared on the subject. The controversy was revived by the publication of the "Confessional," and carried on to still greater extent, by the distinct applications of a body of the clergy, and of the protestant dissenting ministers, for relief in the matter of subscription. The names of Blackburn, Jebb, Dawson, Fire-

brace,

SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have bound ourſelves by an oath to do a thing detrimental to our intereſts, we ought to ſubmit to great inconveniencies rather than violate it: but if the nature of the oath be abſolutely and evidently unlawful, we are not bound by it: and it is certain, that in ſome of the caſes mentioned above, in which virtue allows the violation of promiſes, it may alſo permit our acting contrary to our oaths; with this proviſo, that in proportion to the greater ſolemnity of the latter, the caſe ſhould be more weighty and urgent.

Grot. ib. l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 4.—*Baxt. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 572.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* iv. *c.* ii. § 9, 10.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If a conditional covenant, (*Def.* 45.) be mutually confirmed by an oath, the breach of the condition on one ſide evidently diſſolves the other party from his obligation; which by the way juſtifies the *Revolution in England* in 1688, though many of the perſons principally concerned had ſworn allegiance to King *James*.

Occaſ. Paper, vol. i. *N°.* vii. *p.* 12—16.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Grotius is miſtaken, if he maintains (as ſome have aſſerted he does,) that by an oath we always promiſe ſomething to God, and that for this reaſon an oath muſt in no caſe be violated. It

brace, Wyvil, Mauduit, Furneaux, Fownes, Radcliff, Wilton, and many others, occur in oppoſition to human articles of religion. On the contrary ſide might be mentioned Tucker, Rutherforth, Randolph, Tottie, Powel, and a variety of writers beſides. Mr. Paley has recently offered ſome thoughts on the matter, in his "Moral and Political Philoſophy," vol. i. p. 218—220. Still more recently, a very elaborate Treatiſe againſt ſubſcription has been publiſhed by Mr. Dyer.

appears

appears from the definition of an oath, that the former of these propositions is false, and from the second scholium, that if it were true, the inference drawn from it would be inconclusive: but the following passage, which some have quoted to prove this to be his opinion, is far from containing it.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xiii. § 14, 15.

DEFINITION XLVIII.

MARRIAGE is a covenant between man and woman, in which they mutually promise cohabitation, and a continual care to promote the comfort and happiness of each other. LECT. LXXI.

PROPOSITION LVII.

Virtue requires that mankind should only be propagated by marriage.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. A more endearing friendship, and consequently a greater pleasure arises from continued cohabitation, than could arise from the promiscuous use of women; where there could be little room for a tender, generous and faithful friendship between the sexes.

2. The promiscuous use of women would naturally produce a great deal of jealousy, bitter mutual contentions, and a variety of other passions, from which marriage, when preserved inviolate, very much secures.

3. Experience teaches that a promiscuous commerce between the sexes is very unfavourable to propagation, at least for producing a healthful offspring; and would prove the means of spreading to a fatal degree the venereal infection.

4. The weakness and disorders, to which women are subject during pregnancy, require, that both out of regard to them and the future race of mankind, they should be tenderly taken care

of; and that during their confinement they ſhould be comfortably maintained: now there is none, from whom theſe offices of friendſhip can be ſo reaſonably expected, as from the perſon who apprehends himſelf the father of the child; but without marriage, no man could ordinarily have the ſecurity of being ſo.

5. The education of children is much better provided for by this means, both with reſpect to maintenance, inſtruction and government, while each knows his own, and the care and authority of both parents concurs in the work; to which that of the father is generally on the whole of the greateſt importance.

6. The regular deſcent of patrimony, being the conſequence of fathers knowing their children, is better provided for by marriage, than it could be without it; which by the way is a great encouragement to induſtry and frugality.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6.|7. The happineſs both of men and women, and of the riſing generation, is on the whole more effectually ſecured by marriage, than it would be by the promiſcuous uſe of women; therefore mankind ought only to be propagated this way. *Q. E. D.*

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* i. § 5.——*Witſ. Ægypt. l.* ii. *c.* vi. § 13—15.—*Baxt. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 314. A. *vol.* ii. *p.* 31. B.—*Oſtervald of Unclean. Sect.* 1. *c.* i. § 2. *p.* 4—10.—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l.* ii. § 3. *c.* ii.——*Milt. Parad. Loſt, l.* iv. *ver.* 750—770*.

COROLLARY I.

Thoſe unnatural luſts, commonly known by the name of beaſtiality and ſodomy, are to be

* Some extraordinary ſentiments relative to marriage have been thrown out by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning political Juſtice," vol. ii. p. 848—852.

greatly

greatly deteſted, not only as actions, whereby the dignity of human nature is in the moſt infamous degree debaſed, but alſo as alienating the mind from marriage, which is ſo important a band of ſociety.

COROLLARY 2.

Thoſe who ſeduce ſingle women to violate their chaſtity, are guilty of a very great crime; as thereby they diſcountenance marriage, and bring on perſons ſo debauched, and the families to whom they are related, great calamity and indelible infamy.

Guardian, vol. ii. *N°.* 123.

COROLLARY 3.

All thoſe things, which tend to cheriſh wandering luſts, are for that reaſon to be avoided; as laſcivious actions, and unclean words, which generally lead on by a ſtrong impulſe to greater irregularities.

Spect. vol. iv. *N°.* 286.—*Oſterv. of Unclean. Præf. p.* 16. *ib. Sect.* 1. *c.* vii. *p.* 60—72.—*Evans's Sermons, vol.* ii.

COROLLARY 4.

Since marriage is of ſo great importance to the happineſs of mankind, it is plain that it ought not to be diſſolved upon any trifling conſideration; ſince uncertain marriages would be attended with many of the ſame inconveniencies, as the promiſcuous uſe of women, and would differ from it little more than in name.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* i. § 20.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

To enumerate the principal duties of the married ſtate. LECT. LXXII.

SOLUTION.

1. Virtue requires that both parties preſerve their fidelity to each other inviolate.

2. They ſhould ſtudy in every inſtance to promote each other's comfort and happineſs.

3. They are to contribute their reſpective parts towards the maintenance and education of their children.

Delany on Relat. Dut. N°. ii, iii.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 339—344.——*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 124—140.

DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to perform theſe ſeveral duties ariſes, from the nature of the engagements into which the parties have entered; (*Def.* 48.) and from the tendency which ſuch a conduct will have to ſecure their mutual happineſs and that of their families.

PROPOSITION LIX.

Virtue requires that no man ſhould at the ſame time have more than one wife, and no woman more than one huſband.

PART I.

No man ſhould have more than one wife at a time.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The number of females, ſo far as we can judge by the beſt computation, is not entirely equal to the number of males, in the human ſpecies. Vid. *Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 4. *gr.* 4.

Derham's Phyſ. Theol. p. 175, 176.——*Reflect. on Polyg. p.* 4—7.

1.|2. Should polygamy prevail, there would not be females enow to ſupply all the males; conſequently many of them muſt be deprived of the advantage of marriage: not to mention, how

far it might be the occaſion of thoſe hateful and deſtructive practices, of ſodomy and eviration.

Reflect. on Polyg. p. 32—34.

2.|3. Quarrels would probably ariſe between thoſe men, who endeavoured to poſſeſs themſelves of more women than one, and thoſe who were by this means deprived of partners in life; which might be attended with fatal conſequences on both ſides, ſhould polygamy very much prevail.

4. The jealouſy of the wives would probably make them very unhappy, were ſeveral women to ſhare among them the affection and care of the ſame man; and it would occaſion many caballings, and mutual endeavours to ſupplant each other in his affections, by which the peace of families would be greatly diſturbed; not to mention the frequent adulteries that might be expected, if there was not a ſtrict guard. Vid. *Gen.* xxix. xxx.

5. The diſcords of the mothers might be communicated to the children; and ſo not only alienate their hearts from the father, and thereby prevent the efficacy of his care for their education, but alſo prevent a due harmony between them in riper years, and lay a foundation for quarrels to be tranſmitted to the next generation.

6. The maſter of the family would have his part in all this uneaſineſs; and would find it hardly poſſible to preſerve his own quiet in any tolerable degree, without ſacrificing the peculiar pleaſure of having one intimate and beſt beloved friend, with whom to converſe with the higheſt endearment: and if he had any true taſte of the ſublimeſt pleaſures of friendſhip, the gratification of appetite with a variety of women muſt appear but a poor equivalent for ſuch a ſacrifice.

7. The practice of polygamy may leave room to a married man to be continually entering upon new amours and treaties with reſpect to other women; which would keep the mind in an uneaſy agitation, and greatly divert him from applying to cares of the greateſt importance to the happineſs of his family and of the public, and expoſe him thereby to many obvious inconveniencies.

2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7.|8. Since polygamy is thus pernicious to the intereſt of the huſband, wife and children, and, if it commonly prevailed, to that of ſo many ſingle perſons, virtue requires that one man ſhould have but one wife at a time. *Q. E. D.*

Burn. Life of Rocheſt. p. 112, 113.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* vi. *c.* i. § 16—19.——*Salm. State of Turkey, p.* 411—416.—*Reflect. on Polyg. p.* 13—19.——*L'Eſprit des Loix, vol.* i. *l.* xvi. *c.* ii—vii. *

* The queſtion concerning Polygamy has recently been revived, in conſequence of an elaborate treatiſe in defence of it, written by the late Mr. Martin Madan, and intituled "Thelyphthora." To this work many anſwers appeared, among which may be reckoned, "Polygamy unſcriptural," by John Towers; "Remarks on Polygamy," by Thomas Wills; "Polygamy indefenſible," by John Smith; "Remarks on Thelyphthora," by James Penn; "Bleſſings of Polygamy diſplayed," by R. Hill; "Examination of Thelyphthora," by John Palmer; and "Refutation of Polygamy," by T. Haweis. There were, alſo, ſeveral anonymous publications on the ſubject, of which it may be ſufficient to mention "Anti-Thelyphthora;" "Marriage and its Vows defended," by a Female;" "The Unlawfulneſs of Polygamy evinced;" and the "Cobler's Letter to the Author of Thelyphthora." But the moſt deciſive blow that was given to the "Thelyphthora," was in two articles which occur in the ſixty-third volume of the Monthly Review. Theſe articles were written by the late Rev. Samuel Badcock. Some general reflections on Polygamy may be ſeen in Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philoſophy," vol. i. p. 319—325; and in Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 127—129.

COROLLARY.

It is yet more evidently unlawful for him who has married one wife, with a promiſe of confinement to her, afterwards to take a ſecond. Vid. *Prop.* 55.

SCHOLIUM I.

Some have argued in favour of the propoſition, that it would prevent the over-ſtocking the world with inhabitants, which would be the conſequence of polygamy. But we have waved that argument,

1. Becauſe it ſeems that the contrary is true, *i. e.* that the number of mankind is leſſened rather than increaſed by polygamy, which is a direct conſequence from *grad.* 1. for it is plain, that ten women for inſtance would be like to have more children by ten men, than by one, eſpecially in ſome length of years; conſidering how much the body might be weakened, by that luxury with which ſeraglios are generally attended: and accordingly it is found in fact, that there is the greateſt increaſe of men, where polygamy is not uſed, as the author of the Reflections on that ſubject has proved, in an accurate and convincing manner. But

2. If it were fact, that polygamy would increaſe the number of mankind, it would be an argument *for* it, rather than *againſt* it: for it is certain, the earth with proper cultivation would be capable of maintaining a much greater number of inhabitants, than at preſent ſubſiſt upon it; and ſo many general calamities have from age to age interpoſed to thin their numbers, that it is hardly to be imagined, they will ever grow inſupportably great. In the mean time, that polygamy leſſens the number, is an additional argument that it is contrary to the happineſs of the ſpecies, and therefore to virtue.

Reflect. on Polyg. Diſſ. vi, vii.

PART 2.

One woman ſhould have but one huſband at a time.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Several of the arguments urged in the preceding demonſtration will (*mut. mutandis*) prevail here; eſpecially thoſe taken from the proportion of the ſexes, mutual jealouſy, and the want of peculiar endearments ariſing from one moſt intimate friend.

2. The offspring would be thereby rendered uncertain, and healthful propagation prevented, by which the main purpoſes of marriage would be evidently defeated. *Prop.* 57.

1 & 2 |3. *Valet propoſitio.*

Puff. ib. l. vi. *c.* i. § 15.

SCHOLIUM.

This has appeared ſo intolerable a thing, that it has hardly been practiſed by any nation on earth, unleſs ſome very barbarous people are to be excepted. On the contrary, it has almoſt univerſally been made a main branch of the marriage covenant, that with regard to matrimonial converſe, a wife ſhould be the property of one huſband alone; and thoſe women have been accounted infamous, who have violated this engagement.

L'Eſprit des Loix, vol. i. *l.* xvi. *c.* v.—*Temple's Hiſt. of Engl. p.* 14—16.

PROPOSITION LX.

LECT. LXXIII. To enquire to whom virtue prohibits marriage.

SOLUTION.

1. In general, it is not adviſable that marriage ſhould be contracted by thoſe, who, by reaſon of their unripe age, or ſome natural or accidental

accidental defect in their underſtanding, are deſtitute of reaſon, and ſo incapable of making a proper choice, or behaving themſelves aright in their conjugal ſtate.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* i. § 26.

2. It is prohibited to thoſe who are evidently incapable of propagation, unleſs they marry with others in the like condition with themſelves: otherwiſe, by their incapacity, the great end of marriage would be fruſtrated, and a foundation laid for a perpetual jealouſy, and many other irregular paſſions.

Puff. ib. § 25.—*Ricaut's Ott. Court, p.* 293. —*Lettres Perſannes, N°.* 41.

3. To thoſe who labour under any diſtemper of body, or diſtraction of mind, which would probably be conveyed to their offspring.

4. To thoſe who are already married, and whoſe conſorts are yet living, virtue forbids marriage, upon the principles of the preceding propoſition, while the former marriage continues undiſſolved: and whereas among us, one man and one woman have been mutually appropriated to each other, it is yet more evidently and univerſally unlawful for either to marry a third perſon, without the conſent of the other, as it is a breach of the marriage covenant: whether it may be lawful when ſuch conſent is gained, even ſuppoſing the preceding propoſition to hold good, *i. e.* whether marriage may be diſſolved by mutual conſent, will be enquired in the next propoſition. *Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* v. § 11.

5. It has generally been ſaid, that marriage is unlawful to thoſe who are nearly allied by blood or affinity. The chief reaſons aſſigned againſt ſuch marriages are,

1. That in ſome caſes, the duties of other relations would be plainly confounded by them, as in caſe of a mother's marrying her ſon.

2. Friendſhip

2. Friendſhip by this means would be leſs widely diffuſed; and covetous parents would hinder their wealth from being communicated, perhaps on theſe principles even forcing the elder brethren to marry their ſiſters, however contrary to their inclination; which muſt be the ſource of great calamity to them, as well as detriment to others.

3. By prohibiting theſe marriages, proviſion is made againſt ſome temptations to unchaſtity, ariſing from the more frequent converſe of near relations.

4. There ſeems to be ſomething generally in the conſtitution of our natures abhorring ſuch marriages, if the relations are near, which has rendered them infamous among moſt civilized nations: though it muſt be owned the *Egyptians* and *Perſians* were an exception to this rule: however, among the *European* nations, it prevails in its full force.

Puff. ib. § 28, 32, 34.—*L'Eſprit des Loix, vol.* ii. *l.* xxvi. *c.* xiv.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, it muſt be owned very difficult to fix the degrees of affinity, or conſanguinity, within which marriage is unlawful, and if mankind ever have been or ſhould be in ſuch circumſtances, that a brother could have no wife but his own ſiſter, moſt of the arguments urged above would ceaſe, and the reſt muſt give way to ſuch a neceſſity *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument urged *gr.* 5. concludes much more ſtrongly againſt marrying with thoſe nearly related by *blood*, than by affinity.

Puff. ib. § 35.

* This ſubject has been particularly treated of by a Mr. John Fry, in his "Caſe of Marriages between Kindred." See, alſo, "The legal Degrees of Marriage ſtated and conſidered," by John Alleyne, Eſq.

PRO-

PROPOSITION LXI.

To enquire in what cases marriage may be rightly dissolved.

SOLUTION.

1. It is no doubt dissolved by the adultery of either party, which is an apparent breach of the most fundamental article of the covenant. *Def.* 48. and *Prop.* 55.

2. For the same reason, it is dissolved upon the obstinate desertion of one of the parties, since thereby the covenant is also broken.

Life of Galeacius Caracciolus *.

3. It is questioned whether marriage may be dissolved, on account of the unkind behaviour of one of the married persons. In one view it may appear reasonable that it should, since consulting their mutual happiness and comfort is a branch of the marriage covenant: yet when we consider what damage might arise to the innocent offspring, how frequently complaints of this kind occur among married people, how generally in this case both parties are to blame, and on these accounts how uncertain marriage would be rendered, if the dissolution of it in this case should be allowed, it seems on the whole more for the happiness of mankind, that some who are in these unhappy circumstances should bear their calamity, than that they should be eased of it on terms so hazardous to the security and happiness of many more. To which we may also add, that the consideration of marriage as an indissoluble bond may engage both husband and wife, out of regard to their own peace, to be careful to govern their passions, so as not to make it mutually intolerable; in which exercise of wisdom and

* Galeacius Caracciolus is referred to, because his wife refused to cohabit with him on account of his religious principles. S.

virtue,

virtue, each party may find a very great account.

4. Marriage may not be diſſolved, as many other covenants may, by the conſent of the parties; if it might, marriages might frequently be contracted almoſt in jeſt, or merely in ſome views of preſent indulgence: and when one party was weary of the bond, very indirect meaſures might be uſed to procure the conſent of the other to diſſolve it; and thus a ſtate of things would probably be introduced into the world, little different from that which marriage was intended to prevent.

5. Neither ought marriage to be diſſolved, merely on account of barrenneſs, unleſs one of the parties evidently appears to have been under ſome natural incapacity before the contract: otherwiſe it would be difficult to fix the time when ſuch a diſſolution ſhould take place, and great room would be left for fraudulent ſeparations.

6. Neither are marriages to be diſſolved, on account of any concealed deformity of body, or flaw in eſtate; though it be allowed very criminal and fooliſh, for any to impoſe upon another in a matter of ſo great importance.

Milton's Proſe Works, p. 5—12.——*Puff. l.* vii. *c.* i. § 20—22, 24.—*Lettres Perſannes, vol.* ii. *N°.* 102.—*Locke on Government, part* ii. § 78—81.—*Reeves's Apol. vol.* i. *p.* 187, 188.——*More's Utopia, p.* 141—144.

COROLLARY.

Since the marriage bond is of ſo ſtrict a nature, it ought never to be formed without the moſt mature conſideration; nor ſhould any be forced into it by the authority of ſuperiors, contrary to their own inclinations.

DEFI-

DEFINITION XLIX.

CONCUBINAGE is a ſort of marriage, in which the woman by agreement of both parties is to be conſidered as a ſervant in the family, and expreſs proviſion is made, that her children ſhall not have ſuch a right of poſſeſſion and inheritance, as the children of the primary wife. LECT. LXXIV.

SCHOLIUM.

It appeats by *Prop.* 59. *part* 1. that the taking a concubine during the life of another wife is generally at leaſt to be avoided: and it ſeems, that he who never marries any woman but as a concubine, neither pays due reſpect to the female ſex, nor ſufficiently conſults his own happineſs, in a free and ingenuous friendſhip: yet perhaps, in caſe of a ſecond marriage, where the children by a former wife are living, concubinage is not altogether to be condemned, if the conſtitution of the country permit it.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* i. § 36. *l.* iv. *c.* xi. § 9.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* v. § 15.

PROPOSITION XLII.

Virtue requires that parents ſhould take peculiar care of their own children.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The ſtate of infancy is ſo feeble, that if tender care were not taken of young children, they would die quickly after their birth.

2. In childhood, on account of the weakneſs of reaſon, they are incapable of providing for themſelves.

3. It is evidently of importance to themſelves and the public, not only that their lives be taken care of, but that their minds be formed to virtuous and pious ſentiments, of which they are at firſt

firſt void, not to ſay that many at leaſt ſeem ſtrongly inclined to the contrary.

1, 2, 3. *Prop.* 51.|4. Virtue requires that ſome proviſion ſhould be made for the education of children.

5. Thoſe who have produced them ought not in reaſon to throw them as a burthen upon others, when they are capable of taking care of them themſelves.

6. That στοργη, or natural affection, which parents feel towards the children, will render this taſk more eaſy and delightful to them, than it would be to others.

6.|7. It is probable *cæt. par.* that children will be better taken care of by their parents than others.

4, 5, 7.|8. Virtue requires that parents ſhould take peculiar care of their own children. *Q. E. D.*

Rel. of Nat. p. 159, 160.—*Delany on Rel. Duties, Serm.* iv—vii.—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil.* § 3. *c.* iii.——*Paley's moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 345—367. *Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 139—148.

COROLLARY 1.

Virtue generally requires that thoſe who have children ſhould make them their principal heirs.

Grot. ib. l. ii. *c.* vii. § 5. *N°.* ii.—*L'Eſprit des Loix, vol.* ii. *l.* xxvi. *c.* vi.

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue requires that remoter anceſtors ſhould be careful of grand-children, or other deſcendants; eſpecially if the immediate parents be either taken away by death, or any other way rendered incapable of affording them aſſiſtance.

Grot. ib. § 6.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 1.

It does not appear neceſſary, that an equal diſtribution of goods be made among all the children: ſome proper regard ſhould be had to the merit of each: yet great care ſhould be taken, that the parent does not by an imprudent diſtinction ſow ſuch ſeeds of diſcord, as may counterbalance the advantage accruing to the moſt deſerving child from a larger ſhare.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It ſeems reaſonable, that the eldeſt ſon ſhould generally have a larger ſhare of his father's poſſeſſions than the reſt; that ſo the honour of the family may be ſupported, and that he may be a refuge to younger children, if they ſhould fall into poverty; eſpecially ſince (*cæt. par.*) it may reaſonably be expected, that he will be more capable of managing what he has for the common good, and the diſtinction made in his favour will generally be leſs provoking to the reſt, than if it were made in favour of any other child.

Puff. de Jure, l. iv. *c.* xi. § 8.—*Fleetw. Rel. Dut. p.* 111—113.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 359, 360*.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs, an elder ſon, or any other may be diſinherited, or deprived of a part of what he would otherwiſe have had, upon account of his vicious diſpoſition, if there be reaſon to believe that he will abuſe it to the detriment of others:

* The doctrine of this Scholium has lately been called in queſtion, in a pamphlet publiſhed in Scotland, the title of which I do not recollect. M. Turgot and other philoſophers have, likewiſe, declared againſt all rights of primogeniture, and have contended that the property of parents ſhould, by law, be equally divided among their children. See Condorcet's Life of M. Turgot.

this

this the reaſon of things requires, and the laws of moſt nations admit of it, though *Plato* only allows it with the conſent of near relations. As for the argument brought againſt it from *Deut.* xxi. 15, *&c.* as a law of God to the *Jews*; it may be anſwered, that the *Jews* had not that power of alienating their eſtates in general, which all allow to others not under ſuch a peculiar appointment, and therefore no valid argument can be drawn from hence: and it is plain, God often interpoſed to transfer the inheritance; as in a moſt memorable inſtance *Jacob* did, and that (as all who believe ſcripture muſt ſuppoſe) by divine direction, *Gen.* xliv. 3. 1 *Chron.* v. 1, 2. not to mention that power, which the law of God gave to *Jewiſh* parents to put a wicked child to death, which might render a particular licence to diſinherit him needleſs. *Deut.* xxi. 18, *&c.*

Puff. ib. § 11.—*Fleetw. ib. p.* 113—127.
—*Burn. Life of Sir M. Hale, p.* 7, 8.

AXIOM XVII.

LECT. LXXV. There is an evident fitneſs, that when one rational being has received a favour and kindneſs from another, he ſhould have ſome ſenſe of gratitude, and return good rather than evil.

Puff. de Off. l. i. *c.* viii. § 7, 8.

COROLLARY.

Virtue requires gratitude. Vid. *Def.* 37*.

PROPOSITION LXIII.

To enquire into the duty of children towards their parents.

* Some ſentiments of a different kind, with reſpect to gratitude, are advanced by the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, in his "Eſſay "on the Nature of true Virtue;" and by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning political Juſtice," vol. i. p. 83—85.

SOLU-

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Forasmuch as children have received important favours from their parents, gratitude, and therefore virtue requires that they should *love* them. *Ax.* 17. and *Cor.*

2. Considering the superiority of age, and the probable superiority of wisdom, which there is on the side of parents, and also how much the satisfaction and comfort of a parent depend on the respect shewn him by his children, it is fit that children should *reverence* their parents.

2.|3. It is fit that while the parents are living, and the use of their understanding continued, their children should not ordinarily undertake any matter of great importance without *advising* with them, or without very cogent reasons pursue it contrary to their consent.

4. As young people need some guidance and government in their minority, and as there is (*cæt. par.*) some peculiar reason to trust the prudence, care, and affection of a parent, preferable to any other person, it is reasonable that children, especially while in their minority, should *obey* their parents; without which, neither the order of families nor the happiness of the rising generation could be secured: nevertheless, still supposing that the commands of the parents are not inconsistent with the will of God.

1, 2.|5. Virtue requires, that if parents come to want, children should take care to furnish them with the necessaries of life, and so far as their ability will permit, with the conveniencies of it.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* ii. § 4, 7, 11.——*Fleetwood on Rel. Duties, p.* 4—22, 51, 52.—*Delany, ib. N°.* viii, ix.—*Puff. de Off. l.* ii. *c.* iii. § 12.——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 161, 162.—*Paley's moral and political Philosophy, vol.* i. *p.* 368—378.——

Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. *p.* 148—150.

COROLLARY 1.

The like regards are in some degree due to remoter ancestors, if yet living; though if they come to want, they fall most properly under the care of their more immediate surviving descendants.

COROLLARY 2.

If any generous and compassionate friend act the part of a parent, in taking care of an helpless child, he may justly expect from him the returns of filial duty.

COROLLARY 3.

When the parent has delegated his authority to some other person, reverence and some degree of obedience are on that account to be paid to him, beyond what would otherwise be his due.

COROLLARY 4.

Different degrees of obedience will be due to parents according to the different age and circumstances of the child, and in some degree according to the capacity and character of the parent. *Puff. de Off. l.* ii. *c.* iii. § 5—8.

COROLLARY 5.

It is the duty of parents, or of those who sustain their character and place, to behave to the children under their care in such a manner, as may most effectually conciliate their reverence and love, and make the yoke of obedience as light as possible; and for this reason all unnecessary severities are to be forborne.

Fleetwood of Relat. Dut. p. 73—81.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Many have chosen to build the right of parents to the obedience of the child, wholly or chiefly

chiefly on their having been the inſtruments of bringing it into exiſtence, and have hence inferred a ſovereign right in the parent to diſpoſe of the life, liberty, and fortune of the child; but it appears from the preceding propoſitions, that parental authority, within moderate bounds, may be fixed on a baſis leſs liable to exception.

Grot. l. ii. *c.* v. § 7.——*Filmer of Patr. Government, c.* i. § 4—8.——*Locke of Government, l.* i. § 52—59.——*Puff. ib.* § 1—6.—*Barbeyrac's Notes on ib.* § 10. *p.* 606, 607.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It appears from the reaſoning of the propoſition, that *both* the parents have a right to the duties there mentioned: nevertheleſs, (*cæt. par.*) the authority of the *father* is chiefly to be regarded; though *Hobbes* is of a contrary opinion, and maintains, that a ſovereign and unlimited power over the children reſides in the *mother*, and that the authority of others over them is derived from her.

Hobbes de Cive, c. ix.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* vi. *c.* ii. § 2, 3.—*Puff. de Offic. l.* ii. *c.* iii. § 3.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* v. § 1. *Not.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

Though it appears from *Demonſtration gr.* 3. that it is an irregular thing for children generally ſpeaking to contract marriages without the advice or conſent of their parents, nevertheleſs it might be attended with ſtill worſe conſequences, if marriages ſo contracted were to be deemed invalid.

Puff. ibid. § 14.—*Grot. ibid.* § 10.

SCHOLIUM 4.

The indigence of human infants ſeems to have been wiſely deſigned by providence, on purpoſe

to lay a foundation for thoſe mutual offices of parental and filial duty, on which much of the happineſs of life evidently depends.

Cambray on Gov. p. 26, 27.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It hence follows, that when the health of the mother, and the convenience of the family will admit of it, it is fit that mothers nurſe their own children, or take care that they be nouriſhed at home.

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. i. *p.* 523—525.—*Delany of Rel. Dut. Serm.* iv. *p.* 79—88. *Spect. vol.* iii. *N°.* 246 *.

DEFINITION L.

LECT. LXXVI. A COMMUNITY is a company of men, which is ſo aſſociated, that the whole body, either by themſelves or their repreſentatives, ſhould judge concerning any diſputed rights or properties of each member of it.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. *c.* vii. § 87.

DEFINITION LI.

Thoſe men are ſaid to be in A STATE OF NATURE, who are not by any mutual engagements, implicit or expreſs, entered into communities.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

It is for the happineſs of mankind, that men in a ſtate of nature ſhould form themſelves into ſocieties.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The happineſs of mankind requires, that controverſies which ariſe among them ſhould be determined.

* On this queſtion, recourſe may be had to Dr. Cadogan's Eſſay on Nurſing, and Mr. Nelſon's Treatiſe on the Government of Children.

2. The

2. The prejudices of self-love would lead men to lay down different rules for themselves and others; it is proper therefore that there should be some universal rule.

3. When these rules are admitted, prejudice would bias particular persons in the application of them: therefore it is fit that particular cases should be determined by some other person, rather than by either of the parties, whose interest is in question.

4. Such determinations would often be in vain, if there were not some power to enforce the execution of them.

5. Where men are formed into communities, rules may be laid down, judges appointed, and determinations enforced, by the joint power of the whole body. Therefore

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Prop.* 51.|6. The happiness of mankind, and therefore virtue requires, that men should form themselves into communities.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. *c.* ii. § 124—126.—
Puff. de Jure, l. vii. *c.* i. § 8—11.—
Camb. of Gov. p. 36—38*.—*Thomf. Seaf. Autumn, ver.* 43—144.

SCHOLIUM.

It is queried, who is to be considered as *a member of a community*. There can be no doubt as to those who have given their express consent to it: as for those who live under the protection of any community, it is to be taken for granted that while they so continue, they consent to bear the burthen, as some equivalent for sharing the happiness of it: but for ought that yet appears, such may withdraw themselves from it, when they shall judge it requisite.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. *c.* viii. § 119—122.
Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* v. § 24. *N°.* ii.

* The book intituled "Cambray on Government," was not written by Fenelon archbishop of Cambray, but by the Chevalier Ramsay, upon the principles of that prelate. S.

DEFINITION LII.

A LAW is a rule of action, prescribed by some superior, in such a manner, as at the same time to declare a purpose of favouring or punishing those under his power, as they shall act agreeably or disagreeably to it.

Puff. de Jure, l. i. *c.* vi. § 1—4.——
Baxt. Works, vol. ii. *p.* 25, 26.——
Grot. de Jure, l. i. *c.* i. § 9.

COROLLARY.

If it shall appear to us hereafter, that God has given us intimations, not only of his own delight in virtue and aversion to vice, but also that he will reward the one and punish the other, then it may properly be said, that the *law of God* requires virtue.

DEFINITION LIII.

They are said to have the SUPREME CIVIL GOVERNMENT in any state or community, who have the supreme power of *making laws* for that community, and *executing* them in their own persons, or by such officers as they shall appoint.

DEFINITION LIV.

When the supreme civil government is entirely in the hands of *one person*, it is called A MONARCHY: if in a *select number*, AN OLIGARCHY; which some have divided into an ARISTOCRACY, which is the government of the *nobles*, and AN OCHLOCRACY, which is the government of a few of the *meanest*, appointed and supported in a tumultuous manner; whereas A DEMOCRACY is the government of the *whole body* of the *people*: but a constitution of government compounded of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, like the *British* constitution, is called A MIXED MONARCHY.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

The compoſition in different governments is ſo various, that ſome have thought this diſtribution not ſufficiently accurate, urging that neither *Poland* nor *Holland* fall under any of theſe.

Temple's Eſſ. vol. i. *p.* 47, 48.—*Voltaire's Hiſt. of Charles* XII. *l.* ii. *p.* 61—67.——*Temp. on Neth. c.* ii.——*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 30—43.—*Univerſal Hiſtory, vol.* xxxiv. *p.* 6—30.—*Ibid. vol.* xxxi. *p.* 3—12.

DEFINITION LV.

Laws made by the ſupreme civil power of any community, to be obſerved by all their ſubjects, are called CIVIL LAWS, and ſo differ from MUNICIPAL, made for particular towns and corporations.

SCHOLIUM.

The word *civil law* among us is generally uſed to ſignify the laws of *the Roman empire*, which on account of their equity have been generally received in other nations: whereas thoſe which have been eſtabliſhed by *act of parliament*, are commonly called *ſtatute*, though they be in our ſenſe *civil* laws.

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. *c.* i. § 1 *.

* Though the ſpecific diſcuſſion of the Roman Law does not conſtitute a part of theſe Lectures, it may not be amiſs to refer the ſtudent to a few general writers on a ſubject which may hereafter demand ſome attention. A foundation ſhould be laid in Juſtinian's Inſtitutes, which may be read in Harris's edition, comprehending both the Original and a Tranſlation.——To this may be added Schomberg's "Hiſtorical and Chronological View of Roman Law;" Dr. Taylor's "Elements of the Civil Law;" the ſame gentleman's "Summary of the Roman Law," and Dr. Bever "On the Study of Juriſprudence," and his "Hiſtory of the Legal Policy of the Roman State, and of the Riſe, Progreſs, and Extent of the Roman Laws."

PROPOSITION LXV.

LECT. LXXVII. To enquire into the probable original of civil government, or of communities.

SOLUTION.

1. Conſidering the natural dependence of children upon their parents, it is certain that government would at firſt be *parental:* and it is exceedingly probable, that if, according to many of the moſt credible traditions, the human race deſcended from one pair, ſo long as the firſt man lived, and continued in the exerciſe of reaſon, he had a conſiderable influence over the councils and actions of his deſcendants, and was regarded by them as their common head.

2. From the nature of things, it is not probable that the power he had over his family deſcended entirely to the eldeſt ſon: it is certain, that the reaſon for being governed by an *elder brother*, is by no means the ſame as for being governed by a *father*; though we may naturally ſuppoſe, that (*cæt. par.*) the age and experience of the elder brother, together with the larger ſhare of the inheritance which he probably had, would have given him ſome ſuperiority; yet not ſo great, as an elder brother would now generally have; partly, as the world being thinly peopled, each might have as much land as he pleaſed, and partly, as in proportion to the length of mens lives in thoſe early ages, (if we credit tradition as before,) the difference between the ages of the ſeveral elder brethren of a family would be very inconſiderable.

Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 2.

2.|3. Each family would probably on the death of the common parent become a kind of little ſovereignty, whoſe governor would naturally be the father of it during his life; and ſuch ſovereignties as theſe would be greatly multiplied in the third, fourth, or following generations.

4. It

4. It is exceedingly probable, that among theſe leſſer communities diſputes would ariſe, for the determination of which they might judge it proper, on the principles mentioned *Prop.* 64. to form themſelves into larger ſocieties, including ſeveral of thoſe domeſtic communities; and perhaps the form of theſe might be various, according to the various tempers, characters, and circumſtances of the perſons concerned.

5. As diſputes aroſe between one and another of thoſe larger ſocieties, which no doubt they often did, it was neceſſary, that on their forcibly oppoſing each other, the command of their reſpective armies ſhould centre in one perſon; and if he were not only remarkable for his valour, but alſo for his wiſdom, humanity, eloquence, piety, and good ſucceſs in affairs, any of theſe, but eſpecially the conjunction of them all, would greatly tend to increaſe his authority in the community, and might engage them to acquieſce in his ſtated government. *Sidn. on Gov. c.* i. § 16.

6. It is not to be ſuppoſed, that perſons, families, or larger communities, before free and independent, would ſubmit themſelves to the government of any one perſon whatever, without ſome equivalent; which could probably be no other, than that of protecting them in their liberties and properties; ſo that there was no doubt ſome original *contract* between the prince and the people, in all thoſe kingdoms where the prince gained his power by a peaceable election.

7. Some ambitious perſons, partly by ſtratagem and partly by force, might poſſeſs themſelves of power over others; yet even theſe conqueſts could not be ſettled without ſome agreement between the victor and the vanquiſhed; for till ſuch an agreement was made, there was evidently a ſtate of hoſtility, and not a community.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. *c.* iii. § 1, 5—9.—*Temple's Miſc. vol.* i. *p.* 55—82.——*Camb.*

Camb. of Gov. c. vii. *p.* 49—54.——*Locke of Gov. part* ii. *c.* viii. § 95—112.——*Roll. Anc. Hiſt. vol.* i. *Introd.*——*Lyttelt. Perſ. Let. p.* 33, *&c.*——*Ancient Univ. Hiſt. Folio, l.* i. *p.* 108—*Oct. p.* 230.—*Ibid. Folio, p.* 71, 72.—*Oct. p.* 385—388.——*With. Baumgarten's Supplement, vol.* i. *p.* 42—69.

COROLLARY 1.

Hence it will follow, that though there might be various kinds of governments prevailing, and in monarchies various degrees of liberty in the people, and power in the prince, yet there muſt always have been ſome original *contract* between them, as the foundation of all government, except that of a father over his deſcendants.

Sidn. on Gov. c. i. § 20*.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may ſee, how far ſovereignty may be ſaid to have its original *from God.* We have reaſon to believe that it is the will of God that we ſhould do our utmoſt to promote the happineſs of mankind: now *ſome* government appears neceſſary for this purpoſe; (Vid. *Prop.* 64.) and when governments are formed, attempts to deſtroy them might in many inſtances be pernicious to ourſelves and to the public: we have reaſon therefore to believe, that God wills not only that government in general ſhould be, but that the preſent form of government ſhould continue in any place, ſo long as the happineſs of the whole may be promoted thereby; but there

* In oppoſition to the notion of an original Contract, or Compact, ſee Hume's Eſſays, vol. i. Eſſay 12. Edinb. edit. of 1764; Paley's "Principles of Moral and Political Philoſophy," vol. ii. p. 130—141; and Dean Tucker's "Treatiſe on Government." Dr. Tucker has been anſwered by Dr. Towers, in his "Vindication of the Political Principles of Mr. Locke."

appears

appears as yet no reaſon to believe, that God wills it ſhould continue immutable, however it is adminiſtered, or that a prince can juſtly claim a commiſſion from God in attempting the ruin of the community, which it is his buſineſs to protect. God's being the author of government in the ſenſe explained above, will be a great aggravation of the guilt of ſuch a tyrannical ſovereign; and any pretence to divine authority in ſuch outrages will only be adding impiety to treachery and cruelty: but this will be examined hereafter.

Camb. of Gov. c. vi.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* vii. *c.* iii. § 2—4.——*Roll. Man. vol.* i. *p.* 423, 424.—*Sidn. on Gov. c.* i. § 6.—*Delany on Rel. Dut. Serm.* xiv. *p.* 276—285——*Paley's Princ. of Moral and Political Phil. vol.* ii. *p.* 141—163. *7th edit.*

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. LXXVIII.

The account of the original of civil government here given is illuſtrated, and ſomething confirmed, by the conſtitution of ſeveral of the moſt conſiderable nations which we find in ancient hiſtory; particularly by the power of the *Ephori* and *General Aſſembly* amongſt the *Spartans* (*a*), the *Amphictyones* of *Greece* (*b*), the *Suffetes, Senate,* and *Popular Aſſembly* of *Carthage* (*c*), the *Senate, Comitia,* and *Tribunes* of *Rome* (*d*), the *Saxon Wittenagemot* (*e*), which was the original of the *Britiſh* parliament, and the *Spaniſh Cortes* (*f*); not to mention the conſtitution of many other more modern governments.

Sidney on Govern. c. ii. § 16. *p.* 130, *&c.*—(*a*) *Stanyan's Gr. Hiſt. vol.* i. *l.* iii. *c.* iv. *p.* 80—82. *Univ. Hiſt. vol.* ii. *p.* 574.——(*b*) *Potter's Archæol. l.* i. *c.* xvi. *vol.* i. *p.* 83—85.—*Stanyan ib. p.* 119

p. 119—120.——(*c*) *Rollin's Anc. Hiſt. l.* ii. § 3. *vol.* i.——(*d*) *Moyle's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 8, 9, 103—108. *Vertot's Rom. Rev. vol.* i. *p.* 7—9. *Kennet's Rom. Ant. part* ii. *l.* iii. *c.* ix, & xvi. —(*e*) *Rapin's Hiſt. of England, vol.* i. *p.* 152—156. *Squire of the Anglo-Sax. Gov.*——(*f*) *Geddes's Miſc. vol.* i. *p.* 317, *&c* *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some probable conjectures, why arbitrary monarchy prevailed more in the northern parts of *Aſia*, and in *Africa*, than in *Europe*, may be ſeen in *Temple's Miſc. vol.* i. *p.* 50—53.—— *Works, v.* i. *p.* 390.——*L'Eſprit des Loix, vol.* i. *l.* xvii. *p.* 377—385.— *Eng. Tranſl. p.* 390—395.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The objection againſt this ſcheme, from our not having a right over our own lives, and much leſs over the lives of others, in a ſtate of nature, goes upon a very falſe principle; for every man, previouſly to contract, has a right of uſing all his natural power for the public good, and when that ſeems to require it, even of taking away the life of another, or forbearing to defend his own: and all that any man promiſes in this reſpect, is

* For farther, and extenſive information on theſe ſubjects, recourſe may be had to Mr. Mitford's and Dr. Gillies's Hiſtories of Greece, the Travels of Anarcharſis the Younger, Spelman's Tranſlation of Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis, Hooke's Roman Hiſtory, Ferguſon's Hiſtory of the Roman Republic, Dr. Adam's Roman Antiquities, Dr. Robertſon's Hiſtory of Charles the Fifth, volume the firſt, Hotoman's Franco Gallia, Acherly's Britannic Conſtitution, St. Amand's Eſſay on the Britiſh Legiſlative Conſtitution of England, Hurd's Dialogues, vol. ii. p. 89—331. Third Edition. Dr. Gilbert Stuart's Hiſtorical Eſſay on the Engliſh Conſtitution, and Lord Lyttelton's Hiſtory of Henry the Second, vol. iii. p. 216—281. Ibid. p. 372—464. Third Edition.

ſubmiſſion

ſubmiſſion to a ſentence of death in certain caſes; for no law ever condemns a man to execute himſelf.

Burn. iv. *Diſc. p.* 10, 11.——*Locke of Gov. part* ii. *c.* xi. § 135.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* viii. *c.* iii. § 1.——*Hoadly on Gov. p.* 168—188.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

To propoſe and confute that other hypotheſis of the original of government, which is commonly called the *patriarchal ſcheme.*

SOLUTION.

1. The foundation of it is, that the *firſt man* was abſolute ſovereign of all his poſterity, ſo as to diſpoſe of their poſſeſſions and their lives, without being accountable to any but God.

2. That on his death, his eldeſt ſon *Cain* having been diſinherited by God, the ſupreme power devolved upon *Seth*, the next eldeſt ſon, and paſſed from him by a lineal ſucceſſion to *Noah.*

3. That he, according to the divine direction, divided the earth after the deluge among *ſeventy* of his deſcendants, heads of ſo many nations, who were each of them made independent and abſolute ſovereigns; in whoſe ſucceſſors (when they can be diſcovered) the right of government ſtill continues.

4. That it is to be preſumed, that in every country the *reigning prince* is that ſucceſſor, and conſequently, that ſuch unlimited obedience is to be paid to him, unleſs it appears that ſome other perſon has an hereditary claim better founded than his.

Hoadly on Gov. p. 3, 4.——*Filmer's Patriarch. Scheme, c.* i. § 4—9. *p.* 12—22.

CON-

CONFUTATION.

Admitting the credibility, and for argument's ſake the inſpiration of the *Moſaic* hiſtory, the following objections ſeem abundantly ſufficient to overthrow this hypotheſis.

1. It can never be proved, that *Adam* had ſuch an unlimited power over his whole race: it is certain, the relation of a *father* does by no means imply it, (*Prop.* 63. *Schol.* 1.) and no text in the writings of *Moſes* is alledged directly to prove it, unleſs *Gen.* i. 26—30. and iii. 16. the firſt of which, was a grant to the human race of the whole animal and vegetable creation for its uſe; and the ſecond related only to *Eve*, and at moſt amounts to no more, than that, as woman had abuſed her huſband's tenderneſs, ſhe ſhould ſometimes find herſelf galled by the yoke of his authority; but this does not imply an abſolute power: at leaſt there is not a ſhadow of argument for any thing more than *Adam's* dominion over his own wife, and by no means over their deſcendants.

Hoadly of Gov. p. 5—35. *præf. p.* 5—13.
——*Locke of Gov. part* i. *c.* iv—vi. *præf. p.* 23—31.

2. Allowing *Adam* to have been poſſeſſed of ſuch a power, it will by no means prove that it was to deſcend from him, and centre in one of his children. It is certain that the right of a *father* and of an *elder brother* are in this reſpect very different, (*Prop.* 63, 65. *gr.* 2.) and as for the argument of a ſuppoſed divine appointment, drawn from *Gen.* iv. 7. though it may prove ſome *pre-eminence* in an elder brother, eſpecially during the time that his younger lived with him, it will never prove an *abſolute power* during life, over him and all his remoteſt deſcendants.

Hoadly ib. p. 35—38.——*Locke ib. c.* viii. *Sidney ib. c.* ii. § 4.

3. The

3. The diſtribution of mankind into ſeventy nations, with an abſolute ſovereign to each, ſuppoſes a contradiction to the right of primogeniture, as before aſſerted by *Filmer*, without any apparent reaſon; and is itſelf a moſt chimerical and arbitrary aſſertion. *Gen.* x. 32. is a moſt feeble foundation for ſuch a grand ſuperſtructure; and only ſignifies, that the chief nations among whom the earth was divided ſprang from the perſons there mentioned. The diviſion, which *Filmer* ſuppoſes, would make the parents ſubject to their children; beſides, that ſome of thoſe there mentioned were not born when the diſtribution is ſuppoſed to be made.

Hoadly ib. p. 49—54.——*Sidney ib. c.* 1. § 7, 8.

4. Had God meant to eſtabliſh the right of primogeniture in this manner, it is not probable he would ſo often have choſen *younger* ſons to ſpecial favours, dignity and authority, as we are ſure he did, if the truth of the old teſtament be granted.

Sidney ib. c. i. § 13.——*Hoadly ib. p.* 55. —59.

5. The admiſſion of ſuch an hypotheſis, grounded on ſo ſlender an evidence, would be attended with great damage to mankind; as it might deſtroy the ſettlement of many very conſiderable nations, as appears from the genealogy of their royal families. At beſt, this is an *uſeleſs* ſcheme; ſince no one perſon upon earth can be known to be the true heir: and ſince the number of ſovereigns in the world is ſo vaſtly greater than *ſeventy*, it would upon *Filmer's* hypotheſis, be (*cæt. par.*) a great probability againſt any one, that he was not one of thoſe ſeventy, in whom the right lay.

Locke ib. c. xi.——*Sidney ib. c.* i. § 14, 17, 18.

6. The ſcheme is plainly conſiſtent with itſelf: for if fatherhood give an abſolute power over the

children, then it rests in all parents; and consequently, had *Seth* commanded his children to have resisted *Adam*, they would on this scheme have been obliged to do it, though by another part of it they were obliged to an unlimited obedience to *Adam*.

Locke ib. § 68—72.—*Hoadly ib. p.* 13—15.—*De Foe's Jus. Divin. l.* ii. *p.* 2—6. *Grove's Miscel. p.* 42—62.

SCHOLIUM.

Some have argued for what they call *indefeasible hereditary right* in monarchs, from the right of elder children to succeed to the land of their parents. But it is certain that the elder son has not in equity a right to succeed to the whole paternal inheritance, so that the rest of the children should have no share of it; though it may generally be fit he should have a larger share than the rest; (*Prop.* 62. *Schol.* 2.) yet he may be disinherited, whenever a regard for the common good requires it: besides, that a succession to places of trust, power and dignity, is a thing of a very different nature from a succession to an estate.

Camb. of Gov. c. ix.—*Hutch. Syst.* 3. viii. 3, 9—11.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

LECT. LXXIX. Every man is born in a *state of freedom*, *i. e.* he is (so far as appears by the light of nature) no farther obliged to support or submit to the form of govermenr, in the country where he is born, than he shall judge, upon a view of present circumstances, that a subjection to such government will be for the good of the whole.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If a perſon were, by any argument which the light of nature ſuggeſts, univerſally bound to be ſubject to and ſupport any government, farther than it appears to him for the public good in preſent circumſtances, ſuch obligation muſt be built, either on ſome natural right in the governors to unlimited obedience, or on ſuch a power conferred upon them by ſome previous contract.

2. The natural right in favour of primogeniture has been conſidered and confuted above, *Prop.* 66.

3. A previous contract of parents, binding themſelves and their offſpring to unlimited ſubjection, is a thing which can hardly be ſuppoſed: but if we were ſure that ſuch a contract had been ever ſo expreſsly made, as they had no right to diſpoſe of the lives and properties of their children according to their own will, the children could not be bound by ſuch a contract.

1, 2, 3, 4, *Valet propoſitio.*

COROLLARY 1.

Hence it will evidently appear, that virtue will allow to reſiſt the ſupreme governor, if any circumſtances ſhall ariſe, in which ſuch reſiſtance ſhall appear to be moſt for the public good. Vid. *Prop.* 65. *Cor.* 1. and *Prop.* 56. *Schol.* 3.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. *c.* viii. § 5.—*Locke of Gov. part* ii. § 202—222.—*Sidney on Gov. c.* iii. § 41.

COROLLARY 2.

Much more may it be allowed in a *mixed* monarchy, that the other branches of the legiſlative power ſhould reſiſt the monarch, when he goes about to ſubvert their conſtitution, in di-

rect violation of that contract on which he is admitted to the crown *.

Caermich. Puff. de Off. l. ii. *c.* ix. § 4.

SCHOLIUM I.

Some, waving all pleas from a ſuppoſed donation of power from God to Kings, aſſert reſiſtance to be univerſally unlawful, becauſe it can never promote the public good, but muſt on the whole be detrimental to mankind. But it may be anſwered,

1. That caſes may occur, in which the affections of the people may be ſo alienated from the government, that a revolution may be accompliſhed with very little blood-ſhed and confuſion.

2. That by this means, the civil and religious liberties of a mighty nation may be, and often have been ſecured, when even on the brink of ruin.

3. That ſuch an event may contain matter of very wholeſome inſtruction to ſucceeding princes, in that country and elſewhere, and by preventing future oppreſſions, may greatly promote the good of mankind.

And whereas it is urged, that the encouragement which the doctrine of reſiſtance might give

* The great queſtion concerning the Origin and Deſign of Government, the Rights of the People, and the Power of Reſiſtance, have lately been amply conſidered, in conſequence of the two grand political controverſies of the age, occaſioned, firſt, by Dr. Price's "Obſervations on the Nature of Civil Liberty," and, ſtill more recently, by Mr. Burke's "Reflections on the French Revolution." It would be endleſs ſpecifically to refer to the variety of treatiſes and pamphlets which have appeared on both ſides of the queſtion in agitation. A liſt of theſe publications may be collected from the reviews of the time, and eſpecially from the Monthly Review, which we the rather mention, as being more acceſſible to the generality of readers. Several years previouſly to theſe controverſies, Dr. Prieſtley publiſhed an Eſſay on the firſt Principles of Government.

to inſurrections and popular tumults would be an equivalent for all this, it is to be remembered,

1. That it may be concluded, a virtuous man will, as he certainly ought to do, attentively weigh the reaſons and conſequences of things, before he engages in ſo important an undertaking.

2. That the apparent danger attending it will deter men of prudence from embarking themſelves in it, till there be a great proſpect of ſucceeding; which probably there cannot be, till the people have been alienated from their governors, by long, frequent, and notorious oppreſſions.

3. That though it is true, this doctrine may be abuſed, and may in ſome caſes be attended with ill conſequences; yet, conſidering the temptations of royalty, the doctrine of *paſſive obedience* and *non-reſiſtance* is likely to be much more abuſed, as it has certainly in fact been; ſo that upon the whole, the hazard ſeems to be abundantly balanced.

Camb. of Gov. c. x. *p.* 74—76, 84.—— *Locke on Gov. part* ii. *c.* xix. § 223—230.——*Sachev. Trial, p.* 88—114.—— *Sidn. on Gov. c.* iii. § 40. *p.* 434—436. ——*The Judgment of whole Kingdoms and Nations concerning the Rights, Power, &c. of Kings, and the Rights, Privileges, and Properties of the People. Printed in* 1710. *Hutch. Syſt.* § vii. 3—7.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Conſidering the many difficulties to which princes are expoſed, how liable they are often to be impoſed upon when they deſign beſt, and how impoſſible it is for the bulk of the people to enter into all the reaſons of their coun-

ſels and actions, we do moſt readily grant, that men ought to put the moſt candid interpretation upon the actions of their governors which they can in reaſon bear; and that they ſhould never have recourſe to violent methods, but in caſes of very great extremity, and where the probability of promoting the public ſecurity and happineſs by it is very apparent.

Camb. of Gov. c. x. *p.* 78—83.——*Evans's Chriſt. Temp. vol.* ii. *p.* 308, 309. *Sermon* 14*th.*

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

To enquire what form of government is to be preferred, as generally moſt ſubſervient to the happineſs of mankind.

SOLUTION.

LECT. LXXX.

A *mixed monarchy*, *generally* to deſcend by *inheritance*, ſeems preferable to the reſt.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. An *arbitrary monarchy* would undoubtedly be moſt deſirable, if the monarch were perfectly wiſe and good; ſeeing he would then have much greater opportunities of doing good to his ſubjects, than under a limitation of power he could poſſibly have; and the unavoidable imperfection of general laws would be greatly remedied by his integrity and wiſdom. But conſidering the degeneracy and imperfection of mankind, it ſeems unſafe to truſt ſo much power in one man: and it is generally in fact ſeen, that where this kind of government is admitted, tyranny, cruelty and oppreſſion prevail with it.

2. An *ariſtocracy*, and much more a *democracy*, leaves too much room for the cabals of ſtateſmen, makes the diſpatch of buſineſs ſlower, and there are ſecrets of ſtate of which it is impoſſible that the people ſhould be proper judges,

and

and which it is by no means convenient to lay before them; and when diſcords ariſe between one part of the people and another, it is much more difficult to compoſe them, when there is no monarch.

1, 2, 3. The chief advantages of all theſe conſtitutions are ſecured, and the chief diſadvantages are avoided, by a *mixed monarchy*; eſpecially in one that conſiſts, like ours, of three ſtates, one of which is to be choſen by the people, and to have the power of granting revenues to be raiſed on the ſubjects, while the prince has the power of making peace and war: ſuch a conſtitution is therefore to be preferred.

4. That a kingdom ſhould be *elective*, has indeed many advantages; eſpecially, as it prevents the ſucceſſion of an improper perſon, and moderates the temptation which the ſovereign is under to enhance the prerogative of the crown, as alſo that which the nobles are under to oppreſs the people, if the people have any ſhare in the election.

5. Yet it proves the occaſion of ſo many factions, and where the kingdom is conſiderable, of ſo many deſtructive civil wars, that the danger ſeems to be more than equal to the advantage.

4, 5, 6. The proper balance between both ſeems to be, that the right of *ſucceſſion* ſhould *generally* prevail; but that in caſe of any evident incapacity or mal-adminiſtration, the next heir ſhould be ſet aſide by the other branches of the legiſlature.

3, 6, 7. *Valet propoſitio.*

Camb. of Gov. c. xv. xvi.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* vii. *c.* v. § 22.——*Moyle's Works, vol.* i. *p.* 57—61.——*Puff. de Off. l.* ii. *c.* viii. § 4—8.——*Spect. vol.* iv. *N°.* 287.—*Hobbes's Leviath. c.* xix.——*Sidney on Gov. c.* ii. § 16, 24, 27, 30.——*L'Eſprit des Loix, l.* xi. *c.* vi. *l.* xix.

c. 27.—*Engliſh Tranſl. p.* 321, 337. 456—458.—*Preceptor, vol.* ii. *p.* 474—486 *.

SCHOLIUM I.

Notwithſtanding theſe general reaſons, ſo much regard is to be had to the temper and uſages of particular nations, that it might often be attended with dangerous conſequences, to attempt a change, from a leſs to a more perfect form of government.

Temple's Eſſ. vol. i. *p.* 16, 17.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 70.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Inſtances of the oppreſſion and miſery, which have attended arbitrary governments, are to be ſeen every where, eſpecially in

Addiſ. Freeholder, N°. x.——*Krouſinſki's Rev. of Perſ. vol.* i. *paſſ.*——*Knox's Ceylon, l.* iii, *c.* iii, iv.—*Hanway's Travels vol.* ii. *p.* 339—441.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The *Commons* of *Great-Britain* have grown up to their preſent ſhare in the govrnment, by gradual advances. In the earlier reigns, particularly that of *Edward* I. (*A. D.* 1280.) the laws were enacted by the king and lords, the commons being only mentioned as *ſuppliants*. But what laid the foundation of their growing ſo conſiderable, was the grant, which according to *Cambray*, *Henry* VII. but indeed *Stephen*, *Henry* II. and *John* had long before his time made, to empower the lords to alienate their lands, which thus paſſ-

* A moſt ample vindication of the mixed Form of Government, is given in Mr. Adams's Defence of the Conſtitution of the United States of America, in three volumes, octavo. Very different ſentiments occur in Godwin's "Enquiry concerning Political Juſtice," vol. ii. p. 423—453.

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ing into the hands of the commons, who before were only their tenants, they became more conſiderable than before, as the proprietors of land in a ſtate will always be.

Rapin's Hiſt. of Eng. p. 155. *Note.*——*Camb. of Gov. p.* 138—140, 147.—149.—*Bacon's Henry* VII. *p.* 12.—*Lyttelton's Perſ. Lett. N°.* 59—69.—*Sydn. on Gov. c.* iii. § 10. *p.* 297 *&* § 28.—*Preceptor, vol.* ii. *on Government, ch.* 3, 4.——*Hurd's Dial. N°.* 5 *and* 6. *paſſim* *.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

LECT. LXXXI.

Virtue requires, that obedience ſhould be paid to civil rulers, in thoſe things in which the authority of God is not apprehended to contradict their commands.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 64.|1. Virtue requires that there ſhould be communities.

2. Affairs cannot be adminiſtered in communities, unleſs ſome civil rulers are appointed to manage them.

3. This appointment would be vain, unleſs obedience were to be generally paid to them, as above.

2, 3.|4. The refuſal of ſuch obedience to civil power tends to the ruin of communities.

* Much information on this head may be derived from the early volumes of the Parliamentary Hiſtory, Sullivan's Law Lectures, Blackſtone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. i. King on the Engliſh Conſtitution, Millar on the Engliſh Government, Biſhop Ellys's Eſſays on temporal Liberty, Tract the fourth, and the ſeveral volumes of Dr. Henry's Hiſtory of Great Britain. For a review of the Britiſh Conſtitution as it now ſtands, ſee Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philoſophy," vol. ii. p. 190—234; and Dr. Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 394—454. A ſtill more copious diſcuſſion of the ſubject is preſented in Mr. De Lolme's "Treatiſe on the Conſtitution of England."

1, 4. 5. Virtue requires they ſhould be generally obeyed as above. *Q. E. D.*

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. *c.* viii. § 1.——*Hutch. Syſt.* § vii. 2. ix. 17, 18.

COROLLARY 1.

Reverence is to be paid to rulers; and in dubious caſes, virtue will require us to put the mildeſt conſtruction upon their actions, which they will reaſonably bear. Vid. *Prop.* 67. *Schol.* 2. *Puff. ib.* § 3.

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue will require us rather to acquieſce in their determinations, even where we imagine ourſelves injured, than to diſturb the public by taking our revenge into our own hands; unleſs it may be the probable means of freeing a country from an intolerable tyranny.

Killing no Murther, paſſ. Ap. Harleian Miſcell. now ſeparately publiſhed.

COROLLARY 3.

To chuſe to determine points by ſingle combat, rather than to refer them to the judgment of the magiſtrate, is to be condemned; as being a derogation from his authority, or oppoſition to his determination, as well as a raſh expoſing our own lives or that of others; and a probable means of introducing a wrong ſenſe of honour, which may be detrimental to the lives and ſouls of many, who might otherwiſe be uſeful to the common-wealth.

Hales's Gold. Rem. p. 107—115. *8vo. p.* 90—96. *4to.*—*Spect. vol.* ii. *N°.* 97. ——*Monteſq. Spirit of Laws, vol.* ii. *l.* xxviii. *c.* xvii, xx, xxiv, xxv.—*Freethinker, vol.* i. *N°.* xv.——*Delany's Serm.*

Serm. on Duelling, vol. ii.——*Watts on Self Murder,* § 6. *latter part.—Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 387, 388 *.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Marriages are to be made only as the civil law of any country directs, ſuppoſing there is nothing in the ceremony ſo directed, which ſhall appear unlawful to the parties concerned: and though private contracts are undoubtedly binding in the ſight of God, yet they ought to be diſcouraged, and the offspring of ſuch unauthoriſed marriages may juſtly be laid under ſome incapacities, in order to prevent the prevalency of them, which would be much more to the damage of ſociety. And the ſame kind of obſervations and reaſons may be applied to *divorces* and to *wills* in ſome degree, where the civil law determines the circumſtances with which they ſhall be attended.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. *c.* i. § 36, *ſub fin.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Princes are undoubtedly bound by their covenant with their people; for the reaſoning *Prop.* 55. *Dem.* has a peculiar weight when applied to them. Some have queſtioned, whether a ſucceeding prince be bound by any conceſſions made by his predeceſſors: but there can be no room for ſuch a debate, when a prince ſwears or even promiſes to govern according to law, and the conceſſions made by preceding princes have been, as they generally are, paſſed into civil laws. To ſay, that ſuch conceſſions were ſome-

* Dr. Hey has written a diſtinct tract againſt the practice of Duelling; and Mr. Moore has expoſed it ſomewhat at large at the end of his work on Suicide. Conciſer views of the ſubject occur on Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philoſophy," vol. i. p. 272—276; and in Godwin's "Enquiry concerning political Juſtice," vol. i. p. 94—96.

times

times forcibly extorted, and therefore are not obligatory, would be to deſtroy all the faith of treaties, and is bringing the thing back to the exploded ſcheme of paſſive obedience.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* xiv. § 10, 11.

PROPOSITION LXX.

Briefly to enquire into the mutual duties of maſters and ſervants.

SOLUTION.

1. Servants owe to their maſters diligence in their buſineſs, fidelity in any other truſts repoſed in them, and ſuch a reverence in their behaviour, as may both promote and expreſs their obedience.

2. Maſters owe to their *hired* ſervants, a regular payment of their wages; to *all*, a proper care of their ſupport during the time of ſervice, and a kind and affable treatment: they are to ſee it, that they be neither unemployed, nor overwhelmed with buſineſs, beyond what their ſtrength and time will admit, and that their minds be duly cultivated, according to the circumſtances of life in which they are placed.

Spect. vol. ii. *N°.* 107, *&* 137.—*Delany on Rel. Dut. Serm.* x, xi.——*Paley's moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* i. *p.* 233—235.——*Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol.* i. *p.* 150—153.

DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to theſe duties on both ſides, is evident from the nature of the relation, and thoſe mutual covenants which generally attend it, in which theſe things are either expreſsly or tacitly ſtipulated.

Fleetwood of Rel. Dut. p. 279—281.—— *Puff. de Off. l.* ii. *c.* iv. § 1, 2.—*Hutch. Syſt.* § iii. 1.—*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *p.* 509—511.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM I.

It is diſputed, whether it be unlawful to buy men as ſlaves, and forcibly compel them to do ſervice for life or a term of years. Some have thought the ſtrength of body, and ſtupidity of mind, to be found among ſome parts of the human ſpecies, eſpecially the *Negroes*, intimate, that they were deſigned to be the drudges of the reſt. But to admit ſuch an argument might be attended with dangerous uſurpations and contentions; for who does not think he has genius enough to command others? Nevertheleſs, if any caſe occurs, in which a man may be juſtly condemned to be a ſlave by the laws of his country, it ſeems very allowable to buy him and uſe him as ſuch: and if purchaſing men for ſlaves out of the hands of their enemies, by whom they are taken priſoners, may be a means of preſerving their lives, which in *Guinea* is often the caſe, it ſeems very allowable to purchaſe them; unleſs it prove the means of encouraging unreaſonable and deſtructive wars, and the miſchief occaſioned thereby be grreater than the good ariſing from the preſervation of the lives of thoſe already taken, and the fruit of their labours; which may poſſibly make the matter a greater difficulty than ſome imagine. Yet virtue will require, even in this caſe, that the ſlaves be treated with as much humanity as may be conſiſtent with the ſafety of their maſter, and with a prudent care of his affairs.

Snelgrave's Guin. p. 160, 161.—*Puff. de Off. ib.* § 3. § 4. *With Caermichael's Notes.*——*Monthly Review, vol.* xxiv. *p.* 160.—*Hutch. Syſt.* 2. v. 3. xiv. 3. § iii. 2—5.——*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *p.* 5, 11—13.——*Spirit of Laws, l.* xv. *c.* ii.

c. ii. *vol.* i. *p.* 336—357. *In another Edit. p.* 348, 369 *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned, whether a father may ever sell his child. Some have argued, but without reason, that fatherhood gives a right universally. It seems he only has it, when the constitution of a country appoints him the civil judge of his children; or when his circumstances are such, that the sale of his child in his minority is absolutely necessary for the supporting the lives of either or both of them. *Prop.* 51. *Cor.* 3.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* v. § 5.——*Hutch. Syst. c.* ii. 5.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* vi. *c.* ii. § 9.

LEMMA TO PROPOSITION LXXI.

SECT. LXXXII. As the word *punishment* occurs in the proposition, and is not defined, it may be proper here to give a definition of it, as a *Lemma*, not to alter the number of the succeeding definitions; and it may be taken thus—PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted, in consequence of an offence committed against the person by whom it is inflicted or appointed, whether under a public or private character.

* The question concerning Negro Slavery has lately received the most ample discussion. It may suffice to refer to Mr. Ramsay's treatise on the subject; to Mr. Clarkson's two publications, first on the Iniquity, and secondly on the Impolicy of the Slave-Trade; to Mr. Dickson's Letters on Slavery; and to Dr. Beattie's "Elements of Moral Science," vol. ii. p. 153—223. The poets have not been deficient in appearing on the side of justice and humanity. This is evident from Mr. Day's and Mr. Bicknell's "Dying Negro," Miss Helen Williams's Epistle to Mr. Pitt, Mrs. Barbauld's Address to Mr. Wilberforce, and "Slavery," a poem, written, as is supposed, by Mr. Roscoe, of Liverpool.

PRO-

PROPOSITION LXXI.

Virtue may permit, or even require the civil magistrate, not only to execute other heavy punishments upon offenders, but in some cases to take away their lives.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue requires that the civil magistrate endeavour to preserve the public peace and tranquillity, which is the design of his office.

2. In order to this, it is necessary that effectual methods be taken to deter men from such crimes, as are ruinous to society, *v. g.* murther, treason, theft, *&c.*

3. The corruption of men is so great, that it evidently appears in fact, that they rush on to the commission of those crimes, even though they are made capital by the laws of their country.

3,|4. There is great reason to believe, that if such crimes were not severely punished, and even sometimes with death, they would be much more frequently committed, and the community in time destroyed by them.

1, 2, 4.|5. *Valet propositio.*

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. *c.* iii. § 6, 7.—— *Hutch. Syst. c.* ix. *p.* 10—14.—*Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments, with Voltaire's Commentary. passim.*—— "*Principles of Penal Laws.*" *passim. Understood to have been written by William Eden, Esq. now Lord Auckland.*—— *Paley's* "*Principles of moral and political Philosophy,*" *vol.* ii. *p.* 268—302. *Godwin's* "*Enquiry concerning political Justice,*" *vol.* ii. *p.* 687—759.

COR-

COROLLARY.

A regard to the public good may in some cases require, that an innocent person should be given up to calamity and even to death: *v. g.* if a man infected with the plague, were, in a frenzy, to run up and down to the evident hazard of spreading the contagion; and many add, when an innocent person is demanded by an enemy, against whom the public cannot defend itself. It seems more justifiable to confiscate the estates of traitors, though thereby innocent children are impoverished; both that a regard to their family may prevent their conspiring against the government, and that the children of noble families may be less able to revenge the death of a father.

Puff. ib. § 33. *c.* ii. § 5.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* xxv. § 3.—*Considerations on the Law of Forfeiture. passim.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Considering how precious life is, and how much the fear of violent death would embitter the enjoyment of it, virtue requires that capital punishments should be sparingly used. For murther, none can doubt the reasonableness of them; but perhaps some methods might be found out in case of theft, that would strike the offender with so much terror, as to render capital punishments but seldom necessary; and the severity of *Draco*, in introducing them on the smallest occasions, was greatly to be condemned.

More's Utopia, p. 145, 146.——*Spirit of Laws, vol.* i. *l.* vi. *p.* 16.——*Whiston's Life, vol.* ii. *p.* 415—470.——*Stanyan's Gr. Hist. p.* 145, 146.——*Mitford's History of Greece, vol.* i. *p.* 261, 262.—*Gillies's Ditto, vol.* i. *p.* 455.—"*Thoughts on the Extension of Penal Laws.*" *passim.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

Public executions ought to be managed with very great ſolemnity; and it would be prudent to make a difference between the kinds of death inflicted for different crimes; ſince perhaps ſome may be found, who would dread the pain and ſhame of ſome executions, even more than death itſelf. *Mandeville on Exec. c.* iv. *l.* v.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is queſtioned, whether a community have a right over its *exiles:* but that muſt be determined by the degree of ſeverity attending the ſentence; for if the exile poſſeſſes the revenues of an eſtate, in that country from whence he is driven, it is evident that community has a right and power over him, more than it would otherwiſe have had.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* v. § 25.——*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *p.* 16, 17. *and Notes.* —*Bott againſt Warb. p.* 73—78.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is queſtioned, whether private perſons have a right of killing thoſe who invade them by violence. *Civilians* generally ſtate it thus: where communities are formed, it is to be conſidered whether it be the intent of the law, barely to *permit*, or alſo to *require* ſuch executions: in the former caſe, *v. g.* if a man find another in adultery with his wife, or if a rape be attempted, or an aſſault made by a robber, the law, though it permits to kill the aggreſſor, and thereby frees the ſlayer from puniſhment, yet cannot juſtify the action before God. Yet where the law *requires* ſuch reſiſtance, as in the caſe of ſoldiers invading a country, then it becomes the duty of the ſubject to endeavour the deſtruction of ſuch invaders. But it ſeems, that in the former

mer caſe it is a perſon's *duty* too, when, upon the beſt views he can form of the conſequences, it appears probable, that the immediate ſlaughter of the aggreſſor will turn to the public good; otherwiſe, it is a vicious indulgence of the paſſion of revenge: and thoſe who believe a future ſtate ought to be peculiarly ſolicitous, that they do not plunge even an enemy into irrecoverable miſery, by cutting him off unneceſſarily in the act of his crime. *Prop.* 51. *Cor.* 2.

Grot. ibid. l. ii. *c.* xx. § 17.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* v. § 11, 14.——*Grove's Moral Philoſophy, vol.* ii. *p.* 353—364.

DEFINITION LVI.

LECT. LXXXIII.

Thoſe rules, which by a tacit conſent are agreed upon among all communities, at leaſt among thoſe who are reckoned the polite and humanized part of mankind, are called the LAWS OF NATIONS.

Grot. ibid. Proleg. § 17.——*Grove's Mor. Phil. vol.* ii. *p.* 96.——*Spirit of Laws, vol.* i. *p.* 7, 8.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

The laws of nations are to be regarded.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Communities have certain affairs, which muſt of neceſſity be tranſacted between them.

1.|2. Diſputes may ariſe upon theſe, which cannot be determined by the peculiar civil laws of either of the contending parties.

2.|3. Recourſe muſt in that caſe be had to the laws of nations, to prevent diſputes which might otherwiſe be very miſchievous.

3.|4. Mutual regard muſt be paid to theſe laws. *Q. E. D.*

Hutch. Syſt. vol. ii. *p.* 350, 351.——*See Vattel's "Le Droit de Gens," and his "Queſtions*

"Queſtions de Droit naturel." See alſo the Engliſh Tranſlation of the former Work.

DEFINITION LVII.

WAR is a ſtate, wherein men endeavour by open violence to hurt and deſtroy the perſons or poſſeſſions of each other.

Grot. de Jure, l. i. *c.* i. § 2.—*Puffendorff de Jure, l.* i. *c.* i. § 8.

COROLLARY.

War is a great evil, and virtue will require us to avoid engaging in it, unleſs circumſtances ſhould ariſe, in which it ſhould appear neceſſary for the greater good of mankind. Vid. *Prop.* 51.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Virtue may in ſome caſes permit, and even require that men ſhould engage in war.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The injuſtice of ſome is ſo great, that men will not be able to ſecure their poſſeſſions and their lives in many caſes, unleſs they oppoſe force to force.

2. Perſons violently oppreſſing their inoffenſive neighbours, without juſt cauſe, are ſo far from being valuable members, that they are the peſts of ſociety.

2.|3. By attempting to deſtroy ſuch invaders, we may not only ſecure ourſelves, but alſo many others who might afterwards be ſwallowed up by them, eſpecially if their power of hurting were ſtrengthened by our ſubmiſſion or deſtruction.

1, 3.|4. Caſes may occur, in which oppoſing force to force may tend to the public good, *i. e.*

in which virtue may allow and require us to engage in war. (Vid. *Def.* 57. *Prop.* 51.) *Q. E. D.*

Grot. ibid. l. i. *c.* ii. § 1—3.——*Puff. ibid. l.* viii. *c.* vi. § 7.——*Carmich. in Puff. de Off. l.* i. *c.* v. § 17. *p.* 123, 124.——*Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philoſophy," vol.* ii. *p.* 408—426. *Godwin's "Enquiry concerning political Juſtice," vol.* ii. *p.* 511—525.

SCHOLIUM.

The argument urged in this demonſtration only proves a *defenſive* war to be lawful: it is queſtioned whether it is ever lawful to engage in an *offenſive* war.

Anſ. It is certainly inhuman, and therefore vicious, to begin to hurt unprovoked; and conſidering the many calamities brought on mankind by war, virtue will require us to abhor the thought of increaſing our dominions and poſſeſſions by the ruin of innocent perſons: nevertheleſs, ſelf-defence will require us to take up arms, before we are actually invaded, as it may prevent the intended invaſion, and the mutual ſlaughter which would be conſequent upon it, and will indeed be neceſſary in order to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock, which would otherwiſe be fatal to the party unprepared: nay, a regard to our own ſafety may require us to invade and ſubdue the country of the aggreſſor, and to puſh on our conqueſt, till he is diſabled from doing us farther miſchief.

As to the queſtion, whether it is lawful to take up arms, in defence of the injured ſubjects of another ſtate, to preſerve their civil and religious liberties, it muſt be determined by the proſpect of good ariſing from ſuch a war: if there be an apparent probability, that tyrannical power may be reduced, and the happineſs of other ſtates as well as that invaded may thereby be promoted,

it

it seems lawful on the common principles of humanity.

Puff. ibid. § 3.—*Burn. on Art. p.* 361.—*Grot. ibid. l.* ii. *c.* xx. § 41—43.

DEFINITION LVIII.

PUBLIC WAR is that which is undertaken and managed by the authority of the community; PRIVATE is that which is undertaken and managed without it. *Grot. ib. l. i. c.* iii. § 1.

COROLLARY.

Private war may sometimes be necessary, where the assault is too sudden to allow an act of the community to authorize resistance. (Vid. *Prop.* 71. *Schol.* 4.) But generally where the prospect of danger is more remote, it is very unwarrantable for persons to form themselves into military bodies, without commission from the civil magistrate; even though it be on pretence of warding off the enemy. Yet it must be acknowledged, there may be cases of public danger so extreme, that the force of the civil law may seem for that time to be suspended; and it is the business of every good man, conscientiously to judge for himself, when these cases occur; and the business of every wise and good state, to indemnify by a law such acts as shall appear to have been so necessitated, though not being foreseen they could not have been provided for by laws *a priori*.

Grot. ibid. § 2.

SCHOLIUM I.

Subjects may not, even when commanded by their prince, engage in any war which they are *fully persuaded* is unjust; but if it appears a *dubious point* to them, the same obligation does not hold; for otherwise, common soldiers could hardly ever engage at all, since they seldom have or can have a full view of all the circumstances

of the affair. Nevertheleſs officers in the higher ranks are under greater obligations to enquire critically into it, both as they have much better opportunity of information than their ſoldiers, and as the part they are to act in carrying on the war is of much greater importance.

Grot. ibid. l. ii. *c.* xxvi. § 3—5.—*Puff. ibid.* § 4.—*Burn. Art. p.* 362.

SCHOLIUM 2.

He who offered the injury may defend himſelf, when the party injured has refuſed an equitable ſatisfaction propoſed: in that caſe, the party injured becomes the aggreſſor: much more may ſubjects defend themſelves, even when their prince has been to blame, if the enemy endeavour to avenge the quarrel, not on the perſon of the prince, but on his innocent ſubjects.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. *c.* i. § 18. *c.* xxvi. § 6. —*Puff. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* v. § 19.

SCHOLIUM 3.

LECT. LXXXIV. The violence of war is to be attempered, as much as may be conſiſtent with ſecuring the good ends propoſed by it. An unneceſſary waſte of the enemies goods, (Vid. *Deut.* xx. 19, 20.) and much more of their blood, is to be avoided, and eſpecially rapes, which injure the perſon by, as well as thoſe upon whom, they are committed; nor are women and children to be ſlaughtered, unleſs women be found active in war, and then they are to be treated as other ſoldiers. But it is to be obſerved, that we here, and in all this part of the work, ſpeak only of war as undertaken on the principles of the common rights of mankind, not pretending to diſpute the right which God has to doom any of his creatures to death, in ſuch circumſtances as he ſhall ſee fit, and to make ſome of them executioners on others.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* iv. § 19. *c.* xiii. § 4. —*Hutch. Syſt.* 3 x 6.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is queſtioned how far *ſtratagems* in war are lawful.

Anſ. It may be lawful to deceive the enemy by dubious actions, which may probably be interpreted wrong; and the rather, as there is a kind of univerſal agreement to ſuſpect each other, where no treaties are commenced, ſo that faith among men is not ſo much injured by theſe as by other deceits. Yet there is a degree of honour to be obſerved even towards an enemy, and a direct lie, eſpecially a falſe oath, ſhould by no means be allowed.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* i. § 17, 20. *c.* xix. § 1.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* viii. *c.* vi. § 6. ——*Telemaque, l.* xx. *p.* 246—432.—— *Hutch. ibid.* § 6.

SCHOLIUM 5.

The laws of nations are to be obſerved in war; and theſe forbid violating the perſons of *Embaſſadors*, (ſeeing this would make wars perpetual, as none would venture to mediate a peace) hiring ſoldiers to aſſaſſinate their general, or ſubjects their prince, and poiſoning the enemy by weapons, water, or any other method.

Grot. ibid. l. iii. *c.* iv. § 15—18. *l.* ii. *c.* xviii. § 2, 3, 7.——*Puff. ibid.* § 18. ——*More's Utopia, p.* 158—164—— *Hutch. ibid.* § 12—14.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is much queried, whether temples dedicated to God may be ſpoiled of their treaſures by the conqueror.

Anſ. Thoſe treaſures being in ſome degree ſtill the property of the ſtate, and therefore uſed in times of great extremity for its defence, the conqueror may juſtly ſeize them; yet care ſhould be taken to avoid any circumſtances of rudeneſs

and irreverence, leſt by that means religion ſhould be brought into contempt.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* xii. § 6.—*Prideaux's Connect. vol.* ii. *p.* 25, 26.—*Anno ante Chriſtum*, 278. *vol.* iii. *p.* 35.—*Works of the learned for March* 1738. *Art.* 16.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

To enquire how far government may juſtly be founded in conqueſt.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. The victor in a juſt war may ſee it neceſſary (in order to repair the expences and loſſes ſuſtained, in order to puniſh thoſe who have been injurious to the public peace, and that he may prevent future aſſaults from the vanquiſhed) to make himſelf king of a conquered country, and to model the laws of it in ſuch a manner as he ſhall on the whole judge fit, and he may be juſtified in doing it. Nevertheleſs, if the perſons ſo conquered enter themſelves into no engagements to him, it may reaſonably be expected that they ſhould take the firſt opportunity to throw off his yoke, and they are not obliged to ſubmit to it ſo much as that of their natural ſovereign: yet virtue will require them to be cautious, that they do not make their own condition and that of the public worſe, by a precipitate reſiſtance.

2. If a prince, by an unjuſt war, or any other unrighteous method, have poſſeſſed himſelf of the government, and uſes it well, though he gained it ill, virtue will require, that he be obeyed; at leaſt till the perſon to whom it belongs be able and willing to aſſert his right, with ſome probable proſpect of ſucceſs: for it is certainly better, that an uſurper ſhould govern, than that there ſhould be no government at all.

3. It

3. It ſeems reaſonable, that if the rightful prince, or at leaſt his immediate ſucceſſor be not able to aſſert his claim, but the government continue for a conſiderable time in the hands or family of an uſurper, long poſſeſſion ſhould make up the defect of an original title; leſt the encouragement of antiquated claims ſhould throw nations into confuſion, and by a parity of reaſon private families too.

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. *c.* vi. § 24. *l.* vii. *c.* vii. § 3, 4. *c.* viii. § 9, 10.——*Locke of Gov. part* ii. *c.* xvi, xvii.——*Camb. of Gov. c.* viii.——*L'Eſprit des Loix, vol.* i. *l.* x. *c.* iii—ix.——*Hutch. Syſt.* 3. viii. 4—8.

SCHOLIUM.

The rights of hoſtages and captives are to be ſettled by the law of nations: but it is plain, that neither hoſtages, when upon public faith, nor ſlaves, when they have by compact obliged themſelves to their maſters, may be allowed to deſert, unleſs extreme injury be offered.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* xiv. § 7. *l.* iii. *c.* xix. § 54.

PROPOSITION LXXV.

To enquire into the principal branches of human or perſonal virtue. LECT. LXXXV.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Since the happineſs of a rational creature muſt chiefly depend upon the ſtate of his own mind, virtue requires that great care be taken of it, particularly to furniſh it with ſuch knowledge as may be delightful and uſeful.

Foſter's Serm. vol. iv. 1.——*Grove's Poſth. Works, vol.* ii. *N°.* 11—13.——*Abernethy's Diſc. vol.* ii. *N°.* 5.

2. As we may, by an heedleſs conduct, be betrayed into numberleſs evils, virtue requires that we ſhould attentively conſider our circumſtances in life, and often reflect on our conduct.

Lardner's Counſels of Prudence.—Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. *p.* 221—242.

3. Since we are compounded of body as well as mind, virtue will require a proper care of the body, that on the one hand it may not want any thing neceſſary for its ſubſiſtence, health and vigour; and on the other, that it may not be indulged in ſuch exceſſes, as however pleaſant at firſt, might at length enfeeble and deſtroy it.

Collier's Eſſ. part ii. *N°.* 17——*Stubbe's Dial. on Pleaſure. Proteſt. Syſt. vol.* ii. *N°.* 12.——*Fordyce's Sermon on the Love of Pleaſure.*——*Abern. Diſc. vol.* ii. *N°.* 16.

4. As it is impoſſible to be happy, while our minds are the ſport of irregular appetites and paſſions, virtue will require a due guard upon theſe; that the agreeable things of life may not be objects of exceſſive deſire, hope, or joy; and that the evils of it may not overwhelm us with fear, with grief, or reſentment, nor its uncertainty with exceſſive ſolicitude.

Watts on the Paſſions, § 15—24.—*Grove's Poſth. Works, vol.* iv. *N°.* 6.—*Grove's Ethics, p.* 257—287.

5. As many diſorders of body and mind may take their riſe from idleneſs, virtue will on the preceding principles require, that we keep ourſelves in a ſeries of uſeful employments, and labour to improve every proportion of our time well, proper allowance being made for ſuch recreation as animal nature requires.

Balguy's Sermons, vol. ii. *N°.* 8.—*Grove on Recreations, paſſim.*

6. That we may not be led into undertakings diſproportioned to our ſtrength, that we may not

not expect too high regard from others, nor be too keenly impreſſed with a ſenſe of ſlights and injuries, as well as for many other important reaſons, virtue will require us to moderate our opinion of ourſelves, in proportion to the degree and value of our real advantages, whether of mind, of body, or eſtate.

Col. Eſſ. part i. *N°.* 1.—*Watts on Humility. paſſim.*——*Scott's Chriſtian Life, vol.* i. *c.* iii. § 1.——*Part* i. *Works, vol.* i. *p.* 18—23.——*Carmich. Suppl. to Puff. de Off. l.* i. *c.* v. § 2.—*Wright's Great Concern, p.* 113—125.—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l.* ii. § 2.—*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *part* ii. *c.* ii.——v.——*Grove's Serm. vol.* v. *N°.* 10, 11.—*Price on Morals, p.* 258—263.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 105—123.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It may be obſerved, that the firſt and ſecond of theſe ſteps comprehend *prudence* and *conſideration*, the third *temperance*, *chaſtity*, and *mortification*, the fourth *fortitude*, *contentment*, *meekneſs*, and *moderation*, the fifth *diligence*, the laſt *humility*; and thus the diſtribution in effect coincides with thoſe of *Scott*, *Wright*, &c.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Thoughts tending to vice are no farther criminal, than as they are approved and indulged by the will. *Def.* 38.

Oſterv. of Unclean. § 1. *c.* vii. *p.* 72—74.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Though a conſtant care ſhould be taken (on the principles laid down *gr.* 3.) to maintain ſuch moderation, in the articles of food, dreſs, ſleep, *&c.* as may prevent the mind from being enſlaved

ſlaved to the body; and though it be prudence in us to inure ourſelves to ſuch hardſhips, as may be expected in a worthy and honourable paſſage through life; it is by no means neceſſary to deny ourſelves in every thing which gives pleaſure to the ſenſes: for God has placed us in ſuch circumſtances, that ſome pleaſures are unavoidable, (the benevolence of his nature no doubt engaging him to delight in the happineſs of his creatures;) it is therefore ingratitude to him, as well as injuſtice to ourſelves, to throw back his gifts upon his hands, as if they were ſnares rather than favours. To which we may add, that in the circumſtances in which mankind now are, were all the elegancies and ornaments of life to be renounced, many families muſt be undone, who are now maintained by an honeſt labour in furniſhing them out, and maintained more chearfully, and indeed more ſafely, than they could merely by alms.

Philem. to Hydaſpes, part ii. *præf. p.* 26—64, 91, *ad fin.*

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

To enquire into ſome of the principal means of promoting virtue in the ſoul.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue may be promoted by attentive hearing and reading diſcourſes on divine ſubjects, and ſeriouſly meditating upon them; all which may ſerve to aſſiſt us in forming right notions of God, and in judging of our duty, and may awaken us to the practice of it.

2. External acts of adoration and praiſe may promote as well as expreſs inward veneration.

Atterb. Poſt. Serm. vol. ii. *N°.* vii. *p.* 191—203.

3. Earneſt and frequent prayers to God may greatly tend to promote virtue: for though they can

can neither inform nor move him, yet they may bring us to a proper temper for receiving his mercies. And if any object, that God has eſtabliſhed ſuch an order of things, as he will not alter in compliance with the intreaties of his creatures; it may be replied, that this order was no doubt eſtabliſhed in connection with, and in correſpondence to the view, which the divine being always had of the prayers and temper of his rational creatures: and huſbandry, and all the moſt neceſſary labours of life, might as reaſonably be argued againſt as prayer, on the force of this objection.

Burn. Life of Roch. p. 52, 53, 60—64.—*Stebbing on Div. Rev. p.* 36—42.——*Benſ. of Prayer, p.* 13—21.——*Ibbot's Sermons. vol.* ii.—*Sermons*, 10, 11, 12.——*On the Duty and Benefit of Prayer.*——*Sherlock on Providence. Edit.* 9. *p.* 391—402.——*Dr. Price's Diſſertations. Diſſertation the Second.—Ogden's Sermons on Prayer.—Kippis's Sermons, Sermon the 7th.——Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* ii. *p.* 31—47. *Seventh Edit.——Relig. of Nat. p.* 103, 104.—*Leechman's Serm. on Prayer, præf. p.* 14, 24—25. *Glaſg. Ed.——Grove on ſecret Prayer. Eſſ.* i.—*King's Origin of Evil*, 5. v. 4. *præf. par.* 7—13.——*Abernethy on Attrib. vol.* ii. *p.* 401—415.

4. It is proper that men ſhould meet in religious aſſemblies, to join in divine worſhip; as thereby a public honour is done to God, and the hearts of men may be fixed and quickened by beholding the devotion of each other.

Price, ibid. p. 257—267.—*Proteſt. Syſt. vol.* ii. *Sermon* 8—*Collib. on Nat. and Rev.*

Rev. Rel. p. 25.——*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 84—87 *.

4.|5. It is proper that ſome perſon ſhould be appointed, whoſe chief buſineſs it ſhould be to preſide in theſe aſſemblies; ſince by this means, religious offices will be performed in a manner moſt tending to common edification.

4.|6. Leſt the civil buſineſs of ſome ſhould interfere with the religious appointment of others, it is proper that ſome time ſhould be ſet apart by common conſent for religious purpoſes: beſides that, the reſt of beaſts and ſervants may require ſome ſuch appointments; which therefore have made a part of the religious conſtitution of almoſt all nations.

Watts's Holin. of Times and Places, p. 3—5. —*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 396.—*Foſt. Serm. on the Morality of the Sabbath.—In his* 4 *Volumes of Sermons, oct. vol.* 4*th.*

* The Authority, Propriety, and Utility of Public Worſhip have lately been called in Queſtion by the Rev. Gilbert Wakefield, in an Enquiry concerning that Subject. To this Publication Anſwers were given by a Lady, under the Name of Euſebia, in "Curſory Remarks on an Enquiry, &c." by Mrs. Barbauld, in "Remarks on Mr. Wakefield's Enquiry;" by James Wilſon, M. A. in "A Defence of public or ſocial Worſhip;" by Dr. Prieſtly, in "Letters to a young Man;" by the Rev. J. Bruckner, in "Thoughts on Public Worſhip;" by Mr. Burges, in "Remarks, &c.;" by Mr. Parry, in "A Vindication of public and ſocial Worſhip;" by Mr. Pope, in his Eſſay, entitled "Divine Worſhip, founded in Nature, and ſupported by Scripture Authority;" and in "Remarks, &c." by a Layman. Two Sermons were likewiſed preached and publiſhed upon the Queſtion; one by Dr. Diſney, and the other by Mr. Simpſon. Mr. Wakefield, in his "General Reply to the Arguments againſt the Enquiry into public Worſhip," has partly given up the point; and in the ſecond edition of his "Enquiry," he has ſketched a plan of public worſhip in which he could acquieſce. The controverſy ſeems now to be for ever decided; and it has had the advantage of ſhewing that the practice of public and ſocial worſhip ſtands ſupported upon the unqueſtionable foundation of reaſon and ſcripture.

7. It

7. It may be proper that faſting ſhould ſometimes be joined with other acts of divine worſhip to promote more intenſe devotion, to expreſs our humiliation for ſin, and to promote that command of the mind over the body, which is ſuited to the conſtitution of a rational being.

Limb. Theol. l. v. *c.* lxxv. § 3, 4.—— *Amory's Dial. on Devot.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

LECT. LXXXVI.

Thoſe things are only to be aſked of God in prayer, which are of ſome conſiderable importance, by which our trueſt happineſs may probably be promoted, and which there appears ſome hope of obtaining: and where it is dubious, as with reſpect to many temporal enjoyments it is, whether obtaining our petitions will be on the whole for our advantage, we are to aſk theſe things only conditionally, with a becoming ſubmiſſion to the ſuperior wiſdom of God.

Juven. Sat. x.—*Pluto's Alcibiades.* ii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is queſtioned, whether we may pray for what we are ſure God will give or do.

Anſ. There can be no doubt of this, if our aſking it be the *condition* of its being beſtowed or done: nor can we, without a revelation, be abſolutely ſure of any future event, how probable ſoever: and it ſeems, that if a promiſe were abſolutely given, we might juſtly plead it with God in prayer, thereby to promote our conformity to the divine will, our expectation of the bleſſing, and fitneſs to receive it: but ſuch prayers ought to be managed, ſo as not to intimate any doubt of the divine veracity, but on the contrary to expreſs a firm and joyful reliance upon it.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is allowed, that *forms* of prayer may help the ignorant and weak, and may prevent public devo-

devotion from falling into that contempt, of which there might otherwiſe be danger, when ſuch perſons are to officiate; as alſo from being made the vehicle of canveying the errors and irregular paſſions, which particular perſons ſo officiating might otherwiſe mingle with them: they may alſo be uſeful in ſecret and family-worſhip; and even to perſons of the beſt capacity, in ſeaſons when they are out of frame for the duty. Yet it is very unreaſonable, that perſons in public or private ſhould be confined to forms; ſince they cannot ſuit all circumſtances, and a frequent repetition of the ſame words tends to deaden thoſe affections, which ought to accompany prayer.

The chief objections againſt *extemporary* or *free* prayer are,

1. That the mind cannot, without great diſturbance and diſſipation of thought, give that attention and examination to it, which is neceſſary to a rational aſſent and concurrence.

2. That the auditory may be diſquieted with the fear, leſt the perſon officiating ſhould fall into ſome impropriety or abſurdity of expreſſion, inconſiſtent with the reverence due to the divine being, and the improvement of his fellow-worſhippers.

To the *former* we reply, by appealing to experience as an evidence of the quickneſs of the mind in its operations, to which the quickneſs of words bears but little proportion. A probable gueſs may be made at the tendency of a ſentence from its beginning, eſpecially when due care is taken that ſentences be not drawn out to an immoderate length, and when any book ſuppoſed ſacred, furniſhes out much of the language.—As to the *latter*, experience alſo ſhews, that perſons of no extraordinary genius are capable of praying without groſs abſurdity or impropriety of expreſſion; ſo that where the abilities of the per-

perſon are known, the probability of his running into them is ſo ſmall, as not at all to affect the mind; and there is a poſſibility, that a *reader* may miſtake.

Bennet's Abridg. of Lond. Caſes, p. 72—78.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 122—124.——*Pierce's Vind. of Diſſ. l.* iii. *c.* iv. *p.* 398, 399, 404—406.——*Jackſ. on Lord's Prayer, pref. p.* 7.——*Limb. Theol. l.* v. *c.* xxv. § 28.——*Halif. Char. of a Trimmer, p.* 45, 46.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 671.——*Watts's Miſc. p.* 202—213.——*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 537—542.——*Dr. John Taylor's Scripture Account of Prayer.*——"*Public Prayer,*" *a Treatiſe againſt Forms, in two parts, in* 12*mo.* 1766. *part* i. *ch.* i—iv. *p.* 13—60.——*Diſquiſitions relating to the Diſſenters,* 12*mo,* 1767, *c.* i—iv. *for written Forms.*——*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol* ii. *p.* 58—67.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Where liturgies are eſtabliſhed by public authority, great care ought to be taken that there be no phraſes in them likely to lead men into hurtful miſtakes; ſeeing the veneration quickly contracted for ſuch offices, would render it exceeding difficult to eradicate an error ſo imbibed.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is our duty to pray for *others*; ſince hereby our benevolence for them is expreſſed and increaſed, and it is the only way by which we can expreſs it to far the greateſt part of our ſpecies.

Price's Diſſertations, N°. 2. *p.* 221—227, 237—239.

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SCHOLIUM 6.

It is the duty of the community to take care that there be able teachers, of a virtuous character, that ſo virtue may be promoted in it. Nothing therefore ſhould be done to deter fit perſons from undertaking the work, by ſubſcriptions, oaths, *&c.* which would be moſt likely in ſome caſes to exclude the moſt valuable men. It is alſo fit, that the community by whom they are employed ſhould allow them ſuch ſubſiſtence, that they may purſue their ſtudies without avocation, and may be fitted for performing their office, in a manner moſt honourable to the divine being, and moſt edifying to thoſe among whom they officiate.

Rees of Maintenance.—Hutch. Syſt. vol. ii. *p.* 310—312.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Great care ought to be taken that religion be not over-burthened with ceremonies; for the mind of man is of ſo limited a nature, that by an over-exact attendance to theſe, greater things will probably be neglected; and the diverſity of taſtes, education, *&c.* will probably lead men into differences with reſpect to them, which, if they be too much regarded, will be very detrimental to that benevolence which they ought to maintain for each other.

Tind. Chriſtianity as old, &c. p. 123, 124.
—*Geddes's Tracts, vol.* iv. *p.* 205—225.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Though prayer and praiſe have been mentioned above, as the *means* of virtue, yet they are not *only* to be conſidered in that view; they are certainly a part of the duty we owe to God, as well as proper means of diſpoſing us to the other branches of virtue: and it would appear unnatural, under a deep ſenſe of our dependence upon,

upon, and our obligations to the Divine Being, never to expreſs it in any kind of addreſs to him, though we believe him continually preſent with us. *Dr. Price's ſecond Diſſertation.*

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

LECT. LXXXVII.

Virtue requires, that the civil magiſtrate ſhould not ſo interpoſe in matters of religion, or rites of worſhip, as to inflict any penalties on his ſubjects upon account of them, ſo long as nothing is done prejudicial to the peace of the community.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 49. *gr.* 23.|2. Virtue, and conſequently religion, which is that branch of it that more immediately relates to God, conſiſts not merely in the external performance of an action, but in a correſpondent temper and diſpoſition of ſoul.

2. Compulſion only influences the external actions, and can by no means convince the underſtanding.

1, 2.|3. Such ſeverities cannot make men religious, but are rather likely to make them hypocrites.

3.|4. Perſecution for conſcience-ſake muſt be prejudicial to the public, by corrupting the characters of men.

5. The perſons perſecuted muſt probably be brought into a very unhappy condition by it: for if they renounce their profeſſion, they ſubject themſelves to great remorſe, while they ſecretly believe it to be true; and if they maintain it, penalties are incurred, by which ruin may be brought on themſelves and their families.

6. The minds of men are naturally prejudiced in favour of a religion, for which men ſuffer hardſhips, though they do nothing injurious to the public peace.

7. Perſecutions may promote the cauſe they are intended to deſtroy, and by increaſing the number of its votaries may occaſion inſurrections, which may be extremely detrimental to the public tranquillity.

Tert. ad Scap. c. v. *ad fin. Apol. c.* i.——*Boyle's occaſ. Meditations, p.* 145—148. § 5. *N°.* 2.

4, 5, 7, 8. The magiſtrate by interpoſing in theſe caſes, would prejudice the public rather than ſerve it, and therefore virtue requires him to forbear ſuch interpoſitions.

Moyle's Poſt. Works, vol. i. *p.* 24—26.—*Warburt. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *p.* 304, 305.—*Owen's Syn. Pneum. p.* 137—139.—*Tind. Rights Chriſtian Church, part* i. *c.* i. § 20.——*Monteſ. Spirit of Laws, l.* xxv. *c.* xiii. *vol.* ii. *p.* 183—186.—*Doddridge's Serm. on Perſec.*——*Old Whig, vol.* i. *N°.* v, vi, viii, ix, x.——*Foſt. Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* vi.——*Watts's Eſſay on civil Power in Things ſacred,* § 3, 7, 10.——*Appendix in the laſt vol. of his Works.*——*Voltaire on Toleration.*——*Fownes's Inquiry into the Principles of Toleration. Ed.* 3.—*Furneaux's Eſſay on Toleration.*——*Ditto's Letters to Mr. Juſtice Blackſtone. Ed.* 2——*Six Letters on Intolerance.*

SCHOLIUM.

The hiſtory of religion in moſt countries, and the many calamities which have ariſen from perſecution, greatly tends to illuſtrate and confirm the laſt ſteps of this demonſtration; and perhaps there is no part of hiſtory more inſtructive, though none be more melancholy.

Occaſ. Pap. vol. i. *N°.* iv. *p.* 18—22.—*Temp. Netherl. p.* 166—169, 175.——*Geddes's Account of the Inquiſition, ap. Tracts,*

Tracts, vol. i.——*Geddes's Hiſt. of the Expulſion of the Moriſcoes, ibid. vol.* i. ——*New Advent. of Telemachus.*—— *Chandler's Hiſt. of Perſecut. paſſ.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. There are a variety of religions in the world, which are ſo inconſiſtent, that it is impoſſible they ſhould all be true.

2. If it be the duty of the magiſtrate to eſtabliſh and defend *any* religion by penalties, he muſt eſtabliſh and defend that which he takes to be true.

3. There is reaſon to believe that the generality of men take their own religion to be true.

1, 2, 3.|4. Many magiſtrates in the world, and perhaps the greateſt part of them, would be obliged, (if the contrary to the propoſition were true,) to perſecute truth, and eſtabliſh falſhood. *Q. E. A.*

Old Whig, vol. i. *N°.* xxxiii.——*Price's Morals, p.* 313, 314.

SCHOLIUM 1.

To the whole reaſoning in *Dem.* 1. it is objected, that ſome errors in opinion and in worſhip are ſo diſpleaſing to God, that the toleration of them would quickly bring down his vengeance upon the public, which it is the magiſtrates buſineſs to endeavour to preſerve.

Anſ. It ſeems that opinions and practices ſo provoking to God muſt be highly contrary to reaſon, and therefore that the prevalency of them might be prevented by a rational debate, without having recourſe to violence: and if in ſome few inſtances they ſhould prevail, there may be danger, leſt God ſhould be more provoked by attempting to root them out, by methods ſo detrimental to human ſociety, and to the cauſe of truth, (*Dem.* 2.) which this objection itſelf ſup-

poſes to be the cauſe of God. Nevertheleſs, it muſt be acknowledged, that if God ſhould give any nation convincing proofs, that he would viſit it with ſome extraordinary calamity and judgment, if any particular religion were violated among them, this would indeed alter the caſe, and juſtify ſuch a magiſtrate in fencing it with ſuch penal laws, as in other caſes would be unjuſtifiable: but if a magiſtrate raſhly concludes this to be the caſe of the people under his government, he is anſwerable to God for all thoſe injuries which he may do them and religion upon this falſe ſuppoſition: and as for *chriſtianity*, it does not treat with *nations* as *ſuch*; nor does the New Teſtament contain declarations of vengeance againſt the nations rejecting it, however virtuous they may be, but only treats with *particular perſons*, as thoſe who ſhall be finally happy or miſerable, as it is received or rejected.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To *Dem.* 1. *gr.* 5. it is objected, that it may be kindneſs to the perſon ſuffering, to endeavour by ſuch ſeverity to reclaim him from ſuch notions and practices, which, (ſuppoſing what is generally granted in this debate, the immortality of the ſoul,) may expoſe him to the danger of eternal ruin.

Anſ. It appears by *gr.* 3. of that *Demonſtration*, that perſecution is not the way to prevent it, but rather to bring on farther guilt, by adding hypocriſy to error: and if it be ſaid, that by this means at leaſt others are preſerved; it is anſwered, that the evidence of truth itſelf may be ſufficient, without violence, to preſerve men from ſuch groſs and dangerous errors as the objection ſuppoſes. If it be farther pleaded, that the corruption of their natures will lead them to error, if human terrors be not employed to reſtrain them from it; it may be anſwered, perſecution

tends

tends to beget a ſuſpicion in their minds of the cauſe to be ſupported by it: the magiſtrate cannot by any means prevent and cure all the ſecret abominations of the heart, but many of them muſt be referred to the judgment of God: and upon this principle, it might be allowable to perſecute any notion whatſoever, which the fury and uncharitableneſs of the magiſtrate might call a damnable error.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To *gr.* 2. *Dem.* 1. it is objected, that ſeverity may bring men to examine, and examination may introduce a rational conviction.

Anſ. Arguments ſo offered are not likely to work upon the mind, and the magiſtrate ſeems to have done his part, if he has taken care that the argument ſhould be fairly, clearly, and ſtrongly propoſed; nor is it worth while to riſk ſo much evil, for the ſake of people that will not be perſuaded to enquire; eſpecially ſince the generality of ſuch people uſually go into the prevailing religion, which is that of the magiſtrate, and reſt there.

Grotius de Jure, 2, 20, 44.—*Shafteſbury's Characteriſtics*, *vol.* iii. *p.* 107.—*Locke's Eſſ.* 4. xvi. 4.

SCHOLIUM 4.

To the argument of *Dem.* 2. it is generally replied, that none are obliged to uſe violence in defence of their religion, but thoſe whoſe religion is true. But then the queſtion returns, who is that perſon? Every man will ſay it is he; and the controverſy will be eternal, and all the miſchief ariſing from it perpetual, unleſs ſome one perſon or body of men can give the world convincing proof, that they are in the right; and

then there will be no farther room for perſecution, even on the principles of our adverſaries.

Bayle's Philoſ. Comment on Luke xiv. 23. ——*Conyb. Serm. on Exped. of Rev. p.* 17—21.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Many inſiſt upon the right of puniſhing thoſe who *teach* falſe religions; though they confeſs that men are not to be obliged to profeſs the true. But ſeeing a man may think himſelf obliged in conſcience, to endeavour the propagation of a religion, as well as himſelf to believe and practiſe it, moſt of the reaſonings in both *Demonſtrations* will take place here. Nevertheleſs, we readily allow, that the magiſtrate, or any religious community, may deprive a teacher of any ſalary or emolument, given him at firſt as a teacher of truth, if he appear in the judgment of that perſon or ſociety to become a teacher of error: but this by no means comes within the caſe condemned in the propoſition.

Scotch Confeſſ. Pref. p. 52—58.——*Old Whig, N°.* iv. *p.* 37, 38.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The doctrines of atheiſm, human ſacrifices, and community of women or goods, are ſo evidently detrimental to ſociety, that many who have in general condemned penal laws in religion, have allowed them with regard to theſe, as well as to thoſe who deny the eſſential difference between virtue and vice.

We readily allow, that if by any *overt act* in conſequence of theſe doctrines, any ſubjects of the ſociety be injured, the aggreſſor ought to be ſeverely puniſhed, and his pretences to conſcience to be admitted as no excuſe, in theſe caſes or any others. But theſe notions are ſo notoriouſly abſurd, that there is little danger, that upon a free

free examination they should prevail, especially in a civilized country; and the danger there would be of admitting persecution, on any pretence whatsoever, seems an equivalent for the damage the public would sustain, by permitting them to be publicly defended, while they reached no farther than speculation.

Alliance between Church and State, p. 118—121.——*Old Whig, vol.* i. *N°.* xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii, xxxvi.

SCHOLIUM 7.

If a body of men, as the *Papists* among us, hold principles, which will not allow them to give the government security for their peaceable behaviour, and yet bring them under strong suspicion of being engaged in designs subversive of it, the government may in that case weaken them by heavier taxations than are laid upon other subjects; especially if the probable suspicion of their disaffection puts the public to any additional charge: and it seems only so far as this principle will justify it, that our laws against the *Papists* can be vindicated, on the foot of natural religion, not now to enquire into any supposed revelation.

Serm. against Popery, at Salter's Hall, vol. i. *p.* 36—38.—*Locke on Tol. Let.* i. *pass.* —*Dod. Serm. on Pers. p.* 6—19, 20—28.—*Old Whig, vol.* i. *N°.* xi *.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Some have represented all encouragement given to one religious profession in preference to

* The severity of the laws against the Roman Catholics, has of late years been exposed in various publications, and a general conviction been produced of their impolicy and injustice. Accordingly, these laws have been in part repealed. Dr. O'Leary and Mr. Berrington have appeared as able advocates for their Roman Catholic brethren.

another, as a degree of perſecution: but this ſeems to be carrying the matter into a contrary extreme. Both a regard to the honour of God and the good of ſociety, (which ſurely the magiſtrate is not the only perſon under no obligation to,) muſt engage him to deſire and labour that his people may be inſtructed in what he takes to be truth; for which purpoſe it will be neceſſary that ſome proviſion be made for thoſe that ſo inſtruct them, preferable to other inſtructors: that he may maintain ſuch out of his private purſe, none can doubt; and if he have a diſcretionary power with reſpect to any branch of the public revenue, it ſeems he may apply it to this purpoſe, even though moſt of his people were of a different religious perſuaſion from himſelf: and for any, who teach different doctrines, or will not ſubmit to the ritual he thinks fit to eſtabliſh, to claim the ſame emoluments from him, ſeems an invaſion of that right of private judgment, which the magiſtrate and others joined with him muſt be allowed to have, as to the manner in which either his revenue or theirs ſhall be diſpoſed of. But then it muſt be allowed, that it will be matter of duty and prudence in the magiſtrate, and thoſe that join with him, to make his eſtabliſhment as large as he can; that no worthy and good men, who might as eſtabliſhed teachers be uſeful to the public, may unneceſſarily be hampered and excluded; and for this he will be anſwerable to God.—If the majority of the people by their repreſentatives join with the magiſtrate in ſuch eſtabliſhments, it will be the duty of the minority, though they cannot in conſcience conform themſelves, yet to be thankful that they are left in the poſſeſſion of their own liberty, as by the reaſoning above they certainly ought to be. If it be aſked, whether ſuch diſſenters may regularly be forced by the magiſtrate and majority, to aſſiſt in maintaining eſtabliſhed teachers

teachers whom they do not approve; it is anſwered, that this will ſtand upon the ſame footing with their contributing towards the expence of a war, which they think not neceſſary or prudent. If no ſuch coercive power were admitted, it is probable, that covetouſneſs would drive many into diſſenting parties, in order to ſave their tithes or other poſſeſſions. So that none can reaſonably blame a government for requiring ſuch general contributions: and in this caſe, it ſeems fit it ſhould be yielded to, as the determination of thoſe, to whoſe guardianſhip theſe diſſenters have committed themſelves and their poſſeſſions. But if the majority diſapprove of the conduct of their governor in this reſpect, it muſt ſtand upon the ſame footing with the right of reſiſtance in any other caſe, in which the people apprehend themſelves to be betrayed by their governor.

Dunlope's Pref. to Scotch Confeſſ.——*Abern. Tracts, p.* 170—176.—*Furneaux's Letters to Mr. Juſtice Blackſtone, Letter* 1, *latter part.*

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Virtue prohibits any man to put a period to his own life. LECT. LXXVIII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Self-murther plainly implies a want of reverence for God, and reſignation to his will, who is the Lord of life and death, and has aſſigned to every man his poſt in life to be maintained, till he ſhall diſmiſs him from it.

2. It is generally injurious to the public, in defrauding it of a member who might ſome way or other be uſeful to it, and introducing an example which might be very pernicious.

3. It brings great diſtreſs and often great infamy on ſurviving relatives and friends.

4. It

4. It argues a diſhonourable weakneſs of mind, in not being able to endure the calamities of life, which many others, whoſe paſſions are well governed, ſupport with ſerenity and chearfulneſs.

5. If there be a future ſtate, (which we ſhall afterwards prove,) it may, in conſequence of the preceding arguments, bring irreparable damage on the perſon himſelf, who dies in an action highly diſpleaſing to God, and cuts off the poſſibility of farther preparation.

1, 5, 6. Self-murther is contrary to the duty we owe to God, to ourſelves, and our fellow-creatures, by the preceding propoſitions, and therefore contrary to virtue. *Q. E. D.*

Watts againſt Self-Murther, p. 4—8, 39—41, 47—52.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 358, 359, *and p.* 368, 369.—*Clarke of Nat. and Rev. Rel. p.* 207—211.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* iv. § 19.—*Cic. Somn. Scip. ap. Off. p.* 229. *Græv. c.* iii. *Ed. ibid. Tuſc. Diſp. l.* i. *c.* xxx.—*Gronovius, p.* 1150.—*Olivet. Tom.* ii. *p.* 325—327. *Geneva Edition.*—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, vol.* ii. *p.* 17—28.—*Spirit of Laws, vol.* i. *p.* 145, *vol.* ii. *p.* 29.—*Grove's Ethics, vol.* ii. *p.* 274—280*.

COROLLARY 1.

All lawful means are to be uſed to preſerve our lives; for not to preſerve is to deſtroy.

COROLLARY 2.

If bringing any temporary diſorder upon ourſelves may be the probable means of preſerving

* A Treatiſe on Suicide, in two volumes, quarto, has lately been written by the Rev. Mr. More. In this Treatiſe the ſubject is conſidered in every poſſible variety of lights; and the arguments of the apologiſts or extenuators of ſelf-murder, whether ancient or modern, are amply refuted and expoſed. There are two eloquent letters on the ſubject, including both ſides of the queſtion, in Rouſſeau's "New Heloiſe."

life,

life, virtue will not only permit but require us to do it, though it may be attended with ſome hazard; provided that hazard be leſs than would ariſe from omitting it: and if *inoculation* for the ſmall-pox be lawful, it is on theſe principles.

Some of Inocul. paſſ.—Sowden on Ditto paſſ.

SCHOLIUM I.

To *Dem. gr.* 1. it is objected, 1. That life was given as a *benefit*; and therefore may be returned, when it ceaſes to be ſo.

Anſ. It was not given as a benefit merely to the perſon that enjoys it, but as a *truſt* to be improved for the good of others: God intending, in the creation of each creature, not merely the happineſs of that individual himſelf, but of the whole ſyſtem of which he makes a part: this plainly follows from *Prop.* 45.

2. That we are ſuch inconſiderable creatures, that there is no reaſon to believe, that God will be diſpleaſed with what affects the order of nature ſo little as our death would do.—But this argument would conclude for killing ourſelves or each other at pleaſure, and indeed at once overthrow the baſis of all morality and virtue.

3. That we may conclude God gives us leave to retire, when our continuance in life will anſwer no good purpoſe. But to this it is anſwered, we can never ſay that this is the caſe; ſince we may be ſometimes unexpectedly recovered from great calamities; or even when we lie under them, may be very ſerviceable to others, by affording them examples of patience and reſignation. God alone is capable of judging certainly when our uſefulneſs is quite over; and therefore his orders are to be waited.

4. As for *Gildon*'s obſervation, that we do not come into life by our own conſent, as a ſoldier does into an army; the anſwer is obvious, that God as our creator has a much greater right to

our

our humble obedience, than a general can have to that of a ſoldier, how willingly ſoever he may have enliſted himſelf into his ſervice.

Blount's Orac. of Reaſ. p. 7—13.——*In his Life, p.* 10. 11.——*Lettres Perſannes, vol.* ii. *N°.* lxiv, lxvii.——*Paſſeran's Phil. Enq. paſſ.*——*Fitzoſb. Lett. N°.* xxii.——*Montaigne's Eſſ. vol.* ii. *ch.* iii.

COROLLARY 2.

To *gr.* 2. it is objected, that ſome people cannot in any reſpect be ſerviceable to the public, or that if they could, they have a right to retire from the community when they ſee fit.

Anſ. This can only be allowed, when there may be a proſpect of at leaſt equal happineſs to mankind by the remove; otherwiſe the general laws of benevolence oblige them to a continuance; and how this can be the caſe in ſelf-murther, will be hard to ſhew.

Watts, ibid. p. 12—14.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 360.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To prevent a tormenting death, (whether natural or violent,) certainly approaching, or the violation of chaſtity, ſeems the moſt plauſible excuſe for ſuicide. Yet as to the firſt of theſe, it is to be conſidered, (beſides what was hinted *Schol.* 1.) that to die in torment for the ſake of truth, is a glorious example of virtue, which may be exceedingly uſeful: and humbly to yield to a ſevere ſentence of death for any crime committed, may deter others from it much more effectually than ſelf-violence could do, and may be on the whole an action the moſt pious and the moſt beneficial a man can in theſe circumſtances perform. As to the *latter*, ſuch violence would not deſtroy the character and uſefulneſs of the perſon

perſon ſuffering by it; or if it did, it were to be born with ſubmiſſion as a trial coming from the hand of providence.

Watts, ibid. p. 65—69.——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 372, 373.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Nevertheleſs it ſeems, that if the magiſtrate condemns a man to death, and gives him his choice, whether he will die by his own hand, or by a more ſevere execution from the hands of another, he may in that caſe execute himſelf.

Athen. Oracle.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

God is true in all his declarations, and faithful in all his engagements to his creatures, if he enters into any engagements with them. LECT. LXXXIX.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 54, 55.|1. Virtue requires *us* to be true to our declarations, and faithful to our promiſes.

2. Our obligations to truth and fidelity in our converſe with our fellow-creatures does not ariſe from our own weakneſs and dependence, but from the general laws of benevolence: and if a being, beyond all poſſibility of receiving any perſonal advantage from falſhood and treachery, were to be guilty of it, he would be ſo much the more inexcuſable, and therefore ſo much the more odious. 1, 2. *Prop.* 44. *Cor.* 3.|3. *Valet propoſitio.*

Abern. Serm. vol. ii. *N°.* v. *p.* 229—231. *Dublin. Ed. p.* 216—218. *London Ed. p.* 124, 125.——*Tillotſ. vol.* ii. *p.* 654. ——*Serm.* 87. *p.* 579, 580. *4th Ed.*—— *Wilk. Nat. Rel. p.* 140—142. *Seventh Edition.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 1.

If there be any force in what is ſaid *Prop.* 54. *Schol.* 1. to prove that there is a kind of *inſtinct* in favour of truth rooted in our nature, that may afford ſome preſumption, that God the author of our nature is a lover of truth, as the *benevolent* inſtinct implanted in our nature, may be an argument of his benevolence.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many have queſtioned, whether God, by the veracity and fidelity of his nature, be obliged to fulfil his *threatenings*. It is urged, that promiſes give another a right of a claim to what has been promiſed; but for a perſon not to accompliſh his threatening, is to be *better* than his word; and conſequently it would be no reflection on the divine being to ſuppoſe it thus with regard to him.

But it ſeems, this queſtion is to be determined, by the manner in which the threatening is delivered. If any action be forbidden by God on ſuch a penalty, and no farther declaration be added, he does not ſeem to be bound by it; but if he has in any caſe added a declaration, that he will in fact make his threatenings as well as his promiſes the rule of his final proceedings, it ſeems inconſiſtent with his *veracity*, though not his *fidelity*, to act contrary to them; eſpecially if we conſider, that as there is no change in the views and purpoſes of God, if he fail to act according to ſuch minatory declarations, he muſt have intended to act contrary to them, even at the time he made them; which ſeems a mean and diſhonourable artifice, infinitely beneath the majeſty of God.

Tillotſ. vol. i. *Serm.* XXXV. *p.* 353, 354. *Ed.* 1704. *p.* 413, 414.—*Watts's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 146, 147.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 218.

DEFI-

DEFINITION LIX.

That governor is ſaid to adminiſter his government with JUSTICE, who in proportion to his legal power diſtributes good to the virtuous and evil to the vicious, or in other words, treats his ſubjects on the whole according to their characters.

Abern. vol. ii. *N°.* v. *p.* 180—186. *Lond. Ed.*——*p.* 193—197. *Dublin Ed.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

Juſtice, ſometimes ſignifies, "giving to every "one that which is his own, or that which he "has in reaſon a right to," *i. e.* which virtue requires he ſhould have; or in other words, treating him as virtue requires he ſhould be treated: now in this ſenſe of it, it is *univerſal rectitude.* (*Def.* 38.) Sometimes it ſtands diſtinguiſhed from *charity*; and then he is ſaid to be *a juſt* man, who gives to every one that to which he has by law a claim, and he is *good* or *charitable*, who abounds in good offices, to which human laws do not oblige him.

Foſt. Serm. vol. i. *N°.* ii. *p.* 27—35 *.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Juſtice, as it reſpects *men*, is often divided into *commutative* and *diſtributative* juſtice: the former conſiſts in an equal exchange of benefits, the latter in an equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments.

Bury-ſtreet Lect. Edit. i. *vol.* i. *p.* 82, 83. *Serm.* iv. *p.* 71, 72. *Ed.* 2.

* Mr. Hume, in his Eſſays, vol. the ſecond, on the Principles of Morals, § 3. p. 249, &c. founds the notion of juſtice entirely on utility, as Carneades and others have done before him. S.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

It will not follow from the definition given above, that every governor is unjuſt, who does not carry the execution of the law to its utmoſt rigour upon offenders; all governments allowing a power of pardoning, in caſes in which the governor ſhall judge it moſt agreeable to the public good to do it; and as the public good is the ſupreme law, juſtice is no farther a virtue than as it conſiſts with it: but as injuſtice is always a term of reproach, it is not to be applied to thoſe inſtances of favour, which, though contrary to the *letter* of the law, are conſiſtent with and ſubſervient to its general deſign.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

God is with reſpect to his diſpenſations, on the whole juſt to all his rational and free creatures.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. All rational and free creatures are the proper ſubjects of moral government, *i. e.* are capable of being governed by a law, inforced by the ſanction of rewards and puniſhments.

1.|2. It is in itſelf highly congruous, that they ſhould be treated with favour or ſeverity, as virtue or vice do on the whole prevail in their tempers and conduct.

2.|3. It would be juſtly accounted an infamous thing, for any created governor to act contrary to the rule of juſtice, in his treatment of any ſuch creatures committed to his government.

4. The moſt excellent creatures might in ſome imaginable inſtances lie under ſome temptations of this kind, to which an omnipotent God cannot poſſibly be expoſed.

3, 4, 5. It would be moſt diſhonourable to conceive of the divine being, as acting contrary to thoſe rules, and diſpenſing final good and evil with-

without regard to the moral character of his creatures. *Gr.* 5. *Prop.* 44, *Cor.* 3.|6. *Valet propositio.*

Abern. Serm. vol. ii. *N°.* 5. *præf. p.* 186—280. *Lond. Ed. p.* 197—220. *Dublin Ed.*

COROLLARY.

GOD is just in all his dispensations to mankind. *Prop.* 16.

Tillotf. vol. ii. *p.* 647.——*Wilk. Nat. of Rel. p.* 139, 140. *p.* 123, 124. *Seventh Ed.*——*Butler's Anal. part* i. *c.* iii, vii. ——*Bourn's Sermons, vol.* ii. *N°.* ii. *p.* 123, 124.

SCHOLIUM.

The only considerable objection against this, arises from the unequal distribution of good and evil, observable in the present administration of providence: but it may be sufficiently answered by considering,

1. That we are often mistaken in the judgment we form concerning the characters and conditions of men.

2. That the interest of particular persons may sometimes clash with that of society, in such a manner as that public justice will require, that for the present the former be sacrificed to the latter.

3. That if a future state be admitted, it will solve those phænomena, which otherwise would appear the most unaccountable; and perhaps those inequalities may be permitted, to convince us of it: but of this more hereafter.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. *p.* 248—265. *vol.* i. *p.* 284—291.——*Relig. of Nat. p.* 110—114.——*Abern. Serm. N°.* v. *p.* 209—216. *Dublin Ed.: London Ed. p.* 197—205.——*Bourn's Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* iii.

DEFINITION LX.

LECT. XC. He is said to REPENT of a vicious action that he has committed, who is so convinced of the folly of it, as heartily to wish that he had not committed it, and stedfastly resolve that he will no more repeat it.

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. iii. *p.* 63—69. *Serm.* cxiii. *p.* 61—66. *Ed.* 4.

COROLLARY.

Wherever there is true repentance for an injury offered to another person, the penitent will be ready to make restitution, so far as it is in his power to do it.

Tillotſ. Serm. iii. *Serm.* cxvi. *p.* 85—90. *p.* 80—85. *Ed.* 4.——*Puff. de Jure, l.* iii. *c.* i. § 5—11.—*Grot. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* xvii. § 13—17.——*Granada's Mem. p.* 119—121.

SCHOLIUM.

If it be hereafter proved, that every man who has committed a vicious action is obliged to repent of it, then he who by an unjust war has deprived any of their rights is obliged to make restitution: and if any possessions came into the hands of a conqueror in a just war, which did not of right belong to the persons from whom he took them; such a conqueror seems obliged to restore them, when the claim of the former owner is made and proved; proper allowance being made for the trouble and expence of recovering them.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. *c.* x. § 4—6. *c.* xvi. § 1—3.——*Conti's Will, ap. Life, p.* 7—14.

DEFINITION LXI.

Those rules of action, which a man *may discover* by the use of his reason to be agreeable to the

the nature of things, and on which his happineſs will appear to him to depend, may be called THE LAW OF NATURE: and when theſe are conſidered as intimations of the divine will and purpoſe, they may be called the NATURAL LAWS OF GOD. Vid. *Def.* 52.

Caermich. Puff. 1ſt Suppl. c. i. § 10, 19, 20.

DEFINITION LXII.

That part of the law of nature, which a man by the exerciſe of his reaſon *has actually diſcovered*, is to him at that time THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

COROLLARY.

The light of nature and the law of nature may to the ſame, and yet more evidently to different perſons, be different: yet they can in no inſtance be contradictory to each other.

SCHOLIUM.

If by the *law of nature*, be meant in general the obligation ariſing from the nature of things, it can in all its extent be known only to him, to whom the nature of things is univerſally known, *i. e.* to God: and with reſpect to him, it can only improperly and figuratively be called a *law*, ſince there is no ſuperior whoſe will is thereby ſignified to him. Vid. *Def.* 52.

Conyb. againſt Tind. p. 11, 13—17.——
Leland againſt Tind. vol. i. *c.* ii.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

The natural law of God requires the practice of univerſal virtue.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 44. *Cor.* 1. 1. Since God is a being of perfect rectitude, it muſt be his will, that creatures capable of virtue ſhould practiſe it in all its branches.

Prop. 80.|2. As he is the juſt governor of the world, he will on the whole diſpenſe good or evil, as virtue has been cultivated, or as it has been violated. *Gr.* 1, 2. *Def.* 61.|3. *Valet propoſitio.*

Cit. de Rep. ap. Lactant. quod vide ap. Middlet. Life of Cic. vol. ii. *p.* 556, 557, 558. 4*to Ed. vol.* iii. *p.* 351, 352. 8*vo Ed.*——*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 8—77.

COROLLARY 1.

A due reverence to the divine being, as well as a regard to our own happineſs, will require us attentively to ſtudy the law of nature; eſpecially ſeeing there are ſo many caſes, in which it is exceedingly difficult to determine what it requires. *Sykes's Connect. c.* i, ii.

COROLLARY 2.

The natural law of God muſt require, that thoſe who have been guilty of vice, ſhould repent of it. Vid. *Def.* 60.

COROLLARY 3.

This natural and univerſal law of God, is of infinitely greater efficacy to reſtrain vice and promote virtue, than any human laws can be; ſince, whereas in human laws, *puniſhments* are generally the only ſanctions, (the magiſtrate being neither capable of judging of the degree of virtue in any action, (compare *Prop.* 49. *Cor.* 2.) nor having a fund out of which he can univerſally reward men in proportion to it) the divine law has the ſanction of *rewards* likewiſe, and extends itſelf to, what the civilians call, *duties of imperfect obligation, i. e.* thoſe which cannot fall under the cognizance of human governors.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *p.* 12—21.—— *Fitzoſb. Lett. N°.* xlvi.

COROL-

COROLLARY 4.

It is highly for the intereſt of ſtates, that the great principles of natural religion ſhould be believed, *viz.* the being and providence of God, and the certainty of an exact retribution either here or hereafter; ſince it is on theſe principles alone, that the efficacy of ſuch ſuppoſed laws muſt depend.

Warb. ibid. p. 22—25.—*Watts of Civil Power in Rel. p.* 27—29.——*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 139, 140.

COROLLARY 5.

For any to pour contempt upon this natural law of God, under pretence of extolling any ſuppoſed divine revelation, or intimation of God's will in an extraordinary manner, will appear very abſurd; ſince our obligation to receive any ſuch ſuppoſed extraordinary diſcoveries made by God, muſt depend upon our knowledge of his moral perfections; and no diſcovery can be ſuppoſed ſo particular, as not to need the uſe of reaſoning upon the principles of the law of nature, in explaining and applying it to particular caſes.

Hodges's Elihu, Pref. p. 23—25.—*Dove's Creed, p.* 9, 10, 13.

SCHOLIUM 1.

That it will not at all follow from the uſefulneſs of religion to communities, that therefore it is merely an engine of ſtate-policy, is in a moſt ſagacious and concluſive manner ſhewn in

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *l.* iii. § 6. *p.* 443—471. *part* ii. *p.* 253—286.

SCHOLIUM 2.

From the ſecond *Corollary*, ariſes a moſt difficult and important queſtion, *viz.* whether the juſtice of God will permit him to forgive the penitent; at leaſt, whether we can have ſuch

aſſurance of it, as chearfully to depend upon pardon, how great ſoever our offences may have been. Some have aſſerted the contrary in the ſtrongeſt terms: and urge, that there is an infinite degree of evil in ſin, from which it is impoſſible that any creature ſhould recover himſelf; and that the infinite goodneſs of God muſt make every the leaſt violation of the laws of eternal order and rectitude an incurable evil. But others have univerſally aſſerted, that we may on the principles of the light of nature be certain, that God will and muſt upon repentance fully and freely pardon every ſin. But on the whole, we muſt anſwer in a medium between thoſe two opinions,

1. There ſeems ſome probable reaſon to believe, that at leaſt *ſome* ſins may be forgiven by God; conſidering the known goodneſs of the divine being, and eſpecially from obſerving the proviſion he has made in the world of nature for the neceſſities and calamities of mankind, even of many which are brought upon men by their own folly: and indeed had God determined to puniſh every ſin without mercy, we can hardly believe that ſuch a benevolent being would have placed mankind in circumſtances of ſuch ſtrong temptation from within and without, that not a perſon on earth who is arrived at years of underſtanding ſhould be free from it. Nevertheleſs,

2. We cannot *certainly* and *univerſally* conclude, that ſin ſhall be pardoned on repentance: for the end of puniſhment is not merely, as ſome have raſhly aſſerted, the amendment of the offender, (though even ſome puniſhment might be inflicted upon repentance, to make him more cautious, and to preſerve him from future guilt;) but principally the maintaining the honour of the divine government, and the admonition of others: now it is impoſſible for us certainly to ſay, how far the right of his government and

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the intereſt of the whole rational creation may require ſeverity even againſt penitents themſelves, eſpecially in caſes of notorious provocation. So that, on the whole, it ſeems that unaſſiſted reaſon could give us at beſt but a wavering and uncertain hope that *all* ſin was pardonable, though it might ſhow it to be highly probable, that *ſome* ſins were ſo, or that the penalty inflicted for them might not be the utter deſtruction of the penitent.

Tind. Chriſtianity as old, &c. c. iv.——*Conyb. againſt Tind. p.* 114—131. *or Leland againſt Tind. vol.* i. *c.* vi.——*Balguy on Redempt.*——*Foſt. Diſc. on Nat. Rel. vol.* i. *c.* viii.——*Hallet on Script. vol.* ii. 326—343.——*Taylor againſt Deiſm, c.* i. *p.* 1, *&c.*—*Watts's Strength and Weakneſs, &c. p.* 72—87.——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 236—242.——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* v. § 2—4.—*Howe's Living Temple, part* ii. *c.* vi. § 3. *c.* vi. § 5, 6, 10.—*Leibn. Theod.* § 73, 74.—*Sykes on Redemption, p.* 5—19.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs, though it remains dubious how far God will pardon ſin upon repentance, yet repentance will appear reaſonable; ſince to be ſure, if any pardon is to be expected, it muſt be received in that way; for it would be utterly unbecoming the dignity of the divine being, and his character as the univerſal judge, always to ſpare and always to bleſs an obſtinate and incorrigible rebel: and if any puniſhment is after all to be expected, it muſt ſurely be much better to meet it in a poſture of humble ſubmiſſion, than with a vain and obſtinate reſiſtance and oppoſition to a being infinitely ſuperior to us, and who can continue us in a capacity of feeling puniſh-

ment as long as he pleaſes; for ſome mitigation of which puniſhment we might at leaſt hope, in conſequence of ſuch humble ſubmiſſion as is recommended above.

Collib. of Nat. and Rev. Rel. part i. § 8. *p.* 27—35.

The END *of the* THIRD PART.

PART

PART IV.

Of the IMMORTALITY *and* IMMATERIALITY *of the* SOUL: *its* ORIGINAL: *the general Obligations to Virtue, and State of it in the World.*

DEFINITION LXIII.

THE DEATH of the MAN is the univerſal ceſſation both of perception and of animal motion, and particularly reſpiration, and the circulation of the blood in the human body. LECT. XCI.

SCHOLIUM.

Though perception and animal motion are not neceſſarily connected; yet, ſo far as our obſervation reaches, the latter being never found without the former, it ſeemed not improper to join them as we have done in the definition.

DEFINITION LXIV.

The DEATH of the MIND is the utter deſtruction of its percipient and thinking powers.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

The ſoul does not die with the body; but ſurvives in a ſtate of greater happineſs or miſery than before, as it has behaved in a virtuous or vicious manner.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 80.|1. As God is juſt, he will take care, that on the whole his creatures ſhall be more or leſs happy or miſerable, according to the degree in which virtue or vice prevails in their characters.

2. No.

2. No such distinction is here made, correspondent to their characters; but virtuous men are often exposed to the greatest distress, whilst the worst of men live and die in a series of prosperity. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. l.* iii. § 32—35.

1, 2, 3. There must be a future state of retribution. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 251—257.——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 199——203.—*Balg. Six Sermons, p.* 81—86. 1*st. Ed.*—*Balguy's Sermons, Ed.* 3. *p.* 396—401.—*Burlamaqui Elementa Juris Naturalis, part* ii. *c.* xii. § 1—14 *c.* xiii. § 1. *and* § 11—15.——*Price on Morals, p.* 449—466.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that the secret pleasure attending virtue is its own reward, and renders the good man happier in his most calamitous state, than the wicked man is in his greatest prosperity.

Ans. 1. That the support and comfort of a good man in his troubles, greatly depends on the expectation of a future state; and that this expectation being his greatest encouragement to persevere in virtue under its greatest disadvantages, we can hardly suppose that a wise, just, and good God would so order it, that the great foundation and support of virtue should be a false and vain expectation.

2. There are some sufferings of flesh and blood, to which good men even for conscience-sake have often been brought, so extreme, that without some extraordinary support from God, it is morally impossible the pleasure of rational thought should be enjoyed under them: and this case would be a sufficient answer to the objection, unless such supports were granted; which if they were, as they arise from views of a future state, the faithfulness of God, as well as those attributes

butes mentioned before, would ſeem to be injured, by ſuppoſing there were no ſuch ſtate.

3. Good men, in calmer ſeaſons of life, often find the inward ſatisfaction ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of their own virtue interrupted, whilſt they labour under diſquieting doubts and fears as to the ſtate and prevalency of it; and it is unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that God would leave their minds under ſuch diſtreſſes, if the preſent pleaſure of virtue were its only reward. On the other hand, bad men often outgrow the remorſe of conſcience; ſo that thoſe who are the moſt experienced in wickedneſs, and ſo deſerve the heavieſt puniſhments, do, ſo far as we can judge, ſuffer much leſs than others not equally criminal, and owe their tranquillity to their wickedneſs.

4. That all this paſſes in private, and is little taken notice of; whereas one would naturally expect that the juſtice of God ſhould have its public triumphs, eſpecially over thoſe who, being in exalted ſtations of life, and therefore under the greateſt obligation to virtue, have acted a very guilty part, without appearing to be in any meaſure proportionably miſerable; and in favour of thoſe who have ſuffered very hard things for virtue, without any viſible retribution, and have perhaps even died in its defence.

Relig. of Nat. p. 203—205 ——*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 257—261. *part* ii. *p.* 108—111.——*Balg. Six Serm. p.* 88—91.——*Baxt. Reaſ. of Chriſtianity, part* i. *c.* xiv. § 1. *ap. Op. vol.* ii. *p.* 46—48.—*Foſt. Diſc. on Nat. Rel. vol.* i. *c.* ix.—*Parker's Law of Nature, part* i. § 31.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Others urge, that this goes on a falſe ſuppoſition, that there are ſome good men; whereas the beſt, being but imperfectly virtuous, can claim no future rewards.

Anſ.

Anſ. 1. It muſt be acknowledged, that the beſt of men cannot in ſtrict juſtice claim any reward from God as a debt, ſeeing they owe all to him; eſpecially are they deſtitute of ſuch a claim, when they have in any inſtance failed of the duty they owe him, as the beſt here do: nevertheleſs,

2. The vaſt difference there is in the characters of men will require that there ſhould be ſome greater difference in the manner of treating them, than there is in the preſent ſtate, where there is no proportion between their ſuffering and preſent demerit.

3. That conſidering the extraordinary progreſs ſome make in virtue, and conſequently how fit they are for the moſt ſublime and rational happineſs, and how unavoidable ſome degree of imperfection is, conſidering the conſtitution of our nature and the temptations of life, there ſeems ſome probable though not certain reaſon to hope, that God will hereafter reward thoſe who are in the main his faithful ſervants, with ſome greater degrees of felicity than they have here enjoyed.

Hallet on Script. vol. i. *p.* 226—229. *&* *p.* 236—240.——*Grove's Thoughts on a future State, c.* vii. *p.* 340, *&c.*—*Kenrick's Poems, p.* 148—150.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs it muſt be confeſſed, that reaſon does not certainly aſſure us, that all good men do *immediately* paſs into a ſtate of happineſs: leaſt of all could we conclude it in favour of thoſe penitents, who have been reclaimed but a little before their death, after a long courſe of vice, for which they have met with no remarkable calamity. It might ſeem more probable with regard to ſuch, that they ſhould either ſuffer an utter extinction of being, or paſs through ſome ſtate

ſtate of purgation whereby at leaſt ſome farther honour might alſo be done to the divine violated law.

Virg. En. l. vi. *ver.* 719—748.—*Plato's Phæd.* § 44, 45.——*Cyrus Trav. vol.* ii. *p.* 110, 8*vo.*——*Æſchin. Dial.* iii. § 19—21.——*Fortin's Diſſertations, N°.* vi.——*Pindar's 2d Olympiad, by Weſt.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

LECT. XCII.

1. The human mind is framed with capacities for perpetual improvement; whereas brutes ſoon attain to the utmoſt perfection of which their natures are capable.

1.|2. It ſeems not conſiſtent with the divine *wiſdom*, to form ſo excellent a being for ſo ſhort a duration, and ſuch low employments, as are to be found in this mortal life.

1.|3. The human mind is formed with a capacity for far greater happineſs, than it can enjoy in the preſent ſtate.

4. Men are neceſſarily expoſed to a great variety of evils, from which even innocent infants are not exempted: and perhaps it may be acknowledged, that were immortality to be abſolutely deſpaired of, the ſtate of brutes would appear leſs calamitous and pitiable than that of men; at leaſt that it would be ſo, were the whole human ſpecies to diſbelieve a future ſtate.

5. There is a ſtrong deſire of immortality poſſeſſing our natures, and it is ſtrongeſt in the moſt virtuous minds.

3, 4, 5.|6. The circumſtances of men in the preſent world are ſuch, as we can hardly reconcile with the divine *goodneſs*, unleſs we ſuppoſe ſome other and better ſtate of exiſtence; eſpecially conſidering, that in others, and thoſe much inferior things, there is a correſpondence between natural deſire and the poſſibility at leaſt of enjoyment.

Gr.

Gr. 2, 6. *Prop.* 42, 45.|7. The wiſdom and goodneſs of God join in requiring that there ſhould be a future ſtate, and therefore it is reaſonable to expect it. *Q. E. D.*

Spect. vol. ii. *N°.* cxi.——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 208—211.——*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 269.——*Howe's Vanity of Man, &c. poſſ. præf. ap. Op. vol.* i. *p.* 640—650. *8vo. Ed. p.* 20—46.—*Hallet on Script. vol.* i. *p.* 256—258, 272, 289.——*Foſt. Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* xv. *p.* 406—408 —— *Balg. Six Serm. p.* 66—69. *or Works, vol.* i. *p.* 380—384.—*Various Proſpects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence, N°.* xi.——*Grove againſt Hallet, c.* iv. ——*Young's Night Thoughts, N°.* vii. ——*Kenrick's Poems, p.* 161—166.

SCHOLIUM.

Nearly akin to this argument, is that which Mr. *Balguy* draws from the ſenſe of *friendſhip* rooted in the human heart, which engages virtuous friends to wiſh to continue for ever in the enjoyment of each other, and renders the thoughts of a final ſeparation ſo ſhocking, that it is not to be imagined the great and benevolent author of nature ſhould have implanted ſuch a paſſion, had he not intended to leave room for the eternal gratification of it. And it may farther be obſerved, that whatever weight there is in this argument is increaſed by conſidering, that the notion of the mortality of the ſoul will be an additional grief to a virtuous mind, when he conſiders, that upon this ſuppoſition he muſt not only be deprived himſelf of the enjoyment of his friends, but they likewiſe muſt entirely periſh, and loſe all the delight which growing ſcience and virtue have given, and which they ſeemed fitted for receiving, in yet farther and more exalted degrees. To which we may add, on like prin-

principles, that the love of God growing in the virtuous mind, will make the thought of the extinction of being more painful in proportion to that advance; as all enjoyment of God muſt of courſe ceaſe. And the importance of this thought both illuſtrates *Balguy*'s remark, and is ſtrongly illuſtrated by it.

Balg. Six Serm. p. 71—75.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 386—390.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

The lives of men, according to the ordinary courſe of nature, are continually in the power of themſelves and others.

2. If the ſoul were mortal, a deſperate villain might immediately deprive the moſt virtuous man of his being, and with it, of all the farther rewards which his virtue might have expected and received.

1.|3. Such a perſon might alſo upon that ſuppoſition put a period to all farther puniſhment intended for his crimes and due to them, by laying violent hands upon himſelf.

2, 3.|4. The juſtice of God might in a great meaſure be fruſtrated, if the ſoul were mortal.

Prop. 31, and 80.|5. Seeing God is an omnipotent and juſt being, we have reaſon to conclude that his juſtice cannot be fruſtrated.

4, 5,|6. The ſoul is immortal. *Q. E. D.*

Watts's Reliq. Juv. N°. lxxv. *p.* 334—336——*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 594.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it may be objected, that God will in an extraordinary manner interpoſe, to prevent ſuch deaths as would interfere with the diſtribution of juſtice.

Anſ. 1. So far as we can judge, many ſuch deaths do in fact happen.

2. It would be unreaſonable to expect a courſe of things to be eſtabliſhed, in which without perpetual extraordinary interpoſitions the greateſt irregularities muſt happen; this would reflect as much upon the wiſdom, as the other on the juſtice of the divine being.

Watts, ibid. p. 336, 337.—*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 595.

SCHOLIUM 2.

What is moſt ſolid and important in the argument for a future ſtate, from the impoſſibility of governing the world without the belief of it, ſeems to coincide with this argument, or *Demonſtration* 1.

Baxt. Reaſ. of Chriſt. part i. *c.* xiv. § 5, 6. *ap. Op. vol.* ii. *p.* 49—51.——*Barrow's Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 334—337.—*Hallet's Notes on Scripture, vol.* i. *p.* 288—297. —*Grove on fut. State, c.* v.

DEMONSTRATION 4.

1. There is in man a certain affection of mind, or principle of action, which is commonly called *conſcience*, whereby we are capable of conſidering ourſelves as under a divine law, and accountable to God for our conduct.

1.|2. Hence ariſes ſelf-approbation, or ſelf-condemnation in men, as they apprehend their actions have been agreeable or diſagreeable to the divine law.

3. The force of this often appears ſo great, that the worſt of men cannot, at leaſt without great difficulty, diveſt themſelves of it; and that even when they are in ſuch circumſtances, as to have leaſt to fear from their fellow-creatures, and eſpecially in their dying moments.

Juvenal, Satire 13, *v.* 192, *&c.*—*Satire* 1, *v.* 196.

2, 3.|4.

2, 3.|4. It is exceedingly probable, that this principle is intended by God to intimate a future ſtate of retribution, ſince it is chiefly to that it ſeems to refer.

1, 4.|5. Both the wiſdom and truth of God ſeem to require, that there ſhould be a future ſtate in ſome reſpect anſwerable to this apprehenſion. *Q. E. D.*

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. iii. *p.* 124, 125: *p.* 119, 120. *4th Ed.*—*Barrow, vol.* ii. *p.* 334. 335.——*Hallet on Script. vol.* i. *p.* 259—263.——*Foſt. Serm. vol.* ii. *N°.* iii. *p.* 55—68.——*Balg. Six Serm. p.* 75—79.——*Vol. of Sermons, p.* 390—394.—*Juvenal. Sat.* xiii. *v.* 192, *&c.*—*Sat.* i. *v.* 196.

DEMONSTRATION 5.

1. It appears that moſt nations, not excepting the moſt barbarous, have generally believed the doctrine in the propoſition: and it is obſervable that moſt of their *funeral rites*, ſo far as we are informed concerning them, ſeem to imply ſome apprehenſion of it: as that very ancient kind of idolatry, the worſhip of the dead, (as well as all pretences to the art of *necromancy*, which were plainly founded on this perſuaſion,) contains a farther and moſt evident proof of it. To which we may alſo add, that the *leſſer initiation* of the ancients ſeems to have been a ſort of machinery, in which, eſpecially in the *Eleuſinian myſteries*, the ſeats both of the bleſſed and damned were repreſented.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *l.* ii. § 4.—*Grove on a future State, c.* vi.

1.|2. The doctrine was probably inferred from ſome arguments level to every capacity, or it would not have been ſo univerſally believed. Compare *Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 2.

2.[3. It is reasonable to believe it. *Q. E. D. Tillotf. vol.* iii. *p.* 116—118: 111—113, *4th Ed.*——*Stev. againſt Pop. Serm.* vii. *p.* 192—194.——*Bp. Sherlock's Diſc. vol.* i. *N°.* vi.——*Cuſtoms of Eaſt Ind. and Jews comp. Art.* vii. *p.* 39—42.——*Balg. Six Serm. p.* 70, 71.——*Vol. of Sermons, p.* 384—386.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. XCIII. It is objected, that a great many ancient philoſophers diſbelieved the immortality of the ſoul, and ſome of the ancients tell us, it was firſt taught by the *Egyptians*.

Anſ. The common people ſeem to have had a firmer perſuaſion of it than the philoſophers, many of whom do indeed ſpeak dubiouſly about it; and as for others of them, the accounts they give of it are very low and abſurd, and ſeveral of the arguments which they bring for the ſupport of it are weak and inconcluſive; and it may by the way be obſerved, that in *Plato*'s *Phædon*, the argument in the *firſt* demonſtration, though ſo proper to the circumſtances of *Socrates* at that time, is ſtrangely omitted, nor do any that I remember mention it before *Seneca*.

Dr. *Warburton* has lately ſtated this matter very particularly; and undertaken to prove, that though the philoſophers did indeed believe the doctrine of the ſoul's *immortality*, they did not believe that of the future ſtate of *rewards and puniſhments*; which he proves to be inconſiſtent with the eſſential principles, not only of the *Epicureans*, but alſo of the *Pythagoreans*, *Peripatetics*, *Platoniſts* and *Stoics*, particularly with the doctrine of the το ἓν, or the refuſion of ſouls into their common eternal principle, and alſo with that doctrine, which taught the deity to be incapable of that reſentment without which they ſuppoſed he could not puniſh. So that all thoſe paſſages,

paſſages, in which theſe philoſophers inculcate future retribution, are, according to this ingenious author, to be looked upon, merely as popular accommodations to doctrines commonly received; or at moſt, as what the philoſophers thought fit to *teach*, though they did not themſelves believe them, in a view to their being uſeful to ſociety: and he imagines that the diſtinction between the *exoteric* and *eſoteric* doctrines is of great importance here.—On the contrary, Dr. *Sykes* and Mr. *Bott* ſuppoſe theſe philoſophers really to have believed a future retribution, and that the difference between the external and internal doctrine, was only in the manner of illuſtrating the kinds of thoſe rewards and puniſhments which they aſſerted in both; and the doctrine of the το ἓν is ſo explained by *Bott* as to be conſiſtent with that of retribution.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *l.* iii. § 1—4.—*Bott againſt Warb.* § 2.——*Sykes againſt Warb.*——*Critical Enquiry into the Principles and Practice of the Philoſophers concerning a future State. paſſ.*——*Tilloſ. vol.* iii. *p.* 132—134.——*Plato's Phæd. paſſ.*——*N. Taylor of Deiſm, p.* 80—110. *& p.* 119—144.——*Grot. de Verit. c.* i. § 22. *c.* ii. § 9.——*Whitby's Certainty of Chriſtian Faith, c.* x. § 11. *with Annot. p.* 312—315.——*Cudworth's Intell. Syſt. c.* i. § 45.—*Leland on Revelation, vol.* ii. *part* iii. *præf. c.* ii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Others account for the phænomenon by ſaying, that men might *wiſh*, and therefore *think* themſelves immortal.

Anſ. Moſt who held and taught a future ſtate of diſtinct, perſonal exiſtence, ſeemed to think it a ſtate of *retribution*, which it is to be feared it was not their intereſt to deſire; and the fears of

it are ſometimes ſpoken of as a burthen: and if notwithſtanding theſe fears, they wiſhed the ſoul immortal, it is ſo much the greater confirmation of *Dem.* 2. *gr.* 5.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The principal objections againſt this doctrine are reckoned up by *Lucretius:* but moſt of them are ſo evidently weak as not to deſerve a particular examination. The moſt plauſible are thoſe that ariſe from the ſenſible decay of the faculties of the mind with thoſe of the body, and the ſuppoſed impoſſibility of action and perception without bodily organs: but to theſe it is replied,

1. That the ſoul does ſometimes continue in full vigour, even when the body is under the greateſt diſorder, and death immediately approaching.

2. That it may be a law of nature, that while the ſpirit is united to the body, it ſhould be ſo affected with the good or bad ſtate of the bodily health as we often ſee it is; and that the memory ſhould be impaired with age and ſickneſs will not appear at all ſtrange, conſidering how much it depends on the brain. Vid. *Prop.* 8. *Dem.*

3. That perhaps this may be a ſtate of impriſonment to the ſoul, as many of the philoſophers thought; and that when it is ſet at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at preſent unknown.

4. That if a body were neceſſary, we might more reaſonably believe God would give it a new body in the ſtate immediately ſucceeding this, than ſuffer its faculties to periſh, for the reaſons aſſigned above.

Lucret. l. iii. *ver.* 418—740.—*Polignac's Anti-Lucretius.*——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 194—199.——*Cicero's Tuſc. Diſp. l.* i. § 20. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 79—81.——*Plat. Phæd.* § 9, 10.——*Rocheſt. Life, p.* 65

p. 65—68. & *p.* 20, 21, 150.——*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. § 5. *præf. p.* 395—400.——*More's Immort. l.* iii. *c.* xiv, xv.——*Kenrick's Poems, p.* 152—155.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Others attempt to prove the immortality of the ſoul, from the impoſſibility of governing the world without ſuch hopes and fears on the one hand, (Vid. *Dem.* 3. *Schol.* 2.) or of God's governing it by a lye on the other, as they ſay it is plain he in fact does, if there be not a future ſtate. They alſo argue from God's being the author of thoſe hopes which ariſe in the mind of a good man; and from the probability there is, that there are other worlds inhabited by ſpiritual beings, to whom therefore the ſoul may go, and among whom it may dwell, after the diſſolution of the body. It is likewiſe ſaid, that ſince we ſee other beings ripening gradually to perfection, and animal life improved from low beginnings to noble heights; it is on the principles of analogy probable, that the human ſoul ſhall paſs by death into ſome more elevated ſtate of being, or at leaſt may be a candidate for it *. But as where theſe arguments are diſtinct from the former, the premiſes in ſome of them are liable to much diſpute, and perhaps cannot be all ſufficiently made out; and as in others, granting the premiſes, the concluſion may be diſputed, we reckon it enough barely to have ſuggeſted theſe conſiderations, without entering into the more particular examination of them.

Baxt. Works, vol. ii. *p.* 55, 658.—*Butler's Anal. part* i. *c.* i.——*Young's Night-Thoughts. N°.* vi. *p.* 158, 159. *Ed.* 12*mo.*

* The argument from the ſoul's employment in ſleep, in favour of its capacity of perceiving and acting after death, may be ſeen in Spectator, vol. vii. N°. 487.—Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 391—395.—Young's Night-Thoughts, N°. 6, p. 158. 12mo. Ed. p. 194—196. 8vo Ed. M.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It may farther be queſtioned, whether allowing a future ſtate, it can be proved *eternal* and *immutable*.

Anſ. The ſoul ſeems originally deſigned for an eternal duration on the principles urged *Dem.* 2. but that the ſtate on which it ſhall enter at death ſhall be eternal, the light of nature does not diſcover: there is no reaſon at all to expect eternal rewards, for ſo ſhort and imperfect a virtue as can here be attained; and as for eternal puniſhments, though ſome of the heathens did aſſert them, and many have undertaken to infer them from natural principles; (all moral evil being a breach of order, and every inſtance and act of it having a natural tendency to harden the ſoul, univerſal and perpetual miſery muſt follow, unleſs God interpoſe in an extraordinary manner, either to reſtore the health of the ſoul, or to end its being,) yet it ſeems that our natural apprehenſions of the divine goodneſs would rather encourage us to hope, that he would leave ſome room for amendment, and recovery of happineſs in a future ſtate, or by annihilation would put an end to mens miſery, when they appeared humbled by their puniſhment. But if it ſhould prove that in a future ſtate of chaſtiſement, the ſinner ſhould harden himſelf againſt God, and go on ſtill in his crimes, perpetual ſucceeding ſins would juſtify perpetual ſucceeding puniſhments: for it is certain, every new crime committed after ſevere puniſhment is on that account ſo much the more aggravated. The ſame may be ſaid concerning a ſeries of eternal happineſs, in caſe of continued virtue, and that very conſiſtently with the preceding obſervation. Vid. *Prop.* 81. *Schol.* 2. *Prop.* 82. *Dem.* 1. *Schol.* 3. *Lucret. l.* i. *ver.* 108—112.—*Taylor of Deiſm, p.* 149—167.——*Joſeph. Bell. Judaic.*

Judaic. 3. vii. 5.—*Balguy's Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 409—413.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It may be granted that the reſurrection of the body, whatever change it may be ſuppoſed to undergo after death, may be poſſible to the divine power, and may be ſubſervient both to render rewards and puniſhments the more compleat, and the triumphs of divine juſtice more conſpicuous than they would otherwiſe be: but it by no means appears certain by the light of nature.

Limeſt. Lect. vol. ii. *p.* 376—384.—*Gale's Court of the Gent. part* i. *l.* iii. *c.* vii. *p.* 81, 82. *part* ii. *l.* ii. *c.* viii. *p.* 189.—*Phocylides, ver.* 98—101.—*Pearſon on the Creed, p.* 365—367. *p.* 372—374. *Ed.* 11.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 278—306.—*Leland on Revelation, vol.* ii. *p.* 436—441.—*Jackſon on Mat. and Spirit, p.* 39, 40.

SCHOLIUM 7.

The atheiſt cannot be infallibly certain that there ſhall be no future ſtate, even though he ſhould believe the exiſtence of the ſoul to depend on that of the body, or thought to be no more than a power reſulting from matter ſo diſpoſed; ſince that omnipotent chance, which according to his principles formed the whole world, may poſſibly throw together into one body the particles of which he now conſiſts, with ſuch alteration, as to make him capable even of eternal miſery, from which no virtue can ſecure him.

Gurdon at Boyle's Lect. p. 151—163.—*Fiddes of Mor. Pref. p.* 12—16 *.

* In Edward Search's (Abraham Tucker's) "Light of Nature purſued;" is much curious matter relative to the proofs of a future exiſtence, and the apprehended nature of that exiſtence. See particularly the ſecond and third volumes of the

DEFINITION LXV.

LECT. XCIV. The MIND may be said to be CORPOREAL, if thought arise from and be inseparably connected with a certain system of matter; so that if such system so arranged exist, thought must exist with it, though no distinct being should be produced; or if that system were to be dissolved, or the arrangement of its particles to be altered, thought must immediately and necessarily cease with it, unless God were instantaneously to produce some new being which did not before exist.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

To enquire into the most considerable arguments brought to prove the immateriality of the soul.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 23. *Cor.* 1. *Prop.* 26, & 41.|1. God is an immaterial and almighty spirit.

1.|2. There is no absurdity in supposing the existence of an immaterial spirit produced by him.

3. If the soul be material, its faculty of thinking must either necessarily arise from the nature and arrangement of its particles, or it must be supperadded by God to a system of matter.

Prop. 24.|4. It is in the nature of things entirely inconceivable and incredible, that thought should necessarily arise from matter, however figured or moved.

5. To say that a power of thinking is superadded by the divine will, is unintelligible, or in

work. For a farther view of the natural arguments in support of a life to come, recourse may be had to Andrew Baxter on the Immortality of the Soul, Bishop Porteus's Sermons, N°. v, vi, vii. Dr. Sturges's Discourses, N°. iv, and Dr. Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 414—438. A distinct Treatise has, likewise, recently been published upon the subject, by the Rev. Thomas Watson of Whitby, entitled, "Intimations and evidences of a future State."

effect

effect granting the propoſition; for there cannot be a power of thinking where there is not a thinking being, and the ſuperaddition of this to matter is nothing more than the union of an immaterial being to a body, which none who aſſert the immateriality of the ſoul, (granting what is here ſuppoſed, the real exiſtence of matter) pretend to deny. *Def.* 65.

3, 4, 5.|6. There are inſuperable difficulties attending the ſuppoſition that the ſoul is corporeal.

2, 6.|7. It is reaſonable to believe it incorporeal. *Q. E. D.*

Ditton on the Reſ. p. 430—460.—*Cheyne's Princ. of Nat. Rel. c.* ii. § 13. *p.* 36—40——*Tillotſ. vol.* iii. *p.* 127—129, 130.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 186—189.——*Abernethy, vol.* i. *Serm.* iv.—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 156—160, 186—192.—*Dr. Price's Sermon at St. Thomas's, Jan.* 1, 1766. *p.* 1—12.—*Burlamaqui Elementa Juris naturalis, c.* xiii. § 2—10.—*Colliber on the Soul, Eſſ.* i. § 3, 4.——*Ramſay's Principles, vol.* i. *p.* 230—233.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is objected, that it limits the divine omnipotence, to ſay that God cannot make matter think.—It is generally replied, that it is no more ſo than to ſay, that God cannot make a ſquare circle. God may unite a ſoul to a ſyſtem of matter; but then the matter to which it is united can only be ſaid to think, as our body is ſaid to feel: *i. e.* by the divine appointment, though without any neceſſary connection, it may become an organ of ſenſation and motion to that ſpirit: and it will be difficult to form any ſcheme, by which thought may be ſuppoſed to reſult from matter

matter any how modified and agitated by an omnipotent being, on which it might not be aſſerted to ariſe from it without the action of ſuch a being, and conſequently by which all religion might not be overthrown.

Locke's Eſſ. l. iv. *c.* iii. § 6. *with Not.*—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 189—193.——*Howe, vol.* i. *p.* 52, 53.—*Living Temple, vol.* i. *c.* iii. § 14, 15.——*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 192—195.—*Jackſon on Mat. and Spirit, p.* 1—3, 12, 16.—*Ramſ. Princ. vol.* i. *p.* 235, 236.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. Matter is diviſible, and conſiſts of parts actually diſtinct.

1.|2. Whatever ſyſtem of matter can be ſuppoſed to be conſcious, it is capable of being divided into ſeveral leſſer parts; and they will be as really diſtinct, when laid or cemented together, as when ſeparate, and removed to a diſtance from each other.

2.|3. If any ſyſtem of matter be conſcious, it muſt either have a diſtinct conſciouſneſs in each leſſer particle, or one conſciouſneſs reſulting from the union of its ſeveral parts.

4. There cannot be in each ſyſtem a number of diſtinct conſciouſneſſes; for that would ſuppoſe a vaſt and unknown multiplicity of ſouls in every ſoul. *Q. E. D.*

5. An aſſemblage of various unthinking parts can never be ſuppoſed to make one thinking maſs; ſo that thought ſhould ariſe from the whole, and yet not exiſt in any given part.

3, 4, 5.|6. The ſoul is not material. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke againſt Dodwell, p. 1—3. *p.* 73, 74. *fifth Ed.—Jackſ. on Mat. and Spirit, p.* 4—11, 32—36.——*Ramſ. Princ. Prop.* 32.—*Baxt. ibid. p.* 227—239.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

To the fifth ſtep it is objected, that one indiviſible power may reſide in a ſyſtem conſiſting of diviſible parts, as ſweetneſs in a roſe: but it is replied, that ſweetneſs is only a *ſecondary* power, (*Def.* 18.) and not properly ſpeaking in the roſe at all; and as for thoſe *primary* powers or qualities, they do proportionably reſide in every particle.

Clarke, ibid. p. 8—15.—*Letters between Clarke and Collins.*

DEMONSTRATION 3.

Prop. 82.|1. The ſoul is immortal.

2. What is immaterial has no internal tendency to corruption and diſſolution; and is incapable of being hurt by a variety of accidents, which may deſtroy any material ſyſtem known to us.

3. It is unreaſonable to believe that God would make a being, which he intended for an immortal duration, with a tendency to corruption, or obnoxious to diſſolving accidents.

1, 2, 3.|4. It is unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that God has made the ſoul material; even ſuppoſing it poſſible that matter might think. *Q. E. D.*

Baxt. ibid. p. 239—247.—*Law's Theory, Diſcourſe on Death, and Appendix againſt the natural Immortality of the Soul.*

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it may be replied, that neither is matter obnoxious to diſſolution; nor does any immaterial ſubſtance tend to continue in exiſtence, any otherwiſe than as God ſhall act in and upon it; (*Prop.* 32.) ſo that the whole demonſtration is founded on a miſtake: and it is ſaid, that allowing the ſoul to be material does no more diſprove its immortality, than owning the body ſhall

LECT. XCV.

ſhall be ſo, after the reſurrection which chriſtians expect, will be a ſufficient objection againſt its perpetual duration.

Locke's Third Letter to Still. p. 420—429.
—*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 176—179.
—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 565—568. *Ed.* 3.
Reaſon of Religion, part ii. *Concluſion.*
Baxt. on the Soul, 2, 5.—*Jackſ. on Mat. and Spirit, p.* 11, 12.—*Ramſ. Princ. Prop.* 18.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheleſs we allow, that if the immateriality of the ſoul were proved, it would ſomething ſtrengthen our natural argument for its immortality; as it would certainly ſhew us, that the deſtruction of the body does not imply the extinction of the mind; and would be a probable intimation that God intended it for a longer duration; as we have reaſon to believe, that though marble and freeſtone be equally dependent upon him, he intended the former ſhould continue in its form longer than the latter.

Grove's Thoughts on a future State, c. iii.
—*Baxter on the Soul, c.* iii. *p.* 11.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have argued much to the purpoſe of *Dem.* 2. that an indiviſible power cannot ſubſiſt in a diviſible ſubject: but the power of thinking is an indiviſible power; therefore the ſoul in which it exiſts is indiviſible, and therefore immaterial.—But the foundation of this argument is liable to much diſpute; and ſome attempt to retort it thus: "The idea of two feet is a diviſi-"ble idea; but it exiſts in the mind; therefore "the mind is diviſible." But though we conceive of two feet as diviſible, it is not proper to ſay, that the *idea* of two feet may be divided into two

two ideas, each of which ſhall be half the former, as the *archetype* of it may.

Hallet on Script. vol. i. *p.* 216—219.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Much of the ſame kind is that argument taken from the limited nature of bodies, which are incapable of being extended beyond certain degrees, whereas the mind is continually opening itſelf to receive more and more knowledge, and never complains that an idea is too long, too broad, or too wide: but this goes on the ſuppoſition, that ideas are material things, otherwiſe they could not croud or ſtretch a material mind.

Serm. de Superville, vol. iii. *p.* 10, 11.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Some plead that the ſpirits and particles of the brain are in a continued flux, and therefore cannot be the ſeat of conſciouſneſs which is a fixed thing.—It is anſwered, that conſciouſneſs may inhere in ſome ſtable, ſolid and unchanged piece of matter, ſuch as the *ſtamina vitæ* are by many philoſophers ſuppoſed to be.

Hallet ibid. p. 215, 216.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Againſt the propoſition it is objected, that if thought infer immateriality, and immateriality immortality, then, as brutes may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to have perception, (*Prop.* 2.) which is a ſpecies of thought, they muſt be immortal.—It is anſwered, that we know not what may become of them. God can no doubt put a period to their exiſtence at their death, ſince immateriality cannot neceſſarily infer immortality. Vid. *Schol.* 1. As for *Ramſay*'s notion, that brutes are degraded intelligences, which were once *Seraphim*, and are now doing penance in ſo baſe a ſtate; it depends on ſo many uncertain principles, and is in itſelf at firſt appearance ſo improbable,

bable, that we ſhall not now ſtay to examine or confute it *.

Ramſay's Princ. part i. *vol.* i. *p.* 374—387.——*Tillotſ. vol.* iii. *p.* 127—129. *Clarke againſt Dodwell, p.* 26—28. *p.* 88, 89. *Ed.* 5.——*Burnet on the Art. p.* 34. ——*Edwards's Exercitations, part* i. *p.* 125—129.—*Baxt. on the Soul,* § ii. 36—38. iii. 11.—*Reyn. Lett. to the Deiſts, p.* 61—68.

SCHOLIUM 7.

That the faculties of the mind are ſometimes impaired by the decay of the body, will no more prove the ſoul material than mortal. *Prop.* 82. *Dem.* 5. *Schol.* 3.

Burn. on the Art. p. 35.——*Baxt. on the Soul, v.* 6—20.—*Ramſ. Princ. p.* 233—235.

SCHOLIUM 8.

From comparing the arguments on both ſides it appears, that allowing it not to be *demonſtrable* that the ſoul is immaterial, it is at leaſt *poſſible* it may be ſo, and even highly *probable* that it is. Vid. *Dem.* 1. *gr.* 2.

Blount's Orac. of Reaſ. p. 185, 187—190. —*Locke's Eſſ. l.* iv. *c.* iii.

SCHOLIUM 9.

Should the ſoul be immaterial, it is nevertheleſs poſſible that it may be always united to ſome

* Taking it for granted that the principle of life in brutes is an immaterial principle, a Dr. Wagſtaffe (not Dr. Thomas Wagſtaffe, the celebrated Non-Juror, but Dr. Wm. Wagſtaffe, a phyſician) wrote a treatiſe, in the earlier part of the preſent century, to prove the future exiſtence and immortality of the animal creation. In doing this, he has employed all the arguments which are uſually alleged in favour of the natural immortality of man; and he has urged them with great apparent zeal and earneſtneſs. The performance exhibits a curious inſtance of what will be judged to be ſophiſtical reaſoning.

vehicle: our not seeing it go off at death can be no argument against it; since many things known to be corporeal are to us invisible, particularly the air, which is so extremely forcible, and the magnetic and electrical effluvia.

More's Imm. of the Soul, l. iii. *c.* i. § 2, 3. *Rel. of Nat. p.* 197. *Not.*——*Watts's Ess. N°.* vii. *p.* 173, 174.—*Baxt. on the Soul*, ii. 31. iv. 1—9, 17—21.—*Jacks. on Matt. and Spirit, p.* 41—47, 51—56.——*Collib. on Souls*, I. 5. iv. 1, 2.——*Cheyne's Essay on Regimen.*—*Discourses at the end.*

SCHOLIUM 10.

As to the opinion which the heathen philosophers entertained on this subject, there is room for debate; but it seems the greater part concluded, that the soul consisted of, or was inseparably united to some system of matter; excepting those who held it be an ἀπόσπασμα from the divine substance, and held that substance to be incorporeal.

Locke's Third Lett. to Still. p. 431—441. —*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 570, 571.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 263—267.—*N. Taylor of Deism, p.* 131, 132.——*Plato's Phæd.* § 20.—*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *book* iii. § 4. *p.* 403, 404. *Ed.* 2.—*Campbell's Necess. of Rev. p.* 132—143 *.

PROPO-

* To the authors which have formerly been referred to, p. 15. as treating concerning the immateriality of the human soul, may be added Tucker's "Light of Nature pursued," chapter the fifth, volume the second; Lord Monboddo's "Ancient Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 176—180; ibid. vol. ii. p. 1—50; Rotherham's "Essay on the Distinction between the Soul and Body of Man;" Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

LECT. XCVI. To enquire whether, ſuppoſing the ſoul to be immaterial, there is reaſon to believe that it is extended, *i. e.* limited to ſome certain quantity of ſpace, ſo that it may be ſaid to fill it.

SOLUTION.

There is no reaſon to believe, that if the ſoul be immaterial, it is extended.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If the ſoul be extended, ſeeing all acknowledge that extenſion muſt be limited, it muſt be of ſome ſhape or figure.

1.|2. If the ſoul be extended, we may conceive of it as loſing a part of its ſhape; and if it be ſuppoſed commenſurate either to the whole or to any part of the body, a bullet, ſword, or any thing elſe, which rends or cuts off a part of the body with which the ſoul is co-extended, may, for aught appears, alſo carry off a part of the ſoul with it; unleſs we were to ſuppoſe it, when in ſuch danger, to ſhrink up into ſmaller dimenſions.

vol. i. p. 404—414; and Dr. Ferriar's "Arguments againſt the Doctrine of Materialiſm," publiſhed in the Memoirs of the Literary and Philoſophical Society of Mancheſter, vol. iv. part the firſt, p. 20—44. As the queſtion of materialiſm is connected, in ſome degree, with the controverſy concerning the freedom of the human will, I ſhall here take the liberty of referring to ſeveral treatiſes on the latter ſubject, which either eſcaped my recollection when the note p. 58, 59. was written, or which have very recently been publiſhed. The works I ſubjoin are, Rotherham's "Eſſay on Human Liberty," Dr. Benjamin Dawſon's "Neceſſitarian," the notes and additions to the new edition of Hartley's "Obſervations on Man," Remarks on Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh's "philoſophical and literary Eſſays," Butterworth's "Thoughts on moral Government and Agency," and Mr. Crombe's "Vindication of philoſophical Neceſſity." Other tracts might be mentioned, but they do not ſeem important enough to merit particular notice.

2.|3. This

2.|3. This diſcerption of the ſoul on the one hand, or condenſation on the other, would imply ſome degree of ſolidity, *i. e.* corporeity, *Def.* 4. contrary to the hypotheſis.

4. If the ſoul be extended, it may touch the body, or be touched by it: but it is utterly inconceivable, that there ſhould be any contact between an immaterial being and matter.

5. Whatever abſurdity could be ſuppoſed to follow from granting the *ſoul*, if immaterial, to be unextended, would follow from ſuppoſing *God* to be ſo: yet on the other hand, inſuperable difficulties would ariſe from ſuppoſing *him* extended. *Prop.* 41. *Schol.* 2.

3, 4, 5.|6. There is no reaſon to believe, that if the ſoul be immaterial it is extended. *Q. E. D.*

Watts's Eſſ. N°. vi. § 2. *p.* 146—152.
—*Ramſ. Princ. vol.* i. *Prop.* 27.——
King's Orig. of Evil, p. 31—33.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is objected, that nothing acts but *where it is:* therefore if the ſoul were not extended, it could not act at all.

Anſ. All matter acts upon other matter at a diſtance by gravitation: and it is inconceivable how the ſoul ſhould move the nerves inſerted in the brain, any better by being near, than by being farther off, unleſs we ſuppoſe it material: and we before obſerved, that, in whatever ſenſe it is ſuppoſed to be ſeated there, it is impoſſible to explain the manner of its perception and action. (*Prop.* 1. *Schol.* 2. *Prop.* 8. *Schol.* 3.) God could no doubt give a ſoul a power of moving a ſtone or even a mountain, at ſeveral yards diſtance from the body to which it is united, *i. e.* he might appoint, that ordinarily the motion of ſuch a diſtant body ſhould follow on the volition of that mind; (Vid. *Prop.* 32.) which he could not, if the hypotheſis in the objection were juſt;

ſeeing, if ſuch a proximity were neceſſary, this could not poſſibly be effected, without ſuch dilatation and contraction, as ſeems inconſiſtent with immateriality. It is moreover plain, that it is not this proximity, which gives the mind a conſciouſneſs of bodily motion: ſince the mind is leaſt conſcious of ſome things, which on that hypotheſis muſt be neareſt to it; being entirely unacquainted, otherwiſe than by foreign obſervation and analogy, with the ſtructure of the brain, and the cauſe of its diſorders, and not being able to determine by inſpection or conſciouſneſs, where the common ſenſorium is. Vid. *Prop.* 4. *Schol.* 1.

Howe's Works, vol. i. *p.* 45.——*Living Temple, part* i. *c.* iii. *Oct. vol.* i. *p.* 127, 128.—*Sir Iſaac Newton's third Letter to Dr. Bentley, Octavo,* 1756.—*Watts, ibid. p.* 152—161. *Eſſay* vi. § 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that what is not extended is *no where*; and what is no where has no exiſtence. But though this has been generally allowed as a maxim, it is not ſelf-evident; and indeed it is no other than taking the whole queſtion for granted.

Watts, ibid. p. 161—164. § 4.—*Jackſ. on Matt. and Spirit, p.* 3, 4.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs, when God has united a ſpirit to any body, ſo that it ſhall be to that ſpirit an organ of ſenſation and action; the ſoul may in a leſs proper ſenſe be ſaid to *be there*, where the body is; and ſpirits in general may be ſaid to *be*, where bodies are, on which they are capable of acting. Vid. *Def.* 15, 32.

Watts, ibid. p. 165—167. § 5.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 4.

The objection, that if the soul were not extended, it could have no idea of an extended substance, is taking the matter for granted; and has been considered in the only view in which it is worthy of consideration, *i. e.* as an objection against its immateriality. *Prop.* 83. *Schol.* 3, 4. *Cudw. Int. Syst. p.* 824—826.——*Ralphi Epist. Misc.* 5. *ad Finem.*

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

To propose and examine the principal hypotheses, relating to the original of the human mind. LECT. XCVII.

SOLUTION.

The three chief hypotheses are those of *pre-existence*, of existence *ex traduce*, and of *immediate creation.*

HYPOTHESIS I.

Some suppose the human mind existed at first, without this gross body in which it now dwells; but whether without any body at all, is not universally agreed. Some of the antient philosophers, particularly *Plato*, supposed it *eternal*, or as the *Latins* emphatically express it, *sempiternal*, as being a necessary emanation from the divine mind: but most of those who have embraced this doctrine of pre-existence, supposed it to have been created at some far distant period of time; and they all agreed, that in some unknown moment between generation and birth, perhaps say some the middle space, it was sent to inhabit this body.—The principal argument to support this hypothesis is taken from the justice of God, with which it is supposed to be inconsistent, that a pure and innocent spirit should be so incommodiously lodged: they say that this embodied state seems to be an imprisonment, to which it

is condemned for crimes committed in ſome better ſtate of exiſtence.

To this it is anſwered.

1. That the divine juſtice may admit, that an innocent creature in the firſt ſtage of its exiſtence ſhould be expoſed to ſome inconveniencies, if they be counterbalanced by the advantages of its ſtate, and eſpecially by an opportunity of ſecuring a more perfect happineſs hereafter, which the patrons of this hypotheſis allow to be our caſe.

2. If, as the generality of chriſtians believe, the firſt parents of our race were in a happier ſtate of exiſtence, and were alſo under ſuch a conſtitution, as made them the repreſentatives of their whole poſterity; and they in that ſtate offended their maker; it is poſſible that the whole family might fall under ſome marks of his diſpleaſure, which they would not otherwiſe have been ſubjected to; and this may perhaps be the eaſieſt way of accounting for thoſe phænomena on which the hypotheſes is built.

3. That divine juſtice ſeems to require, that if a creature were puniſhed for its own perſonal offence committed in a former ſtate, it ſhould have ſome conſciouſneſs of its guilt: our preſent calamities therefore, not being attended with ſuch conſciouſneſs, cannot be a puniſhment for ſins ſo committed.

SCHOLIUM.

It is a great objection againſt this hypotheſis, that it is merely *gratis dictum*; foraſmuch as no man can remember any ſuch pre-exiſtent ſtate as is pretended, or the adventures that befel him in it. *Brainerd's Journal, p.* 221—223.

Plato anſwers, that we have not entirely forgotten them, but that all our knowledge is entirely *remembrance*; and that without it no knowledge could be obtained. But that is evidently inconcluſive, becauſe at this rate the argument might be

be carried on *ad infinitum*, and an eternal, immutable, and self-existent being could know nothing.—It is much more reasonably replied, that it is the law of our present state of being, that we should remember only by the assistance of the brain, in which it is impossible that any traces of our former adventures should be drawn.

Plato's Phæd. § 16—18.——*Burn. Theory, vol.* ii. *l.* iv. *Præf. p.* 3—5.—*Phœnix, vol.* i. *N°.* i. *p.* 16—30.——*Ramsay's Princ. Prop.* xlvii. *vol.* i. *p.* 147—156.——*Jenk. of Christian. vol.* ii. *p.* 243—245.—*Travels of Cyrus, vol.* ii. *p.* 145—152. 8*vo. Ed. p.* 248—252. 12*mo.*—*More's Immort. of the Soul, l.* ii. *c.* xii, xiii.——*Cudw. Int. Syst. l.* i. *c.* i. § 31, 32.—*Watts's Ruin and Recov. quæst.* ii. *p.* 94—105. *Ed.* 2.——*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 221—225.—*New Practice of Piety,* 12*mo. p.* 41—44.—*Barrow's pre-existent Lapse of human Souls. passim.*——*Price's Dissertations, No.* i. *p.* 159.——*Lux Orientalis. præf. c.* 5, 6, 10. *with annot.*——*Colliber on Souls, Eff.* 3*d. passim.*—*Stonehouse on univ. Restit. Lett.* x. *p.* 213.—" *No Pre-existence.*" *By E. W. passim.*

HYPOTHESIS 2.

The hypothesis of the soul's existence *ex traduce*, is this. From the observations made chiefly by *Leuwenhoek* of the animalcula existing in *semine maris*, some have supposed, that the first elements of the soul as well as the body were contained there; which gradually grow up to sense with the ripening fœtus, and to reason in the advance of life. Of the patrons of this hypothesis, some suppose that these animalcula are produced from the food of the immediate parent, others, that the elements of them are to be found

in the body of an infant, and that all thoſe from which all mankind have ariſen, beſides an immenſely greater multitude that have periſhed, were contained in the body of the firſt man, each generation being incloſed in the former, as the coats of an onion within each other, or, as perhaps it might be better illuſtrated, the kernel of a nut.—The chief arguments to prove this, are,

1. The exiſtence of theſe animalcula.

2. The abſurdity of ſuppoſing a kind of *equivocal* generation in the body of the parent. *Prop.* 21. *Schol.* 1.

3. The reſemblance between parents and children, which ſeems to imply ſuch a derivation or traduction of the *body*, which on principles of analogy may prove that of the *ſoul*.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is replied,

1. That there is ſome reaſon to doubt whether there really be ſuch animalcula as *Leuwenhoek* talks of: few but himſelf have ever been able to diſcover them with his glaſſes, and it is very poſſible the motion might ariſe from ſome ſpirituous particles of the fluid, as it was only obſerved while the fluid was in a degree of gentle warmth, but ſoon ceaſed, *i. e.* as it ſeems, thoſe particles evaporated in the heat.

2. That if it be allowed that animalcula are really ſeen, it may be queſtioned whether they are originally in the ſeed, or in the water; ſince they muſt be diluted with water, before they can be diſcerned.

3. That if they be in the ſeed, it may ſtill be queſtioned whether they be the ſtamina of the human body; not only, as it is doubtful whether they can paſs the two teguments of the *ova*, but alſo conſidering how unlike the animal growing in an impregnated egg, as obſerved and delineated by

by *Malphigi*, is to that obſerved in the ſeed of the cock.

4. That allowing ſuch animalcula in the ſeed of every adult male, and alſo allowing them to be the ſtamina from whence the next generation proceeds, it is groundleſs to aſſert that they contain the ſtamina of all future generations. It is allowed indeed, that the exquiſite ſmallneſs of thoſe removed at the greateſt diſtance from the preſent is no objection againſt the poſſibility of their exiſtence, ſince omnipotence could no doubt, in the compaſs of a grain of ſand, make a ſyſtem ſimilar to our ſolar ſyſtem: but there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing this to be the fact here, ſince we are ſure that the ſame omnipotence can, and perhaps does, by ſome ſettled law of nature to us unknown, produce animal bodies from particles of matter before exiſting under another form. And it is the more probable, as it ſeems hardly conſiſtent with our views of divine wiſdom, to form ſuch multitudes of animal bodies for certain deſtruction, and to anſwer no imaginable purpoſe; for it is evident, that not one of many millions of them is ever born into the world: and if it be true with regard to *men*, it is ſo likewiſe with reſpect to *fiſhes* and *inſects*, where this objection is vaſtly greater.

5. If ſuch bodies were allowed, it would be unreaſonable to ſuppoſe them all endewed with ſouls: ſuch low degrees of life, as in proportion we muſt have had at the diſtance of many generations, being hardly conceivable: nor can we imagine, that God would, for ſo many thouſand years, continue human minds in ſo mean and contemptible a ſtate of exiſtence.

6. This hypotheſis is moſt ſuitable to the *materiality* of the ſoul; the tradution of one *ſpirit* from another being inconceivable, and but poorly illuſtrated by the ſimile uſually brought, of lighting one taper by another.

7. The deſtruction of a multitude of ſouls to every one that grows up or has life, is a ſtill ſtronger objection againſt this doctrine than the deſtruction of bodies, *gr.* 4. and that theſe ſubſiſt in a future ſtate none maintain.

Baker of Microſcopes, c. xvi. *p.* 152—167. ——*Leuwenhoek Epiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 1—12, 149, *&c.*—*Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol.* i. *Contempt.* xvi. § 9, 11, *p.* 341—344, 345—348. *p.* 305—308, 310—313, *in another Edition.*—*Lux Orientalis, c.* iii. ——*Rel. of Nat. p.* 88—91.——*Watts Phil. Eſſ. N°.* ix. § 2. *with Append. p.* 201—208, *& p.* 307—311.—*Dennes's* 2*d Serm. of Veget. Pref.*—*Drake's Anat. vol.* i. *c.* xxiv.——*Baxt. on the Soul, vol.* i. *p.* 198—202.——*Chamb. Dict. on the Word* Generation.

HYPOTHESIS 3.

The hypotheſis of *immediate creation* is, that at a certain time, generally ſuppoſed between conception and the birth, perhaps 20 weeks after the former, but ſome ſay in the birth itſelf, the ſoul is created; and from the firſt moment of its exiſtence united to the body.—The weakneſs of the former hypotheſis, ſeems the principal ſtrength of this. It is indeed objected, that this ſuppoſes God to be always creating new ſouls: but it is not eaſy to ſee the force of that objection. We are ſure he always acts; (*Prop.* 32.) and acts with infinite eaſe; (*Prop.* 31.) nor is continual new creation any reflection upon him. What if we ſhould acknowledge, that his works may be ever growing, both in number, extent, and perfection? It is difficult to ſee how it would blemiſh either his wiſdom or power.

Gale's Court of the Gent. part ii. *p.* 344—346. § 3. *p.* 382—384. *Ed.* 2.——*Lux Orientalis, c.* ii.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

On the whole, it ſeems that this laſt hypotheſis is rather the moſt probable: but it does not become us to be confident in ſo dark and dubious a matter. *Le Clerc's Pneum. part* i. *c.* viii.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

It is highly probable, that there are ſome created ſpirits, which were in the firſt conſtitution of their nature ſuperior to human ſouls. LECT. XCVIII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. When we conſider the vaſt variety there is in the inanimate, the vegetable, and the animal creation, and how one claſs and order of beings riſes above another, almoſt by imperceptible degrees, it ſeems highly probable, that we, who are in part allied to the beaſts that periſh, and who are placed in ſo imperfect a ſtate of being, are not the higheſt order of ſpirits, and the moſt glorious creatures of our almighty creator; but rather, that the ſcale of created beings riſes abundantly higher.

Baxter's Matho, vol. i. *Conf.* v. *p.* 248—257, 270—290.

2. Aſtronomers generally grant, and ſtrongly prove, that ſome of the planets are abundantly larger than the earth: we can hardly think they were made merely to afford us that little light and benefit we derive from them; it is much more probable that they are habitable worlds; eſpecially conſidering what diſcoveries have been made of the ſatellites of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, and thoſe varieties in the face of our moon, that ſeem like ſeas, land, and mountains. And it is highly probable, that ſome of theſe inhabitants may be ſpirits ſuperior to us: nor to mention the poſſibility there is, that the interſtellar ſpaces may be inhabited: nor to inſiſt on *Well*'s conjecture, that there

there may be more planets than we commonly reckon revolving about the ſun.

Swind. of Hell, p. 287.——*King's Orig. of Evil,* 4. i. 1, 2.

3. Moſt nations have believed the exiſtence of *Demons, i. e.* created ſpirits ſuperior to human ſouls: and the accounts that have been given of their intercourſe with men might probably have ſome foundation in fact; though no doubt the greater part of them are fabulous *.

1, 2, & 3.|4. *Valet propoſitio.*

Spect. vol. vii. *N°.* 519.——*Locke's Eſſ. l.* ii. *c.* xxiii. § 13. *l.* iv. *c.* iii. §. 24, 26. *l.* iv. *c.* xvi. § 12.—*Wilkins's World in the Moon, Prop.* vii—ix, xiii.—*Matho, vol.* ii. *p.* 55.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 55, 56.——*Hier. in Pyth. Carm. ver.* 3, 4. *Vid. Dacier's Not. ibid.*——*Euſeb. Prep. Evang. l.* xv. *c.* xliii.——*Voltaire's Miſc. Of the Doctrine of the Genii.*——*Night Thoughts, p.* 173, 174. 8*vo. Ed.*

SCHOLIUM I.

If it be objected, that perhaps thoſe beings, now ſuperior to us, were at firſt on a level with us, though perhaps ſomething different; we anſwer, that the reaſoning of the *firſt* ſtep lies ſtrongly againſt this. And as for what is objected againſt the *third* ſtep, (though it muſt be acknowledged, according to Dr. *Sykes*'s aſſertion, that many of thoſe, whom the heathens called both good and bad *Demons*, were ſuppoſed to be *human ſouls*,) yet it is very evident they had a

* The various publications of Mr. Farmer and his antagoniſts with regard to Demons, will be noticed hereafter. In the mean while, we content ourſelves with referring to his general prevalence of the "Worſhip of Human Spirits, in the ancient Heathen Nations," and to Mr. Fell's "Idolatry of Greece and Rome diſtinguiſhed from that of other Heathen Nations."

notion of ſome *Demons*, who were originally in a ſtate ſuperior to humanity, and never had dwelt in human bodies: compare *Hierocles* and *Euſebius* quoted above.

Inq. into Demoniacs, p. 1—4.——*Twells's Anſ. p.* 5, 6.——*Farther Inq. p.* 2—20.——*Anſwer to it, p.* 8—24.——*Pegge of Demon. p.* 1—35.——*Juſt. Mart. Opera, p.* 28. *Col. Ed.*—*Pope's Iliad, l.* xix. *ver.* 93. *Not.*—*Still. Orig. l.* iii. *c.* iii. § 17. *p.* 514—516. *Fol. Ed. p.* 322.——*Euſeb. Prep. l.* viii. *c.* xiv. *p.* 387. *l.* xiii. *c.* xi. *p.* 663.——*Gale's Court Gent. l.* ii. *c.* viii. § 11, 12. *p.* 186—188, & 337. 196—198. 375.

SCHOLIUM 2.

However it may be granted, that the perfection and happineſs of thoſe ſpirits are growing and increaſing, as (if we ſuppoſe them not ſubject to forgetfulneſs, which the extraordinary memory of ſome men makes probable) it is certain their ſtock of knowledge muſt always be; with the increaſe of which much pleaſure is connected.

Locke's Eſſ. l. ii. *c.* x. § 9.——*Watts's Imp. of the Mind, p.* 253—254.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs it muſt be acknowledged, that whatever their perfection be, or can be at any imaginable moſt diſtant ſpace of time, with any imaginable degree of continued improvement, they will ſtill continue inferior to the divine being in knowledge and in power, and will ſtill be equally dependent on him for their exiſtence and every degree of their happineſs; in which reſpect the nobleſt and meaneſt of his creatures are on a level, and ſo are to him as nothing.

And

And this, by the way, is a ſtrong argument for the infinity of the divine being.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Let it be obſerved, that the propoſition is to be taken only in a general ſenſe; for we have not any aſſurance by the light of nature, that no human ſoul ſhall ever arrive in its improvement to an equality with the moſt excellent of thoſe ſuperior ſpirits: on the other hand, that there are ſome ſpirits now ſuperior to what thoſe of men are in this embodied ſtate, is in effect no other than a corollary from *Prop.* 82.

Republic of Letters, vol. vi. *p.* 282—284.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

LECT. XCIX. More fully to prove that it is the intereſt of every man to cultivate virtue through the whole courſe of his life, and in every particular action. Vid. *Prop.* 44. *Cor.* 2.

DEMONSTRATION.

Ax. 15. *Cor. Schol.* 1.|1. There is a ſecret and immediate pleaſure attending virtuous actions, eſpecially thoſe of a benevolent kind, or thoſe in which there is any remarkable degree of gratitude and piety towards God; which pleaſure is of a very ſublime and delightful kind, vaſtly preferable to any ſenſual gratification; as thoſe who have tried both experimentally know: and pious philoſophers will acknowledge that the immediate pleaſures of virtue are ſuperior to thoſe of ſcience.

2. In reflecting upon all virtuous actions, and particularly thoſe which are attended with the greateſt difficulty, there is a high ſatisfaction of mind.

3. Human nature and life are ſo conſtituted, that generally ſpeaking health, reputation, and intereſt in the world, and in a moderate degree the

the poſſeſſions of it, may be moſt effectually ſecured by a virtuous courſe: at leaſt it is ſeldom or never injurious to any of theſe.

4. A good man has or may have a ſource of happineſs diſtinct from all theſe, in the preſent views of the favour of God, a confidence in his care, and the proſpect of a future ſtate of happineſs after death, by which he may be delightfully ſupported under thoſe calamities which are common to all; ſo that the painful ſenſe of them may ſometimes be ſwallowed up in vaſtly ſuperior pleaſure.

5. On the contrary to all this, a wicked man often finds a great deal of uneaſineſs in his vicious affections and actions, eſpecially in his reflections upon them: he often brings upon himſelf diſeaſes, infamy, poverty, and various kinds of diſtreſs in life, greatly aggravated by the apprehenſions of the divine diſpleaſure, and the fears of future evil to ariſe from it, in this life and in the next.

1, 5.|6. If we conſider only the preſent life, it appears that virtue does ordinarily on the whole tend to promote its happineſs.

Prop. 82.|7. Though it be granted that in ſome extraordinary caſes, it may be otherwiſe than has been repreſented in the former ſteps, (Vid. *Prop.* 82. *Schol.* 1.) yet the future ſtate will abundantly overbalance all the advantages, which there may in any imaginable circumſtances be on the ſide of vice; even where the moſt gloomy fears have clouded the virtuous mind on the one hand, or on the other the vaineſt hopes have been entertained by the bad man, his conſcience ever ſo much deadened and perverted, or where his courſe of proſperity in life has been ever ſo great.

6, 7.|8. It is on the whole the intereſt of every man to cultivate virtue in every action. *Q. E. D.*

Wiſhart's Ref. Serm. p. 15—29.—*Hutch. on the Paſſ. c.* v.—*Wilk. Nat. Rel. l.* ii. *c.* i.

c. i—viii.——*Gaſt. Nat. Rel. p.* 129—136, *& p.* 178—181.—*Puff. de Jure, l.* ii. *c.* iii. § 14, 15.——*Shafteſb. Inq. after Virtue, part* ii. *paſſ.*—*Self-Love and Virtue reconciled by Relig.*—*Pope's Eſſ. Ep.* iv. *præſ. ver.* 309—360.—*Balg. Serm. vol.* i. *N°.* iii.—*Sermons at Boyle's Lecture on the Certainty and Neceſſity of Religion.*——*Night-Thoughts, vol.* ii. *p.* 95—125. *N°.* viii.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol.* ii. *p.* 8—41.

COROLLARY 1.

It muſt be the intereſt of every one to proſecute and cultivate the proper means of virtue.

COROLLARY 2.

It muſt be the intereſt of every perſon heartily to repent of every inſtance in which he has acted contrary to virtue. Vid. *Prop.* 81. *Cor.* 4.

SCHOLIUM.

Some have argued the neceſſary connection between virtue and happineſs from this conſideration, that the divine being who is perfectly virtuous is perfectly happy; ſo that in proportion to the degree in which any inferior being reſembles him in virtue, he muſt alſo reſemble him in happineſs. But ſo far as this argument is diſtinct from that ſtated in the preceding demonſtration, it is inconcluſive: for if it would prove any thing, it muſt be, that every virtuous man is in every moment of his exiſtence happier than any vicious man is, or can be, which ſeems evidently contrary to fact.

Clergyman's Lett. to Dr. Clarke, paſſ.

PRO-

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

It is on the whole for the benefit of societies to cultivate virtue. LECT. C.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 87.|1. It tends to promote the happiness of every individual member, and therefore by consequence of the whole.

Prop. 51. *Schol.*|2. Virtue teaches each to consult the good of all, and to be willing to resign any private interest of his own to the interest of the society, when it comes in competition with it; so constituting each man in his sphere the guardian of the public happiness.

Prop. 80, 81.|3. Virtue must ordinarily tend to bring down the favour and blessing of God upon societies, to which they must owe their surest foundation and best prosperity: and his interposition may the more reasonably be expected, since societies, as such, have no existence in a future state. 1, 2, 3.|4. *Valet propositio.*

Clarke's Serm. vol. vi. *N°.* xiv. *p.* 207—210. 12*mo Ed.*—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 626, 627.—*Butler's Anal. part* i. *article* 5. *c.* iii. *p.* 85—96. *Ed.* 2. 8*vo.*

SCHOLIUM.

To this *Mandeville* has objected, that private vices are often public benefits; and that an universal reformation would necessarily produce the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, who subsist upon the public luxury and debauchery: but it may be replied,

1. That though some good may arise to particular persons from the vices of others, it does not thence follow, that greater might not arise to the whole from common virtues.

2. That virtue would allow the free use of many things, not absolutely necessary to the support

port of life, yet tending to make it more agreeable, as wine, tea, *&c.*

3. That public temperance and reformation would prevent the ruin of multitudes of perſons and families, which is often aggravated by former ſplendor, and the conſciouſneſs of thoſe extravagancies by which they have been reduced, as well as by the additional infamy attending poverty when occaſioned by ſuch means.

4. That during the time that the proſperity of families continues, we ſhall judge very wrong, if we eſtimate their happineſs by their external circumſtances, without allowing for the inward temper of their minds, the happineſs of which virtue would always promote, and thereby be a noble equivalent for rendering them ſomething leſs opulent and magnificent.

5. That the community would be better defended from foreign and domeſtic enemies by poorer citizens, that were temperate, generous and courageous, than by the effeminate, debauched and mercenary; beſides all that extraordinary protection, which an univerſally virtuous people might juſtly promiſe itſelf from divine providence.

6. If the hiſtory of the moſt celebrated antient or modern ſtates and kingdoms be examined, it will be found they have riſen by virtue, and fallen by vice, agreeably to our argument in the propoſition above, and contrary to thoſe principles which we here oppoſe. See, (beſides *Perſian Letters* referred to *Prop.* 51. *gr.* 4.)

Fable of the Bees, paſſ.—*Warb. Div. Leg. l.* i. § 6. *vol.* i. *p.* 76—84.——*Innes of Virtue, p.* 99, *&c.*——*Brown's Eſſ. on the Charact. N°.* ii. § 5. *p.* 146—158.——*Law's Theory, p.* 235—239.——*Pinto's Eſſay on Luxury. paſſim.*

PRO-

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

To take a ſurvey of the ſtate of virtue in the world.

SOLUTION.

1. A great part of the world is over-run with pagan idolatry and ſuperſtition; many of their rites are impious, obſcene or cruel; and as new countries are diſcovered, new ſcenes of wickedneſs are diſcovered with them: and it is by the way obſervable, that ſeveral of thoſe writers which ſpeak moſt favourably of the morals of newly diſcovered countries, have in other reſpects moſt of the air of a romance.

2. Though it is to be acknowledged, that the religious inſtitutions of *Chriſtians*, *Mahometans* and *Jews* contain many excellent leſſons of morality in all its branches; yet it evidently appears, that under all theſe profeſſions, the greateſt part of mankind are ſtrangers to real virtue.

3. Thoſe who cultivate it with the greateſt care are in many reſpects defective, and far from that perfection which they themſelves deſire.

DEMONSTRATION.

The proof of all this is too evident from all the opportunities we have of knowing the moral characters of our fellow-creatures, by reading, travelling, or obſervation at home.

Watts's Ruin and Recov. quæſt. i. § 5. *p.* 32—41.——*Barrow on the State of Pre-exiſtence, c.* vi. *Ed.* 2 *.

* Great additional light has been thrown upon the hiſtory of the ſtate of knowledge and virtue amongſt mankind, in conſequence of the vaſt number of voyages and travels, to and through every part of the world, which have been made and publiſhed within the courſe of the laſt thirty years.

SCHOLIUM.

That the ſtate of things in former ages, even amongſt the moſt polite, learned, and celebrated nations of antiquity, was generally much the ſame, appears from all the ſtrain of ancient authors; and farther from the known lewdneſs and cruelty of many of their religious rites, the cuſtom of expoſing children, and the public ſpectacles, beſides many other things illuſtrated in

Jenk. of Chriſt. vol. i. *p.* 353—364.——*St. Real, vol.* i.——*England's Morals of the Ancients, c. ult.*——*Leland on Revelation, vol. i. particularly c.* i. 18—20. *vol.* ii. *part* ii. *c.* iii. *&c.*——*Law on the Theory of Religion, part* ii. *p.* 116—124.

COROLLARY 1.

There is great reaſon for adoring the divine patience, that the earth is ſtill preſerved, and made the ſeat of ſo much pleaſure, conſidering the exact and circumſtantial manner in which God knows all crimes, and the almighty power with which he is always armed to puniſh them.

COROLLARY 2.

Thoſe who are themſelves truly virtuous have great reaſon to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to ſtem the torrent of vice, and to ſupport the intereſts of virtue, which humanly ſpeaking are ſo weak.

COROLLARY 3.

There ſeems a great deal of reaſon to ſuſpect, that mankind is degenerated from ſome better ſtate, in which it may be ſuppoſed the race firſt came out of the hands of ſo holy and good a being as the bleſſed God is: and accordingly, we may obſerve among ſome ancient as well as modern

dern nations remarkable traditions on that head, which will be more fully conſidered hereafter.

Howe, vol. i. *p.* 150, 151.——*Living Temple, part* ii. *c.* iv. § 7.——*Cyrus's Trav. part* ii. *Ap. p.* 93—99.

COROLLARY 4.

Some farther diſcoveries from the Divine Being ſeem very deſirable, to lead us into the paths of more perfect virtue and happineſs: but the fuller diſcuſſion of this will be the buſineſs of the next part of this work *.

* Though many of the books hereafter mentioned have already been referred to in different places, it may not be amiſs, at this cloſe of the lectures on the ſeveral branches of moral philoſophy, to make a general reference to ſome works which it will be proper for a ſtudent to become acquainted with, as far as may be, in the courſe of his academical education, and ſtill more in his future enquiries. The more diligently he applies to the beſt ſources of information, the more will his mind be enriched and ſtrengthened, and his views of things become accurate and juſt. It is not of ſmall importance to be maſter of what the antients have written on ethical ſubjects; in which view Ariſtotle, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Antoninus, and Plutarch will deſerve to be cloſely ſtudied. The great body of Engliſh ſermons will furniſh a vaſt fund of information concerning almoſt every moral queſtion, and every part of human conduct. Among foreign authors, it may be ſufficient here to mention Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, and Vattel. The Engliſh writers which occur immediately to recollection, are as follows: Biſhop Wilkins of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, Dr. Henry More's Enchiridion, Bp. Cumberland on the Laws of Nature, Shafteſbury's Characteriſtics, Wollaſton's Religion of Nature delineated, Hartley's Obſervations on Man, Hutcheſon's Compendium, and his Syſtem of moral Philoſophy, Fettiplace Bellers's Delineation of univerſal Law, Grove's moral Philoſophy, Foſter's Diſcourſes on natural Religion and ſocial Virtue, Fordyce's Treatiſe of moral Philoſophy, Nelſon on Virtue and Happineſs, Hume's Principles of Morals, Lord Kaims's Principles of Morality, Tucker's Light of Nature purſued, Prieſtley's Inſtitutes of natural Religion, Harris's Dialogue on Happineſs, Adam Smith's Theory of moral Sentiments, Dr. Price on Morals, Bruce's Elements of the Science of Ethics, Paley's Principles of moral and political Philoſophy, Giſborne's Principles of moral Philoſophy inveſtigated, Beattie's Elements of moral Science, and Dr. Ferguſon's Principles of moral and political Science.

PART V.

Of the Reaſon to expect and deſire a REVELATION: *and the internal and external* EVIDENCE *with which we may ſuppoſe it ſhould be attended.*

DEFINITION LXVI.

LECT. CI. THEOLOGY or DIVINITY is that branch of *Pneumatology*, which relates in general to the *knowledge* of *God*, but eſpecially to thoſe *extraordinary diſcoveries* which he is ſuppoſed to have made of himſelf to mankind; and conſiders the probability, the certainty, and the contents of them.

SCHOLIUM.

Foraſmuch as *miracles* are generally urged in proof of ſuch extraordinary diſcoveries, it ſeems proper here to enquire into the nature, uſe and importance of them.

DEFINITION LXVII.

When ſuch effects are produced, as (*cæteris paribus*) are uſually produced, God is ſaid to operate *according to the common courſe of nature*: but when ſuch effects are produced, as are (*cæt. par.*) *contrary to*, or *different from* that common courſe, they are ſaid to be MIRACULOUS.

Conybeare on Mir. p. 6—12.——*Fleetw. on Mir. p.* 2—5. 8*vo Ed. p.* 22, 23.—— *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 374—376.—— *Clarke and Leibnitz, p.* 89. § 17. *p.* 113. § 43—46. *p.* 149.

COROL-

COROLLARY 1.

Nothing can be known to be miraculous, till the courſe of nature has been obſerved.

COROLLARY 2.

If two oppoſite effects (*cæt. par.*) were to be alternately produced, neither of them would be properly miraculous; but the alternate ſucceſſion of both would make up the courſe of nature: *v. g.* if the ſun were to ariſe one morning in the eaſt, and the next in the weſt.

COROLLARY 3.

When the courſe of nature can be but imperfectly known, in particular inſtances we may be incapable of pronouncing in many reſpects concerning certain remarkable events, whether they be or be not miraculous.

COROLLARY 4.

A miracle contains no greater exerciſe of divine power, than an operation according to the courſe of nature. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 371, 372.

COROLLARY 5.

Miracles are poſſible in general, (*Cor.* 4.) and poſſible in any given inſtance, when the wiſdom of God does not require that the courſe of nature ſhould be preſerved; which it is impoſſible for us to know that it always does.

It has indeed been aſſerted, that it is moſt honourable to God to ſuppoſe that he at firſt lays down the beſt poſſible laws, from which therefore it would be a defect of wiſdom to deviate. But it may be anſwered, that at leaſt for any thing we know, the beſt poſſible ſcheme may be that, in which there ſhall be ſome deviation from the ſtated rules, provided always that thoſe ſtated laws be generally ſo far obſerved, as that men may know what it is their duty to do, and

what conſequences are generally to be expected from their actions, which is apparently the caſe.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 376, 377.——*Conybeare's Serm. on Mir. p.* 12—17.——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* ii.——*Macknight's Truth of the Goſpel Hiſtory, c.* iv. § 2.—*Campbell on Miracles againſt Hume, part* i.——*Price's Diſſertations, N°.* iv. *paſſim.*——*Douglas's Criterion.*——*Hartley on Man, vol.* ii. *prop.* 28.——*Adams on Miracles, part* i.—*Hume's Eſſays, N°.* x. *part* i.

PROPOSITION XC.

To conſider ſome other definitions which celebrated writers have given of miracles.

SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Locke* defines a miracle to be "a ſenſible operation, which being above the comprehenſion of the ſpectator, is *in his opinion* contrary to the courſe of nature, and taken by him to be divine."

Locke's Works, vol. ii. *p.* 270. *Fol. Ed.*

But on this account of the matter, every juggling trick, which I cannot underſtand, will while my ignorance continues, be a miracle to me. In anſwer to this, *Locke* urges, that if this definition be not taken, we can never know what a miracle is; becauſe no man is acquainted with the whole courſe of nature. But though we acknowledge that great part of it is unknown, yet ſo much may be known, as that ſome inſtances may plainly appear to be above it: *v. g.* recovering the ſight of the blind, or the life of the dead by a word ſpeaking, or multiplying bread, ſo that one loaf ſhould ſerve a thouſand men, and more be left at laſt than there was at firſt.—Beſides this, the extraordinary works apprehended

to

to be done by evil agents, would not be miracles on this definition.

Locke's Poſt. Pieces, p. 217—220.——*Chandler of Mir. p.* 9—11.

2. Many others define a miracle to be "an "extraordinary operation, above the power of "all created beings, and performable by God "alone."

But this definition either goes on the falſe ſuppoſition, of ſuch a proper agency in the creature, as is inconſiſtent with *Prop.* 32. or elſe ſuppoſes, contrary to fact, that we know the utmoſt limits of the power of created agents, allowing that to be called *their power*, which is uſually communicated to them.

Limb. Theol. l. i. *c.* ii. § 17.——*Chand. on Mir. p.* 11—13.——*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 372—374.

3. Dr. *Chandler* ſays, "a miracle is an action "done, or an operation viſibly performed by "any being, which is really and truly above the "reach, natural power and capacity of that "being who does it of himſelf and without the "aſſiſtance of ſome ſuperior agent to perform."

This definition ſeems liable to the following objections.

1. It ſuppoſes created beings capable of doing ſomething of themſelves, and without the aſſiſtance of any ſuperior agent, contrary to *Prop.* 32.

2. It makes it impoſſible for God to perform a miracle, without the interpoſition of ſome creature.

3. It ſuppoſes that it would be no miracle for God to ſend an angel to relieve a ſtarving man, to open the priſon-doors, or even to roll back the ſun in his courſe, ſuppoſing I know the angel ſo employed to be ordinarily capable of producing ſuch an effect; whereas in truth here would be a miracle, in ſuffering an angel in ſuch a manner

to act out of his uſual ſphere, though not beyond his common ſtrength.

Chand. of Mir. p. 13—19.

Dr. *Hutcheſon's* definition, "that it is a work "far exceeding human power, yet performed "by the command or upon the volition of a "man," nearly coincides with this of Dr. *Chandler's*, and is equally liable to the 2d and 3d objection.

Hutcheſ. Metaph. Synopſ. p. 89. *p.* 222, 223. *2d Ed.*

4. Dr. *Clarke's* definition of what he calls a *theological* miracle, includes ſeveral particulars in it, which may more properly be examined hereafter. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 382, 383.

According to Dr. *Sykes*, "a miracle is a de-"ſigned effect, ſenſible, unuſual in itſelf, beyond "the art and power of man to do:" and he expreſsly declares againſt defining it, an event contrary to the courſe of nature. But to this it may be objected,

1. That if he does not by the word *unuſual*, mean as much as *beyond the courſe of nature*, its being unuſual is of no importance at all to prove any thing miraculous, as in the inſtance of the firſt *parhelion*

2. If by ſenſible be meant ſomething made known in conſequence of a ſenſation excited by external objects, diſtinguiſhed from the inward perception of impreſſions upon our minds, it is no way eſſential to conſtituting a miracle.

3. That the expreſſion of deſigned is either ſuperfluous or improper; ſince conſidering it as the work of God, every thing is deſigned; and if it might happen without *human* deſign, it might ſtill be miraculous; as if health ſhould unexpectedly be reſtored, while another perſon was praying for it. *Sykes of Mirac. p.* 16—28.

6. Dr. *Chapman* defines it, "an unuſual and "ſenſible event, moſt evidently either in the "nature

" nature or manner of it, above the power of all " natural material cauſes, and the art of man to " produce."—To this it may be objected,

1. Againſt the words *ſenſible* and *unuſual*, as in the laſt ſtep, *N°.* i, ii.

2. That an event may really be a true miracle, though it is not *moſt evidently ſo.*

3. That it ſeems to intimate a diſtinction between *natural* and *ſupernatural* material cauſes; not to urge that a *material cauſe* can only be a paſſive power, nor to inſiſt upon it, that it may be queſtioned, whether *dreams* be not miracles upon this ſuppoſition: ſo that here as well as in other inſtances, what is ſuperadded to our definition appears to be an incumbrance rather than an advantage.

Chapman's Euſ. vol. i. *p.* 72—76 *.

DEFINITION LXVII.

LECT. CII.

A DIVINE REVELATION is a diſcovery of ſome propoſition to the mind, which came in not by the uſual exerciſe of its faculties, but by ſome miraculous divine interpoſition and atteſtation, either mediate or immediate.

SCHOLIUM.

We ſhall endeavour in the following propoſitions to prove, that a revelation is poſſible, (*Prop.* 91.) that it is deſirable, (*Prop.* 92.) and that there is ſome reaſon to hope that God will grant it, (*Prop.* 93.) and then ſhall more particularly examine with what kind of internal and external evidence, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe that it ſhould be attended.

* The queſtion concerning the nature of miracles is treated of with great ability in Mr. Farmer's preliminary Conſiderations, in his " Diſſertation on Miracles," p. 1—51. The deſign of the whole work is to prove that miracles are never effected without a divine interpoſition.

PROPO-

PROPOSITION XCI.

A divine revelation is a poſſible thing.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. God may, for any thing we can certainly tell, think proper to make ſome diſcovery to his creatures of what they did not before know, or what by the uſe of their faculties they could not find out.

Prop. 31.|2. Since God is almighty, we may aſſure ourſelves, that he who has given us a power of communicating our ideas to each other, cannot be at a loſs for ſome proper method to make it apparent to his creatures, that it is he who ſpeaks to them.

3. The pretences that have from time to time been made to divine revelation, and the ready reception they have many of them met with, plainly ſhew, that the greater part of mankind have thought it not impoſſible.

1, 2, & 3.|4. A divine revelation is at leaſt a poſſible thing. *Q. E. D.*

Tillotſ. vol. iii. *p.* 441, 442.—*Conybeare on the Credib. of Rev. p.* 17.—*Leland's Advant. of Rev. vol.* i. *p.* 17—27.—*Farmer on Miracles, c.* i. § 2. *p.* 24.

SCHOLIUM.

It would be moſt abſurd to object, that God's goodneſs will oblige him to give his creatures by their natural faculties the knowledge of all that it is *neceſſary* for them to know, and that his wiſdom will prevent his miraculous interpoſition to diſcover *unneceſſary* things; for both theſe propoſitions univerſally taken are falſe. For ſince it is as eaſy for God to communicate knowledge to us by revelation, as by the uſe of our natural faculties, we cannot ſay univerſally, that he muſt make man in ſuch circumſtances as that no revelation ſhould be neceſſary; much leſs,

leſs, that he can never ſuffer him to fall into ſuch circumſtances. On the contrary, on the firſt formation of mankind, (when that experience, which now inſtructs us in ſo many things of the greateſt importance, could not poſſibly be our guide) it ſeems that ſome revelation was neceſſary with relation to his food; for ſurely, unleſs human nature were then vaſtly different from what it is now, appetite would have been but a very uncertain and dangerous rule: and it is certain, that the giving neceſſary intimations by revelation rather than by reaſon, would in ſome views be an additional favour; as it would ſo much the more ſenſibly illuſtrate God's care of his creatures and inſpection over them; which, though it might be ſolidly reaſoned out on principles laid down above, might become more obvious in this caſe, at leaſt to weaker minds. Nor is it on the other hand true, that God beſtows on his creatures nothing that is unneceſſary: if by *unneceſſary* be meant, what in the preſent connection it muſt mean, only ſomething without which they might have enjoyed ſome conſiderable degree of happineſs, ſufficient to overbalance the evils to which they are expoſed: nothing is more evident than the contrary, *i. e.* that God has conſulted our convenience and delight in numberleſs inſtances.

Delany's Rev. examined, vol. i. *p.* 2, 3.—*Leland againſt Tind. c.* i, ii, iii.—*Ditto on the Advant. and Neceſſ. of Rev. vol.* i. *p.* 48—51. 4*to Ed.*—*Hartley on Man, vol.* ii. *prop.* 27.

PROPOSITION XCII.

The circumſtances of mankind are ſuch, as to render a divine revelation highly expedient and deſirable. LECT. CIII.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. In the generality of mankind, we too plainly ſee ſuch indolence with regard to the things of religion, ſuch ſtrong paſſions, ſuch early prejudices, and inveterate habits of vice, as render them very unfit for an impartial inquiry after divine truth.

2. The greater part of mankind, even thoſe whoſe morals are leaſt vitiated, are ſo entangled in ſecular cares, that they have little leiſure for long and laborious inquiry.

3. It appears by the preceding parts of this work, that it is a very laborious and difficult taſk, to trace out the great principles of natural religion in their due connection and evidence.

1, 2, 3 ∴ 4. It is not to be expected that many will undertake it for themſelves, or that if they do, they will ſucceed in it.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 273—278.

5. There are ſome points, which the moſt diligent and impartial inquirer will find it hardly poſſible to clear up to himſelf, eſpecially thoſe relating to the pardon of ſin, and the compleat happineſs of a future ſtate. *Prop.* 82. *Schol.* 3. *Prop.* 83. *Schol.* 5.

6. Of thoſe things which ſuch an inquirer may be able to clear up to *himſelf*, there will be many, which it will be difficult to communicate to *others*; conſidering how abſtruſe many of his arguments will be on the one hand, and on the other, that indolence, prejudice, and ſecular cares, will in their degree hinder the generality from inquiring into truth propoſed by others, as well as from diſcovering it for themſelves. Vid. *gr.* 1, 2.

7. Could the great doctrines of religion and rules of morality be ſettled, and propoſed, and taught ever ſo plainly, and inculcated ever ſo frequently,

frequently, it would nevertheleſs be exceedingly difficult to *enforce* the *practice* of them. The credit of the perſon propoſing them would do little, conſidering the pride of the generality of mankind, and the difference which might probably happen among thoſe who ſhould undertake to inſtruct others: and we have before (*Prop.* 77.) proved it not to be the buſineſs of the civil magiſtrate to eſtabliſh religion by force; and it is certain, if he ſhould attempt it, he could not by his ſecular power produce any ſingle action truly virtuous, conſidering how much depends upon the temper and intention, with which an action is performed. *Prop.* 49. *gr.* 1, 2.

4, 5, 6, 7.|8. A revelation ſeems in *theory* highly expedient, and in a manner neceſſary to bring men to the knowledge of natural religion and the practice of virtue.

Conyb. Serm. on Rev. p. 4—28.

Prop. 89.|9. If we conſult *fact*, we ſhall find the ancient and modern world over-run with error, ſuperſtition and vice.

10. Though there have been in the heathen world ſome excellent teachers of morality, yet the number of thoſe who have in good earneſt ſet themſelves about it has been but ſmall; and ſome of thoſe few have been entirely ignorant of ſome things neceſſary to be known, and very dubious about others, concerning which they had ſome glimmering of knowledge: where they appear to have been certain themſelves, they have often been unable to advance a clear and diſtinct proof; and even where proofs have been moſt clear and diſtinct, they have wanted authority to enforce their inſtructions and precepts; ſo that they have availed but little to reform thoſe parts of the world where they dwelt; of which the remarkable wickedneſs of *Greece*, in the age of *Socrates* and *Plato*, is a very melancholy inſtance, as that

of

of *Rome*, in the days of their best moral philosophers, also was.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 281—302.——*Jenk. of Christ. vol.* i. *p.* 364—376, 384—389.—*In Ed.* 5. *part* iii. *c.* v. *p.* 367—379, 387—392.—*Dac. Plato, vol.* i. *Intr. p.* 7—9.——*Fiddes of Mor. Virt. c.* xix.—*Chandler of Mir. p.* 65—77.—*Campb. on the Neceff. of Revelation. paffim.*——*Leland on Adv. of Rev.* vi. *ch.* 10, 12, 21.——*Prot. Syft. vol.* i. *N°.* xx. *p.* 450—464.—*Leland's View, vol.* ii. *p.* 192—195.——*Monthly Review, vol.* xi. *p.* 99—105.

8, 9, 10.|11. Experience joins with theory, to prove a revelation so necessary to bring mankind to the knowledge and practice of virtue, that little is to be expected without it.

12. A revelation may make the knowledge of what the light of nature might discover to every man, more plain, easy, certain and affecting; not to say, that there may possibly be some things beyond the discovery of our unassisted reason, which might prove cogent motives to virtue.

Prop. 87, 88.|13. The knowledge and practice of virtue is necessary to the happiness of private persons and societies.

11, 12, 13.|14. A divine revelation is, in the present circumstances of mankind, highly expedient, and therefore greatly desirable. *Q. E. D.*

Foft. againft Tind. p. 12—24.——*Campb. Neceff. of Rev. poff. præf. c.* v, vi.—*Watts's Strength and Weakneſs of Human Reaſon.*—*Works, vol.* ii.—*Hodges's Sermons, N°.* xiv. *p.* 297—309.——*Leland's Advant. of Revel. vol.* ii. *p.* 27—39.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 1.

The proposition may be illustrated (and especially *gr.* 10.) by observing, that the most celebrated *Lawgivers* of antiquity have thought it necessary to profess some intercourse with heaven, in order to enforce their laws, though many of them were armed with secular power; as appears, not only in the instances of *Moses*, but also of *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, *Seleucus*, *Numa*, *Hermes Trismegistus*, *Orpheus*, *Suphis* the *Egyptian*, *Minos*, *Zamolxis* the *Getan*, *Woden* the *Saxon*, *Melesagoras* the *Eleusinian*, *Zathrausles* the *Arismaspian*, *Mango-Copal* the *Peruvian*, and *Phoe* the *Indian*: to which we may also add *Amasis*, *Mnevis*, *Radamanthus*, *Triptolemus*, *Zaleucus*, *Lycaon*, *Romulus*, and *Sertorius*.

Shuckford's Conn. vol. i. *p.* 319—323.—*Temple's Miscel. part* ii. *Eff.* ii. *p.* 87—89.—*Lucas Inq. vol.* i. § 2. *c.* iii. *p.* 108, 109. *p.* 79. *7th Ed.*—*Customs of Ind. and Jews compared, p.* 56, 57.—*Collier and Bayle in Nom.*—*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *p.* 101—109.

It may not be improper to observe by the way, that whereas the rise of superstition is generally ascribed to the *priests*, it appears in fact, that *princes* and *legislators*, under pretence of inspiration, as well as by other methods, were the chief agents in introducing it into the world; as is with great accuracy and learning shewn at large by

Chand. against Morg. part ii. § 15. *vol.* i. *p.* 556—585.——*Philemon to Hydaspes, part* iii. *p.* 53, 54.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the reasoning in the demonstration above, it is objected, by the author of *Christianity as old as the creation*, that natural religion is so *plain*, as

LECT. CIV.

as to need no explication, and so *perfect*, as to admit of no addition.

Tind. of Christianity, c. ii. & vi.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the *first* of these assertions it is answered, that the differences there have been between many learned philosophers, about many branches of natural religion, do evidently prove it not to be so *plain* as is here supposed: and indeed this hypothesis would entirely supercede all *human* as well as divine teachings. And as to what is said of the *perfection* of it, we reply, that if *natural religion* only mean that which in the most extensive sense may be called the *law of nature, i. e.* the obligation on a rational agent arising from the whole nature of things, (*Def.* 62. *Schol.*) though the assertion be true, it is nothing to the present purpose; but if we mean by it merely the *light of nature*, (*Def.* 62.) then the assertion is evidently false, being contrary to fact; but if it be a sort of medium between both these, *i. e.* that rule of life, to the knowledge of which men might attain, if they would in general use their faculties well; then it seems, that it is neither so perfect nor so plain, as to supercede the usefulness of a revelation, though it should on the other hand be granted not to be so imperfect and obscure, as to render it universally of absolute *necessity*.—On the whole, *Tindal* is very little consistent with himself, when, shifting between these different ideas, he sometimes insists on such a *perfection* of it, as is inconsistent with any tolerable degree of *plainness*; and sometimes on such a *plainness*, as must suppose it very *imperfect*.

Conyb. against Tind. p. 134—138. *or Leland against Tind. p.* 4—10. *vol.* i.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected farther, that it seems injurious to the divine goodness, to suppose that God has

suffered

suffered mankind to fall into such deplorable circumstances as the proposition represents. We answer,

1. That the proposition does not assert mankind to be left under an absolute *impossibility* of obtaining virtue and happiness.

2. That to leave men in great danger of error and vice, and that in such a degree, as will in *fact*, though *not necessarily* prove fatal to many, is certainly consistent with the divine perfections, because we plainly see it to be done; and is a difficulty by no means peculiar to those that believe revelation, but common to all that believe the goodness of the deity. And what *Tindal* says of the great evil of *superstition*, which he supposes worse than atheism, joined to the charge of superstition which he brings against the whole *christian* world, serves yet more to illustrate and confirm this reply.

3. To suppose the light of nature ever so perfect, will not infer the circumstances of mankind to be less deplorable: for the degree of wickedness and consequently misery prevailing in the world, being in other respects the same, will be aggravated in proportion to the degree in which their light and advantages are supposed perfect.

Tind. Christian. as old, &c. p. 173, 174.—
Fost. against Tind. p. 64—70, 73—77.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is objected nearly to the same purpose as before, that if a revelation were thus expedient, it must have been *universal*; there being no imaginable reason, why God should give it to some rather than others. Reserving this to be more fully considered elsewhere, we here answer,

1. Since, on our principles, God was not obliged in strict justice to give it to *any*, he could not be obliged to give it to all.

2. That though we cannot tell why one nation should have it rather than another, there is no

reaſon to be ſurprized at ſuch a diſtinction, conſidering in how different, and to us unaccountable a manner, all muſt acknowledge the means of virtue and happineſs to be diſpenſed among the children of men.

3. That it is a very ſuppoſable caſe, that if ever God gave a revelation at all, ſuited to the general uſe of mankind, it was with ſuch circumſtances, that its not having an univerſal ſpread was owing to the folly and wickedneſs of men: nay it is a very poſſible caſe, that God may already have given an univerſal revelation; *i. e.* a revelation made to the human family when very ſmall, the tradition of which has been loſt through their own folly, though their happineſs might have been greatly promoted by keeping up the memory of it.

Blount's Orac. of Reaſ. p. 211, 198, 199. —*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 315—318. ——*Foſt. againſt Tind. c.* ii. *p.* 78—86. ——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* vi.—*Sykes on Mir. p.* 217—229.——*Law's Theory of Religion, part* i.——*Balguy's Tracts, p.* 324—334.—*Second Letter to a Deiſt.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

Thoſe who aſſert a revelation to be ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that every man, how well ſoever he uſes his reaſon, muſt inevitably periſh without it, generally ground that aſſertion, not on principles of natural religion, but on thoſe paſſages of *ſcripture*, which relate to the neceſſity of *faith in Chriſt*, which cannot here be properly examined.

Jenk. Reaſ. of Chriſtianity, vol. i. *p.* 2—14.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

LECT. CV. There is ſome reaſon to hope that God will grant a revelation.

LEMMA.

LEMMA.

It is to be obſerved, that we are far from ſaying, that a man could have any *certainty* in this point: but a *probable hope* might be produced by the following conſiderations.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 92.|1. The circumſtances of mankind greatly need it.

1.|2. The general goodneſs of the Divine Being may lead us to expect it: and it ſeems probable, that God would not have ſuffered mankind to have fallen into ſo great apoſtacy, unleſs he had intended them ſuch an aſſiſtance.

3. The proviſion which God has made in the natural world for removing *bodily diſorders*, gives us ſome additional reaſon to hope, that he will not be altogether regardleſs of the much more dangerous diſeaſes of the *mind*.

Prop. 92. *Schol.* 1.|4. The pretences to a divine revelation, which have been often made, and one and another of them ſo readily received, even ſometimes upon very ſlender evidence, plainly ſhew that men have thought a revelation probable: and perhaps we may add, that there would not have been ſo many counterfeits, if there had been no true coin.

5. Some of the ancient philoſophers, and eſpecially *Socrates* and *Plato*, though they did not believe the pretences to revelation made by their *prieſts*, yet hoped that ſuch a favour would be given to mankind, and expreſs their comfortable expectation of it. 2, 3, & 4, 5.|6. *Valet propoſitio.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 304—310.——*Jackſon's Chronology, vol.* ii. *Sub Finem.*——*Apud Monthly Rev. vol.* vii. *p.* 47, 48.

SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be objected, that ſince mankind brought themſelves into theſe deplorable circumſtances by their own fault, there is the leſs reaſon to expect any extraordinary aſſiſtance.

Anſ. We allow that no particular perſon can have any aſſurance that God will favour him in this manner; but ſince it is certain that God confers many unmerited favours upon his creatures, and that in the natural world many remedies are provided for evils, which men bring upon themſelves by their own folly, this objection will not overthrow the preceding argument.

DEFINITION LXIX.

That MIRACLE is ſaid to be UNCONTROULED, the apparent deſign of which is not evidently *contradicted*, either by the *abſurdity* of the thing it is intended to prove, or by ſome at leaſt *equal miracle* oppoſed to it.

Chandler on Mir. c. iii.——*Sykes, ibid. p.* 130—134.

SCHOLIUM.

A man may be ſaid to perform miracles *in proof of a doctrine*, when he aſſerts the doctrine, and then works the miracle as an immediate confirmation of it; or when he does publicly and frequently aſſert himſelf to be a teacher ſent from God, and appeals to a train of miracles to ſhew that he is ſo: for in that caſe ſuch miracles, (if they be allowed to be any proof at all) do prove particular facts or doctrines aſſerted by him, even though no miracle be diſtinctly applied to ſuch particulars.

Fleetwood of Mir. p. 120, 121, 220—228.
——*Works, p.* 144. *p.* 159, 160.——
Farmer on Miracles, p. 515—521.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

When a man performs evident and uncontrouled miracles as a proof of any doctrine, virtue requires thoſe who have ſufficient evidence of the reality of ſuch miracles, to admit of the doctrine as true.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 91.|1. God may ſee fit to reveal ſome things to his creatures, not diſcoverable by their natural light.

1.|2. God's wiſdom will require him to reſerve to himſelf ſome certain *criteria*, by which his own teſtimony may be known and diſtinguiſhed by us.

Prop. 32. and *Def.* 67.|3. A miracle cannot be performed without an extraordinary divine interpoſition, either mediate or immediate.

3.|4. If God would confirm the truth of a propoſition to one man, by the teſtimony of another to whom it was immediately revealed, we can think of no method, by which he could do it in ſo effectual a manner, as by giving him a power to work a *miracle* in confirmation of it.

Def. 69.|5. When a miracle is *uncontrouled*, we can imagine no circumſtance by which it can be diſtinguiſhed from a miracle wrought to confirm a truth.

4, 5 |6. If God were to ſuffer an uncontrouled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falſhood, it ſeems he cou'd have no criterion by which his teſtimony could be diſtinguiſhed.

2, 6.|7. It is inconſiſtent with the *wiſdom* of God, to ſuffer an uncontrouled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falſhood.

6 |8. It would alſo be inconſiſtent with his *goodneſs*; ſeeing it would leave his creatures in a perpetual and melancholy uncertainty, as to the truth of any pretended revelation from him: an

uncertainty that would be moſt painful to the moſt virtuous and religious part of mankind.

7, 8 |9. Seeing God is both wiſe and good, we may depend upon it, that a propoſition atteſted by uncontrouled miracles is atteſted by him.

Prop. 79, 9.|10. Seeing God is true, virtue will require us to admit of a propoſition ſo confirmed. *Q. E. D.*

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. *p.* 214—216.—
Locke's Poſt. Works, p. 219—222.——
Works, vol. iii. *p.* 453. *Ed.* 3.——
Chand. on Mir. c. ii.

SCHOLIUM I.

We have not mentioned that additional confirmation, which may ariſe to the propoſition, from the regard which men in all ages and nations ſeem to have paid to miracles, as the ſureſt proof of a divine revelation; that fact having been diſputed, eſpecially of late by the learned and ingenious Mr. *Weſton*, though ſome conſiderable ſtreſs is laid upon it by Biſhop *Atterbury*, in the place quoted below; and Mr. *Comber* has laboured to ſhew that miracles were greatly regarded by the Gentiles. It is obſervable, that few of the *legiſlators* mentioned above, (*Prop.* 92. *Schol.* 1.) though they pretended to revelations, (which by them muſt have been ſuppoſed miracles, *ſee Def.* 68.) ventured to prove the truth of them by profeſſing a power to work miracles. Nevertheleſs, though the pretended miracles of the heathens were ſeldom propoſed as in proof of any doctrine, (as will be farther noted) yet there was a ſort of accidental credit derived to heathen eſtabliſhments by ſuch pretenſions to them, which occaſioned the multiplication of thoſe pretences in oppoſition to chriſtianity; and is a proof after all, that miracles were not diſregarded by the pagans in general; as, conſidering the conſtitution of human nature, it would be

be ſtrange if they were, at leaſt by thoſe who were themſelves eye-witneſſes of them, and that in inſtances where the facts could not be diſputed.

Atterb. Poſt. Serm. vol. i. *p.* 207—210*.

SCHOLIUM 2.

LECT. VI.

To this it is objected, that if we believe the *bible*, we ſhall find that it is not only ſuppoſed there, that miracles *may be* wrought in proof of a falſhood, but it is expreſsly aſſerted to *have been fact* in one caſe, and foretold as what *ſhall certainly be* in others. *Deut.* xiii. 1—5. *Matt.* xxiv. 24. 2 *Theſſ.* ii. 9, 10. *Exod.* vii. and viii. To theſe texts it has been anſwered by ſome, that they, eſpecially the *firſt*, may be only *hypothetic:* by others, that all the wonders here ſpoken of are *tricks* and not real miracles; which may be true of 2 *Theſſ.* ii. 9. But the juſteſt anſwer ſeems to be, that none of theſe are ſuppoſed to be *uncontrouled* miracles, but to be ſufficiently confuted, either by the apparent abſurdity of the thing they attempted to prove, or by other more and greater miracles wrought on the contrary ſide: and it is to be remembered in this view, that *Matt.* xxiv. 24. refers to the *apoſtolic* age; ſo that all the miracles of thoſe falſe Chriſts were directly oppoſed, by the ſum of all thoſe wrought in the very ſame time in proof of chriſtianity.

Tillotſ. Serm. vol. iii. *p.* 499, 500.——*Sermon* 175, *Ed. 4th. p.* 476, 477.——*Limb. Theol. l.* iii. *c.* xvii. § 2.—*Fleetw. of Mir. p.* 173—209.—*Works, p.* 152—157.——*Chapman's Euſeb. vol.* i. *p.* 119—127.——*Sykes of Mir. p.* 175—

* Weſton's "Inquiry into the Cauſes of the Rejection of the Chriſtian Miracles by the Heathens," is a work which excited ſome attention at the time of its publication, but is now nearly forgotten. The author's ſcheme has been generally eſteemed to be more fanciful than juſt. His Inquiry, however, is a book of learning.

179.—*Jortin's Rem. on Eccles. History, vol.* ii. *p.* 32—36.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Bishop *Fleetwood*'s singular solution of the miracles of the *Egyptian Magi*, may be seen at large in

Fleetwood, ibid. p. 52—61.——*Works, p.* 134, 135.——*Shuckford's Connection, vol.* ii. *p.* 412—433.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Others assert, that by stating the case as in the proposition above, we fall into a round of proving the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. But the contrary is plain; for though we readily allow, that nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature can be proved by a miracle, yet we maintain, that many doctrines, of which the light of nature could give us no information at all, and in which even when proposed we can see no innate mark of truth, may be proved by miracles; it being sufficient in this case to render the proof valid, that no apparent absurdity attend the doctrine to be established by them, where there are no contrary miracles to be compared with them: nor could miracles according to us in any imaginable case be proved by the doctrine, be it ever so apparently true.

Fleetw. on Mir. p. 169—173.——*Works, p.* 151, 152.——*Hoadly's Tracts, p.* 26—28.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p.* 383—385.—*Bp. Sherlock's Discourses, vol.* i. *p.* 303, 304*.

* We should here distinguish, says Mr. Merivale, between the doctrines we *prove* by miracles (viz. those of revelation), and the doctrines by which we *try* miracles, (viz. those of natural religion.)

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther pleaded, that any *one* miracle is as good a proof of divine interpoſition as *a thouſand*; and that *all* miracles are as to their evidence *equal*, ſince no work can to the divine power be greater or leſs than another.—We anſwer, though all things be equally eaſy to God, yet there are ſome of his works, which appear to us more grand and magnificent than others, and more indubitably miraculous: and the ſtory of the *Egyptian Magi*, before referred to, plainly ſhews there may be circumſtances, by which one miracle may appear evidently to triumph over another; in which caſe, it ſeems that all the evidence ariſing from the oppoſite miracle is in a manner even transferred to the victorious ſide.

Fleetw. ibid. p. 30—37, 81—83, 211—213.—*Works, p.* 131, 132—138, 157, 158.——*Hoadly's Tracts, p.* 5—16.——*Locke on Mir. p.* 223—231.——*Works, vol.* iii. *p.* 453, 454. 3*d. Ed.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

It muſt be granted, that the evidence of miracles ſeems ſo ſtrong, as to render it highly probable, that God will not ſuffer it to be applied in proof of a falſhood, without appearing by miracle to turn the balance on the ſide of truth: for ſhould he ſuffer them often to be profaned, to confirm what is evidently contrary to the principles of natural religion or common ſenſe, they would gradually grow into ſuch ſuſpicion and contempt, as we can hardly ſuppoſe his wiſdom would permit; and the more illuſtrious any miraculous fact in queſtion appears, the ſtronger will this argument be.

Champ. Euſeb. vol. i. *p.* 89—93, 96—116.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is farther objected, that this method of ſtating the doctrine of miracles renders them of no

no uſe. But not to repeat what was ſaid in anſwer to the objection in the 4th *Schol.* which is nearly equivalent to this; it is moſt evident they may, on this hypotheſis, ſerve to awaken attention: to illuſtrate the goodneſs of the deity, when they are of a benevolent kind, and in all inſtances his power, and thereby impreſs the conſciences of men with ſentiments of religious reverence and awe: to command reſpect to the perſon ſpeaking, who might otherwiſe, eſpecially if in circumſtances of external meanneſs, appear pragmatical and uſurping: to increaſe the evidence of ſome things which may be leſs certainly known by natural light; and to diſcover many others, which though not contrary to reaſon, are not diſcoverable by it, nor capable of receiving immediate evidence from it.

Foſter againſt Tind. p. 50—63.—— *Atterb. Poſt. Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 210—216.—— *Jortin's Remarks, vol.* ii. *p.* 3.

SCHOLIUM 8.

It appears from the ſurvey we have now been taking, that the queſtion, whether evil ſpirits, if ſuch there be, may work miracles, is not of ſo great importance as ſome have repreſented: ſince it is certain that on the principles of the propoſition, God will not ſuffer them to work uncontrouled miracles; and if any ſuch ſhould be wrought in proof of a falſhood, charging it upon an evil ſpirit would by no means remove the difficulty, ſince ſuch a ſpirit could act no otherwiſe than by a divine energy communicated to him, *Prop.* 32. Nevertheleſs, if a miracle were ever wrought, which was controuled by the abſurdity and wickedneſs of the doctrine to be proved by it, or by a ſeries of oppoſite and greater miracles; in that caſe, it ſeems more congruous to the chriſtian ſcheme, (if there appear to be reaſon for admitting it) to aſcribe

ſuch

ſuch miracles to the power of evil ſpirits, than to ſpeak of them as the work of God. Vid. 2 *Theſſ.* ii. 9. *Acts* xiii. 10. *Job* ii. 7. compare *Rev.* xiii. 2, 14. Vid. *Prop.* 32. *Schol.* 3.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 318—322.——*Jortin's Remarks, vol.* ii. *p.* 3.—*Farmer on Chriſt's Temptation, p.* 25—27 *.

DEFINITION LXX.

LECT. CVII.

That is called the INTERNAL EVIDENCE of any revelation, which is drawn from the conſideration of thoſe declarations and doctrines which are contained in it: and that is called its EXTERNAL EVIDENCE, which ariſes from ſome other circumſtances referring to it, *v. g.* predictions concerning it, miracles wrought by thoſe who teach it, its ſucceſs in the world, *&c.*

PROPOSITION XCV†.

To enquire what kind of internal evidence, we

* Moſt of the queſtions to which theſe ſcholia refer are amply conſidered by Mr. Farmer, in his Diſſertation on Miracles.

† This and the ninety-ſeventh propoſition ſeem liable to ſome objection. It muſt be owned that we are very little qualified to judge *à priori* what kind of evidence, and eſpecially what *external* evidence ſhould attend a divine revelation: and to ſelect all the particulars of that evidence with which the *chriſtian* religion was attended, and to propoſe this as the *ſtandard*, by which revelation in *general* is to be tried, looks too much like an attempt to prepoſſeſs the mind in favour of chriſtianity, before it is fairly examined. The author ſeems to have been aware of this objection himſelf; and has accordingly in his *Lemma* to the 97th propoſition endeavoured to ſoften the manner of expreſſion; as if the intention of the propoſition was only to ſhew the *reaſonableneſs* of ſuch kind of evidence, if it ſhould hereafter appear to have in fact attended any ſuppoſed revelation, without aſſerting that all the particulars of this evidence would have occurred to us as probable, when only reaſoning upon it in theory: for it is evident that to ſee the reaſonableneſs of any ſcheme when it is propoſed to us, is a very different thing from making the diſcovery ourſelves.—But though this way of ſtating the queſtion muſt be allowed to be leſs exceptionable than the other, yet it ſeems on the whole, that this inquiry would be made with much greater

we may probably expect to find in a divine revelation ‡.

LEMMA.

Let it be obſerved, that the divine revelation of which we here ſpeak, is ſuppoſed to be one intended for the benefit of mankind *in general*, and introduced as that in which the whole ſcheme of revelation *terminates:* for otherwiſe it muſt be acknowledged, that there may be particular revelations on different occaſions, which may be very credible, though not attended with all thoſe internal evidences; nor could it be expected, that every diſcovery which God makes of himſelf to any particular perſon, or nation, ſhould anſwer all theſe characters.

SOLUTION.

1. We may be ſure it can contain nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature, becauſe that is the law of God, *Def.* 61. and he is too wiſe and too faithful to contradict himſelf.

2. It may be expected, that it ſhould farther confirm ſome important truths known by the light of nature, and clear up the difficulties which hang on ſome articles in which our happineſs is much concerned: particularly, that it ſhould give us firmer aſſurance of the pardon of ſin in a way conſiſtent with the divine juſtice, and that

greater advantage, if it were reſerved till the evidence which has in fact attended chriſtianity were fully ſtated. We ſhould then be better able to judge of any objections that are made to particular parts of the evidence, and ſhould be prepared to make a more preciſe and determinate anſwer: whereas when the ſubject is only treated *in theory*, our reaſoning upon it will of neceſſity be more indeterminate, and therefore leſs ſatisfactory; an inſtance of which we have in the objections that are urged in ſome of the following pages, againſt *poſitive inſtitutions* and a *traditional* revelation. Former editor.

‡ See, ſays Dr. Savage, both the internal and the external evidences to be required in a divine revelation, well laid down in Bailey's Eſſay on divine Inſpiration, part the ſecond.

it

it ſhould diſcover more of a future ſtate of happineſs, perhaps alſo of the entrance of ſin and calamity in the world.

3. It may very probably contain a diſcovery of ſome doctrines as well as facts, which though not inconſiſtent with our natural light, are not diſcoverable by it.

4. As it is very probable that much of it will relate to the divine being and his operations, it is to be expected, that though ſome additional light may be given us as to many things concerning him, yet theſe diſcoveries may be connected with farther hints relating to what is yet unknown; ſo that there may be many things in it beyond our adequate comprehenſion, or in other words, ſome things *myſterious*. Vid. *Prop.* 18. *Cor.* 3.

5. Nevertheleſs, we may conclude that the moſt important things will be plainly revealed; ſo that every honeſt inquirer may come to a full ſatisfaction about them.

6. The end of all muſt be to ſubſerve virtue, and ſo to promote the happineſs of mankind: and thoſe additional diſcoveries beyond what the light of nature could have found out, ſuppoſed *gr.* 3. will no doubt center in this, and not tend merely to amaze our minds and excite our curioſity.

7. Conſidering how greatly and how univerſally *pride* prevails in the minds of men, how detrimental it is to almoſt all the branches of virtue, and how much it taints and debaſes many actions which would otherwiſe be the moſt excellent, as likewiſe how ill it becomes any creature, and eſpecially a mortal and a ſinful creature; it is exceedingly probable, that the whole ſeries of a divine revelation will evidently tend to exalt God and to humble man.

Tillotſ. vol. iii. *p.* 442, 443.——*Dod.* x. *Serm. N°.* viii. *p.* 209—211.—*Duchal on*

on the preſumptive Evid. of the Chriſt. Rel. p. 111—118.——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* iii.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is objected, that on theſe principles a revelation muſt be needleſs; ſince a man muſt underſtand the principles of natural religion before he can judge of a revelation, and if he can judge of theſe he does not need a revelation.

To what is ſaid *Prop.* 94. *Schol.* 7. we may here add the following remarks.

1. We allow that the being and truth of God muſt be known, before we can judge of the internal evidence of a revelation as above.

2. That nevertheleſs a revelation may improve what is known, correct miſtakes, and excite men by proper motives to the practice of virtue, which they generally need more than merely to be inſtructed in its nature.

3. That a revelation may be a means of leading a perſon into the knowledge and belief of thoſe doctrines, which muſt be believed before that revelation can be admitted: *v. g.* miracles may convince an atheiſt of the being of a God.

4. That the report of a revelation, and ſome probable external evidence of its truth ſtriking the mind, may lead into more attentive reflection on the principles of natural religion; and thereby farther promote the knowledge of them, and make way for a rational admiſſion of the revelation itſelf, with a regard to its internal evidence as now better underſtood.

5. That the evidence with which a revelation is attended may farther convince even a wiſe and good man of thoſe things which he before believed, and on the belief of which he admitted the revelation as probably true: *v. g.* remarkable appearances of God may farther prove his particular providence, and the accompliſhment of prophecies

prophecies and threatenings may introduce a farther and more lively conviction of its truth. To which we may add,

6. That the whole objection is founded upon an evident miſtake; ſince it lies againſt all methods of inſtruction whatſoever, and might be applied even to mathematical treatiſes; as it might be ſaid, they cannot improve reaſon, ſince we muſt by reaſon judge whether the arguments are concluſive.

Tind. of Chriſtianity, p. 369. *Ed.* 1. *p.* 77—82. *2d Ed. Former part of c.* xiv. *p.* 335.—*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 41—51. *part* i.—*Leland againſt Tind. vol.* ii. *p.* 95—100.—*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* i.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be queſtioned whether a revelation is to be admitted, which commands an action forbidden by the general rules of morality, *v. g.* to kill an innocent child, or put a whole nation of men to the ſword.

Anſ. 1. That cannot be a divine revelation, which requires any thing which all things conſidered is in preſent circumſtances evil.

2. It is difficult for us to ſay, that ſuch actions as thoſe here mentioned are in all caſes and circumſtances unlawful, or even that human ſacrifices are univerſally ſo; becauſe it is poſſible they may be for the public good; and God, whoſe views are infinitely more extenſive than ours, might ſee them to be ſo in circumſtances when we could not poſſibly diſcern it.

3. Upon the whole therefore, we muſt judge by comparing the evidence on both ſides: and if in any given inſtance, we have a ſtronger evidence that God requires a thing, than we have on the other hand that in preſent circumſtances it is an evil, we are then to believe it good, and to obey the revelation requiring it; depending upon it

it that God will one way or another interpose, to prevent such an issue of the affair, as it would be contrary to his perfections to permit.

Chubb's Prev. Quest. pass.—*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* iii. *p.* 267, 268. 8*vo Ed.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

Considering how liable the human mind is to mistake, great care should be taken that we do not admit any principle as certain, which may really be doubtful, with respect to natural religion; lest, trying revelation by this complex notion as a standard, we should reject any thing that is really authentic, and sufficiently proved to be so by external evidence. This therefore is to be diligently attended to upon the principles laid down above, and one part of the internal evidence weighed against another; as well as the sum of both with the external, in order to form a right judgment. *See Prop.* 120. § 1, 3.

DEFINITION LXXI.

LECT. CVIII. Those are called POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS or PRECEPTS, which are not founded upon any reasons known to those to whom they are given, or discoverable by them, but which are observed merely because some superior has commanded them.

COROLLARY.

It is plain, that *positive* precepts may be distinguished from *arbitrary* precepts, *i. e.* those which are founded upon the mere will of the commander, and for which he himself can see no reason.

Conyb. against Tind. p. 155—157.—— *Main Arg. p.* 45, 46.——*Hallet on Script. vol.* iii. *p.* 187—191.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XCVI.

There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There are various relations of things unknown to us, and beyond the discovery of our natural faculties.

1.|2. It is possible those unknown relations may render some things fit to be done by us, which we cannot see ourselves under any obligation to.

Prop. 33.|3. These are most clearly known to the divine mind.

1, 2, 3.|4. God may have sufficient reasons to us unknown for appointing some particular actions, which we could not otherwise see ourselves obliged to.

5. There may be in other instances a general reason for appointing some test of our obedience, when there is no peculiar reason for preferring one to another.

6. Humility, and consequently virtue, may be in some circumstances more effectually promoted, when we are required to obey commands founded on reasons unknown to us, than if those commands carried their own apparent reason along with them; and it may be with this view that God sees fit to conceal from us the foundation of the commands in question.

7. Civil governors may make laws founded on reasons unknown to their subjects, and proper to be concealed from them.

8. God, as our creator and constant benefactor, has a right to command us incomparably superior to that of any civil governor.

9. Circumstances of worship will appear more solemn, when considered as matters of divine institution, than merely as matters of human in-

vention; and a greater solemnity may thereby be added to the worship itself: by which means they may have a remoter tendency greatly to promote those several virtues, which such acts of religious worship are intended to subserve.

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9.|10. There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author. *Q. E. D.*

Conyb. p. 158—170.—*Fost. against Tind. p.* 281—284.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that forasmuch as God is unchangeable, (*Prop.* 30. *Cor.*) his will and our duty to him must always be the same.

Ans. Our *general* duty will always be the same, but the *particular expressions* of it must vary as our circumstances vary; nor is there any change in the divine will implied in such a variety, or in his giving new commands to us, when those new circumstances arise, more than there is in his producing new creatures.

Tind. ibid. p. 20. *Oct. p.* 118. *c.* x.——*Conyb. ib. p.* 170—174.——*Fost. ibid. c.* iv. *p.* 288, 289.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is also objected, that it is inconsistent with the divine wisdom to command *indifferent* things as *necessary*.—It is answered, they are not commanded as necessary, *i. e.* as *morally* and *universally* so, though in the present circumstance they may be *expedient*; and if they could never in any instance be expedient, they would not be indifferent, but universally and morally evil, contrary to the hypothesis.

Tind. ibid. p. 131, 132.——*Conyb. ibid. p.* 174—177.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is said to be inconsistent with the goodness of God to fetter our liberty, and thereby impair our happiness, by requiring things under certain penalties, which we might else have been excused from; and that this will turn a revelation into a curse instead of a blessing.

To this it is replied,

1. It is not granted that every positive institution as such does necessarily impair our happiness, whether by restraining our liberty, or by multiplying our care in observing them; for the pleasure a pious mind will have in resigning to God's will, some of its enjoyments, and in finding itself continually employed in his service, may upon the whole make the observance of such positive precepts more delightful than a freedom from them.

2. The tendency these things may have in their consequences to promote virtue, may on the whole be vastly more than an equivalent for present pleasure forborne and labour and difficulty incurred.

3. If on the whole these positive precepts did diminish our happiness, a revelation of which they are a part might contain such advantages of another kind, as on the whole to make it a great blessing: nor can it by any means be proved, that every thing which God *requires* of us must *immediately* promote our happiness, any more than that all he appoints in the course of his *providence* must have this effect.

Tind. ibid. p. 123, *&* 131. *c.* xi.—*Conybeare, ibid. p.* 177—182.—*Limb. Collat. ap. Spect. vol.* iii. *N°.* 213.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected, that it is self-contradictory to suppose God should *forbid* that by a revelation, which he has *allowed* by a natural law.

Anſ. 1. No natural law allows it in *ſuch circumſtances*, as thoſe in which it is by a revealed law forbidden, *i. e.* when God has expreſsly determined a caſe, in itſelf indifferent.

2. On the ſame principles, all thoſe civil laws are to be condemned, by which things are forbidden, which are not directly contrary to the law of nature.

Main Arg. p. 52.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 285—288.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is alſo objected, that poſitive precepts overcharge the mind, and ſo lead to the neglect of moral virtue; and that if people come to believe theſe things good for any thing, they will ſoon ſuppoſe them good for every thing, *i. e.* place the whole of their religion in them, conſidering how prone men are to ſuperſtition. *Prop.* 76. *Schol.* 7.

Anſ. 1. There is no arguing againſt the uſe of a thing from the poſſibility of its being abuſed; for then all the entertainments and ſupports of human life muſt be condemned.

2. It is reaſonable to believe, that if God gives a revelation in which poſitive precepts are contained, he will take proper care to diſtinguiſh them from the great precepts of moral virtue.

3. A few poſitive precepts, given in a revelation declaring the rule of faith and practice, may more effectually prevent the increaſing and idolizing ſuch obſervances, than if none at all had been appointed.

Tind. of Chriſtianity, p. 123, 124.—— *Conyb. againſt Tind. p.* 182—193—— *Main Arg. p.* 48—51.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 289—303.

COROLLARY.

It appears from this ſurvey of the ſubject, that the inſertion of ſome poſitive inſtitutions, in a pro-

proper manner moderated, and declared ſubordinate to the precepts of moral virtue, is ſo far from being an objection againſt ſuch a revelation, that it is rather to be conſidered as an additional part of its internal evidence; eſpecially conſidering, that as a divinely inſtituted religion will probably require ſome aſſociation of its profeſſors, there muſt in the nature of things be ſome form of entering into that aſſociation, and of maintaining a profeſſion of continued adherence to it; which will have evident advantages, if ſuppoſed of divine appointment.

Butler's Anal. part ii. *c.* i. *p.* 215—217. *Oct. Ed.*——*Letter to Wallace, p.* 8—11.——*Anſwer, p.* 27—33.——*Leland againſt Tind. vol.* i. *p.* 51—92.—*Lett. of Poſit. Inſt. prefixed to Leland, vol.* ii *.

PROPOSITION XCVII †.

To enquire into the external evidence which may probably attend a revelation. LECT. CIX.

LEMMA.

It is to be obſerved, that we do by no means limit the divine being to all the circumſtances here mentioned; but only remark, that if a revelation offered ſhould ſeem to be attended with ſuch circumſtances, in conjunction with the above mentioned internal evidences, each of theſe circumſtances would concur to recommend it to our candid and diligent examination.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. We might reaſonably ſuppoſe, that at leaſt *moſt* of the perſons chiefly employed in the firſt publiſhing the revelation would be perſons of

* Rather affixed to volume the firſt; but it is not in the ſecond edition. s.

† See the note on *Prop.* 95.

piety and virtue; otherwiſe, we could neither imagine that God would favour them with ſuch extraordinary diſcoveries of himſelf, nor could we depend upon their veracity in reporting them to us: yet we cannot ſay, that it is neceſſary that *all* the perſons ſo employed, if there be a conſiderable number of them, ſhould be good men, and much leſs that every one of them ſhould be freed from every degree of ſin, though perhaps, if any one perſon is to bear a much greater part in the revelation than the reſt, he may be ſo diſtinguiſhed.

Tind. ibid. p. 8, *&* 243. *Oct. p.* 219.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 113, 114. *c.* iii. *p.* 112, 113.——*Leland, ibid. vol.* ii. *part* ii. *c.* ii. *p.* 36—38, 49—53. *2d Ed. p.* 28—31, 39—43.

2. It is poſſible that ſome *ſuperior ſpirit* (Vid. *Prop.* 86.) may be employed as a meſſenger from heaven to bring this revelation; and if he ſhould not only make a tranſient appearance on earth, but take up his abode here for a conſiderable time in a human form, giving an example of the moſt perfect virtue, we muſt acknowledge the circumſtance extremely well choſen and worthy the divine wiſdom, though we cannot pretend it to be of abſolute neceſſity.

3. We may reaſonably depend upon it, that the *chief* meſſenger, if ſuch there be, or others commiſſioned by him, will, at the firſt publiſhing of ſuch a revelation, be endued with a power of working evident, uncontrouled, and probably moſt of them beneficial *miracles*; they being not only a very ſolid proof of a divine miſſion, (*Prop.* 94.) but upon many accounts the moſt plain, popular, and convincing, and beſt ſuited to the bulk of mankind, for whoſe benefit no doubt a revelation would be calculated.

Atterb. Serm. vol. iii. *p.* 217—222.

4. It

4. It is probable that the chief perſons employed in opening ſuch a revelation may appear in plain and low circumſtances of human life, rather than with princely grandeur; ſince in this view their teſtimony might be leſs ſuſpected of being a political contrivance, and their example would be more inſtructive to the generality of mankind. Nor is it on the whole incredible, that ſuch perſons, notwithſtanding their own virtue, ſhould be deſpiſed and perſecuted, and perhaps put to death, for their attempts to reform the world: if this were the caſe, they would give a moſt edifying example of ſuffering virtue, and an evidence of the integrity of their character and teſtimony to all ages, beyond what we could conceive in other circumſtances. And though for this reaſon God might probably leave ſome of them to die by their enemies hands, yet it is not unlikely, but in ſome remarkable inſtances he might interpoſe for the delivery of his ſervants in their extremity, either reſcuing ſome of them by miracle, in order to their farther uſefulneſs, or perhaps raiſing them from the dead.

Plato de Rep. l. ii. *ap. Dod.* x. *Serm. p.* 206. *Ed.* 1. *p.* 131. *Ed.* 4.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 317, 318.——*Flem. Chriſtol. vol.* ii. *p.* 51—53, 76—85.

5. It is not improbable, that a revelation ſhould be *gradually* introduced, and the expectation of mankind awakened by *predictions* and previous miracles, before the greateſt ſcene of all be diſcloſed: this is analogous to the uſual method of divine operation in the works of nature; and would lay a foundation for a very convincing additional evidence of the truth of the revelation; if it ſhould appear, that a variety of different perſons, of different ages and perhaps different countries, had been led by the providence of God and his influence on their minds to carry on their proper diſtinct parts of one harmonious

deſign, the connection of which was unknown to each of them.

Barringt. Eſſ. on Div. Diſp. Pref. p. 22—28.——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* vii.

6. It is probable that God may bear farther witneſs to ſuch a revelation, by giving it at firſt remarkable ſucceſs, notwithſtanding ſtrong oppoſition, and though it may be deſtitute of human ſupport; and by making it viſibly effectual for reforming the characters of its profeſſors. Such facts might be capable of moſt convincing proof to future ages; on which account they ſeem peculiarly proper.

7. Foraſmuch as miracles would loſe much of their force, if they were frequently to be repeated for a long ſucceſſion of ages, it is not reaſonable to conclude, that ſuch a revelation would always be attended with the ſame degree of ſenſible evidence, with which it was at firſt introduced into the world: it is more natural to imagine, that God would take care that the firſt publiſhers of it ſhould deliver in *writing* the hiſtory, purpoſes, and contents of the revelation, and that their books ſhould be tranſmitted to poſterity with ſuch kind of evidence as other ancient records have.

8. It is probable, that if this method of tranſmitting a revelation be taken, providence may ſo order it, that the evidence of the main facts on which it is built ſhall at leaſt in part be drawn from the teſtimony and confeſſion of thoſe by whom it was oppoſed: at leaſt we muſt confeſs that this would be a ſtrong additional medium of proof.

Dod. x. *Serm. N°.* viii. *p.* 215—218. *Ed.* 2. *p.* 206—208. *Ed.* 1.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CX.

The principal objections againſt the preceding ſolution are thoſe which affect the *ſeventh ſtep* of it:

it: we ſhall therefore in the following *Scholia*, give a view of the chief arguments brought againſt the ſuppoſition of ſuch a *traditional* revelation, (as *Tindal*, though with ſome partial ambiguity, has affected to call it) and propoſe the moſt obvious anſwers to them.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is objected, that foraſmuch as the credibility of any teſtimony is impaired by paſſing through a number of hands, all the evidence which any traditional revelation can be ſuppoſed to have, muſt in time be utterly worn out.

Anſ. 1. Where the teſtimony of any traditional witneſs gives *indubitable perſuaſion*, the credibility of the thing teſtified ſuffers *no diminution* by paſſing through his hands; and the credit univerſally given to many facts in ancient hiſtory, proves that the decreaſe is exceedingly ſmall even in a long ſucceſſion of ages, when the intermediate witneſſes are faithful, careful and knowing.

2. That a tradition preſerved by *writing*, is evidently leſs liable to corruption than that which is merely *oral*; ſince when the facts are once recorded, there is no room left for a failure in memory, to which alone the miſtakes of honeſt men will be owing in tranſmitting a teſtimony.

3. That the agreement of various witneſſes, and many of them in ſeparate intereſts, concerning ſuch a revelation, may be more than an equivalent for the little defects mentioned above.

4. That the ſucceſs of a revelation, or the accompliſhment of ſome prophecies contained in it, and the illuſtration of many other branches of internal evidence, relating to the characters of hiſtorians, mutual connection, and correſpondence of facts, *&c.* on the principles of the *fifth* ſtep, may give it ſuch an increaſe of evidence, as ſhall abundantly over-balance all that it can be

be ſuppoſed to loſe, by being tranſmitted through many hundred years.

Tind. ibid. p. 185. 4*to*, *Oct. p.* 163. 12*mo. p.* 165—168.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 92—96.——*Leland, ibid. vol.* ii. *p.* 113—119.——*Warb. Div. Leg. p.* 1—3. *vol.* i.——*Comber againſt Weſton, Append. Jennings Log. Prop.* xvii, xviii.——*Ditt. on Reſur. part* ii. *Prop.* xv, xvi.——*Flemming's three Monuments, confirming three plain Facts. paſſim.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is alſo objected, that there are ſo many forgeries of books pretended to be ancient, that it is a difficult matter to diſtinguiſh the genuine from the ſpurious, and that ſince the bulk of the common people have neither leiſure or ability to manage an enquiry of this nature, if they receive a traditional revelation, it muſt be by an implicit faith in the teſtimony of thoſe who are the teachers of that religion; ſo that in reality they believe not *God* but the *Prieſt*.

Anſ. 1. It is univerſally allowed that learned men may have ſufficient evidence as to the genuineneſs of ancient books, and therefore of thoſe which contain the ſubſtance of a ſuppoſed revelation: and as it is highly probable in the nature of things, that books of this kind would early paſs into many hands, and be examined with the utmoſt rigour, and preſerved with the greateſt care, the evidence of their being genuine might (*cæt. par.*) be much greater than could be obtained as to any other books of equal antiquity.

2. Though the common people cannot of themſelves enter minutely into the proofs, yet they may have ſome opportunity of gaining rational ſatisfaction, by conſulting perſons of learning and ſeeming integrity, not merely among the prieſts but the *laity*; and by reading books that give

giue a view of the argument, in which they may reaſonably take it for granted, that eſpecially in a learned and inquiſitive age, no man will cite vouchers notoriouſly falſe.

3. They may compare writers on both ſides, if the revelation be oppoſed; and perhaps may ſee, from the manner in which the oppoſition is made, what may greatly confirm them in the truth oppoſed.

4. A perſon that cannot read himſelf may get ſome valuable treatiſes read over to him, perhaps again and again by different perſons, whoſe partiality he has no reaſon to ſuſpect, and concerning whom he might be confidently ſure they read what was before them.

Tind. ibid. p. 232—234. *4to. p.* 209—212. *12mo.*——*Foſt. ibid. p.* 171—174, 178—182.——*Main Arg. p.* 67—72.—*Dodd. Firſt Lett. to the Author of Chriſt. not founded, &c. p.* 52—56.——*Benſon's Reaſ. of the Chriſt. Rel. part* ii. *Dial.* 4. *præf. p.* 144, 145, 153—155.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected that the common people cannot be ſufficient judges of the faithfulneſs of a *tranſlation*, which yet is neceſſary in order to their underſtanding a traditional revelation, depending on books and deſigned for the uſe of various nations. We reply,

1. That though we acknowledge they cannot be ſo entirely ſatisfied as thoſe who underſtand the original language; (which ſhould recommend the ſtudy of the original to thoſe who can conveniently engage in it;) yet the unlearned may very chearfully depend upon the teſtimony of perſons of acknowledged ability and known integrity, who have diligently compared the verſion with the original, and declare it as a fact on their

their own knowledge, that it is in the main agreeable to it.

2. Such a teſtimony acquires a very ſtrong additional degree of evidence, when perſons of different parties and ſentiments in religion agree in allowing the ſame verſion; and when the originals are in the hands of thoſe who are its greateſt enemies.

Main Arg. p. 73.——*Dod.* x. *Serm. N°.* viii. *p.* 228—231. *Ed.* 1.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther objected, that there will be difficulties in the moſt literal and faithful tranſlation of any ancient book, and in the original itſelf, ariſing from the different genius of languages; and eſpecially if it be an oriental book, from the ſtrong figures with which it will abound.

Anſ. 1. Figurative language is not always obſcure.

2. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that if God ſees fit to communicate a revelation by books, he will take care that the moſt important things ſhall be expreſſed in ſuch a manner, as to be very intelligible in a literal tranſlation.

3. The objection here urged would equally affect all ancient books.

Foſt. againſt Tind. p. 186—191, 194.—— *Main Arg. p.* 74, 75.——*Leland againſt Tind. vol.* ii. *p.* 232—246.

SCHOLIUM 6.

To get clear of all theſe objections againſt a traditional revelation, ſome have aſſerted, that we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, that if God communicates a revelation from age to age, every particular perſon will have the truth of a revelation ſo propoſed immediately diſcovered to him by ſome divine agency on his mind; though perhaps this may be an argument only for his own uſe.

It

It cannot be denied, that such an immediate impulse on the mind of each individual is possible to divine power: but this manner of stating the case supposes the revelation to be a *personal* thing: so that those who have never experienced any thing of this kind, would probably look upon is as an enthusiastical pretence. Yet we may perhaps reasonably admit, that where men lie under great disadvantages for receiving the ordinary proofs, God may by some secret influence so dispose their minds, as that the *internal* evidence of a revelation, and its visible effects, shall produce a very strong degree of assent, though they are forced to take up with very slender *external* proofs: to which we may add, that God can if he pleases order such a correspondence between certain events in his providence, and certain impressions on the mind made in consequence of the supposed truth of a revelation, as shall greatly confirm the faith of the enquirer, and be almost equivalent to miracles wrought for his conviction; though he may not be able to make these things out fully to another. And if on the whole the belief of any revelation produces a virtuous temper, the great end of it is answered; even though the person so influenced and reformed by it may not be able to give a rational account of the grounds of this assent, or may build it upon some weak arguments.

Lett. to Wallace, sub fin.——*Christianity not founded on Arg. pass.*——*Dodd. Anal. N°.* i. *præf. p.* 11—32.—*Law's Theory, p.* 18—23.

SCHOLIUM 7.

On a survey of the whole argument, we must confess that a traditional revelation will be attended with some difficulties and some defects; and that those who have it, will not enjoy altogether

gether the ſame advantages with thoſe to whom the revelation was originally given: nevertheleſs it ſeems reaſonable to conclude,

1. That ſtrong degrees of internal evidence, and an experience of the reforming power of any religion upon the minds of its profeſſors, and eſpecially on our own, will make up the deficiency of ſome degree of external evidence, which might otherwiſe be very deſirable: more eſpecially, when on the one hand it concurs with ſome remarkable *perſonal experience*, (as above *Schol.* 6.) and on the other, there are no ſtrong circumſtances of ſuſpicion attending what external evidence there is, *v. g.* the vices of the author of that revelation, its being firſt introduced by ſanguinary methods, its acknowledging the want of miracles, or pretending to ſuch as are palpably ridiculous, *&c.*

2. That if God gives a traditional revelation, he will give ſuch evidence of one kind or another, as ſhall be ſufficient to convince every honeſt and candid enquirer.

3. That it by no means becomes us to preſcribe to God, what farther degrees of evidence, beyond what is barely ſufficient for this purpoſe, ſhall be given to any revelation.

4. That a mixture of obſcurity either in the proof or contents of a revelation may perhaps have its uſe; particularly to humble men's minds, and to ſerve as a *touch ſtone*, by which their true character may be diſtinguiſhed.

Grot. de Verit. l. ii. *c.* xix.—*Dodd. Third Lett. ibid. p.* 57—59.——*Butler's Anal. part* ii. *c.* vi. *p.* 226—235. 4*to.* 333—344. 8*vo.*

SCHOLIUM 8.

In this argument, it may be very proper to review that excellent abſtract of the controverſy

verſy between *Tindal* and his antagoniſts, which is given in *Main Arg. p.* 77—86 *.

* "The main Argument," the whole title of which I do not recollect, is a pamphlet that was publiſhed in 1733, and which excited much attention at the time of its appearance. It is now difficult to be procured. A collection of ſcarce and valuable tracts on moral and theological queſtions is a Deſideratum in Engliſh Literature.

The END *of the* FIFTH PART.

PART

PART VI.

In which the GENUINENESS *and* CREDIBILITY *of the Old and New Teſtament are aſſerted and vindicated.*

PROPOSITION XCVIII*.

CHRISTIANITY is not a modern religion, but was maintained and profeſſed by great multitudes quickly after the time in which CHRIST, its ſuppoſed founder, is ſaid to have appeared, *i. e.* in the days of *Tiberius Cæſar.*

DEMONSTRATION.

LECT. CXI. 1. There is a ſeries of books written by *Chriſtian* authors, who are ſaid to have lived, ſome in the *firſt*, ſome in the *ſecond* century, beſides a multitude in thoſe that follow; concerning the genuineneſs of which we have as much ſatisfaction as concerning that of any other ancient writers, whether *Jewiſh* or *Pagan*; particularly *Clemens Romanus*, *Ignatius*, and *Polycarp*, in leſs than an hundred years after the time mentioned; *Juſtin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tatian*, *Athenagoras*, and *Theophilus Antiochenus*, in leſs than 200 years; for accounts of whom ſee any hiſtorical dictionary; not to mention a great many others, whoſe books are now loſt, but whoſe writings are mentioned by *Euſebius* and other ancients, by whom alſo ſome conſiderable fragments of them are preſerved; of whom ſee *Prop.* 101.

* See a good view of the argument contained in this and the following propoſition in Dr. *Leland*'s Reflections on Lord *Bolingbroke*'s letters on the ſtudy of hiſtory, p. 105—122, 307—315. Former Editor.

2. Some

2. Some of the moſt ancient *Jewiſh* books, ſaid to have been written about theſe 1700 years, expreſsly mention the *Chriſtians*, and bitterly inveigh againſt them.

Lardner's Jewiſh and Heathen Teſt. vol. i. *c.* vii. § 1.—*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 187—189.

3. It plainly appears that *Celſus, Porphyry, Hierocles, Julian*, and many other *heathen* writers, aſſaulted chriſtianity with great bitterneſs; and ſeveral fragments of their writings are preſerved in thoſe of the chriſtian apologiſts, by whom they were anſwered, and whoſe pieces are allowed to be genuine, though many of the heathen originals are unhappily loſt. Their antagoniſts were *Origen, Methodius, Euſebius, Gregory Nazianzen*, and *Cyril.*

Lardner's Jewiſh and Heathen Teſt. vol. ii. *c.* xvii. *vol.* iii. *c.* xxxvii. § 9.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 1—5, 220—226.

4. *Tacitus* aſſures us, that in *Nero*'s days there was a multitude of chriſtians, not only in *Judea*, where he tells us that religion began, but in *Rome*; againſt whom *Nero* raiſed a perſecution, attended with ſuch circumſtances of ignominy and cruelty, as moved the compaſſion of their enemies; intimating alſo that this was not the firſt attempt to cruſh that ſect.

Tacit. Anal. l. xv. *c.* 44.——*Lardner, ibid. c.* v. § 2.—*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 253—255.

5. *Suetonius* alſo expreſsly mentions the puniſhment inflicted upon the chriſtians by *Nero.*

Sueton. Nero, c. xvi.——*Piſiſc. Annot. in Loc.*——*Lardner, ibid. c.* viii. § 3—*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 266—268.

6. *Pliny Junior* informs *Trajan* at large of his proceedings againſt the chriſtians in *Bithynia*, and after having borne a very honourable teſtimony to the morality and virtue of their cha-

racter, ſays, "that multitudes of both ſexes of "perſons of every rank were infected with this "ſuperſtition, which was got into villages as "well as cities; ſo that, till he began to put "the laws in execution againſt them, the tem-"ples of the heathen deities were almoſt de-"ſerted, and few could be found to buy victims "for them." *Plin. Epiſt. l.* x. *Ep.* 97.

To which we may add the anſwer of the emperor to him, forbidding the chriſtians to be ſought out, but commanding them to be puniſhed if they preſented themſelves: (*ibid. Ep.* 98.) and alſo the epiſtle of *Tiberianus* governor of *Palæſtina Prima* to *Trajan* on the ſame ſubject, and nearly parallel to this of *Pliny*, which is preſerved by *John Malala* in the ſecond book of his chronicles, and publiſhed by Archbiſhop *Uſſher* in his *Appendix Tiberiana*, to the genuineneſs of which nothing can be reaſonably objected; ſo that it is ſtrange, that ſo many who collect teſtimonies of this kind, ſhould have entirely omitted it *.

Nearly a-kin to this alſo is the letter of *Serrenius Granianus*, proconſul of *Aſia*, to *Adrian*, with the reſcript of *Adrian* himſelf in favour of the chriſtians, mentioned by *Juſtin Martyr*, and alſo by *Melito* as quoted by *Euſebius*.

Biſcoe at Boyle's Lect. p. 449, 450.—*Euſeb. Hiſt. l.* iv. *c.* viii, ix, & xxvi.—*Juſt. Mart. Op. p.* 99, 100.—*Lardner, ibid. c.* ix. § 3. *c.* ii. § 2, 3.—*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 291—294. 358—364.—*Jortin's Remarks on Eccleſ. Hiſt. vol.* ii. *p.* 82, 83.

* The epiſtle aſcribed to Tiberianus is not underſtood to be genuine. Mr. Dodwell has examined it with particular attention, and has argued that it is a downright forgery. His argument has been approved of by Pagi, Baſnage, Le Clerc, Jortin, and by learned critics in general. John Malala was a writer near the end of the ſixth century, and of little credit. Lardner's Works, vol. vii. p. 321, 322.

7. *Lucian*

7. *Lucian* expreſsly mentions the chriſtians, as performing ſome extraordinary works, as reſolutely bearing ſome extreme ſufferings, as expreſſing a great contempt of heathen deities, and as remarkable for their mutual charity, as well as for the prophets and the miſſionaries of their churches; and though the author of the *Philopatris* be not certainly known, it is undoubtedly a very ancient piece, in which chriſtians and their affairs are expreſsly mentioned in a great variety of circumſtances.

Moyle's Works, p. 261—263.——*Poſt. Works, vol.* i. *p.* 285, *&c.*——*Huet. Dem. Evang. p.* 41, 42. *Prop.* iii. § 20. *ad fin.*——*Lucian de Morte Pereg. ap. Op. vol.* ii. *p.* 565—567.——*Pſeudomant. ib. vol.* ii. *p.* 419—423.—*Biſcoe at Boyle's Lect. p.* 450, 451.—*Lardner, ibid. c.* xix. *paſſim.*——*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 69—81.

8. *Marcus Antoninus* expreſsly mentions the chriſtians as examples of an obſtinate contempt of death; and in his *Conſtitutions to the community of Aſia*, (quoted from *Melito*, who wrote in this emperor's time, by *Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* iv. *c.* 13.) ſpeaks of the chriſtians as having for a conſiderable time been perſecuted even to death. See alſo *Juſtin Martyr*'s apology to *M. Anton. ap. Op. p.* 101, 102.—To which we may add, that *Epictetus* is generally ſuppoſed to have referred to them, when he ſpeaks of the fortitude with which the *Galileans* endured the ſevereſt torments: and *Galen*, the celebrated phyſician, in the ſecond century, uſes the obſtinacy of the chriſtians in defending their tenets, as a proverbial expreſſion.

Marc. Anton. l. xi. *c.* iii.——*Clerici Hiſt. Eccleſ. p.* 543.—*Arr. Epict. l.* iv. *c.* vii. *p.* 400.—*Lardner's Heathen Teſt. vol.* ii. *c.* xxi. *c.* x. § 6. *c.* xiv. § 3. *c.* xv. § 2.

—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 90, 91. *vol.* vii. *p.* 354—357, 390—395, 398—406.—*Moyle's Poſt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 93—96, 243—255.—*Moyle's Diſcourſe, in the Theological Repoſitory, vol.* i.

9. *Juſtin Martyr*, in his dialogue with *Trypho*, mentioning the practice of the *Jews*, to curſe the chriſtians in their ſynagogues, charges it upon them as a known fact, "that after the death of "Chriſt, and while *Jeruſalem* was yet ſtanding, "they ſent out choſen men from them into all "the world, to inform them that the new ſect "of the chriſtians was an atheiſtical ſect; ex-"preſsly to contradict the doctrine of Chriſt's "reſurrection and aſcenſion, and to warn them "in the moſt ſolemn manner againſt receiv-"ing it."

Juſt. Mart. Trypho, p. 169—171, & 368. *Ed. Thirlb.*—*Lardner's Cred. vol.* i. *l.* i. *c.* viii. § 2.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 171, 172.

10. The ſame *Juſtin Martyr*, not much above 100 years after the death of Chriſt, declares it as a notorious fact, "that there was no nation of "men, whether *Greek* or *Barbarian*, not except-"ing even thoſe wild ſtragglers the *Amaxobii*, "and *Nomades*, who had no fixed habitation, "who had not learned to invoke the one father "and former of all things, in the name of Jeſus "who was crucified:" and though one may allow ſomething hyperbolical in the expreſſion, it muſt undoubtedly contain a moſt important teſtimony to the fact aſſerted in the propoſition, parallel to which is a celebrated paſſage in *Tertullian* referred to below.

Juſt. Mart. Trypho, p. 388. *Thirlb. Ed.* ——*Tertul. Apol. c.* xxxvii. *ap. Op. p.* 30.——*Ap. Reeves's Apol. vol.* i. *p.* 323—326.——*Macknight's Truth of the Goſpel Hiſtory, book* iii. *c.* iv. § 1. *p.* 489—495.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM I.

It is obſervable, that moſt of theſe writers, at the ſame time that they mention the chriſtians as a body of men then in being, do alſo mention the *perſecutions* they endured; an important fact, which is alſo farther confirmed by the apologies of *Juſtin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, *Athenagoras* and *Origen*; which are undoubtedly to be reckoned among the moſt valuable remains of antiquity.

Dodd. x. *Serm.* N°. viii. *p.* 226—230.—
Chand. of Perſecut. p. 17—30.——
Macknight, ibid. § 2. *p.* 495—519.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It ſeems exceedingly probable, that when *Seneca*, (*apud Auguſt. Civ. Dei.* vi. 11.) *Tacitus*, *Dio*, *Numatian*, and other pagan writers, ſpeak of the vaſt increrſe of the *Jewiſh ſect*, about their age, and of the ſevere puniſhments inflicted upon them for their religion, they do at leaſt include, if not principally refer to the *Chriſtians*, whom they looked upon as a branch of the *Jews*; becauſe the founders and firſt teachers of chriſtianity were by birth of that nation *.

Huet. Dem. Pr. 3. § 21. *p.* 42.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

There was ſuch a perſon as JESUS of *Nazareth*, the founder of the *chriſtian* religion; and he was LECT. CXII.

* Mr. Merivale has added a third Scholium, which is as follows: "Several of the foregoing teſtimonies repreſent the Chriſtians as extremely numerous indeed, even in the firſt and ſecond centuries, particularly thoſe quoted gr. 4, 6, 7, and 10. So that it ſhould ſeem that in many places they vaſtly exceeded the heathens in number: which, nevertheleſs, from other conſiderations appear to be very improbable. We muſt, therefore, conſider theſe repreſentations rather as ſtrains of rhetoric, than as ſtrict truth, and plain matters of fact."

Burnet's Letters, p. 168—170.—Moyle's Poſt. Works, vol. ii. p. 82, 83, 104—110. 142—162, 292—297, 320—327.

crucified at *Jeruſalem*, about ſeventeen hundred years ago, *i. e.* during the reign of *Tiberius Ceſar*.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 98. 1. There were a multitude of men, who called themſelves by the name of Chriſt, and profeſſed the religion which he was ſaid to have founded, a little after the time in which we aſſert that he lived.

2. We can never imagine they would have done this, eſpecially at ſo great a hazard of their poſſeſſions and their lives, (*Schol.* 1.) if they had not been well aſſured that he was a real perſon, and not merely a fictitious name.

3. *Tacitus* expreſsly ſays, "that he was the "author of the chriſtian name, and that he was "put to death by *Pontius Pilate*, the *Roman* pro-"curator for *Tiberius Cæſar*."

Tacit. Ann. l. xv. *c.* 44.

And *Pliny*, in the paſſage quoted before, (*Prop.* 98. *gr.* 6.) aſſerts, "that the chriſtians ſang a "hymn to Chriſt as to a God."

4. The primitive chriſtians appeal to the *acts of Pilate*, as giving an account of the innocence and death of Chriſt: and though we readily allow thoſe now extant to be ſpurious, yet we can never think ſuch writers would have made ſuch appeals, eſpecially to the very perſons in whoſe keeping theſe monuments were, (if they were at all) had they not been ſatisfied of their exiſtence and contents *.

Juſt. Mart. Apol. p. 76. *c.* 84. *e.*—— *Tertull. Apol. c.* xxi.——*Ditton on the Reſ. p.* 416—420. *Ed.* 1712. *p.* 467—470. *p.* 354—356, *of Edit.* 1720.—*Vand. de Orac. p.* 608—624.—*Fabric.*

* The queſtion concerning the acts of Pilate, and his Letter to Tiberius, is particularly conſidered by Dr. Lardner, who in his general ſentiments upon the ſubject coincides with Dr. Doddridge. Lardner's Works, vol. vii. p. 231—244.

Cod.

Cod. vol. ii. *p.* 298—301. *vol.* iii. *p.* 455—465.——*Addiſon of Chriſtianity, c.* i. § 7.—*Jortin's Remarks on Eccleſ. Hiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 2—4.

5. It is very probable, that *Suetonius* refers to *Chriſt*, when he ſays, "that *Claudius Cæſar* expelled all the *Jews* from *Rome*, on account of "the tumults which they raiſed, *impulſore Chreſto*," *i. e.* probably, on account of *Chriſt*, whom it is certain they often called *Chreſtus*. Compare *Acts* xviii. 2.

Sueton. Claud. c. xxv. *N°.* xii.——*Pitiſc. Not. in Loc. vol.* i. *p.* 689.—*Vand. de Orac. p.* 604—607.—*Lardner's Cred. vol.* i. *l.* i. *c.* ii. § 3.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 246, 247. *vol.* vii. *p.* 266, 267.——*Witſ. Meletem. de Vit. Paul,* § 7. *N°.* ii, iii.—*Uſher's Annals Jul. Per.* 4767.—*Dodd. on Acts, ch.* 18. *v.* 2.

6. *Ælius Lampridius*, aſſures us, that the emperor *Alexander Severus* entertained ſuch high thoughts of Chriſt, that he would have admitted him among the number of his deities, and built a temple to him, had not his pagan ſubjects vigorouſly oppoſed it.

Spart. de Vit. Serv. c. xxix, & xliii.——*Lardner's Heath. Teſtimonies, vol.* ii. *c.* ii. § 4. *vol.* iii. *c.* xxxv.——*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 364—367.

7. *Porphyry* alſo, though an inveterate enemy to chriſtianity, not only allowed that there was ſuch a perſon as Chriſt, but honoured him as a moſt wiſe and pious man, tranſlated into heaven, as being approved by the Gods; and accordingly quotes ſome oracles, referring both to his ſufferings and virtues, with their ſubſequent rewards.

Euſeb. Dem. Evang. l. iii. *p.* 134.——*Lardner's Heath. Teſt. vol.* ii. *c.* xxxvii. § 10.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 176—248. *præſertim, p.* 226—248.

8. *Celſus* likewiſe mentions numberleſs circumſtances in the hiſtory of Chriſt; (indeed ſo many, that an abſtract of the chriſtian hiſtory might almoſt be taken from the very fragments of his book preſerved by *Origen*;) and never pretends to diſpute his real exiſtence, or the truth of the facts.

Ancient univ. Hiſt. vol. xv. *p.* 247. *Oct. Edit.*—*Lardner's Heath. Teſt. vol.* iii. *c.* xviii. § 4, 5, 12, 13.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 5—69. *præſertim, p.* 18—43. *p.* 57—69.

9. *Hierocles* alſo, under the fictitious name of *Philalethes*, in a book which *Euſebius* has expreſsly quoted, and largely anſwered, ſpeaks of *Jeſus* as extolled by the chriſtians as a God, for giving ſight to the blind, and doing ſome other wonders of that kind; and alſo ſpeaks of *Peter* and *Paul* as crying him up in ſo extraordinary a manner; though he fooliſhly endeavours to ſhew that *Apollonius* was equal and even ſuperior to him, of which we ſhall afterwards treat.

Euſeb. Dem. Evang. p. 512. *cont. Hier. ſub init.*——*Lardner, ibid. vol.* iii. *c.* xxxix. § 2, 4.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 254—266. *See Prop.* 113. *Scholium* 5.

10. It is a moſt notorious fact, that (ſo far as we can learn) the enemies of chriſtianity never diſputed the exiſtence of ſuch a perſon as Chriſt, nor his dying as his followers aſſert; but on the contrary, upbraided them with it as their greateſt reproach; the *Jews* calling him in deriſion תלוי, *i. e.* the crucified perſon, and his followers עברי תלוי; and many of the heathens, particularly *Lucian*, derided him as a crucified impoſtor; and *Julian* himſelf, who was one of the moſt learned as well as the moſt inveterate enemies againſt chriſtianity, though he had himſelf been educated among the chriſtians, and therefore probably knew this religion thoroughly, never goes

goes about to diſpute this fact; but owns, not only the being, but, as we ſhall afterwards obſerve, the *miracles* of Chriſt.

Buxt. Lexic. Tal. in תלוי.—*Lucian de Morte Pereg. ubi ſupra.*—*Ditton on the Reſ. part* iii. § 3, 8.——*Chapm. againſt Morg. vol.* i. *p.* 364, 365.——*Lightf. Hor. Heb. on Matt.* xii. 24.—*Lightfoot, apud Opera. vol.* ii. *p.* 189.—*Joſephi Antiq. Lib.* 18. *c.* iii. § 3.

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.|11. *Valet propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM I.

We do not here argue from that celebrated paſſage, in which *Joſephus* bears ſuch a remarkable teſtimony to Chriſt.

Joſ. Ant. l. xviii. *c.* iv. § 33. *c.* iii. § 3. *p.* 798. *Hudſon's Edition.*

It is moſt certain that it is to be found in all the manuſcript copies of *Joſephus*, and that it was very early quoted by the chriſtian fathers, particularly *Euſebius* and *Jerom.* The two chief objections are,

1. That neither *Juſtin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, nor even *Photius*, in his extracts from *Joſephus*, have cited it: but this negative argument againſt fact is not much to be regarded; eſpecially conſidering, that *Juſtin* argues only out of *ſcripture*, and never mentions *Joſephus*: that *Tertullian* in his controverſial writings deals chiefly with *Gentiles*; that *Cyprian* does not profeſſedly write in defence of chriſtianity; and that *Photius*'s extracts from *Joſephus* are very imperfect. It is with more weight objected,

2. That the encomium upon the character and miracles of Chriſt is ſo great, that *Joſephus* muſt have been a *chriſtian*, or he could not have written as he did. To this *Lambeſius* anſwers, that his words are to be underſtood *ironically*, and really contain a ſevere ſarcaſm: and Mr. *Whiſton*, that

that *Joſephus* was a *Nazarene*, *Ebionite*, or *Jewiſh chriſtian*, afterwards biſhop of *Jeruſalem:* but Mr. *Martin* maintains, that *Joſephus*, being a penſioner of the *Roman* court, and ſeeing *Domitian* ſomething alarmed with the prophecy of the *Jewiſh Meſſiah*, for his own ſecurity and that of his people, choſe rather to repreſent the matter, as if that meſſiah had already appeared, but through the miſtake of their prieſts been rejected. But none of theſe things ſeem upon the whole a ſufficient account of it; ſo that if he really wrote it, he muſt have been inwardly convinced of the truth of chriſtianity; and wanting courage openly to profeſs it, left this teſtimony, perhaps in the laſt copies of his antiquities, in ſome meaſure to quiet his conſcience, for not having more generouſly and faithfully purſued its dictates.

As for the other paſſages in *Joſephus*, relating to the death of *James* the brother of Chriſt, *Ant. l.* xx. *c.* viii. it is of much leſs importance in the preſent queſtion. But what *Origen* quotes as from him, concerning the death of that righteous man being the cauſe of the deſtruction of the *Jews*, it is no where to be found in *Joſephus*, and ſeems to have been a ſlip of *Origen*'s memory. Vid. *Hudſ. Notes in Loc. p.* 896.

Ittigii. Prol. ad Joſ. Ed. Col. præf. p. 25, *&c.*——*Ditton on the Ref. part* iii. § 4—7.——*Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop.* iii. § 11—18. *p.* 31—39.—*Martin's Diſſ. paſſ.*——*Whiſt. Joſ. Diſ.* i, *&* vi.——*Chapman againſt Morg. vol.* i. *p.* 386—389.——*Orig. cont. Celſ. l.* i. *p.* 35.—*Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* ii. *c.* 23 *.

SCHO-

* Since theſe references were made, two Engliſh tracts have appeared in defence of the famous paſſages in Joſephus. The firſt is entitled, " A Diſſertation upon the Account ſuppoſed to have been given of Jeſus Chriſt by Joſephus: being an Attempt to

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be aſked, why facts of ſo great importance are not more frequently mentioned by ancient hiſtorians, whether *Jews* or heathens? To this it is anſwered,

1. That many books written in that age are loſt, in which it is very poſſible ſome mention of theſe facts might be made.

2. That of the few remaining hiſtorians, who wrote about that age, moſt of them were by their ſubject otherwiſe engaged.

3. That ſeveral of thoſe facts relating to Chriſt and his miracles, coming from the *Jews*, would be ſlighted by the *Gentile* writers as fabulous, eſpecially conſidering on the one hand, how common prodigious and magical ſtories were, and on the other, how ſuperſtitious and credulous the *Jews* were thought to be.

4. That the firſt appearance of the chriſtian ſcheme would ſhock them, as ſeeming ſo improbable, and ſo contrary to their received maxims, that it is no wonder if many of them cared but

to ſhew that this celebrated paſſage, ſome ſlight corruptions only excepted, may reaſonably be eſteemed genuine." This performance was publiſhed, without a name, at Oxford, in the year 1749; but is known to have been written by Dr. Nathaniel Forſter. The other tract is Mr. Jacob Bryant's "Vindiciæ Flavianæ: or a Vindication of the Teſtimony given by Joſephus concerning our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt." Both theſe gentlemen have diſplayed much ingenuity and learning. The accurate and penetrating Lardner is on the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion. He has fully conſidered the ſubject in his account of Joſephus, and in his farther obſervations, occaſioned by Dr. Forſter's Diſſertation. See Lardner's Jewiſh and Heathen Teſtimonies, vol. i. c. iv. § 2. and the preface to the ſecond volume.—Works, vol. vii. p. 120—129. ibid. p. 273—286. The learned are divided in their opinions; but the larger number, and thoſe who are eſteemed the moſt judicious, believe the paſſage to be an interpolation. For the other paſſage in Joſephus, concerning James the brother of Chriſt, ſee alſo Lardner, ibid. c. ii. § 3.—Works, vol. vii. p. 129—133. Some curious obſervations concerning Joſephus's teſtimony to Chriſt will be found in the Rev. Mr. Henley's Letter to Dr. Kippis, publiſhed in the Appendix to Lardner's Life, N°. x. p. clix.—clxviii.

little

little to inquire into evidences and facts relating to it.

5. Many of thoſe who did inquire no doubt became chriſtians; and therefore their teſtimony is not here reckoned.

6. The facts mentioned above as recorded by ſome, are ſuch as on the whole it was moſt reaſonable to expect that they, continuing enemies, ſhould know, obſerve and mention.

Addiſon on Chriſtianity, c. i. § 2—6. *c.* ii. §. 1, 2.—*Jackſ. Cred. vol.* i. *c.* xi, xii. *ap. Op. vol.* i. *p.* 38—44.—*Lardner's Jew. and Heath. Teſt. vol.* ii. *c.* xxii. § 3.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 94—97.

PROPOSITION C.

LECT. CXIII. The firſt publiſhers of chriſtianity wrote books containing an account of the life and doctrine of their maſter: ſeveral of which bore the names of thoſe books, which now make the *New Teſtament.*

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The great importance, of which the primitive chriſtians at leaſt apprehended the facts and doctrines of their religion to be, (as appears by the extremities they endured for their profeſſion of it. Vid. *Prop.* 98. *Schol.* 1.) would engage them to take the moſt effectual care they could to tranſmit the memory of it to future ages.

2. The age in which they lived was one of the moſt learned ages of antiquity; nor was there any, in which books were more common in the countries where they flouriſhed.

1, 2, 3. It is exceedingly probable in the nature of things, that there were ſome ſuch ancient books as the propoſition aſſerts.

Weſt on the Reſurrection, p. 308—318.

4. Writers of great antiquity do expreſsly mention *four* books, written by the diſciples of Chriſt, whom they call *evangeliſts:* and ſome of them

them do particularly name *Matthew*, *Mark*, *Luke* and *John* as the four.

Jones on the Can. part iv. *Introd.*

5. *Euſebius*, the moſt accurate hiſtorian among the ancient chriſtian writers, mentions it as a fact well known, and aſſerted particularly by *Origen*, a ſtill older writer, that the *four goſpels* of *Matthew*, *Mark*, *Luke* and *John*, the *epiſtles* of St. *Paul*, *one* of *Peter* and *one* of *John*, were *univerſally* received by the church; and he calls them εὐαγγελια ἀναντιῤῥητα and ὁμολογουμενα, as not being able to find they had ever been diſputed; and though the *Acts* are not expreſsly mentioned in this catalogue by *Origen*, *Euſebius* himſelf, in the paſſage referred to in the next ſtep, declares that he hath no ſcruple concerning it; and it is certain, from many paſſages in *Origen*'s works ſtill extant, that he paid the ſame regard to the *Acts* as to any other book of the New Teſtament: nay in the cloſe of the paſſage referred to below, he alſo mentions them incidentally as written by *Luke*.

Biſcoe at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. *p.* 507—509.—*Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* iii. *c.* xxiv. *l.* vi. *c.* xxv.——*Lardner's Cred. part* ii. *vol.* iii. *p.* 234—237. *vol.* viii. *p.* 90—96.——*Works*, *vol.* ii. *p.* 465—468. *vol.* iv. 224—228.

6. Though the other ſeven books of the New Teſtament, *i. e.* the epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, the epiſtle to *James*, the 2d of *Peter*, the 2d and 3d of *John*, *Jude* and the *Revelations* were *diſputed*, (and therefore called by *Euſebius* ἀντιλεγομενοι) yet he tells us they were at length introduced into the *canon*, *i. e.* into the number of thoſe books, which chriſtians regarded as the rule of their faith and manners, and which they diſtinguiſh from other books, written by perſons, whom they thought leſs eminently under the

divine direction, whatever their ſanctity might be.

Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l. iii. *c.* xxv.——*Jones on the Can. vol.* i. *p.* 23—27.——*Jenk. of Chriſtian. vol.* ii. *p.* 116—118.——*Lardner's Cred. vol.* viii. *p.* 97—104.——*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 228—234.

7. We ſhall endeavour to ſhew at large in the following propoſition, that at leaſt all the moſt important of thoſe books, were either expreſsly quoted by name or plainly alluded to by a ſeries of primitive writers, ſeveral of them much more ancient than *Euſebius*; and indeed, that there is hardly any writer of chriſtian antiquity, who has not either ſome expreſs reference or alluſion to ſome of them.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7.|8. *Valet propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM.

Whereas Mr. *Toland* in his *Amyntor*, and ſeveral other writers, have taken great pains to ſhew, that there were many ancient books; ſome of which are pretended to be ſtill extant, but are evidently ſpurious, which yet are quoted by ſeveral writers of the primitive church with great regard; whence no doubt he would lead his reader to infer, that little regard is to be had to their opinion on this head; we ſhall not enter into the particulars here, but leave the reader to judge, by thoſe paſſages referred to by *Toland*, compared with thoſe enumerated below, as to the different manner in which they mention confeſſedly fictitious writers, and thoſe of the New Teſtament: but the fulleſt and beſt account of this matter that I know of, is to be found in

Lardn. Cred. of Goſp. Hiſt. part ii. *vol.* i. & ii. *paſſ.*—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 11—363, *and in Jones's Hiſt. of the Can. vol.* i, & ii. *paſſ.*——*Toland's Amyntor, p.* 28—68.——*Nye on the Canon.*

PRO-

PROPOSITION CI.

To take a more particular ſurvey of what the moſt conſiderable ancient eccleſiaſtical writers have delivered concerning the ſeveral books of the New Teſtament; at the ſame time giving a catalogue of thoſe of the *three firſt centuries*, in the order in which they wrote. LECT. CXIV.

SOLUTION.

1. *Barnabas*, contemporary with the *Apoſtles*, who is mentioned *Acts* iv. 36, 37. *Acts* xi. 22—24. xiii. 1—4. 1 *Cor.* xi. 6. is ſaid to have written a general epiſtle in *Greek*; a *Latin* tranſlation of which is by many maintained to be extant; though I think the arguments againſt its authority are ſo ſtrong, as to leave little weight to any thing argued from thence; any farther than that ſo far as we can judge by the manner of the writing, it is indeed very ancient.

Jones on the Can. part iii. *c.* 37—42.——*Lardn. Cred. part* ii. *vol.* i. *p.* 23—30.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 10—15.——*Wake's Prelim. Diſ. p.* 69—72.

In this epiſtle ſeveral words of Chriſt are quoted, which are recorded by the evangeliſts; *v. g. Matt.* xx. 16. ix. 13. xxii. 43. *Luke* vi. 30. and many of thoſe ſcriptures quoted from the Old Teſtament in the New are likewiſe cited here. Many of the phraſes and arguments uſed by *Paul* in his epiſtle to the *Hebrews* and elſewhere, are alſo inſerted; *v. g.* 2 *Tim.* iv. 1. i. 10. but not in the form of quotations, ſo that hardly any ancient work gives leſs aſſiſtance in this inquiry.

Lardner, ibid. p. 31—48. *præf. p.* 45, *&c.*——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 15—22.——*Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt. ſeculum* i. § 53.——*Jortin's Remarks on Eccleſ. Hiſt. p.* 329—332.

2. *Clemens Romanus*, mentioned *Phil.* iv. 3. who is ſaid to have been one of the firſt biſhops of

of *Rome*, wrote an epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, probably about the year 96.

Lardn. ibid. p. 51—61.——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 22—28.

He quotes by name no book of the New Teſtament, excepting the *firſt* epiſtle to the *Corinthians*; which by the way is one of the moſt important in the whole volume for proving the truth of chriſtianity, as will afterwards appear; and it is worth our notice, that it is here quoted by thoſe who were the beſt judges of its being genuine, and quoted as of an authority acknowledged even by all the different parties among them: it is therefore not improbable, that the *original* might then be in their hands.

Lardn. ibid. p. 61.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 29.

He evidently refers to ſome of Chriſt's words, which are alſo recorded by *Matthew*, *Mark*, and *Luke:* but we cannot lay much ſtreſs upon thoſe paſſages, to eſtabliſh the authority of theſe books, becauſe *Clement* living ſo near the apoſtle's time might have learned them by *oral* tradition, and the *evangeliſts* are not named. Yet on the other hand it may be remarked, that he does not introduce thoſe things as new, but refers to them as well known to the *Corinthians*; which we could hardly have been ſo ſure they were, unleſs they had ſome books among them, (commonly alſo received among other chriſtians) in which thoſe paſſages were inſerted: nor will *Acts* xx. 35. invalidate this obſervation, ſince it does not appear that *Clement* had lived among the *Corinthians*, as *Paul* had done with the elders of *Epheſus*, and probably taught them thoſe traditions with his own mouth.

Lardn. ibid. p. 65—68.——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 29—31.

The following paſſages are tranſcribed with very little variation, *Rom.* i. 29. xii. 5. 1 *Cor.* x. 24. xiii. 4, *&c. Eph.* iv. 4. *Phil.* i. 10. *Col.* i. 10. 1 *Theſſ.*

1 *Theſſ.* v. 28. 1 *Tim.* v. 4. *Tit.* iii. 1. *Heb.* i. 3—5, 7—13. iv. 12. xi. 37. xii. 6. 1 *Pet.* iv. 8. He ſeems alſo evidently to allude to the following paſſages, *Rom.* xiv. 1. 1 *Cor.* xii. 12. xv. 20. 2 *Cor.* iii. 18. viii. 5. xi. 24. 1 *Tim.* iii. 13. *Heb.* vi. 18. *James* iii. 13. 2 *Pet.* ii. 5. iii. 4.

Lardn. ibid. c. ii. *præſ. p.* 102—105.——*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 34—47.

3. *Hermas* (mentioned *Rom.* xvi. 14.) is ſaid to have been the author of ſeveral books under his name: one is called his *Paſtor*, in three parts, the firſt of *viſions*, the ſecond of *commands*, the third of *ſimilitudes:* we have only a *Latin* tranſlation of it, and a few fragments of the original. It is probably an ancient book, but ſtrong objections are brought againſt its being genuine.

Wake's Prelim. Diſc. c. viii. *p.* 79—87.——*Moſheim's Hiſt. Eccleſ. p.* 51. *Sec.* i. § 54.——*Jortin's Rem. on Eccleſ. Hiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 337, 338.

There are no expreſs quotations of any book either of the Old or New Teſtament by name to be found in him; but there are many alluſions to the latter, of which the moſt conſiderable are the following paſſages, *Matt.* v. 28. x. 32. xiii. 5, 7, 31. xviii. 3. xxviii. 18. *Luke* xvi. 18. *John* xiv. 6. *Acts* v. 41. 1 *Cor.* iii. 16, 17. *Eph.* iv. 4, 30. *Heb.* xii. 17. *James* i. 5. iv. 7, 12. 1 *Pet.* i. 6. v. 7. 1 *John* ii. 27. *Jude, ver.* 21. There are alſo many viſions reſembling thoſe of the *Revelations*, but no mention is made of that book.

Lardn. c. iv. *præſ. p.* 144—146.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 50—65.—*Moſheim, ubi ſupra.*

4. *Ignatius* biſhop of *Antioch* who was martyred about the year 116, wrote ſeveral epiſtles mentioned by *Euſebius*, *Irenæus*, *Jerom*, and many others: they are ſtill ſaid to be extant; but there are two different copies of them. Mr. *Whiſton* has contended earneſtly that the *larger* are genuine; but from comparing both, it appears much more probable, that the larger are a para-

phraſe upon the *ſmaller*, than the ſmaller (as ſome ſuppoſe) an abridgment of the larger.

Whiſt. Prin. Chriſt. vol. i.—*Jortin's Rem. vol.* i. *p.* 62—67, 363.

Nor is it at all probable, that the epiſtles to *Tarſus*, *Antioch*, and *Hiero* are genuine; ſince they are not mentioned by *Euſebius*, who was ſo likely to have diſcovered them, and would no doubt have been glad to quote them. We ſhall therefore only take notice of thoſe quotations and alluſions, which are to be found in the *ſmaller* epiſtles, and which are as follow. He plainly quotes or alludes to *Matt.* iii. 15. x. 16. xii. 33. xv. 13. xviii. 19. xix. 12. *John* iii. 8. viii. 29. x. 9. *Acts* x. 41. *Rom.* xv. 7. 1 *Cor.* i. 10. v. 7. vi. 9. xv. 8. *Eph.* v. 2, 25. *Phil.* ii. 3. 1 *Theſſ.* v. 17. 2 *Tim.* ii. 4. *Philem. ver.* 20. 1 *Pet.* v. 5.

Lardn. c. v. *præf. p.* 188—190.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 65—85.—*Jortin's Rem. vol.* i. *p.* 54—61.

To which we may add, that he ſpeaks of the *Goſpel* in ſuch a connection with the *Law* and the *Prophets*, as ſeems to imply that he meant *a book*.

Lardn. ibid. p. 180—184.——*Works, ibid. p.* 84, 85.—*Seed's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 294—299.

5. *Polycarp*, biſhop of *Smyrna*, thought by ſome to be the *angel* of the church there mentioned in the *Revelations*, was martyred about the year 169. *Euſebius* mentions a letter written by him to the *Philippians*, which probably was that excellent epiſtle bearing his name, which is now extant in a *Latin* tranſlation, and moſt of it in the *Greek* original. In this epiſtle he quotes by name 1 *Cor.* vi. 2. as the words of *Paul*, and alſo *Eph.* iv. 26. as *a ſaying of ſcripture*, and alſo mentions *Paul's* epiſtle to the *Philippians* with the higheſt reſpect, as written by a wiſdom which nothing could equal: he likewiſe moſt evidently tranſcribes the following paſſages, *Matt.* v. 3, *&c.* vii. 1, 2. v. 44. xxvi. 41. *Acts* ii. 24. *Rom.* xii.

xii. 9. xiv. 10. 1 *Cor.* vi. 9. 2 *Cor.* iv. 5. vi. 7. viii. 21. *Gal.* iv. 26. vi. 7. *Eph.* ii. 8, 9. *Phil.* ii. 10, 16. 1 *Theſſ.* v. 17, 22. 2 *Theſſ.* iii. 15. 1 *Tim.* ii. 1, 2. vi. 7. 2 *Tim.* ii. 11. iv. 10. 1 *Pet.* i. 8, 21. ii. 11, 12, 17, 22, 24. iii. 9. iv. 7. v. 5. 1 *John* iv. 3. Conſidering how ſhort this letter is, the tranſcribing ſo great a number of paſſages in it from the new teſtament, is an evident proof of the regard he paid to that book.

Lardn. ibid. c. vi. *præf. p.* 202, 203, & 222, 223.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 86—100.

6. That epiſtle from the church of *Smyrna*, giving an account of the martyrdom of *Polycarp*, evidently refers to 1 *Cor.* ii. 9. and gives the title of *goſpel* to the hiſtory of Chriſt written by the *Evangeliſts*.

Lardn. ibid. c. vii.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 100—105.

It may be obſerved, that the writings which have been enumerated under theſe ſix firſt ſteps, are thoſe which are commonly called the works of the *Apoſtolic Fathers*, being publiſhed under that title by *Cotelerius*, in a very celebrated edition of them, and tranſlated into *Engliſh* by Archbiſhop *Wake*, whoſe account of them all it may be convenient to peruſe.

LECT. CXV.

7. *Papias*, who is ſaid to have been the companion of *John*, and who flouriſhed about the year 115, wrote five books now loſt, called an explication of the oracles of our Lord; in which *Euſebius* ſays he often quoted our four *Evangeliſts*, and mentions ſome remarkable particulars both relating to the goſpel of *Matthew* and *Mark*: *Euſebius* alſo ſays, he brings teſtimonies out of the firſt of *John* and the firſt of *Peter*.

Lardn. ibid. c. ix.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 106—115.

8. *Juſtin Martyr* wrote his two apologies, and his dialogue with *Trypho* the *Jew*. He died at the lateſt about 163. The epiſtle to *Diognetus*, and *queſtions to the orthodox*, though they do not

ſeem to belong to *Juſtin Martyr*, (among whoſe works they are publiſhed) are however undoubtedly writings of great antiquity.

There are in his genuine works the following quotations and alluſions, *Matt.* i. 20, 21. v. 28—32. xi. 27. xxv. 41. *Mark* viii. 31. *Luke* i. 31, 35, 38, x. 19. *John* i. 20. iii. 3. xiv. 24. He quotes alſo the *memoirs of the apoſtles*, which he adds are called *goſpels*, as containing the inſtitution of the euchariſt, and *Luke* xx. 44. *Matt.* xxvi. 39. He introduces *Trypho* the *Jew*, ſpeaking of the precepts delivered in the *goſpel*, as what he had read; and expreſsly declares that the *written commentaries*, or memoirs of the *apoſtles*, as well as of the *prophets*, were read publicly in all chriſtian aſſemblies for divine worſhip, which is a circumſtance of vaſt importance.

Juſt. Mart. Apol. § 87.——*Reeve's Apol. vol.* i. *p.* 114.

He either quotes or refers to *Acts* vii. 22. xiii. 27. 1 *Cor.* v. 7. xi. 18, 19. xii. 8—10. *Gal.* iv. 12. *Eph.* ii. 20. *Col.* i. 15. 2 *Theſſ.* ii. 3, 4. *Heb.* v. 9, 10. 2 *Pet.* iii. 8. *Rev.* xx. 4, *&c. Luke* xx. 35, 36.

Lardn. ibid. c. x. *præf. p.* 286—288.—— *Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 115—129.

9. The epiſtle to *Diognetus*, which Mr. *Whiſton* wildly thinks to have been written by the evangeliſt *Timothy*, is certainly ancient, though it was not written by *Juſtin*; and there are evident quotations or alluſions to the following paſſages, *Matt.* vi. 25, *&c. John* i. 1. xvii. 14. *Rom.* v. 19, 1 *Cor.* iv. 12. viii. 1. 2 *Cor.* x. 3. iv. 8, *&c. Phil.* iii. 20. 1 *Pet.* ii. 24. iii. 18. 1 *John* iv. 19: and he alſo ſpeaks of the *goſpels* and *traditions* of the *apoſtles*, in ſuch a connection with the law and the prophets, as ſeems plainly to intimate, that he referred to books of that name.

Lardn. ibid. p. 296, 297.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 129—133.——*Jortin's Rem. vol.* i. *p.* 342—348.

10. *Dio-*

10. *Dionyſius* of *Corinth* was a man of an excellent character, who flouriſhed about the year 170. He wrote ſeven epiſtles, which are now loſt; but in a fragment of one of them, preſerved by *Euſebius*, he mentions the converſion of *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* by *Paul*, agreeably to the account given in the *Acts* of the apoſtles; but it does not appear, that he ſpeaks of that book.

Lardn. ibid. c. xii. *p.* 300.—*Works, ibid. p.* 133—136.

11. *Tatian*, who flouriſhed about the year 172, wrote an elegant oration againſt the *Greeks*, which is ſtill extant; and *Euſebius* (*Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* iv. *c.* 29.) tells us, he wrote the harmony of the four goſpels. In his *oration*, he quotes *Luke* vi. 25. *John* i. 3, 5. 1 *Cor.* xv. 22. beſides ſome other paſſages, which *Clement* and *Irenæus* ſay he quoted from the epiſtles to the *Corinthians* and *Galatians*, in a work now loſt; and *Jerom* ſays he allowed *Paul*'s epiſtle to *Titus*.

Lardn. ibid. c. xiii.—*Works, ibid. p.* 136—140.

12. *Hegeſippus*, a converted *Jew*, wrote the hiſtory of the chriſtian church about the year 170, of which only ſome fragments are remaining: in which the following ſcriptures ſeem to be referred to, *Matt.* xxvi. 64. *Luke* xxiii. 34. *Matt.* xiii. 16.

Lardn. ibid. c. xiv.——*Works, ibid. p.* 140—145.

13. *Melito*, biſhop of *Sardis*, in the year 170, wrote an apology to *Marcus Antoninus*, and many other books, particularly a commentary on the *Revelations*: and as he expreſsly ſpeaks of the *old* teſtament, he ſeems by that phraſe to imply, that there was in his time a collection of books called the *new*.

Lardn. ibid. c. xv.—*Works, ibid. p.* 146—148.

14. There is an epiſtle of the churches of *Vienne* and *Lyons*, preſerved in *Euſ. Eccleſ. Hiſt. vol.* iv. and written about the year 177; in which there are very expreſs quotations from *Luke* i. 6. *John* xvi. 2. *Acts* vii. 60. *Rom.* viii. 18. *Eph.* vi. 5. *Phil.* ii. 6. 1 *Tim.* iii. 15. 1 *Pet.* v. 6. 1 *John* iii. 16. *Rev.* xiv. 4.

Lardn. c. xvi.—*Works, ibid. p.* 148—153.

15. *Irenæus*, biſhop of *Lyons*, wrote, about the year 178, beſides many other books, five of *Hereſy*, which are yet preſerved in the *Latin* tranſlation, and ſome fragments in the original *Greek*. In one of theſe fragments preſerved by *Euſebius*, as well as in the tranſlation, there is expreſs mention of the four *goſpels*, under the names of their reſpective authors, and they are likewiſe mentioned together. In two other paſſages of his works, he profeſſedly vindicates the genuineneſs of each, and ſets himſelf to give an account of the occaſion on which they were written. He often expreſsly quotes the book of the *Acts*, and in many places the epiſtles of *Paul* by name, and mentions all which our new teſtament aſcribes to him, excepting that to *Philemon*. He has many paſſages in ſenſe parallel to ſeveral in the *Hebrews*, but he does not expreſsly quote that epiſtle, and *Photius* ſays he did not allow it to be St. *Paul*'s. He has alſo paſſages in ſenſe parallel to ſeveral of *James*, but no expreſs quotations: the *firſt* epiſtle of *Peter* is quoted by him, and the *firſt* of *John*, and alſo the *ſecond*, though by a miſtake he calls it *the ſame with the former*. *Jude* is not quoted, though it would have been peculiarly proper to the occaſion of his writing; but the book of the *Revelations* he very frequently and largely quotes.

Lardn. ibid. c. xvii. *præf. p.* 381, 382. *& Ind. ad Iren.*——*Works, ibid. p.* 153—180.

16. *Athen-*

16. *Athenagoras*, who before his converſion was a philoſopher, between 166 and 178, wrote an *apology* for chriſtianity, and quickly after a diſcourſe on the *reſurrection*, in which he expreſsly quotes, or evidently alludes to the following paſſages, *Matt.* v. 28, 44, 45. *Luke* xvi. 18. *John* x. 30, 38. *Acts* xvii. 25. *Rom.* i. 24, 27. 1 *Cor.* xv. 32, 54. 2 *Cor.* v. 10. *Gal.* iv. 9. 1 *Tim.* v. 1, 2. vi. 16. He ſeems alſo to refer to *James* iii. 13. v. 7. 2 *Pet.* i. 21. *Rev.* xx. 13.

Lardn. ibid. c. xviii.—*Works, ibid. p.* 180—187.

17. *Miltiades* is ſuppoſed to have written about the year 170 an elegant apology, which is now loſt. He is celebrated by *Euſebius*, (*Eccleſ. Hiſt.* v. 17.) for his acquaintance with ſcripture; but no fragments remain. LECT. CXVI.

Lard. ibid. c. xix.—*Works, ibid. p.* 188, —189.

18. *Theophilus*, biſhop of *Antioch*, wrote three books to *Autolycus* yet extant, publiſhed about the year 181. His book againſt *Hermogenes*, in which *Euſebius* ſays he quoted the *Revelations*, is loſt, as alſo that againſt *Marcion*, and the *harmony of the Evangeliſts*, mentioned by *Jerom*, *Ep.* 151. but the *commentary* upon them, which goes under his name, is ſpurious. In thoſe of his genuine works which remain, he quotes *Matt.* v. 28, 32, 44, 46. vi. 3. *Luke* xviii. 27. *John* i. 1, 3. *Rom.* ii. 6, *&c.* xiii. 7, 8. 1 *Cor.* vi. 9—11. 2 *Cor.* xi. 19. *Eph.* ii. 2. iii. 10. *Phil.* i. 10. iii. 20. iv. 8. *Col.* i. 17. 1 *Tim.* ii. 1, 2. *Tit.* iii. 5. *Heb.* xii. 9. 1 *Pet.* i. 18. ii. 13. Some of theſe paſſages he mentions as ſpoken by a *divine word*, and he ſeems to allude to 2 *Pet.* i. 20. *Rev.* xii. 19.

Lardn. ibid. c. xx. *præf. p.* 447—449.——*Works, ibid. p.* 190—202.

To this work is added, particularly in the *Cologn* edition, a little tract of *Hermias*, called

Irrisio gentium, which is written with great elegance and spirit; which begins with an express quotation of 1 *Cor.* iii. 19. as *the words of the blessed apostle Paul in his epistle to the Corinthians.*

Lardn. ibid. c. xxv. *p.* 553, 554.—*Works, ibid. p.* 246, 247.

19. *Pantænus*, once a philosopher of the *Stoic* sect, was president of the catechetical school of *Alexandria*, about the year 130, as *Eusebius* (*Hist.* v. 9, 10.) assures us: he wrote commentaries on scripture, which are now entirely lost; so that he is capable of doing no service in the present question, any farther than as *Jerom* testifies, he brought back the gospel of *Matthew* written in *Hebrew* from *India*, whither he was sent by *Demetrius* his bishop, to preach the gospel.

Lardn. ibid. c. xxi.—*Works, ibid. p.* 202—205.

20. *Clemens Alexandrinus* succeeded *Pantænus*, and wrote about the end of the second and beginning of the third century. His remaining works are his *Pædagogue* and *Stromata*, his *admonition to the Gentiles*, and a homily of the *salvation of the rich*. He is mentioned with great honour by the most valuable ancient writers that succeeded him; *Eusebius* tells us, that he speaks of *Mark*'s gospel, as written from the account of things he had received from *Peter*, and in effect at least authorised by that apostle. (*Eccles. Hist.* ii. 15.) He also speaks of the epistle to the *Hebrews*, as written in *Hebrew* by *Paul*, but translated by *Luke*. *Ibid.* vi. 14.

Lardn. ibid. c. xxii. *p.* 468—473.—*Works, ibid. p.* 210—212.

He expressly mentions the *four gospels* of our evangelists, the *Acts*, the epistles to the *Romans*, *Galatians*, *Ephesians*, *Philippians*, *Colossians*, first and second to the *Thessalonians* and *Corinthians*, first and second to *Timothy*, *Titus*, *Hebrews*, the first of *Peter*, and the first of *John* by the name of

of his *larger* epiſtle, and *Jude* and the *Revelations:* but does not expreſsly mention *James* or the ſecond of *Peter.* We refer not to particular paſſages, there being great numbers of them from the ſeveral books above-mentioned. It is true that he alſo quotes ſeveral *apocryphal* pieces, ſuch as the *goſpel* according to the *Hebrews* and the *Egyptians,* the *preaching of Peter,* the *ſhepherd of Hermas*; but not with titles of equal regard, nor in ſuch a manner as to ſeem to lay any ſtreſs upon them.

Lardn. ibid. c. xxii. *p.* 494—515. *and Index to Clem. Alex.*——*Works, ibid. p.* 206—243.

21. *Polycrates,* biſhop of *Epheſus,* about the cloſe of this century, in an epiſtle of his, of which *Jerom* has preſerved ſome fragments, refers to *Matt.* xix. 12. *John* xxi. 20. *Acts* v. 29. and ſpeaks of the ſcripture as *the rule of faith.*

Lardn. ibid. c. xxiii.—*Works, ibid. p.* 243—245.

22. *Tertullian,* preſbyter of *Carthage,* was contemporary with *Clemens Alexandrinus,* and ſurvived him: his works are known and numerous. In them he expreſsly quotes all the books of the New Teſtament, but *James,* the ſecond of *Peter,* the third of *John: Hebrews* he ſuppoſes to have been written by *Barnabas.* It is remarkable that there are more quotations from the New Teſtament in him, than from all the writings of *Tully* in all the ancient books in the world; the ſame may be ſaid of thoſe of *Irenæus* and *Clemens Alexandrinus.*

Lardn. ibid. c. 27.—*Works, ibid, p.* 250—287.

23. Dr. *Lardner* has alſo mentioned a great many other chriſtian writers, of whoſe works only fragments are preſerved, which ſerve to illuſtrate the preſent queſtion, of which we ſhall not give ſo particular an account. The chief of them are *Serapion,* who ſpeaks with great reverence

ence of our gospels, rejecting that of *Peter*; (*ibid. c.* xxvi) *Quadratus, Aristides, Claudius Apollinaris,* and *Symmachus.* (*Ibid. c.* xxviii. *pass.*) Besides these, he also mentions several supposititious writings forged in the second century, such as the *Acts of Paul* and *Thecla,* the *Sibylline verses,* the testament of the 12 *patriarchs,* the *Recognitions, Homily* and *Epitome* of *Clement:* but they bring little light to the present question; which is not to be wondered at, considering that most of them pretend to be written before the books of the New Testament. But it is observed, that in the three last of these there are several references to facts recorded in the evangelists, and that phrases used especially in *Paul*'s writings are introduced in these pieces.

24. The third century produced many famous christian writers, *v. g. Minutius Fælix, Origen, Cyprian* and *Arnobius*; most of whose works abound with a vast many quotations from all the *uncontroverted* books of the New Testament, especially *Novation* on the trinity; and it would be almost an endless task to enumerate them all: much less is it necessary to enter into the particulars of those quotations, brought from *Lactantius, Athanasius, Eusebius, Optatus, Basil, Ephraim Syrus, Gregory Nyss.* and *Nazianzen, Ambrose, Cyril* of *Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Hilary, Jerom, Augustin,* and other authors of less note, who flourished in the *fourth* century, of whom see

Spanh. Eccles. Hist. Sæc. iii. § 10. *Sæc.* iv. § 12.—*Lardn. part* ii. *vol.* iii. *pass.*—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 247—249.——*Ibid. p.* 287—310.—*Ibid. p.* 310—363.—*Ibid. p.* 364, *to the end of the volume* *.

COROL-

* Though Dr. Doddridge has judged it sufficient for the purpose of his lectures to stop here, it may not be improper to remind the theological student that he will hereafter find his full account

COROLLARY 1.

Hence we may eaſily collect and compare the evidence, which there is of each particular book of the New Teſtament, to prove it genuine.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may ſee great reaſon to believe what is aſſerted *Prop.* 100, at leaſt concerning the books which are called ομολογεμενοι. Vid. *ibid. gr.* 7.

COROLLARY 3.

Hence it appears, that the evidence of thoſe books which are called ανλιλεγομενοι is comparatively very ſmall, ſo far as it depends upon the fathers of the two firſt centuries, eſpecially with regard to *James*, the ſecond of *Peter*, and *Jude*.

COROLLARY 4.

Mr. *Dodwell* was groſsly miſtaken in aſſerting, that the books of the New Teſtament lay concealed till the year 130, and that there was nothing ſettled concerning the canon till the fourth century.

Dodw. Diſſ. on Iren. p. 65—73.——*Jenk. of Chriſtian. vol.* ii. *c.* iv. *p.* 118—128. *Lardner's Cred. vol.* xii. *p.* 21—86. 90—126.——*Works, vol.* v. *p.* 352—398. *Macknight's Truth of the Goſpel Hiſt. book* iii. *c.* i. § 1, 2, 3.

account in reading and ſtudying the whole of Dr. Lardner's Credibility of the Goſpel Hiſtory, which carries on the ſubject down to the beginning of the fourteenth century, and contains a great variety of important critical information. Should a ſtudent, from the number and rapidity of his academical employments, not have leiſure to read the whole of the preceding references (ſome of which are long) it is earneſtly requeſted that he will not fail in an immediate peruſal of the admirable recapitulation of the evidence, given in the twelfth volume of the Credibility, and in the doctor's works, vol. v. p. 341, to the end.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXVII. It may not be improper here to add, that *Amelius*, the *Platonic* philosopher in the third century, mentions the writings of *John*, and *Dionysius Longinus*, *A. D.* 250, those of *Paul*, with considerable applause.

Huet. Dem. Ev. Prop. i. § 6. *p.* 21. *b.*—*Euseb. Præp. Evan. l.* xi. *c.* xix.—*Smith's Life of Longinus*, *p.* 23, 24.—*Lardner's Test. vol.* iii. *c.* xxxiii, *and* xxxiv.—*Works, vol.* iii. *p.* 160—168.

And it is yet of greater importance to observe, that *Celsus*, who seems to have lived in the second century, and perhaps not later than the middle of it (*Orig. against Celsus, l.* i. *p.* 3, & 8.) not only brings a great many citations from the New Testament, but founds the main stress of his argument against christianity upon the supposed absurdity of that book; which is an illustrious testimony, not only to its antiquity, but to its high esteem among christians in that early age.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be added here, that some have thought *Luke* x. 7. is expressly quoted by *Paul*, 1 *Tim.* v. 18. and it is observable, that if it be so, then it is put upon a foot of equal authority with *Deut.* xxv. 4. quoted in the same passage.

Seed's Serm. vol. ii. *p.* 292.—*Macknight's Truth of the Gospel Hist. p.* 391.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some may perhaps wonder, that (considering how much christianity prevailed, and in how great esteem the writers of the New Testament are supposed to have been in those early ages) there should have been no more quotations from them within the first 150 years. It may be answered,

1. That

1. That as moſt of the firſt chriſtians were perſons of a low ſtation in life, (1 *Cor.* i. 26—28. *James* ii. 5.) the number of early chriſtian writers was ſmall, and of thoſe who did write many of their works are loſt, as evidently appears from *Euſebius*, *Photius*, and many more, who have given us ſome of their names and ſome account of them, and in part from ſeveral ſteps in the preceding propoſition.

2. That ſeveral of the remaining pieces are but ſhort.

3. That the ſubject of many of theſe was ſuch, as to give little opportunity of quoting the writings of the New Teſtament; very few of them relating to any controverſy of chriſtians with each other, and in their controverſies with the heathens, it is obſerved that they are employed more in demonſtrating the falſhood of paganiſm, than the truth of chriſtianity, as that was the point moſt neceſſary to be laboured, conſidering the *ſociability* of the heathen ſuperſtitions.

4. Several of the writers whom we have mentioned were ſo early, that it is exceedingly probable, they had not an opportunity of ſeeing ſome of the epiſtles, which could not circulate in the world ſo ſoon as papers now do by the aſſiſtance of printing.

5. Thoſe books not being then divided into chapters and verſes as now, quotations from them were not altogether ſo eaſy: not to ſay, that conſidering to what extraordinary divine aſſiſtances many of the primitive chriſtians pretended, they might not ſeem to have ſo much need of a written rule; ſo that on the whole, it is wonderful, that we can trace ſo great evidence in ſuch circumſtances.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *l.* ii. § 6. *p.* 266—284. *Ed.* 2. *p.* 278—295. *Edit.* 4. *vol.* i. *part* ii. *p.* 36—56.—*Macknight's Goſpel Hiſt. p.* 408, 409.

PRO-

PROPOSITION CII.

To inquire more particularly into the evidence there is, that the ancient christians had books among them, which went by the name of those which *Eusebius* calls ἀντιλεγομενοι. Vid. *Prop.* 100. *gr.* 6.

SOLUTION.

1. With regard to the epistle to the *Hebrews*, many parallel thoughts and phrases are to be found in *Clemens Romanus*, *Justin Martyr*, and *Irenæus*. *Clemens Alexandrinus* quotes it as the words of the *divine apostle*, and elsewhere of *Paul*. *Origen* frequently speaks of it as *Paul's*; and *Eusebius* mentions it as received with great pleasure by the *Hebrews*, who were the most capable of judging whether it were genuine or not.

Lardn. Cred. part ii. *vol.* i. *p.* 87—95, 368—373. *vol.* ii. *p.* 470—472, 501, 502. *vol.* iii. *p.* 234—238, 248—261,—— *Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 39—43, 211, 212, 224, 467, 472—478.——*Whitby Comment. on Heb. Pref.*——*New Transl. of New Test. p.* 838—840.——*Twells's Exam. part* ii. *c.* ii. § 1.——*Lardner's Supplement, vol.* ii. *c.* xii. § 3, 4.—— *Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 391—415——*Hallet on the Heb. Introd.* § 1.——*Sykes on Ditto. Introduction. passim.*

2. As for *James*, passages at least parallel to it are to be found in *Clemens Romanus*, *Irenæus*, and *Athenagoras*, and it is acknowledged by *Origen*, *Eusebius*, and *Jerom*, though the last tells us it was long doubted in the *Latin* church.

Whitby Comment. on Jam. Pref.——*Lardn. ib. in nom. Clem. Ignat. &c.*——*New Transl. p.* 873—875.—*Twells, ibid.* § 2. *Lardner's Suppl. vol.* iii. *c.* xvii.—— *Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 502—509.

3. The

3. The ſecond of *Peter* ſeems to be quoted by *Juſtin Martyr*, and is aſcribed to *Peter* by *Origen* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Whitby on 2 Pet. Pref.——*New Tranſl.* p. 903, 904.——*Twells, ibid.* § 2.——*Benſon on the ſecond of Peter, p.* 1—9. *Lardner's Suppl. vol.* iii. *c.* xix. § 1.——*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 563—566.

4. The ſecond epiſtle of *John* is quoted by *Irenæus*, and by the council of *Carthage* in the year 256. *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſpeaks by way of diſtinction of the *larger* epiſtle. *Origen* likewiſe mentions the *ſecond* and *third* epiſtle, though ſomething dubiouſly; and *Epiphanius* has ſome reference to them, ſpeaking in the plural number of *John's epiſtles*.

Whit. in Loc.——*Benſon on the Epiſtles of John, p.* 177, 178.——*Lardner's Suppl. vol.* iii. § 4, 5, 6.——*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 593—607.

5. *Jude* is expreſsly quoted by *Origen*, *Tertullian* and *Cyprian*, but by no earlier writers.

Whit. on Jude, ver. 1.——*New Tranſl. p.* 943.—*Twells, ibid.* § 4.—*Benſon on Jude, p.* 114.——*Lardner's Suppl. vol.* iii. § 21.—*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 607—627.

6. *Juſtin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* allow the *Revelations* to have been an ancient book, and aſcribe it to *John the apoſtle*: and if we may believe the teſtimonies of *Euſebius* and *Jerom*, who had in their hands the writings of many of the ancients which are now loſt, *Papias*, *Melito*, *Theophilus* of *Antioch* and *Apollonius*, all in the ſecond century, received and quoted it: and it appears to have been allowed by *Origen*, *Cyprian*, *Victorius*, *Methodius*, and *Pamphilus*, beſides *Hypolitus*, earlier than any of them in the third: though it is certain

ſome

ſome rejected it, as the work of an unknown and heretical writer.

New Tranſl. p. 1019—1022.——*Mills's Proleg. ad Nov. Teſt. p.* 24—28.——*Twells's Ex. part* iii. *paſſ. præf. part* i. *c.* i. § 2. *c.* ii. *p.* 11—15.——*Republic of Letters, vol.* vii. *article* 9*.

COROLLARY 1.

It evidently appears, from comparing this demonſtration with that of *Prop.* 101. that the evidence of the genuineneſs of the ſix former of theſe books is not equal to that of the reſt, nor are they all equal to each other in this reſpect.

COROLLARY 2.

Nevertheleſs it ſeems more reaſonable to admit than to reject them, if we conſider,

1. That ſeveral of theſe epiſtles, not being written as moſt of *Paul*'s were, either to particular churches, or even particular perſons, whoſe names and abodes are recorded in them, it could not be ſo eaſy to find out the originals.

2. That ſome of them are ſo ſhort, and the contents of them ſo general, that there was (*cæt. par.*) leſs reaſon to expect quotations from them.

3. As they were more inquired into, they came to be generally received; and at laſt all oppoſition againſt them ceaſed. To which we may add,

4. That the accompliſhment of many remarkable prophecies in the *Revelations*, eſpecially thoſe relating to the *Roman* and *Papal* empire,

* M. Abauzit, a learned gentleman of Geneva, but a Frenchman by birth, in a diſcourſe on the apocalypſe, hath ſtrongly denied the authenticity of the book. See his Miſcellanies on hiſtorical, theological, and critical Subjects, tranſlated by Dr. Harwood, in 1774, p. 213—376. On the other ſide of the queſtion is Lardner, Suppl. vol. iii. c. xxii.—Works, vol. vi. p. 627—638.

in

in proportion to the degree in which it appears, muſt, to thoſe that ſee it, be one of the ſtrongeſt demonſtrations that can be imagined, not only that the book itſelf was genuine, but that it was written by ſome extraordinary aſſiſtance and illumination from God: and when this is granted, and the external evidence conſidered, and compared with that of the reſt of theſe ſeven pieces, it will farther prove, that a book, not more frequently quoted by the earlieſt writers than this, may yet be both genuine and divine.

Blackhall at Boyle's Lect. Serm iii. *p.* 9.—12.——*Jenk. of Chriſtian. vol.* ii. *p.* 106—116.

SCHOLIUM I.

Whatever be thought of the preceding arguments, it is to be remembered, that the agreement between theſe books and others of the New Teſtament is ſo great, that we need not be very ſolicitous about them: nor if the others ſhould hereafter be proved to be of divine authority, need we be apprehenſive of any dangerous conſequences attending our referring to them in public diſcourſes. This is eſpecially obſervable with regard to thoſe whoſe external evidence is the weakeſt; in which number the ſecond and third of *John* and *Jude* are to be reckoned.

Foſt. againſt Tind. p. 143—147.——*Sherlock on Proph. Diſſ.* i. *p.* 199, *&c.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

With relation to the books mentioned by *Toland* in his *Amyntor*, (compare *Prop.* 100. *Schol.*) ſuch as the *acts of Paul*; the *Revelation of Peter*; *the goſpel of Peter*, *Andrew*, and *Matthias*; the *acts of Peter* and *John*, *&c.* it is evident that *Euſebius*, in the place before quoted, (*Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* iii. § 25. *p.* 119.) mentions theſe as νοθοι; which (though Dr. *Twells* maintains the con-

trary,) is plainly different from the ἀντιλεγομενοι, as well as the ομολογουμενοι: and it will appear, as was hinted above, that even when they are quoted, which they seldom are, by ancient writers, it is in such a language, as plainly to shew, that the regard to them was far inferior to that which they had for the *sacred* books. And it is farther remarkable, that though *Celsus* has one where or another given us a kind of abridgment of the history of the *evangelists*, (see *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 1.) yet he has hardly ever if at all mentioned a single fact recorded in any of those pieces, though many of them would have afforded matter for much more plausible objections, than those which he endeavours to ground upon the facts recorded by the evangelists: (Compare *Evang. Infant. ap. Fabric. Cod. Apocriphus, vol.* ii. *p.* 163—165, 182—185.) which makes it probable that he was not acquainted with those pieces; for his candour was not so great, as to have waved any opportunity of aspersing christianity; and it is highly probable several of those forgeries were later than his time. We may also add that *Tertullian* tells us (*de Baptis. c.* xvii.) that *John* the apostle discovered the *acts of Paul* and *Thecla* to have been forged by a *presbyter*, and degraded the author on that account; which if true, is a very remarkable circumstance.

Seed's Serm. vol. ii. *p.* 209—311.

PROPOSITION CIII.

LECT. CXVIII. The New Testament as we now have it in the original is *genuine*; *i. e.* it is in the main such as it came out of the hands of those, by whom the several pieces contained in it are said to have been written.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 100.|1. The primitive christians had books among them, said to have been written by

by thoſe authors whoſe names are prefixed to thoſe of our New Teſtament.

2. The primitive chriſtians had as good opportunities of ſatisfying themſelves as to the genuineneſs of them, as other ancients had with regard to the genuineneſs of their books; eſpecially conſidering that ſeveral of thoſe epiſtles were written to numerous ſocieties of men, or to perſons of a very public and ſacred character; and thoſe of *Paul*'s, if not written by his own hand, were *ſigned* by him, to prevent as far as could be the very poſſibility of impoſture. (1 *Cor.* xvi. 21. 2 *Theſſ.* iii. 17. Comp. *Rom.* xvi. 22. *Gal.* vi. 11.)

3. The great concern which chriſtians had in theſe books, and the high value which they ſet upon them, (as appears in part already, and will hereafter more fully appear,) would no doubt engage them to be very careful and accurate in this inquiry.

Lardn. Cred. vol. i. *p.* 384, 385. *vol.* iii. *p.* 282—289. *vol.* viii. *p.* 197—203.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 172, 173. *ibid. p.* 488, 492. *vol.* iv. *p.* 272—274.

4. We find there were many books going under the name of the *apoſtles*, which were rejected by the primitive chriſtians; and that a vaſt difference was made between thoſe of the New Teſtament, and other books allowed to have been written by perſons of great eminence in the church. Vid. *Prop.* 100. *Schol.* and *Prop.* 102. *Schol.* 2.

Lardn. ib. vol. viii. *p.* 105—124.—*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 231—240.——*Blackhall at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* iii. *p.* 12, 13.

5. We do not find that either the *Jews* or the *Heathens*, with whom the chriſtian apologiſts were engaged, diſputed the genuineneſs of theſe records: nay *Julian* the apoſtate, who was ſo well acquainted with them, and afterwards proved

ſo inveterate an enemy to chriſtianity, does in ſome of his writings allow them to be genuine; as we before obſerved that *Celſus* doth earlier, eſpecially the evangeliſts. See *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 1. *Macknight's Truth of the Goſp. Hiſt. book* ii. *c.* iv. *p.* 312—343.——*Weſt on the Reſur. p.* 319—331.——*Leland's View, vol.* ii. *p.* 335—337.

1, 2, 3, & 4, & 5.|6. There is great reaſon to believe that the books of the ſame title with thoſe of our New Teſtament, which were in the hands of the primitive chriſtians, *i. e.* thoſe of the two firſt centuries, were genuine.

7. Conſidering the zeal which the primitive chriſtians expreſſed for the New Teſtament, and the ſufferings which they were ready to undergo rather than they would deliver it up, as the *Traditores* under the *Diocleſian* perſecution did, we can hardly imagine, that if it had been in their power, they would willingly have corrupted it in any important inſtances; which would indeed have been introducing another religion, different from that for which they ſuffered ſuch dreadful extremities.

Suic. Theſaur. vol. i. *p.* 800.——*Lardn. ibid. vol.* vii. *l.* i. *c.* 66. *p.* 210—217.——*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 88—91.

8. If they had been ever ſo deſirous of corrupting the New Teſtament, neither they nor any in ſucceeding ages could have effected ſuch a deſign; conſidering how long the originals were preſerved, how ſoon they were tranſcribed, and tranſlated into various languages, how publicly they were read in their religious aſſemblies, ſo that wherever there was a chriſtian church, there muſt have been a copy, by which any that attended might examine and correct their own; (Vid. *Prop.* 100. *gr.* 8.) conſidering alſo how widely they were diſperſed in a very few years after they were written; and what a variety of ſects

ſects aroſe very early among chriſtians, who were all a guard upon each other, to prevent any material alteration in the books which they profeſſed to make the rule of their faith, and from which each pretended to defend his own opinions.

King of the Prim. Church, part ii. *c.* i. § 2. *Tertull. de Præſcript, c.* 36.——*Adverſ. Marcion. ap. Biſcoe at Boyle's Lect. p.* 491—493.——*Lardn. ibid. vol.* iii. *p.* 289—293, 300—304.—*Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 491—493. 495—497.

9. There are numerous quotations from the New Teſtament in chriſtian writers of all the latter ages, and even from the beginning of the third century; inſomuch that if the books were to be loſt, by far the greater part of them might be recovered from ſuch quotations, and from the homilies and commentaries written upon ſeveral parts of it: and all theſe do in the main agree with our preſent copies, in ſenſe at leaſt, if not in words. Comp. *Prop.* 101. *gr.* 22.

7, 8, 9|10. The New Teſtament, as we now have it in the original, is in the main agreeable to what it was in the firſt ages of chriſtianity.

6, 10|11. The New Teſtament as we have it in the original is genuine. *Q. E. D.*

Limborch's Collatio, p. 46.——*Script.* iii. *Judæi. Quæſt.* iv. *N°.* viii. *p.* 144—148.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 119. *b.* 120 *a.*——*Reaſons of Rel. part* ii. *c.* vii. § 68—94.——*Ditton on the Reſ. part* iii. § 10—17.——*Bennet on Script. p.* 302—306.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 95—105. 161.——*Weſt. New Teſt. Pref. p.* 77—81.—*Benſon's Reaſ. of Chriſtianity, p.* 63—75.——*Macknight's Truth of the Goſp. Hiſt. book* iii. *c.* iii. *p.* 478—488.——*Jortin's Rem. on eccleſ. Hiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 41—45.——*Leland. ubi ſupra.*

COROLLARY 1.

Hence it appears, that the evidence we have of the genuineneſs of the writings of the new teſtament, is abundantly greater than for that of any other book of equal antiquity; as may be ſeen by comparing the preceding argument with what could be ſaid in proof of thoſe writings, which go under the names of *Virgil*, *Tully*, *Cæſar*, *Suetonius*, &c.

Blackhall at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iii. *p.* 6—8.

COROLLARY 2.

From comparing the ſeveral ſteps of the preceding demonſtration, particularly *gr.* 3, 7, 8. it will appear, that where the poſſibility of corrupting the books of the new teſtament, (if it had been deſired) was greateſt, *i.e.* in the time immediately following their being written, we have the ſtrongeſt evidence of an averſion to do it; conſidering the known zeal and piety of the firſt profeſſors and confeſſors of chriſtianity, and that as the character of chriſtians grew worſe, the impoſſibility of changing theſe books increaſed. And it may not be unworthy of farther remark, that with reſpect to thoſe epiſtles, which being written to particular perſons might have been moſt eaſily altered, we have peculiar evidence that they were not; partly from the diſtinguiſhing piety of thoſe perſons, *i.e. Timothy* and *Titus*; and partly from the tenour of thoſe epiſtles as they now appear, which is the very contrary to what diſhoneſt, ambitious, and intereſted men, who alone would have been likely to have attempted a corruption, would have deſired it ſhould have been.

SCHOLIUM 1.

LECT. CXIX. If it be objected to *gr.* 7, 8, that the fathers accuſed the *Heretics* of corrupting the ſcripture, and that it is poſſible that all the copies or verſions

ſions now extant might be thus corrupted by them; to this we anſwer,

1. The corruption of ſcripture, to which they refer, was either by falſe interpretations, or at moſt by the alteration of a few particular paſſages.

2. The agreement between the doctrines of the fathers in ſome of thoſe points, and the ſcriptures as now extant, ſhews that we have not corrupt copies of thoſe paſſages.

3. We may conclude from the reaſons urged above, that if the *Heretics* made any ſuch attempts, they muſt have been unſucceſsful; and the proteſt of the fathers againſt them ſhews it.

4. The copies now extant came from ſuch different parts, and many of the tranſlations, eſpecially the *Syriac*, *Ethiopic*, and *Vulgate*, were ſo ancient, that the hypotheſis propoſed in the objection is utterly incredible. To which we add, that the fathers, who have ſeveral of them quoted the ſame paſſages of ſcripture, lived in very diſtant countries, at or near the ſame time; *v. g. Juſtin Martyr* and many others in *Aſia*, *Irenæus* in *France*, *Clemens* at *Alexandria*, *Cyprian* at *Carthage*, ſome of his correſpondents at *Rome*, *&c.* at all which places chriſtian churches were founded, long before the time in which theſe authors reſpectively lived; yet theſe authors never in the leaſt intimate any diſapprobation of thoſe anciently received copies, which greatly confirms the evidence drawn from this view of them. And whoever conſiders the alarm taken at the attempt of Pope *Celeſtine* I. about the year 425, to impoſe a forged canon, as eſtabliſhed by the council of *Nice*, upon the *African* biſhops, whereas it was only a canon of the council of *Sardica*, will be yet more ſenſible of the force of this argument.

Bower's Hiſt. of the Popes, vol. i. *p.* 370, *&c.*——*Weſtſt. Prol. in New Teſt.* § 2. *p.* 29

p. 29—48. 12*mo. Edit.*——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 149—165.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nearly akin to this, is that objection taken from the paſſages in *Victor's Chronicon*, in which it is ſaid, "that when *Meſſala* was conſul, at the "command of the emperor *Anaſtacius*, the holy "goſpels, as written by *Idiotis Evangeliſtis*, were "corrected and amended:" which ſeems only to refer to the correcting *a few copies* at *Conſtantinople*, which were falſified by *Macedonius*, and were now reſtored to what the *plain evangeliſts* wrote. It is certain no thought could be wilder, than an univerſal corruption of all the copies of the new teſtament at ſuch an age, (*A. D.* 500.) and among ſo many diverſities of opinions, as well as in the vaſt tract of land where *Anaſtacius* had not the leaſt power.

Collins on Freethink. p. 89, 90. *Edit.* 2. *Edit.* 1. *p.* 72, 73.——*Bentley Rem. part* i. § 33. *p.* 77—84.——*Sir Iſaac Newton's* 2*d Letter to Le Clerc, or rather to Mr. Locke, p.* 116.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Many have objected the *various readings*, which Dr. *Mills* reckons to be more than 30000: but it may be replied,

1. That conſidering the bulk of the book, the vaſt number of copies which have been compared, the ignorance of many tranſcribers, and the nicety with which the leaſt variations have been obſerved; and eſpecially conſidering how many *verſions* and *quotations* Dr. *Mills* brings into the account, we are rather to wonder there are no more; ſince in the few copies of *Terence* which have been compared, almoſt as many various readings have been found.

2. There are but very few of theſe various numerous readings, which at all affect the ſenſe, at

at leaſt in any important article; as appears by examining not only thoſe of *Mills*, but thoſe of *Wetſtein*, which are by far the moſt ſignificant of them.

3. That when copies come to be compared, there is often ſo great a number on one ſide againſt thoſe of the other, that it is eaſy to ſettle the true reading, and to ſee what it was that led the tranſcriber into a miſtake; and this is generally the caſe, where the variation from the received reading is the greateſt.

Canones Critici ap. Wetſ. p. 11—16 *and Pref. p.* 77, 78.——*Collins, ibid. p.* 87—90.—*Bent. Rem. part* i. *p.* 60—68, 74—84.——*Ditton on the Reſ. part* iii. § 18, 19 *.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected, that it is improbable that the whole new teſtament ſhould have been written in *Greek:* we anſwer,

1. That many great critics alledge, chiefly on the authority of *Papias*, as quoted by *Euſebius* (*Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* iii. *cap. ult.*) that the goſpel of *Matthew* and the epiſtle to the *Hebrews* were originally written in *Hebrew* †: but if that ſhould be allowed to be dubious, we may farther add,

* For much curious learning on this ſubject, recourſe may be had to Michaelis's "Introduction to the New Teſtament," lately tranſlated by Herbert Marſh, B.D. vol. i. p. 246—341. See alſo Mr. Marſh's notes, ibid. p. 489—522.

† Dr. Williams, in his enquiry into the authenticity of the two firſt chapters of St. Matthew, and in his appendix to that work, ſtrongly contends that Matthew's goſpel was originally written in Hebrew, or, to ſpeak more properly, in Syro-Chaldaic. Michaelis is decidedly of the ſame opinion, which, indeed, is powerfully ſupported by the general teſtimony of the ancient fathers. It is likewiſe contended for by Michaelis, that the epiſtle to the Hebrews was compoſed in the ſame language. Dr. Lardner's reaſons for embracing the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion, (in which he coincides with ſeveral learned critics) will be ſeen in the references.

2. That

2. That great numbers of the chriſtian converts were *Grecians* born, and others *Helleniſts*, who uſed the *Greek* tranſlation of the Old Teſtament.

3. That the *Greek* language had ſpread ſo much beyond any other in thoſe days, that on the whole it was moſt convenient for books that were intended for univerſal uſe; which alſo in part appears from the writings of ſeveral of the ancients, who though they lived in *Aſia* and *Egypt*, uſed this language, as *Joſephus* alſo did, though he wrote at *Rome*, and ſeems to have deſigned his books principally for the uſe of the *Romans*.

Brerewood's Inq. c. i, & vi.—*Limb. Coll. p.* 144, 145, 183, 184.—*Jones againſt Whiſt. c.* xvii, &c.——*Hallet on Heb. Pref.*——*Lardner's Suppl. vol.* i. *c.* v. § 5. *ibid. vol.* ii. *c.* xii. § 14.—*Works, vol.* vi. *p.* 60—65. *ibid. p.* 381—415.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Mr. *Whiſton* has endeavoured to prove the evidence of the genuineneſs of the *Apoſtolic Conſtitutions* to be equal to that of the New Teſtament. We own there are many curious and valuable articles, among many weak and ridiculous things, in that very miſcellaneous collection. Nevertheleſs, when *Whiſton*'s arguments for them come to be compared with thoſe in the propoſition, it will immediately appear that they fall vaſtly ſhort of them. And indeed theſe *Conſtitutions* contain many very evident marks of forgery; eſpecially as they expreſsly determine the two grand controverſies, relating to the time of *Eaſter*, and the re-admiſſion of thoſe who had fallen away after *baptiſm*: yet their authority is never pleaded for the deciſion of theſe controverſies, even when thoſe perſons were engaged in them, in whoſe hands he ſuppoſes the originals of theſe *Conſtitutions*

tions to have been lodged: not now to inſiſt upon the great improbability of keeping thoſe things ſecret at firſt, which were intended to be a rule to chriſtians in all ſucceeding ages; which very ill agrees with the plain and ſimple genius of chriſtianity, or that courage in defence of the truth for which its earlieſt profeſſors were above all mankind ſo eminent. There are likewiſe ſo many things in theſe *Conſtitutions*, different from and even contrary to the genius and deſign of the writers of the New Teſtament, that no wiſe man would believe, without the moſt convincing and irreſiſtible proof, that both could come from the ſame hand.

Whiſt. Prim. Chriſtian. vol. ii, iii.—*Saurin's Serm. vol.* ii. *p.* 185—187.—*Coci Cenſura Patr. p.* 3—7.—*Grabe's Anſ. to Whiſt. paſſ.*—*Barratieri Opera.*—*Lardn. Cred. part* ii. *vol.* viii. *c. ult.*—*Works, vol.* iv. *p.* 320—356 *.

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* Mr. Merivale has added a ſixth ſcholium, as follows: "Concerning the queſtion whether, beſides thoſe books that make up the preſent canon of the New Teſtament, there might not have been other ſacred writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts that were very early loſt, ſee Jones on the Canon, vol. i. part ii. c. ii. and Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii. c. xxv.—Works, vol. vi. p. 663—672 †.

† Not having Dr. Harwood's "New Introduction to the Study and Knowledge of the New Teſtament" at hand, (the work having become ſcarce) we refer in general to the firſt volume of it, and eſpecially to the firſt, third, and fourth chapters. The authenticity of the New Teſtament is particularly conſidered by Michaelis. See his "Introduction to the New Teſtament," as lately tranſlated by Herbert Marſh, B. D. vol. i. p. 1—69; to which may be added, Mr. Marſh's notes, p. 345—374. Recourſe may, likewiſe, be had to Dr. Prieſtley's "Letters to a Philoſophical Unbeliever," part the ſecond. In the latter end of theſe letters, the Doctor has examined Mr. Gibbon's inſinuations againſt chriſtianity, in the fifteenth and ſixteenth chapters of his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." Many other writers appeared in anſwer to Mr. Gibbon. A liſt of their publications is as follows: "Remarks on the two laſt chapters of Mr. Gibbon's Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;"

in

PROPOSITION CIV.

LECT. CXX. The *Jewiſh* religion has been of conſiderable antiquity; and according to the common chronology, was founded by *Moſes* nearly 1500 years before *Chriſt*'s time.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. That there was ſuch a people as the *Jews* about the time of the chriſtian æra, and that they were a little while after ſubdued by the *Romans* under *Veſpaſian* and *Titus*, is ſo apparent from the hiſtory of *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, as well as many other ancient writers and monuments, that

in a letter to a friend. "An Apology for Chriſtianity, in a Series of Letters, addreſſed to Edward Gibbon, Eſq." by Dr. Richard Watſon, now Biſhop of Landaff, firſt ſeparately publiſhed, and ſince reprinted in the volume of the Biſhop's Sermons and Tracts; "Some Strictures on Mr. Gibbon's Account of Chriſtianity and its firſt Teachers," by the Rev. William Saliſbury, B. D. in his tranſlation of Bulmer's Hiſtory of the Eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, compiled from Jewiſh and Heathen authors only; "Loftus's Reply to the Reaſonings of Mr. Gibbon;" Dr. Apthorp's Obſervations on a late Hiſtory of the Decline of the Roman Empire, in his "Letters on the Prevalence of Chriſtianity, before its civil Eſtabliſhment;" Davis's "Examination of the fifteenth and ſixteenth chapters of Mr. Gibbon's Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" "A few Remarks on the Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" Dr. Chelſum's "Remarks on the two laſt chapters of Mr. Gibbon's Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" The Rev. Henry Taylor's "Thoughts on the Nature of the grand Apoſtacy; with Reflections and Obſervations on the fifteenth chapter of Mr. Gibbon's Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" and Sir David Dalrymple's "Enquiry into the ſecondary Cauſes which Mr. Gibbon has aſſigned for the rapid Progreſs of Chriſtianity," a book very valuable, though but little known.

In anſwer to Mr. Davis, Mr. Gibbon publiſhed "A Vindication of ſome paſſages in the fifteenth and ſixteenth chapters of the Hiſtory of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" to which Mr. Davis replied. In the publications referred to, not only the general authenticity and credibility of the goſpel are vindicated, but ſeveral collateral queſtions of no ſmall importance are conſidered.

The authority of St. Matthew's, St. Mark's, and St. John's goſpels has lately been attacked by Mr. Evanſon, in his work, entitled "The Diſſonance of the four general received Evangeliſts, and the Evidence of their reſpective Authenticity examined." To this treatiſe Dr. Prieſtley has given an anſwer, in the ſecond part of his "Letters to a young Man." As the controverſy is of a very recent date, it will probably be productive of farther publications.

it

it has never been called in queſtion, and therefore needs no more particular proof.

2. *Philo* and *Joſephus*, the two moſt conſiderable writers who lived in that age, as well as a great many others of the ſame religion before and ſince, do expreſsly aſſert it as a notorious fact, that *Moſes* was the author of their religion and polity, and that he lived about the time mentioned in the propoſition.

3. There is a reaſon to believe, that as the *Hebrew* language is of acknowledged antiquity, and does indeed bear many of the peculiar marks of an original, they had among them ſome written and credible account of the beginning of their conſtitution and nation; eſpecially conſidering how much their laws differ from thoſe of any other people on the face of the earth.

4. Several of the *Pagan* writers, of whom we ſhall give a more particular account in the ſcholium, do mention *Moſes* as undoubtedly the *Lawgiver* of the *Jews*.

5. We cannot find that there was any conteſt between the *Jews* and the neighbouring nations, concerning the antiquity of *Moſes*, and the origin of the *Jewiſh* religion, though ſeveral of them pretended their religious inſtitutions to be much older; as appears eſpecially by thoſe two excellent books which *Joſephus* has written againſt *Appion*, expreſsly on this ſubject.

1, 5, 6. There is reaſon to believe that the *Jewiſh* religion has been of conſiderable antiquity, and was founded by *Moſes* about the time mentioned above. *Q. E. D.*

Grot. de Verit. l. i. § 16. *p.* 63—66.—*Jenk. of Chriſtian. vol.* i. *p.* 95—100.

SCHOLIUM I.

It may not be improper here to illuſtrate *gr.* 4. by giving an account of ſeveral ancient authors among the *Pagans*, by whoſe teſtimony it is confirmed.

1. *Manetho*,

1. *Manetho, Cheremon, Apollonius*, and *Lyſimachus*, beſides ſome other ancient *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, whoſe hiſtories are now loſt, as expreſsly quoted by *Joſephus*, as extant in his days, and paſſages are collected from them, in which they agree, that *Moſes* was the leader of the *Jews* when they departed from *Egypt*, and the founder of their laws; though ſome of theſe writers intermix with their ſtory many ridiculous and infamous circumſtances, which the *Jews* have always denied, but from the quotation of which we may aſſure ourſelves, that the authors quoting the paſſages in queſtion took them honeſtly and exactly as they found them.

Joſ. againſt Appion. l. i. § 26. *p.* 1352—1354. *Ed. Hudſ. p.* 1055. *Cologn.*—*Ibid.* § 32. *p.* 1357, 1358. *ibid.* § 34. *p.* 1359, 1360.

And *Euſebius* brings paſſages to the like purpoſe from *Eupolemus* and *Artapanus*; but as for thoſe long quotations he afterwards brings from the tragedies of *Ezekiel* and *Demetrius* upon the ſame ſubject; as the authors ſeem to have been *Jews*, if not *Chriſtians*, they are placed with leſs propriety among the teſtimonies now under examination.

Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. ix. *cap.* 26—29.—— *Clayton's Vind. of the Old Teſtament, p.* 128.

2. *Strabo*, (*Geog. l.* xvi.) gives an account of the law of *Moſes* as forbidding images, and limiting divine worſhip to one inviſible or rather univerſal being; and in conſequence of this bears an honourable teſtimony to the *Jews*, as a pious and righteous nation.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. *p.* 417, 418. ——*Leland againſt Morg. p.* 212, 213. *Edit.* 2.

Celſus alſo refers to this paſſage of *Strabo*, and frequently mentions *Moſes* and other perſons recorded in the *Jewiſh* hiſtory, in ſuch a manner

as plainly to ſhew he was familiarly acquainted with it.

3. *Juſtin* from *Trogus Pompeius* tells us, that *Moſes*, whom by miſtake he calls the ſon of *Joſeph*, being driven from *Egypt*, and leading other exiles, encamped at mount *Sinai*, and there conſecrated the ſeventh day as a ſacred ſolemnity, or as he ignorantly expreſſes it, a perpetual *faſt*.

Juſt. Hiſt. l. xxxvi. *c.* ii.

4. *Pliny* the elder ſpeaks of *Moſes*, as eminent among the magicians, probably referring to his power of working miracles.

Pliny's Nat. Hiſt. l. xxx. *c.* i.—*Lardner's Teſt. vol.* i. *p.* 339, 340.—*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 250.

5. *Tacitus* mentions *Moſes* as one of the exiles from *Egypt*, who perſuaded the reſt of them to commit themſelves to him as a celeſtial guide, and takes farther notice of their being conducted by him through the wilderneſs, relieved in their thirſt, and receiving a ſet of laws from him, of which he gives a large though a very faulty account.

Tacit. Hiſt. l. v. *c.* iii.—v.——*Gord. Tac. vol.* iv. *p.* 476—482.——*Clayton, ibid. p.* 132—138.

6. *Juvenal* mentions *Moſes* as the author of a volume, which was preſerved with great care among the *Jews*, by which the worſhip of images and eating ſwines fleſh were forbidden, circumciſion and the obſervation of the ſabbath ſtrictly enjoined. *Juv. Sat.* xiv. *ver.* 96—106.

N. B. Before him, *Horace* has mentioned *Judæus Apella*, or a circumciſed *Jew* as a ſort of proverb of *credulity*, probably in reference to their believing ſo many miraculous events recorded in their ſacred books: (*Hor. Sat. l.* i. § 5. *ſub fin.* comp. *Sat.* ix. *ver.* 69, 70.) yet as he does not expreſsly mention *Moſes*, (however ſome have thought he referred to him *Od.* ii. *ver.* 19. which

which we lay no ſtreſs upon, Vid. *Delph. Not. ibid.*) we chuſe not to add him to the catalogue of theſe writers.

7. *Longinus* cites *Moſes* as the law-giver of the *Jews*, and a perſon of no inconſiderable character, and adds, that he has given a noble ſpecimen of the true ſublime, in his account of the creation of the world.

Long. de Sub. § 9. *p.* 50. *Pearce's Ed.* 1732. ——*Lardner's Teſt. vol.* iii. *p.* 105.—*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 166—168.

8. *Numenius*, as quoted by *Euſebius* and *Origen*, mentions *Muſæus*, probably *Moſes*, as a leader of the *Jews*, who by his prayers brought dreadful calamities on *Egypt*; which *Jamnes* and *Jambres*, thoſe celebrated magicians, were not able to reſiſt: and *Euſebius* reports it as his ſaying, that "*Plato* was only *Moſes* ſpeaking *Greek*."

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. ix. 8. xi. 10.——*Orig. againſt Celſ. l.* iv. *p.* 198, 199.—*Lardner's Teſt. vol.* iii. *c.* xxxv.——*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 168—172.

9. *Chalcidius* ſpeaks of *Moſes* as a perſon of eminent wiſdom, more than human eloquence, and as one who pretended to divine revelation; but it is much to be doubted whether he were a *Pagan*, or, as both *Euſebius* and *Fabricius* maintain, a *Chriſtian Platoniſt*. Vid. *Budæi Phil. Hiſt. c.* iv. § 22. *not. p.* 160, 161.

Lardn. Ibid. vol. iv. *c.* xlii.——*Works, vol.* viii. *p.* 346—349.

10. *Hermippus*, an ancient writer of the life of *Pythagoras*, ſays that the philoſophers did in many of their rules imitate the laws of the *Jews*; but I find not that he expreſsly mentions *Moſes* as the author of them.

Joſ. againſt Appion, l. i. § 22. *p.* 1345. *Hudſ.*

11. The *Orphic* verſes, which, though ſpurious, are generally reckoned of great antiquity, incul-

inculcate the worſhip of one God as recommended by that law, " which was given by him " who was drawn out of the water, and received " two tables of ſtone from the hand of God."

Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. xiii. *c.* xii. *p.* 666.

12. *Diodorus Siculus*, in his catalogue of thoſe law-givers who pretended to have received the plan of their laws from ſome deity, mentions *Moſes*, as aſcribing his to that God whom he calls *Joab*, which is probably a corruption of *Jehovah*.

Diod. Sic. l. i. *ſub. init. Engliſh Tranſlation, p.* 49.——*Gale's Court of Gent. part* i. *p.* 308.

And in an extract out of his fortieth book, which is preſerved by *Photius*, he gives a large though in ſome reſpects erroneous account of the *Jews*; in which he ſpeaks of *Moſes* as a man of illuſtrious prudence and courage, who ſettled the *Jews* in their land, and inſtituted their religion and laws, forbidding them images, as he pretends, on *pantheiſtic* principles, divided them into twelve tribes, eſtabliſhed the prieſthood among them with a judicial power, and adds ſeveral other particulars, which though mingled with miſtakes are of great importance.

Diod. Sic. ap. Phot. Bib. N°. 244. *p.* 2051, 2052.

13. *Dion Caſſius*, *l.* xxxiii. ſpeaks of the *Jews* as worſhipping a being of unutterable majeſty and of an inviſible nature; but I find not that he mentions *Moſes* as giving them thoſe ideas of him.

14. *Varro* mentions the *Romans* as having agreed with the *Jewiſh* nation, in that firſt worſhip of theirs without images, of which he declares his approbation.

Var. ap. Aug. de Civ. Dei, iv. 31.

15. *Philemon*, in the days of *Alexander* the Great, has ſome verſes which ſeem to be a kind

of tranſlation from part of the decalogue; ſo that there can be no reaſonable doubt of his being acquainted with it, though he ſays nothing of *Moſes*. See the verſes in

Ridley of the Spirit, Serm. vii. *p.* 266.

And if *Phocylides* were indeed, as is generally thought, a heathen poet, before Chriſt's time, he may juſtly be joined to *Philemon*, as he has plainly tranſlated many of the *Moſaic* laws, though he does not expreſsly mention their author.

16. *Juſtin Martyr* expreſsly ſays, that moſt of the hiſtorians, poets, law-givers and philoſophers of the *Greeks* mention *Moſes* as the leader and prince of the *Jewiſh* nation; and particularly enumerates *Polemon*, *Appion* of *Poſſidon*, *Ptolemy Mendeſius*, *Hellanicus*, *Philocorus*, *Caſtor*, *Thallus* and *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, beſides thoſe taken notice of above; and adds, what it is very important to obſerve, that they took their account of *Moſes* not from the *Jews*, but the *Egyptian* prieſts, whence it is well known they collected moſt of their learning.

Juſt. Cohortatio ad Gent. p. 9—11.——
Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. *c.* ii. *p.* 49, *&c.*——
Calm. Dict. vol. ii. *p.* 236—238.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may not be improper here to add, that *Joſephus* has inſinuated, that the *Shepherd kings*, whom *Manetho* mentions as making ſo great a figure in *Egypt*, and at length expelled, were *Iſraelites*; and Dr. *Morgan* has grafted a great many falſe and abſurd things relating to the *Jewiſh* hiſtory upon that ſuppoſition: but a late ingenious writer has entirely overthrown the foundation of that notion, as well as juſtly expoſed *Morgan*'s wild ſuperſtructure; and has advanced ſome reaſons worthy of conſideration, to prove

prove that the ſhepherd kings were *Arabians*, and deſcendants of *Iſhmael*.

Morg. Mor. Phil. vol. iii. *p.* 73.——*Theophilus Cantabrigienſis Vind. of anc. Heb. Hiſt. paſſ. præſ. Rem.* xxv. *p.* 53—64. *Joſ. Cont. App. l.* i. § 14—16*.

PROPOSITION CV.

LECT. CXXI.

The ancient *Jews* before the time of Chriſt had books among them, bearing the titles of thoſe which make up what we proteſtants call the books of the *Old Teſtament*, and a catalogue of which may be ſeen at the beginning of any of our bibles.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The books of the old teſtament are ſtill extant in the *Hebrew* and *Chaldee* languages, with ſuch marks of purity as prove them to be very ancient.

2. There was a *Greek* tranſlation of them, in the days of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, which was laid up in the *Alexandrine* library collected by him.

Prid. Con. vol. ii. *p.* 27—47. *præſ. p.* 27—35, 44—47.——*Joſ. Ant. l.* xii. *c.* ii.——*Euſ. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l.* v. *c.* viii. *Valeſ. Not.*

3. It is generally thought by learned men, that *Onkelos* publiſhed his *Targum*, *i. e.* the *Chaldee* paraphraſe on the law, and *Jonathan* his on the

* Much has been ſaid by chronologers concerning the Shepherd kings, and different conjectures have been formed concerning them. The matter is not of great importance. Mr. Jackſon refers the Shepherd Dynaſty to the ſettlement of the Iſraelites in Egypt. Sir Iſaac Newton ſuppoſes the Shepherds to have been the expelled Canaanites; and Mr. Bryant, if my recollection does not fail me, refers them to the Amonians. Mr. Brekell, in his "Diſſertation upon the Subjects of Circumciſion," coincides in opinion with Theophilus Cantabrigienſis, who, I apprehend, was Dr. Squire, afterwards Biſhop of St. David's.

prophets, either before or very near the time of Chriſt, which plainly ſhews the original *Hebrew* to have been older.

Calmet Dict. in Onk. and Jonath.——*Prid. Con. vol.* ii. *p.* 531—538, 542—545.

4. *Joſephus* gives us an obſcure kind of catalogue of the ſacred books among the *Jews*, in which he expreſsly mentions the five books of *Moſes*, 13 of the *Prophets*, 4 of *Hymns* and *Moral precepts*. Now if we with many critics allow, that *Ruth* was added to *Judges*, and *Lamentations* to *Jeremy*, then this number will agree with thoſe which make up our Old Teſtament.

Joſ. againſt Appion, l. i. *p.* 1036. *Col. Ed. p.* 1333. *Hudſ.*——*Prid. Con. vol.* i. *p.* 331, 332.——*Jennings's Jewiſh Antiq. vol.* ii. *p.* 373.

5. Both *Jews* and *Chriſtians* from the time of Chriſt, have generally agreed to receive thoſe books which make up our Old Teſtament as genuine. As to the attempt that has been made to introduce others called the *Apocrypha*, which will hereafter be examined, it does not affect the preſent queſtion, any farther than as the *Jews* reſpecting theſe books may be conſidered as an argument of their care in examining thoſe they admitted.

6. The quotations made from the Old Teſtament in the *New*, which we have already proved to be genuine, do evidently infer the exiſtence of thoſe books from whence they were taken; and alſo ſhew by the way, that the *Jews* did not only receive them as authentic but *divine*, as *Joſephus* alſo in the preceding reference aſſures us that they did in the ſtrongeſt terms: and it is obſervable, that all the books of the Old Teſtament are cited in the New, except *Judges*, *Ruth*, *Eccleſiaſtes*, *Canticles*, *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, *Eſther*, and perhaps *Chronicles*; inſomuch that on the whole, the expreſs quotations from or references

to

to the Old Teſtament in the whole volume of the New, are computed at about 600. Vid. *Index to Mattaire's Ed. of the New Teſtament.*

7. *Melito, Gregory Nazianzen, Origen, Athanaſius, Hilary, Epiphanius, Jerom,* and ſeveral later writers, have given us catalogues of the books of the Old Teſtament; in which none of ours are omitted, excepting *Ruth,* which is left out in ſome, becauſe perhaps included in *Judges.*

8. The *Samaritans,* who ſeparated from the *Jews,* many hundred years before the birth of Chriſt, have in their language a *Pentateuch,* in the main exactly agreeing with the *Hebrew.*

Prid. Con. vol. i. *p.* 416—418.——*Dupin on the Can. vol.* i. *c.* i. § 2—5.—*Calmet's Dict. vol.* ii. *p.* 599, 600.——*Kennicott's Diſſert. on the Hebrew Text. vol.* i. *p.* 337—*&c.*——*Kennicott's Account of his Collation, p.* 145.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9. *Valet propoſitio.*

Leuſd. Diſſ. Phil. p. 54—62.——*Jenk. of Chriſtian. vol.* ii. *p.* 84—94.

COROLLARY.

Sir *William Temple*'s inſinuation, that there are no *Hebrew* records now extant older than the *Auguſtan* age, is moſt wild and arbitrary; and ſo contrary to ſtrong and direct evidence, and indeed to common ſenſe, that one would believe he intended to except the Old Teſtament, though he expreſſes himſelf in ſo unguarded a manner.

Temp. Miſc. vol. ii. *p.* 36. *Ed.* 2.

SCHOLIUM.

Nothing is ſaid above of that *Jewiſh chronicle,* called *Seder Olam Rabbah, i. e. the larger chronicle,* on which ſome have laid ſo great a ſtreſs, as the authority of it is diſputed: but the regard which ſome very learned men have paid to it, makes one wiſh that the evidence of its authen-

ticity, and the importance of its contents, may be ſet in a clearer and eaſier light than that in which it has hitherto appeared; for if it be indeed true, that its author was maſter to the compilers of the *Miſhna*, it muſt be worthy an attentive inquiry. *Prid. Con. vol.* ii. *Pref. p.* 20.

PROPOSITION CVI.

The books of the Old Teſtament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them in Chriſt's time, were in the main genuine *.

DEMONSTRATION I.

From *external* evidence.

Prop. 104. 1. Conſidering what evidence there is, that there was ſuch a perſon as *Moſes*, and that he was law-giver of the *Jews*; there is reaſon to believe that he would write his inſtitutions, ſince there was ſuch proper and important occaſion for doing it.

Prop. 104. *Schol.* 1. *N°.* 6, 7, 9, 11. 2. Several of the authors enumerated above ſpeak of *Moſes* as a *writer*, as well as a law-giver.

3. In the nature of things it is very probable, that in a polity ſo founded as that of *Moſes* appears to have been, occaſions of writing hiſtories and laws ſhould have occurred; and that religious teachers, riſing in different ages, ſhould by their writings, as thoſe of other religions have done, endeavour to inforce an inſtitution, which they at leaſt ſuppoſed to be divine.

4. The perſons to whom the books of *Moſes* and the ſucceeding writers were firſt propoſed, were capable of judging whether they were genuine or no; and there is no reaſon to believe,

* As a general reference on this ſubject, ſee *Leland's Anſwer to Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study of Hiſtory. p.* 44—70. Former Editor. See alſo Leland's View of Deiſtical Writers, vol. ii. p. 286—305. 4th Edition.

they

they would have received them with ſuch extraordinary regard, as it is well known the *Jews* paid to them, if they had not been well ſatisfied on that head: and conſidering how highly thoſe books were regarded by all the pious *Jews*, and how much even their civil affairs depended upon them, we cannot ſuppoſe that an entire change of them could have been attempted, without being diſcovered and rejected with the utmoſt indignation.

1—5. *Prop.* 105.|6. There is reaſon to believe that the books of the Old Teſtament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them, were genuine. *Q. E. D.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

Taken from *internal* arguments.

1. Many of the facts recorded in the Old Teſtament are of ſo extraordinary a nature, that if the books giving an account of them had been forged, the very circumſtance of their being before unknown, would have been a ſufficient argument againſt receiving any books that contained an account of them.

2. Many of the inſtitutions contained in their laws were ſo burthenſome, and ſome of them, humanly ſpeaking, ſo hazardous, or rather ſo certainly ruinous to any nation not ſecured by an extraordinary providence correſpondent to them, (eſpecially thoſe relating to the *ſabbatical year*, the reſort of all the males to *Jeruſalem*, and the prohibition of cavalry) that forged books containing ſuch precepts would probably have been rejected with the greateſt abhorrence.

Bennet on Script. p. 72—74.——*Sherlock on Proph. Diſſ.* iv.——*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* ii. *p.* 462, 463.—*Diſcourſe of the Proofs of the Books of Moſes, at the End of Paſcal's Thoughts. French Edition.*

3. The great variety obſervable in the *ſtile* of theſe books, makes it improbable they ſhould have been the work of *one*, and the *unity of deſign*, that they ſhould have been the invention of *many:* for if theſe ſuppoſed inventors lived in different ages, they could not have conſulted with each other: and if they lived in the ſame age, the largeneſs of their plan would only have ſubjected them to new difficulties, without being likely to anſwer any valuable end: and he who could be weak enough to embarraſs a ſcheme with ſo many unneceſſary articles, muſt probably have wanted a genius capable of managing them all ſo well.

Jortin's Rem. on Eccleſ. Hiſt. vol. i. *p.* 41—45.

N. B. The ſame remark may alſo be applied to the *New Teſtament*, though the external arguments for the genuineneſs of it are ſo ſtrong, that it did not ſeem neceſſary to inſiſt upon this hint. *Millar's Prop. vol.* i. *p.* 98.

4. The proviſion that was made for reading the law publicly every ſeventh year, at the feaſt of *tabernacles*, (when it is probable the copies kept in private hands might be compared with that laid up before the Lord) *Deut.* xxxi. 9—13, 24—26. and the injunction on the king to tranſcribe it with his own hand, *Deut.* xvii. 18—20, would be a probable means of preventing corruption; and adds an evidence to the genuineneſs of theſe writings, much greater than can be found with regard to others of the moſt ancient authors.

The charge alſo given to private perſons to make themſelves familiarly acquainted with the contents of the law, and to teach it their children, deſerves to be mentioned under this head, as an inſtitution of the greateſt importance for keeping it uncorrupted: (*Deut.* vi. 6—9. *and ſim.*) and which indeed according to the remark

of

of *Josephus* in the preceding reference, had an extraordinary efficacy to this purpose.

1, & 2, & 3, &c. 4.|5. *Valet propositio.*
Nich. Conf. vol. iv. *p.* 17—22. 12*mo Edition. Oct. Ed. vol.* ii. *part* iv. *p.* 10, 13.
——*Jenk. of Christian. vol.* i. *p.* 169—187.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXXII.

To this it is objected, that the degeneracy of the *Jews*, according to their own history, and their disregard to the institutions of *Moses*, together with the scarcity of books in those early ages, and the various oppressions which they suffered under their enemies, might occasion the loss of authentic copies, and give some designing priests an opportunity of substituting others in their room: especially might this happen, when the *book of the law* was said to be found in the reign of *Josiah*, 2 *Kings* xxii. 8, &c. or during the time of the *Babylonish* captivity. But to this it is answered,

1. This at best is no more than a conjecture, without any positive proof of such a forgery.

2. It is uncertain whether, if such a fraud had been attempted, it could have succeeded at either of the times mentioned, though they are indeed the most probable which can be assigned. For, not to insist upon the possibility there is, that the writing found in *Josiah*'s reign was only the last chapter of *Deuteronomy*, that awakening passage of scripture; were we to suppose it to have been the *whole Pentateuch*, perhaps *Josiah* might before have had some copy of the law, though not equally perfect with the original which had been found in the temple; and he might be more powerfully struck with hearing it read in the circumstances there described, though he had not been before an entire stranger to the contents of it, which it is certain he was not, considering the

the reformation he had before made, 2 *Chron.* xxxiv. 3, *&c.* There were probably some copies of the law remaining in other hands, as there certainly were during the time of the captivity; See *Dan.* ix. 11—13. to which may be added *Ezra* iii. 2—5. vi. 18—21. 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22. *Ezra* i. 1. *Neh.* viii. 1—8. So that it appears to be an idle tale, which so many of the christian fathers borrowed from the *Jews*, that *Ezra*, by divine inspiration restored the sacred books, after they had been entirely lost.

Euf. Eccles. Hist. v. 8. *Valef. Not.*——*Prid. Con. vol.* i. *p.* 329.——*Jennings's Jewish Antiq. vol.* i. *p.* 172.

3. There is not the least probability, that such laws as those which are now to be found in the Old Testament, were forged at any time, especially on such an occasion; since nothing could have been more imprudent, upon the principles of human policy, than such precepts as those mentioned *Prop.* 106. *Dem.* 2. *gr.* 2. which would have been peculiarly liable to exception, when *Israel* was so surrounded with enemies, and straitened in their possessions, as they were both in the days of *Josiah* and *Ezra*. Nor can we imagine, that to these *Ezra* would have added that precept, on which they were obliged to put away their strange wives, which was so tender a point, and might have produced such fatal divisions; considering how many had married such, and how considerable some of them were both by birth and alliance, and how many foreign families would be made their enemies by such divorces: some of them were also priests and *Levites*, who must have been privy to the forgery, if there had been any. So that upon the whole, there is so little reason to suspect *Ezra* as the inventor of these precepts, that it is an instance of the impartial regard he had for the original, that he would retain them at so great a hazard;

Ezra

Ezra ix, x. *Neh.* xiii. 23—29. a remark alſo applicable in ſome degree to *Joſiah.*

Burn. on the Art. p. 83, 84.——*Evans's Chriſtian Temp. vol.* ii. *p.* 375—377.——*Millar's Prop. vol.* i. *p.* 88—94.—*Allix's Reflect. vol.* i. *p.* 32, 33.——*Shuckford's Connection, vol.* ii. *p.* 337.—*Leland againſt Tindal, vol.* ii. *p.* 123—142.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that it is impoſſible that *Moſes* ſhould have been the author of the *Pentateuch*, or *Samuel* or *Nehemiah* of thoſe books which go under their name; ſince many circumſtances are recorded in them, which did not happen till many years after their death; Vid. *Gen.* xii. 6. xxii. 14. xxxvi. 31. *Exod.* xvi. 35. (compared with *Joſh.* v. 12.) *Numb.* xii. 3. *Deut.* ii. 12. iii. 11, 14. xxxiv. 5, *&c.* 1 *Sam.* xxv. to the end of the 2d of *Samuel*, *Neh.* xii. 10, 11. where the catalogue of high prieſts is carried down to the time of *Alexander the Great.*

To that part of this objection which may affect the *Pentateuch*, ſome have replied, that *Samuel* might have been the author of thoſe books, which are called the books of *Moſes*, becauſe they treat of him, as thoſe of *Samuel* are named after that prophet, becauſe his hiſtory made ſo conſiderable a part of them. Among others, Sir *Iſaac Newton* and Lord *Barrington* ſuppoſe *Geneſis*, and the other hiſtorical books before *Moſes*'s time, to have been written by *Samuel*, and for this purpoſe quote *Acts* iii. 21, 24. But this is ſo directly contrary to many other ſcriptures, that it is ſtrange that any ſhould patronize the opinion; eſpecially when comparing 1 *Sam.* ii. 10. and 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 3—5. which may afford ſo eaſy and beautiful an illuſtration of the above-mentioned

tioned text in *Acts*, on which *Barrington* lays his chief ſtreſs. (See *Grey* on the laſt words of *David.*) The ſcriptures to which this hypotheſis is moſt directly contrary, are 2 *Chron.* xxiii. 18. *Dan.* ix. 11, 13. *Mal.* iv. 4. *Mark* vii. 10. xii. 19. *Luke* xvi. 29, 31. xx. 28, 37. xxiv. 27, 44. *John* i. 45. v. 46, 47.

Barring. Eſſays on Div. Diſpenſations. App. N°. iv.——*Works, vol.* iii. *p.* 197—208.——*Newton on Daniel, c.* i.

Therefore waving this, it ſeems more reaſonable to ſay, (as the moſt ancient *Jewiſh* writers ſince the time of the Old Teſtament aſſure us,) that *Ezra* publiſhed a new edition of the books of *Moſes*, in which he added thoſe paſſages as *notes*, which perhaps afterwards crept into the text, by the miſtake of the tranſcribers: though indeed with regard to many of the paſſages alledged, it is evident there is no abſurdity at all in ſuppoſing them to have been written by *Moſes* himſelf. Perhaps *Simon the Juſt* might alſo make ſome additions to thoſe books which were written after *Ezra*'s time.

Prid. Con. vol. i. *p.* 342—345, 573—575. *Kidder on the Pent. vol.* i. *Diſſ.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

As for Father *Simon*'s hypotheſis, that the *Pentateuch* was formed from ſome looſe writings of the annals of *Moſes*, and that many of the leaves were tranſpoſed; the reaſons on which it depends are ſo inconſiderable, that it ſeems not neceſſary to give a more particular view of it.

Sim. Crit. Hiſt. Old Teſt. p. 36, *&c.*——*Dupin. of the Can. vol.* i, *c.* iii. § 1. *p.* 68—75.——*Nich. Conf. vol.* iv. *p.* 8—16. *vol.* ii. *p.* 5—10, 8*vo.*——*Marſh's Authenticity of the five Books of Moſes conſidered.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 4.

Under the 2d ſtep of the 2d *Demonſtration*, we might have mentioned the omiſſion of the doctrine of future rewards and puniſhments, on which Dr. *Warburton* has inſiſted ſo largely in his learned work, called the *Divine Legation* of *Moſes*: but as that argument is intended to prove not only the genuineneſs, but alſo indeed the divine authority of thoſe books, it may be proper to ſtate it alone elſewhere. We ſhall only add here, that there is reaſon to ſuſpect whether, allowing the argument to be valid, it be of ſo great importance as the ingenious author ſuppoſes; ſeeing it depends upon ſo many nice queſtions, *v. g.* how far it is certain that *Moſes* has omitted it? how far ſuch an omiſſion is peculiar to him as a legiſlator? how far it proves its dependence upon an equal providence? what that equal providence was? whether perſonal or national? and how far the expectation of it, or ground for that expectation, was a thing peculiar to the *Jews*? On all theſe accounts, the argument is much more complex, and ſeems leſs certain and leſs ſtriking, than ſimilar arguments, drawn from *Moſes*'s having laid it down as a fact certainly to be depended upon, that a treble crop ſhould attend the ſixth year of tillage from the ſabbatical, *Lev.* xxv. 21. and that the family of *Aaron* in its male line ſhould never be extinct, nor ever want an adult heir free from thoſe blemiſhes that would have rendered him incapable of ſervice; which nothing but a full conſciouſneſs of a divine legation, could have warranted ſo wiſe a man in making fundamental to his ſyſtem.

Middleton's Miſc. Works, vol. i. *p.* 381—384.

PROPOSITION CVII.

The Old Teſtament as now extant in the *Hebrew*, is in the main what it originally was. LECT. CXXIII.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 106. 1. The Old Teſtament, as extant in the time of the *Jews* who were contemporary with *Chriſt*, was genuine *.

2. Such as it was in the time of *Chriſt*, it came early into the hands of the chriſtians, and has continued in their hands ever ſince; ſo that the *Jews* could not have been able to make any conſiderable alteration in it, had they been ever ſo deſirous of it, while the chriſtians were ſuch a guard upon them, in a matter on which ſo much of the evidence of chriſtianity has at leaſt been ſuppoſed to depend; nor on the other hand, could the chriſtians corrupt it without the diſcovery of the *Jews*, who would never have ſpared them, could they have proved ſuch an attempt on records which they eſteemed ſo ſacred, by perſons for whom they had ſuch an implacable averſion.

3. There have been many ancient *verſions*, which are yet extant in the *Polyglot* bible, in which there is ſuch an agreement in the main both with the original and with each other, as we cannot ſuppoſe there could have been, had the original been corrupted after the date of thoſe verſions, of which ſome are of conſiderable age.

N. B. The moſt conſiderable verſions to which we refer above, beſides the LXX. were the *Targums*, or *Chaldee Paraphraſes*, which if later than Chriſt's time were yet very ancient; the *Greek* of *Theodotion*, *Aquila*, and *Symmachus*; the *Syriac*; the *Arabic*; *Ethiopic*, and *Perſian*; beſides the

* A perſuaſion of the abſolute integrity and purity of the Hebrew text was long current among the generality of proteſtant divines. But this opinion was ſo powerfully attacked by Dr. Kennicott, in his two Diſſertations on the printed State of the Hebrew Text, and, at length, ſo completely and experimentally refuted by his collations, that it is now univerſally exploded.

old *Italic:* of all which see *Jones* and *Walton* referred to below.

4. In latter ages, the *Masorites* have expressed a great and even superstitious care, in keeping the copy of the Old Testament as incorrupt as possible, numbering even the lines, the words, and the letters in each book: and though this care may be said to come late, *i. e.* about the year 500, it is to be remembered, it extends to those ages in which christians were most ignorant of *Hebrew*, and the *Jews* had some learning; so that perhaps had they been disposed to corrupt their scriptures, they might have done it then with the greatest safety: in which view, there seems to be something very providential in this exact scrupulosity of theirs at such a period. See *Pref.* to *Van Hooght's Ed.* of the *Heb. Bib.*

1, 2, & 3, & 4.|5. The Old Testament as extant in the *Hebrew* is in the main uncorrupted.

Jones's Crit. Lect. c. iv. § 70—74. *c.* xiii. xiv, xvi, xvii, xviii. *MS.*——*Turret. vol.* i. *Loc.* ii. *quæst.* x. § 5—13.——*——Walton's Prol. to Polyg. Bib.*——*Dr. Gill's Preface to his Dissertation on the Hebrew Language, part* i.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this some object the difference which there is in many places between the LXX. and the *Hebrew*; some of which variations are of great moment, especially in chronology. To this we may reply,

1. That it is reasonable to believe the LXX. may have been altered in some places, or the *Hebrew* mistaken by the first translators, which may account for several differences.

2. If it be supposed that the *Hebrew points* were of later invention, a supposed difference in them will account for a vast number of variations in

in the LXX. and the similarity of several *Hebrew* letters will account for many more.

3. The LXX. itself attests the truth and exactness of vastly the greater part of the *Hebrew* bible, even if it should be granted that this translation is preferable to the original; which yet is a concession by no means to be made: now the proposition does not assert, that there are no errors at all in the *Hebrew* copy; the contrary to which the difference between the *Keri* and *Kethib* does evidently shew.

Prid. Con. vol. i. *p.* 331.——*Shuckford's Con. vol.* i. *p.* 48—72.——*Winder's Hist. of Knowl. vol.* i. *c.* xvi.——*Hallet's Notes on Scripture, vol.* i. *p.* 118—129*.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that many passages quoted in the New Testament, and in the writings of the christian fathers, are very different from the correspondent passages as they now stand in the *Hebrew*; and that some words are introduced as quotations, which are no where to be found. —Now if with some we suppose, that those early christian writers quoted from the LXX. the objection will then coincide with the former: but as for reasons to be given elsewhere, we do not grant that, we answer,

* There is nothing in which the difference between the Hebrew Bible and the septuagint version is more striking and important than in the diversity of their chronology. To which the preference should be given has been much disputed among learned men, and there are great names on both sides of the question. Two of the latest English writers on the subject are Bishop Clayton and Mr. Jackson. The Bishop's work is entitled, "The Chronology of the Hebrew Bible vindicated; the Facts compared with other antient Histories, and the Difficulties explained, from the Flood to the Death of Moses; together with some Conjectures in Relation to Egypt, during that Period of Time." Mr. Jackson, in his "Chronological Antiquities," has sustained, with great ability and learning, the opposite hypothesis.

1. Per-

1. Perhaps they quoted from their memory; which is the more probable, as ſometimes the ſame paſſage is quoted by different authors in very different words, even where the ſenſe agrees.

2. The *ſenſe* of the paſſages ſuppoſed to be loſt is ſtill to be found in the Old Teſtament, though the *words* be not, eſpecially *Matt.* ii. *ult.* *John* vii. 38. Yet if it were to be granted, that ſome of the verſes originally belonging to the Old Teſtament are loſt, it would not be at all inconſiſtent with the truth of our propoſition, which only oppoſes general, material, and deſigned corruption *.

Dod. Fam. Exp. in Loc. crit.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that many of the chriſtian fathers complain, that the *Jews* had corrupted the Old Teſtament, in order to weaken the proofs of chriſtianity from thence.

Anſ. Juſtin Martyr, and ſome others who advance this charge, were only acquainted with ſome *Greek Verſions*, which whether it were the LXX. or not, muſt be hereafter conſidered; and believing the divine authority of them, they charge all the variations which are to be found in the *Hebrew*, as the *Jews* quoted it, to be corruptions of their own: and ſometimes they may mean only *falſe interpretations.*

Collins's Grounds, part ii. *c.* i, ii, v.——*Whiſt. Eſſ. &c. Prop.* xii.——*Carpzovius's Def. &c. c.* ix.——*Jones's Crit. Lect. c.* iv. § 75—83. *MS.*——*Middleton's Inq. p.* 41—43.

* The queſtion concerning the quotations from the Old Teſtament in the New is amply conſidered in Michaelis's Introduction to the New Teſtament, vol. i. p. 200—235. See alſo Mr. Marſh's notes, ibid. p. 466—389.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Nevertheleſs, we may, conſiſtently with the truth of the propoſition, allow, that ſome alterations have happened in tranſcribing, many of which were undoubtedly undeſigned, becauſe they could anſwer no imaginable end. Sometimes a very ſmall miſtake in a tranſcriber would greatly alter the ſenſe, as *Pſal.* xxii. 17. And it ſeems, on comparing all the arguments, we may ſafely conclude, that if there have been any deſigned alterations in the Old Teſtament, they muſt have been made between the time of Chriſt and the riſe of the *Maſorites* in the third century; and then the alterations would be of ſuch a kind, as to be prejudicial rather than favourable to chriſtianity: ſo that whatever arguments in proof of chriſtianity can be brought from the Old Teſtament, the force of them will not be at all diminiſhed, ſhould we allow ſome deſigned variations. But indeed it is not in the nature of things very probable, either that, leaving thoſe important paſſages which yet remain, they would have corrupted the reſt for ſo little reaſon, or that, believing (as we are ſure they did) the divine original of the ſcriptures, they would upon any terms have corrupted them deſignedly, *i. e.* have deſtroyed what they thought divine, ſo far as in them lay, to ſubſtitute ſomething human in its ſtead. Compare *Deut.* iv. 2. xii. 32. *Rev.* xxii. 18, 19.

Hallet on Script. vol. ii. *p.* 109, 110.—— *Leland's View of Deiſt. Writ. vol.* ii. *p.* 302—307.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

LECT. CXXIV. The hiſtory of the New Teſtament is in the main credible: *i. e.* there is as great regard to be paid to it, as is due to other hiſtories of allowed character and reputation.

LEMMA

LEMMA TO DEMONSTRATION.

It is reasonable to believe, that the history recorded in the New Testament is in the main agreeable to those facts, which were asserted by the first preachers, and received by the first converts of christianity; for if there had been any remarkable inconsistency between them, those first converts could not have received the books of the New Testament as genuine, which yet we have already proved that they did.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 103.|1. The several books of the New Testament were written by those who were personally concerned in many of the facts they relate, and who had the best opportunities of being informed concerning the most important of those other facts which they have recorded. This especially appears with respect to *Matthew*, *Peter*, *John*, *Paul*, and *Luke*, at least so far as he wrote of several of *Paul*'s journies, in which he himself attended him.

1.|2. The authors of the New Testament were capable of giving us a true account of the facts they have undertaken to record, and if what they have written were false, it must have been a designed forgery; for there is nothing which looks like lunacy in any of their writings: least of all can we imagine, that such a number of madmen could have agreed in so consistent a story.

3. There are the greatest marks of integrity in their writings, both in the simplicity of their style, and the faithful manner they relate circumstances, which might bring reflection on their own character and their master's.

Roll. Man. d'etud. vol. ii. *p.* 420—426.
West on the Resur. p. 344—363.

4. There are also in their writings, the most genuine traces of a pious and benevolent temper,

of a contempt of suffering and death itself, when they might be called to meet it in the cause of truth: upon the whole, it seems the design of their writings, to carry virtue in all its branches to the sublimest degree, even beyond what any of the heathen moralists did or attempted; and so far as we can judge by their strain and manner, they appear like good men, bringing out of the treasure of their hearts good things.

3, 4.|5. Their character seems on the whole such, as may give us a probable expectation, that they would speak the truth to the best of their knowledge; and there must have been at least some circumstances of strong temptation, to engage them knowingly to deviate from it, especially in points of so great importance, as those which by their writings they were labouring to carry: nor ought we by any means lightly to believe, that persons, whose characters at first view appear so fair and honourable, would engage in a design so much to the dishonour of God and injury of mens souls and bodies, as their's must have been, if their testimony were false; since they laboured to turn mens devotion into a wrong channel, and to engage the most upright of mankind, and those who were their best friends, in a cause which was likely to ruin both themselves and their families.

6. Considering how incredible their story seemed at the first hearing, and how contrary it was both to the passions and secular interests of mankind, they had no temptation to attempt a fraud of this nature in expectation of any worldly advantage; but might depend upon such persecutions and oppositions, as many of the first professors of christianity appear to have met with, and as they themselves in their writings tell us they both encountered and expected. See the texts under *Schol.* 4.

5, 6.|7. There is no reason to believe, that they would in this instance attempt to impose upon us.

8. The persons to whom they addressed themselves, would be inclined to do their utmost to discover the fraud, if there were room to suspect any; considering that the doctrines of the first teachers of christianity evidently tended to fix an odium upon the *Jewish* rulers, to destroy peculiar privileges and emoluments both of the *Jewish* and *Pagan* priests, to oppose all the superstitious regard paid to deified emperors, and the idolatries which mingled themselves in their most pompous games and spectacles; that it poured contempt upon those things, for which the Gentile orators and philosophers were ready to value themselves most, and on the whole required such eminent degrees of humility and universal virtue, as were exceedingly opposite to that pride and wickedness, which so generally prevailed both among *Jews* and *Gentiles*.

West on the Resur. p. 410—428. *præf. p.* 420—423.

9. A fraud like this, if it were a fraud, might very easily have been detected; seeing they bore their first testimony in the very place and age, in which Christ is said to have been crucified, and to have risen from the dead: (as appears from what was observed of the early prevalency of christianity in *Judea, Prop.* 98. *Gra.* 4.) and as the persons, whose character and interest were chiefly affected by it, had the civil power in their own hands, no doubt the thing would be thoroughly canvassed, and if it had appeared false would have been immediately exposed. Besides, wherever they came, they attested facts of such a nature, as might easily have been discovered on the spot; not merely asserting, that they had seen Christ and some of his followers work miracles, but that they themselves had

such a power; nay, that they communicated extraordinary gifts of the Spirit to their hearers, producing so sensible an effect as the speaking languages they had never learned. *Paul* particularly appeals on this occasion both to the *Corinthian* and *Galatian* churches, and argues with them on these facts, even when his interest among them was beginning to decline: so that on the whole, multitudes must immediately and certainly have known, whether the great facts they asserted were true or not.

9.|10. Had the story which the apostles told been a forgery, it would no doubt have been quickly discovered, and rejected with the utmost abhorrence.

Prop. 98, & 103.|11. Nevertheless, it gained a very great degree of credit in *Judæa*, *Greece*, *Italy*, and other places; and vast numbers of persons, in that very age in which these things are said to have been taught and done, were so fully persuaded of the truth of christianity, that, as it appears from the writings of the apostles to the primitive churches, as well as from other ancient monuments, they chearfully ventured their estates and lives, upon a confidence of the truth of those facts, which the first preachers of the gospel taught.

2, 7, 10, 11. *Lem.*|12. Since the writers of the New Testament were neither liable to be deceived themselves in the facts they relate, nor would have been inclined to attempt imposing on the world by such a forgery; and since their history met with that acceptance and success in the world, which without the support of truth it could never have found, there is abundant reason to believe it is true. *Q. E. D.*

Dod. x. *Serm.* N°. ix. *per tot.*—*Gastrel's Certainty of Christian Rev. p.* 250—272.——*Bp. Burnet's* iv *Disc. p.* 27—35.——*More's Theol. Works, p.* 223—227.

227.——*Baxt. Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 110—113. *part* ii. *c.* vii. § 17—29.—*Ditton on the Ref. part* iii. § 21—34. *p.* 251—278.——*Burnet on the Art. p.* 59—64.——*Foſt. againſt Tind. p.* 135—137.——*Barrow's Works, vol.* ii. *p.* 304—312.—*Sermons on the Creed, N°.* xxix.—*Bulkley's Oeconomy of the Goſpel,* I. 3.——*Hodge's Sermons, N°.* viii. *paſſim.*—*Macknight on the Truth of the Goſp. Hiſt. book* iii. *c.* ii. *p.* 421—478.

SCHOLIUM I.

To the credibility of the goſpel hiſtory, ſome have objected our Lord's not appearing in public after his reſurrection, which might have been the moſt effectual method of convincing the *Jews*.—But it may be replied, LECT. CXXV.

1. It is not certain the *Jews* would have been convinced even by this, conſidering the great obſtinacy that people ſhewed in a variety of inſtances, in the Old Teſtament as well as in the new. Compare *John* xii. 10, 11.

2. God is not obliged to give the higheſt poſſible degrees of evidence to any revelation; and thoſe evidences, which the New Teſtament affirms to have been given, were ſo conſiderable, both with reſpect to the number of witneſſes, and the confirmation of their teſtimony by miracles, that there is no room to complain, merely becauſe one may imagine how the evidence might have been carried yet higher: eſpecially if we conſider, how incapable the enemies of chriſtianity ſeem to have been of producing evidence on the contrary ſide.

3. As the former obſtinacy of the *Jewiſh* people, and their wicked treatment of Chriſt, abundantly juſtifies this conduct of God towards them; ſo if it were to be granted that they would generally have believed, upon Chriſt's public

appearance among them, it is difficult to conceive how the prophecies of their rejection for rejecting Chriſt could have been fulfilled: or that evidence for the truth of chriſtianity preſerved, which now ariſes from the exiſtence of the *Jews*, as a diſtinct people, with the records of the Old Teſtament in their hands. On the whole therefore, the conduct of providence in this affair is to be thankfully adored, rather than cenſured.

Woolſton's 6th Diſc. p. 26—28.——*Ditton on the Reſ. part* iii. § 60—67. *p.* 338—352. § 69, 70. *p.* 361—368.——*Bp. Burnet's* 4 *Diſ. p.* 52—56.—*Sykes of Chriſtianity, p.* 162—170.——*Fleming's Chriſtol. vol.* iii. *p.* 494—498.—*Blackall at Boyle's Lect. Serm.* iv. *p.* 25, 26. —*Superville's Serm. vol.* iv. *p.* 9—12. —*Atterb. Poſt. Serm. vol.* i. *p.* 182—190.—*Weſt on the Reſurrect. p.* 296—304.—*Macknight's Harmony, p.* 864—866.——*Hodge's Serm. N°.* ix.——*Leland's View, vol.* i. *p.* 157, 158, *and* 295—298.——*Miſcell. ſacra. vol.* ii. *p.* 77, 78.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that there were but very few of the *Jews* who believed in Chriſt; and conſidering that they were the beſt judges of his claim to be the Meſſiah, there is reaſon to ſuſpect that the evidences of it were not ſufficiently convincing.

Anſ. 1. According to the account given in the New Teſtament, there were ſome conſiderable numbers of the *Jews* converted on the firſt publication of the goſpel, and even ſome who were *prieſts*, and conſequently lay under peculiar prejudices, Vid. *Acts* ii. 41. iv. 4. vi. 7. xxi. 20. and alſo thoſe texts in the epiſtles, which evidently refer to the *Judaizing Chriſtians*, and therefore

fore prove that there were considerable numbers of *Jewish* converts.

2. That the *Jewish* nation in general lay under very strong prejudices, especially those arising from their expectation of temporal deliverance and grandeur from their Messiah, the peculiar dignity and privileges of their own nation, the perpetuity of the *Mosaic* law, and the sanctity of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, as well as the authority of their dictates in matters of religion, besides those arising from the wickedness and immorality of their own characters in that very corrupt age; so that it is not at all to be wondered at, that they had a very strong aversion to that teacher and religion, which seemed so expressly levelled against those prejudices. To which we may add, that the force of the argument arising from Christ's miracles would be much diminished, considering the notion they had of the power of magic, and the supposition they thought they had some reason to make, that a false prophet might possibly work them, of which there also remain many traces in the rabbinical writings.

3. We are not to conclude that all who refused to embrace christianity remained in their hearts unconvinced; for it is certain that the severity of persecution might engage many, who had not a deep principle of religion, to dissemble the inward conviction of their own mind; as it is expressly declared, many did, *John* xii. 42, 43, *&c.*

Woolston's 5th Disc. p. 48.—*Whitby's Cert. of Christian Faith, c.* ix. § 9. *ad fin. p.* 276—280.——*Burnet's* 4 *Disc. p.* 38—41, 56—58.—*Whitby on Rom.* ii. 1. *Note b.*——*Lardner's Test. vol.* i. *c.* i. —*Works, vol.* vii. *p.* 1—24.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that the apoſtles had nothing to loſe, and they might at leaſt gain a ſubſiſtence, and the fame of being divine meſſengers by ſuch a forgery.

Anſ. 1. They had at leaſt their lives to loſe, which the pooreſt of mankind regard as well as others.

2. That if it could be ſuppoſed that perſons of ſuch low circumſtances and education had the moſt eager deſire of fame, they could not reaſonably expect to raiſe their reputation by ſuch an undertaking, but on the contrary to expoſe it to the greateſt infamy: beſides that the ſimplicity, with which they refer the honour of all they did to their great maſter, moſt evidently ſhews, how far they were from that vain-glorious temper, which the objection pretends to have been ſo ſtrong in them, *Acts* iii. 12, 13. xiv. 15. 2 *Cor.* iii. 5. iv. 5. 1 *Cor.* iii. 5—7.

3. That if they had been actuated by mercenary views, they might much more eaſily have raiſed their fortune, by renouncing the cauſe they had undertaken, and diſcovering the forgery they had invented.

Baxt. Works, vol. ii. *p.* 111. *b.*——*Limborch's Collat. p.* 161—163.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is alſo objected, that the apoſtles met with but little perſecution among the *Gentiles:* but we anſwer,

1. That though we acknowledge that the *Romans,* whoſe maxim it was to tolerate conquered nations in their own religion, were often a refuge to them at firſt, yet the heathen populace in the ſeveral cities of *Greece* and *Aſia* to which they came, frequently roſe up againſt them in a tumultuous manner, and expoſed them to the extremeſt danger.

2. That

2. That conſidering how abſolutely all pagan ſuperſtitions were condemned by chriſtianity, the firſt preachers of it had great reaſon to believe, what was indeed fact, that in proportion to the degree in which their doctrines came to be known among the heathens, perſecutions would be raiſed by the magiſtrates, and penal laws enacted againſt them. (Vid. *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 3. and *Warburt.* quoted there.)

3. That the number and power of the *Jews* was very great in the apoſtles days, not only in *Judæa*, but alſo in other countries; ſo that upon the whole the perſecutions of the primitive chriſtian preachers and hearers were very grievous; as evidently appears from the whole tenour of the New Teſtament, eſpecially the following paſſages, *Acts* v. 17, 18, 40. vii. 57—60. viii. 1. ix. 1, 2, 23, 24. xii. 1—4. xiii. 50. xiv. 5, 19. xvi. 22, *&c.* xvii. 5, 6. xviii. 12, *&c.* xix. 29. xx. 3. xxi. 27. 28. xxii. 22. xxiii. 14. xxvi. 10, 11. *Rom.* viii. 36. 1 *Cor.* iv. 9—13. xv. 29—32. 2 *Cor.* i. 8, 9. iv. 8—11. vi. 4, 5, 8, 9. xi. 23—27. *Gal.* vi. 17. *Phil.* i. 27—30. *Col.* i. 11, 24. 1 *Theſſ.* i. 6. ii. 14—16. 2 *Theſſ.* i. 4—7. 2 *Tim.* i. 8. ii. 3, 9, 10. iii. 11, 12. *Heb.* x. 32—34. *James* ii. 6. v. 10, 11. 1 *Pet.* ii. 19—21. iii. 14—17. iv. 1, 12—16. *Rev.* ii. 10, 13. iii. 10. *Lardn. Cred. part* i. *l.* i. *c.* viii. *præf.* *p.* 225—229, 259—264.—*Works, vol.* i. *p.* 164—201.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Some may perhaps think, that if ſuch miracles as the chriſtians pretend had really been wrought in proof of their religion, it would have been impoſſible that it ſhould not have met with an earlier and more general regard in the world.—So far as the *Jews* are concerned in this objection, it has been conſidered above, and ſo far as it relates to the *Gentiles* only, it may be anſwered,

1. That

1. That it evidently appears in fact, that many of the pagans had at that time but a very low opinion of miracles, and paid but little regard to them. Mr. *Weſton* has entered largely into ſeveral cauſes that might contribute to this; eſpecially the many ridiculous pretences that were made to them by the profeſſors of divination, and the pretences to oracles and magic; to all which the multitude and intercommunity of their Gods would not a little contribute.

2. That where any regard was paid to them, (though if there had been a fair and candid examination, it muſt ſoon have appeared, that thoſe which were pretended to as countenancing heatheniſm, were by no means in point of evidence comparable to thoſe by which chriſtianity was ſupported,) yet the ſtrong prejudices that would lie againſt it as a *new* religion, and eſpecially as a religion ſo oppoſite to mens ſecular intereſts and ſinful paſſions, would prevent a careful and impartial inquiry; and ſo would dazzle their eyes, and make them prone to diſregard the goſpel, notwithſtanding its miracles were allowed.

3. That the great diſcouragements under which chriſtianity lay, while the empire was in the hands of the pagans, would no doubt engage many to ſmother the ſecret conviction of their minds in its favour; but when *Conſtantine* declared himſelf a chriſtian, moſt of the oppoſition againſt chriſtianity ceaſed; which might in many be owing to the dictates of conſcience, as being perſuaded of the truth of that religion, though in others it might be only a conformity to an eſtabliſhment.

Weſton's Inq. into the Reject. of Chriſtian Mir. paſſ. præf. c. iii. *p.* 17—79.

SCHOLIUM 6.

As for thoſe objections which Dr. *Tindal* has brought againſt the moral character of the apoſtles,

tles, in ſome inſtances, they are circumſtantially confuted by Dr. *Foſter*, Dr. *Leland*, and others who have written on the other ſide the queſtion.

Tind. of Chriſtianity, p. 220, 221.——
Foſt. againſt Tind. p. 111—132.——
Leland, ibid. vol. ii. *c.* ii.

SCHOLIUM 7.

The objections which Mr. *Woolſton* has advanced againſt ſeveral miracles related in the New Teſtament, in his diſcourſe on the miracles of Chriſt, have been ſufficiently anſwered by almoſt all his antagoniſts; the moſt valuable of which are Mr. *Stephenſon*, Dr. *Lardner*, Bp. *Pearce*, and the author of the *Trial of the witneſſes*. An abſtract of their moſt curious and important thoughts may be ſeen in our notes on the harmony of the evangeliſts, on thoſe texts which he has excepted againſt

Stonehouſe's Account of the Controverſy *.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Many material facts, which are recorded in the Old Teſtament, are alſo mentioned by very ancient heathen writers. LECT. CXXVI.

* For a general treatiſe in defence of the chriſtian miracles, we refer to the "Criterion," a work publiſhed in 1754, without a name, but which is known to have been written by Dr. Douglas, the preſent Biſhop of Saliſbury. The deſign of this work is to ſhew, with regard to Pagan and Popiſh miracles, that they were ſuch events as were either in their nature not miraculous, or in their evidence not true; whereas the miracles of the Chriſtian Revelation are in their nature miraculous, and from their evidence true. It is to be regretted that the book is become ſcarce. With reſpect to the reſurrection of our Saviour, the two treatiſes of Mr. Humphrey Ditton and Mr. Gilbert Weſt deſerve particular attention; to which may be added Dr. Prieſtley's Sermon on the Reſurrection, preached at Buxton. For a conſideration of the manner in which the evangeliſts have related the circumſtances of the reſurrection, ſee, in addition to Weſt, Benſon's View of the Evidence of Chriſt's Reſurrection, Macknight's Harmony, Dr. Lardner's Remarks on ditto, and Biſhop Newcome's "Review of the chief Difficulties in the Goſpel Hiſtory relating to our Lord's Reſurrection."

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The heathens had a tradition among them concerning the original of the world, which bore ſome viſible reſemblance to the account which *Moſes* has given of it; particularly the *Phœnicians*, *Indians*, *Egyptians*, *Greeks* and *Romans*: and though they differ conſiderably from *Moſes*, as to the time of the creation, we have formerly ſhewn their accounts to be in this reſpect extravagant and incredible. Vid. *Prop.* 21. *Dem. gr.* 2. *Cumberland's Sanchoniathon, p.* 1—23.—*Burnet's Archæol. l.* i. *c.* i—vi. *l.* ii. *c.* i. *Ray's* 3 *Diſc. N°.* i. *c.* i.—*Ovid's Met. Lib.* i.—*Grot. de Verit. with Le Clerc's Notes, l.* i. *c.* xvi. *p.* 26—40.—*Univ. Hiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 11—17. *fol. p.* 23—34. *Oct. Edition.*

2. The diviſion of time into weeks has long prevailed, not only among the inhabitants of *Greece* and *Italy*, as we learn from *Joſephus*, *Philo Byblius*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and *Lucian*, but alſo among the *Celtæ* and *Indians*, as *Philoſtratus*, *Dion Caſſius*, and *Juſtin Martyr* aſſure us; and which we may farther learn from the ancient names of the ſeven days.

Grot. ibid. p. 41, 42.——*Roll. Hiſt. Anc. tom.* iv. *p.* 416. *French.*——*Selden de Jure N. & Gent. l.* iii. *c.* xvi—xxiii. *præf. c.* xvi, & xix.

3. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Plato*, *Dicæarchus*, *Calanus* the *Indian* philoſopher quoted by *Strabo*, and others quoted by *Maimonides*, and ſeveral other writers mention a ſtate of innocence, and the fall of man; to which it is probable we are to refer what ſo many writers ſay of the *golden age*: nor is it an improbable conjecture, that the worſhip of *ſerpents*, which has prevailed among ſo many heathen nations, may have ſome reference to

that form in which *Moses* tells us the tempter appeared to the first human pair.

Grot. ibid. p. 42, 43.—*Burn. Arch. l.* ii. *c.* ii, iii.——*Rev. exam. with Cand. vol.* i. *p.* 80, 81.——*Jenk. of Christian. vol.* ii. *p.* 246—248.—*Still. Orig. Sac. p.* 516—518.—*Owen on Serp. Diff.* iv, v. *p.* 216—232.

4. The long lives of men in the early ages of the world are mentioned by *Berosus*, *Manetho*, *Hiromus*, and *Helanicus*, as also by *Hesiod*, and many other writers quoted by *Josephus*, and afterwards by *Servius* in his notes on *Virgil*.

Grot. ibid. p. 44.—*Jos. Ant. l.* i. *c.* iii. § 9.

5. The account which *Pausanias*, *Philostratus*, *Pliny*, and several other writers give us of the remains of gigantic bodies which have been found in the earth, serve in some degree to confirm *Moses*'s account of the antediluvian giants.

Grot. ibid. p. 45.——*Pliny's Nat. Hist. l.* vii. *c.* xv.—*Solinus*, *c.* i. *with Salm. Not. p.* 9.—*Annual Register for* 1764, *part* ii. *p.* 106, 107.

6. *Berosus*, the *Chaldean* historian, quoted by *Josephus*, and *Abidenus* by *Eusebius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucian*, *Molo*, *Nicholas Damascenus*, as well as many of the heathen poets, mention the deluge; and some traditions concerning it are to be found among the *Americans* and *Chinese*; not to mention what some modern travellers have fabulously related concerning some ruins of the ark said to remain on mount *Ararat*, and to have been seen there but a few centuries ago.

Grot. ibid. p. 47—52.——*Ray's* 3 *Disc. N°.* ii. *c.* i.——*Saurin's Diss. vol.* i. *p.* 131—134.—*Still. Orig. Sac. l.* iii. *c.* iv. § 8.—*Univ. Hist. vol.* i. *p.* 112. *fol**.

We

* Many curious traces and evidences of the remembrance of the deluge, among the heathens, are scattered through Mr. Jacob

We may add under this head, (that we may not break the order of all that follow) that *Alexander Polyphistor* quotes *Artapanus* and *Eupolemus*, as mentioning the tower of *Babel*, and the former speaks of it as built by *Belus*. (*Euſ. Præp. Evan. l.* ix. *c.* xviii.) *Abydenus* likewiſe (*ibid. c.* xiv.) and *Heſtiæus* (15.) mention the ſame building, with ſomething of the circumſtances attending the diſappointment of that enterprize.

7. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Strabo*, *Tacitus*, *Pliny*, and *Solinus* agree in giving us an account of the deſtruction of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, and the neighbouring cities, in the main agreeable to that of *Moſes*: the truth of which is in ſome meaſure confirmed by what modern travellers of the beſt credit have related concerning the phænomenon of the dead ſea: and *Alexander Trallianus* mentions an heathen form of exorciſm, "in the name "of the God that turned *Lot*'s wife into a pillar "of ſalt."

Tacit. Hiſt. l. v. *c.* vii.—*Whitby's Cert. of the Chriſtian Faith, p.* 36—39.——*Pliny's Nat. Hiſt. l.* v. *c.* xvi. *l.* xxxv. *c.* xv.——*Solinus, c.* xxxvi. *with Salm. Not.*——*Grot. ibid. p.* 58, 59.—*Maundrel's Trav. p.* 83—85.——*Univ. Hiſt. vol.* i. *p.* 576, 577. *fol.*

8. *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Philo Biblius*, and ſome others mention *circumciſion*, as a rite uſed by ſeveral of thoſe nations into which, according to *Moſes*, *Abraham* travelled, or which were deſcended from him, eſpecially by *Hagar* of *Penteturah*: and if the hypotheſis of a late learned author be admitted, that the *Egyptians* derived it from the *Iſhmaelite Shepherd-kings*, it

Jacob Bryant's great work, entitled, "A new Syſtem, or an Analyſis of ancient Mythology." This work is only referred to as what will hereafter merit the notice of the literary ſtudent.

will be equally to the present purpose. Vid. *Prop.* 104. *Schol.* and the references there.

Grot. ibid. p. 59, 60.—*Saur. Diss. vol.* i. *p.* 246, 247.

9. *Berosus*, *Alexander Polyhistor*, (from *Eupolemus* and *Melo*, more ancient writers than himself,) *Damascenus*, *Artapanus*, and other ancient historians cited by *Josephus* and *Eusebius*, make express and honourable mention of *Abraham* and some of his family, as some of them do also expressly speak of his interviews with *Melchisedeck*. To which we may add the account given of him by *Trogus Pompeius* as abridged by *Justin*: nay, *Josephus* tells us, that *Hæcatæus* wrote a whole book of *Abraham*'s life.

Jos. Ant. l. i. *c.* vii. § 2.—*Just. l.* xxxvi. *c.* ii.—*Mill. Prop. of Christian. vol.* i. *p.* 114, 115.—*Eus. Præp. Evan. l.* ix. *c.* 17—23.

10. Besides the express testimony concerning *Moses*, *Prop.* 104. which may properly be referred to this proposition, there are also many fabulous stories of *Thoth*, *Typhon*, *Hermes*, and others, in which many celebrated writers have endeavoured to prove that such traces of his history are to be found as shew he was the person represented under that variety of names.

Heut. Dem. Evang. Pr. iv. *c.* iii. *p.* 49—68.——*Dacier on Hor. l.* i. *Od.* x.——*Mill. Prop. Christianity, vol.* i. *p.* 167—169.——*Witsi. Ægypt. l.* iii. *c.* iv. *per tot.*——*Jacks. Cred. part* ii. § 2. *c.* viii, ix. *apud Op. vol.* i. *l.* i. *c.* 14, 15.——*Warb. Div. Leg. vol.* i. *l.* iii. § 3. *p.* 354—358. *vol.* i. *part* ii. *p.* 130—135.

11. *Eupolemus* and *Dius*, as quoted by *Eusebius* and *Grotius*, mention many remarkable circumstances of *David* and *Solomon*, agreeing with the Old Testament story; and *Herodotus* has a

remarkable though much controverted passage, supposed to refer to the destruction of the *Assyrians* in the reign of *Hezekiah*, in which he mentions *Sennacherib* by name.

Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. ix. *c.* 30—34, & 39—41.——*Joſ. Ant. l.* viii. *c.* ii.——*contr. App. l.* i. *p.* 1340.—*Millar, ibid. vol.* i. *p.* 123—127.—*Prid. Con. vol.* i. *p.* 25.—*Herod. Hiſt. l.* ii. *c.* 141.

12. As for the mention of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and some of the succeeding kings of *Babylon*, as well as of *Cyrus* and his successors, it is so common in ancient writers, as not to need a more particular view of it.

1—12.|13. *Valet propoſitio.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

It would be very easy to prove, that many passages of the Old Testament are mentioned by *Celsus*, and objections against christianity formed upon them; but he comes too late to be esteemed a witness to them; and all that can be inferred from those passages is, that he had read the Old Testament, probably in the *Greek* version of it, and that he knew *Christians* paid a religious regard to it, neither of which facts are at present in question.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may not be improper here to mention the monument which *Procopius* mentions as found in *Africa*, testifying "that they had fled from "the face of the robber *Joſhua* the son of *Nun*;" though that coming through the hands of a *Christian* writer, and of one who lived so very long after christianity was introduced, it did not seem so convenient to insert it among the preceding testimonies.

PROPO-

PROPOSITION CX.

The hiſtory of the Old Teſtament is in the main worthy of credit. LECT. CXXVII.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 106, 107.|1. The books of the Old Teſtament received by the *Reformed*, (of which alone we ſpeak,) are genuine.

1.|2. Many of the writers of the Old Teſtament have given us an account of things, in which they were themſelves perſonally concerned, *v. g. Moſes, Joſhua, Samuel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Iſaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel*, and ſeveral of the minor prophets; and conſequently they were capable of giving us a true account of what they repreſented, as having fallen within their own obſervation and experience.

3. There are great marks of integrity in their writings, not only as they tell their very amazing ſtory with great ſimplicity, and without apology, excuſe, digreſſion, *&c.* but as they every where write with the deepeſt ſenſe of God upon their ſpirit, regarding him as the author of all events, whoſe moral as well as natural perfections they every where celebrate, and in whom they ſeem to have repoſed the confidence of their ſouls, ſeeking his favour above all, and referring their actions to his glory: they do alſo moſt candidly acknowledge their own faults, and the faults of the greateſt heroes of their hiſtory; and as for *Moſes*, whoſe credibility is of the greateſt importance to ſupport all the reſt, his leaving his family in the circumſtances of common *Levites*, without entailing any peculiar honours or poſſeſſions upon them, is as ſtrong a proof of his uprightneſs as could well be imagined.

Jackſ. Cred. p. 20—38. 4*to. apud Op. vol.* i. *l.* i. *c.* iv. *p.* 15—28.

3.|4. There is no reaſon to believe they would attempt to impoſe upon us, at leaſt unleſs we can find that they were under ſome ſtrong temptation to have attempted it.

5. Conſidering the time in which their writings were publiſhed, and alſo the public and remarkable nature of many of thoſe events which are there recorded, and how many witneſſes there muſt have been to the falſhood of them if they had been falſe, they could expect no advantage by attempting to impoſe upon the world by ſuch forgeries, nor could they have reaped any thing but contempt from it.

Prop. 104|6. Nevertheleſs, we find that their writings were received as credible by thoſe who were the moſt capable of judging in the caſe, and thoſe inſtitutions ſubmitted to, (on the authority of theſe facts) which would otherwiſe have appeared very unreaſonable and very grievous.

2, 4, 5, 6.|7. There is reaſon to believe that the hiſtory of the Old Teſtament is true, ſo far as the authors wrote it upon their own perſonal knowledge.

8. As for the hiſtory of remoter ages, much might be known of it by tradition, conſidering the long lives of the firſt men; at leaſt all that was neceſſary might be learnt by revelation, to which we well know that *Moſes* pretended: and there is ſuch an evident and cloſe connection between what was written by *Moſes* and other perſons mentioned *gr.* 2. upon *their own knowledge*, and what they or others whoſe names are not certainly known have written in the Old Teſtament upon *tradition* or *revelation*, that he who believes the former to be credible, will eaſily admit the latter, eſpecially conſidering that it is one leading fact of the hiſtory, that *Moſes* himſelf was inſtructed in ſo extraordinary a manner by God.

Prop.

Prop. 109.|9. The agreement there is between many facts recorded in the Old Teſtament, and the teſtimony of many heathen hiſtorians of conſiderable note, is a farther evidence in favour of its credibility.

7, 8, & 9.|10. The hiſtory of the Old Teſtament is in the main credible. *Q. E. D.*

Bennet on Script. p. 116, 117.——*Mill. Prop. vol.* i. *p.* 87, 88, 94—99.——*Burnet on the Art. p.* 83.——*Still. Orig. Sac. l.* ii. *c.* ii. § 1, 2, 7—9. *c.* iii. § 1, 2.——*Williams at Boyle's Lect. p.* 119—121.—*Jenkins on Chriſtianity, part* ii. *c.* iii, vi, xi. *vol.* i. *p.* 132, *&c.* 151, *&c.* 296, *&c.*——*Leland againſt Tind. vol.* ii. *p.* 38—42. *chap.* ii. *p.* 30—33. *2d Edition.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

The great ignorance of thoſe *Latin* and *Greek* writers which now remain, as to facts which happened very long before their own time, and the peculiar contempt which ſeveral of them had for the *Jewiſh* nation, ariſing from the diverſity of its cuſtoms and inſtitutions, concur with ſome other conſiderations mentioned *Prop.* 99. *Schol.* 2. to anſwer any objections, which might be raiſed againſt the credibility of the Old Teſtament hiſtory, from the ſilence of ſuch writers as to many important articles of it.

Jenkins's Reaſ. of Chriſtianity, vol. i. *p.* 95, 96.—*Leland's View, vol.* ii. *p.* 286—294.

SCHOLIUM 2.

We do not particularly mention the ſuppoſed abſurdities to be found in ſome parts of the hiſtory, becauſe they do not affect the truth of the whole, and will much more properly be conſidered as objections againſt its *inſpiration.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheleſs, as we have before proved that it is no abſurd thing, that God ſhould make a revelation of ſome things before unknown; (*Prop.* 93.) and as the main body of the *Jewiſh* ſtory is taken up in giving an account of ſuch revelations; the propoſition muſt lay a reaſonable foundation for our believing that ſeries of *Prophecies*, which will be the ſubject of the two next propoſitions.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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